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PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN
Cyril D. Townsend, M.P.

THE STABILITY OF ... DEMOCRATIC SPAIN
Paul Preston

TWILIGHT FOR THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY
Thomas Murphy

CASA GUIDI: A PORTRAIT
N. S. Thompson

and other articles together with a twelve-page Literary Supplement

60p

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Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

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PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN

by Cyril D. Townsend, M.P.

CHILD pornography is a distasteful subject but it was right that last year it should have received the attention of public and Parliament. Not unnaturally, many people found it hard to accept that it was prevalent in Britain; that there was a ready market for high-priced pornographic magazines displaying children in lewd and provocative poses; even that their children were in danger of being exploited sexually by pornographers. But when the facts were exposed there was instant public pressure, from all over Britain, for a change in the law and in August 1978, following a personal intervention by the Prime Minister, the Protection of Children Act was passed by Parliament.

Throughout history there has always been a tiny—and usually silent minority who have sought sexual pleasure with children. Throughout history that minority has always been condemned and prosecuted for basic and obvious reasons. In the Western world, since the last World War, there has been a gradual easing of the laws controlling pornography. In the last few years so-called soft pornography has given ground, perhaps inevitably, to so-called hard pornography. That, in turn, has led to various deviations such as a vile combination of sex and extreme violence, even murder, and what Americans call 'kiddie porn'. Perhaps regular users of pornography have found that a stronger dose is necessary to maintain an identical stimulus. As with any mass-produced commercial commodity there has had to be a change of content to create novelty and thus to sustain and increase demand. Once it was clear that large sums of money could be made by selling child pornography all the resources of modern advertising, produc-

tion and distribution were brought into play, particularly in the United States.

In the last few years most Western countries have either set up official investigations into child pornography or have passed new laws to prevent this insidious form of child abuse. (Communist countries, of course, have always taken a strong line against internally circulated pornography.) For example, in Australia the Police Offences (Child Pornography) Act 1977 introduced penalties of fines or imprisonment for any person concerned in the production or publication of obscene articles involving a person under 16. In Sweden a committee is due to report in a few weeks and legislation is expected early this year. In the United States last February, President Carter put his name to an amendment to the American Child Protection Act to prevent the sexual exploitation and abuse of children. It provides for up to 15 years' imprisonment for publishers and film-makers convicted of exploiting children under 16. Child pornography is now banned in more than 20 states; at least 15 passed legislation on the subject in 1977.

There can be no doubt that in the United States prior to the passing of legislation, child pornography and child prostitution, once confined to the darker shadows of American life, blazed into the open and from city to city in a few months. An horrific article appeared in *The Sunday Times* on 4th December, 1977 under the heading 'The Chicken Hawks of Los Angeles'. It quoted a police sergeant as saying: 'Thirty thousand boys and girls are sexually exploited by adults in Los Angeles every year. . . . At least 25,000 have had their pictures taken for sexploitation movies or magazines'.

Dr. Densen-Gerber, a leading international authority on the world trade in child pornography, has estimated that at one stage the United States was producing 269 child pornography magazines a month. She also thought that 1 million children had been caught up in child prostitution in that country.

In November 1977 I had the luck to draw fourth place in the Ballot for Private Members' Bills. I decided to attempt a short Bill to strengthen the law against the exploitation of children for pornographic purposes, for I was concerned about the long-term effects upon the children. My starting point was that whatever view one took on pornography in general, there was surely a clear and immediate need to get children out of it, and I found this approach united those from all parts of the political spectrum. With the help of many colleagues and supporters I carried out a nationwide investigation into child pornography in Britain. I consulted the police, the child welfare organisations, the Churches and religious bodies as well as the parents of children who had become entangled in it. Of particular assistance was the National Abuse Campaign (Action to Ban Sexual Exploitation of Children) and the Festival of Light.

It became clear that most of the child pornography available in Britain, perhaps over 80%, came from abroad—from Sweden, Holland and Germany in particular. The authorities appeared to have legal powers to deal with the imported pictures, under the Customs and Excise legislation, but they were hampered by a shortage of manpower. It was difficult to search

> included scenes of buggery, sexual intercourse, masturbation, sex between children and other nude photographs all involving children. . . . Another of my divisional Vice-Squads has reported that films of children engaged in sexual acts with adults have also featured regularly in raids on bookshops.

He went on:

> In my personal and considered opinion, the law relating to the involvement of children and young persons in sexual activities could be improved to deal particularly with cases in which children are photographed or filmed for pornographic purposes.

This professional and authoritative view of an outstanding police officer clearly made a deep impression on the House of Commons during the Second Reading of the Protection of Children Bill on 10th February. I personally had found it fully supported by the evidence I had been given in private from other police officers with direct knowledge of the problem in other areas of the country.

It was clear that a lucrative market had been established in Britain. If, as a result of new legislation passed in the United States and elsewhere, foreign supplies were to diminish—and there were signs this was already happening —it seemed obvious that our own pornographic photographers would attempt to make up the deficiency, and thus put more British children in danger.

Research revealed other deeply alarming aspects. It was immediately clear that children from low-income families, one-parent families and broken homes were more likely to be at risk because they were easier for the photographers to lure into the studios with offers of 'easy money' and future careers as models. Indian and West Indian children were being used increasingly, possibly because they were more readily available and possibly because their photographs were preferred by the purchasers. A London police officer told me of cases where coloured boys, playing truant from school, had gone up to the West End for fun and had been picked up by the photographers.

Already published child pornography was often used to encourage the children to adopt obscene poses and to have sexual relationships with other children, adults and even animals. Once some indecent photographs had been taken the child could be blackmailed to pose for more. One boy victim I spoke to had been told that if he refused to co-operate further the photographs already taken would be posted to his headmaster.

Our inquiries also revealed the activities of a child sex group called the Paedophile Information Exchange. Their policy was and is to press for the age of consent to be lowered to the age of four, with special rules to cover those between four and ten! There was some evidence that even the sellers of pornography had become concerned at the trend in pornography.

There are those who do not believe that there is a connection between child pornography and sexual offences against children. But on occasions the child models are sexually assaulted in the studios. *The Times* pointed out in an editorial on 9th September, 1977:

> All advertising is based on the principle that whatever arouses intense interest

one container lorry for a packet of pornography, let alone 100 lorries. This smuggled-in material had titles such as 'Lust for Children', 'Tommy', 'Children Love', 'Lolita', 'Incest I', 'Nymph Lover' and 'School Children'. The magazines sold in our streets and cities for between £2 and £8 a copy.

It was impossible to prove beyond a shadow of doubt that the photographing of children for pornographic purposes was on the increase in Britain, for this was an activity which had one foot in the criminal underworld. But the majority of people consulted believed that it was increasing. There was no doubt that the photographing of children for such purposes was widespread in this country and not confined to Greater London or the major conurbations. There were many articles and reports in the national newspapers at this time which supported this view. *The Times*, the London *Evening News* and *Evening Standard* and *The Sun* all carried out their own investigations. Marjorie Proops of the *Daily Mirror* wrote:

> In the past I have defended certain types of pornographic publications—have even suggested that soft porn can help couples with sexual problems. I didn't think I would ever be shocked by anything published under the general label of pornography. But the child-porn books I have seen during the Mirror's investigations have disgusted me beyond description.

In 1977 BBC Television had a most convincing programme on the subject which proved conclusively that indecent photographs of children were being taken in Britain. The programme's producer had at first poohpoohed the seriousness of the matter, but he had been shocked by what the BBC researchers had unearthed.

The Director of the NSPCC wrote and told me:

> We do from time to time have to deal with cases where our officers discover that children are being photographed for pornographic purposes and under our standing arrangements with the Home Office we report these to the police for prosecution of any offence and ourselves take any necessary steps for the protection of the children. Both the police and we are often inhibited by the present state of the criminal law.

General Brown of the Salvation Army stated:

> The Salvation Army has been greatly concerned to discover that children under the age of 16 and in some cases of very tender years have been used as models for sex orientated photography. Information reaching us both from our own sources and elsewhere supports the view that incalculable harm can be done to the child victims of this trade, to their families, and to others associated with it.

Perhaps the most important letter of all that I received came from the Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police. It so happened that he had recently carried out a major campaign against pornography in that city. In a letter dated 3rd February he said:

> There have been a number of cases in my area in which persons who have taken indecent photographs of children have been charged . . . many of the cases now giving cause for public concern do not come within the ambit of current legislation. . . . There is clear evidence from several of my police divisions that more and more pornographic material seized by my officers depicts young children. . . . It is estimated by my Vice-Squad officers that of all the material seized from 'hard porn' bookshops in Greater Manchester approximately 5 per cent of it relates to child pornography. . . . In this connection books seized have

> also tends to encourage people to act. Commonsense suggests that this applies to pornography.

As a psychiatrist, Dr. Judianne Densen-Gerber has put forward a most powerful case against the assertion that child pornography does not cause crime and results only in masturbatory release. She is convinced that it damages more children by stimulating and encouraging the proclivities of those whose own sexual drive is dangerous to them.

It is a fact that sexual offences against children are on the increase. For example, in 1976, in England and Wales, there were 392 individuals found guilty of gross indecency with a child compared with 370 in 1975 and 347 in 1974.

I have been impressed by the work done by Dr. Court of Flinders University, South Australia. Using evidence from diverse contexts, his findings show an increase both in serious and minor sex offences in those places where a liberal approach to pornography has been adopted. His evidence confounds the earlier work of Kutchinsky.

Police officers and welfare workers told me that to all intents and purposes those who took indecent photographs of children, without touching them or assaulting them, were not being prosecuted because of the great uncertainty of the law. The Obscene Publications Acts of 1959 and 1964, the Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act 1955 and the Sexual Offences Act 1956 all border on this grey area. It is well known that the Obscene Publications Acts have proved to be ineffective. The most relevant legislation, prior to the Protection of Children Act, was the Indecency with Children Act 1960. This Act, however, is concerned only with children under 14. It does not protect young people between the ages of 14 and 16—two very vulnerable years when they are not only approaching sexual maturity, but also when they are of special interest to the photographer and more likely to be away from their homes and parents and thus available. Worse, the extent of the operation of this Act is by no means clear. It provides that anyone who commits an act of gross indecency with or towards a child is guilty of an offence. But the phrase 'with or towards' is an unhappy and unhelpful one in the context of indecent photography. The legal advice given was that even if it were possible to prosecute successfully, the penalties were inadequate to deal with this new social problem.

In the light of subsequent events the Home Office attitude to child pornography is worth examining. I am unaware of any statement by a Home Office Minister on this subject before October 1977. This is all the more remarkable if one bears in mind the interest taken by the media in the subject during the first six months of that year.

On the 5th September, 1977 Margaret Thatcher wrote to the Home Secretary following a visit from Mrs. Whitehouse. She told Merlyn Rees:

> I have been shocked by what I have read and appalled that these things could be happening here . . . our children must be protected from those who use them in this way. . . . Will you please look into these reports urgently yourself, with a view to introducing any necessary legislation as soon as Parliament reassembles?

The Home Secretary replied to her on 14th October:

> I feel some reluctance . . . to rush into legislation which may prove to be unnecessary or ill-aimed, particularly in an area as difficult as this, and particularly at a time when a fundamental re-examination of the law on pornography is being carried out by the recently appointed departmental committee under the chairmanship of Professor Bernard Williams.
>
> So we do need first to establish how far a substantial problem exists. Some of the recent comment has implied that the use of children in the production of pornography is a new and growing phenomenon and that the law is powerless to deal with it. Neither supposition is true. . . . Contrary to statements in the press, child pornography is not widely or indeed easily obtainable and the effectiveness of the present law and its enforcement is undoubtedly an important factor in restricting its availability. In these circumstances it does not seem to me that there is an immediate need for the law to be strengthened. . . .

A month later, Mr. Brynmor John, Minister of State at the Home Office, told another MP in a letter:

> The Home Secretary has no evidence of the existence of any significant problem which the law is at present inadequate to cope with.

Only a few months after these letters, and following the unopposed Second Reading of the Protection of Children Bill, Home Office Ministers in both Houses and their experts were speeding the new legislation on its way. Clearly the Home Secretary must be blamed for allowing the Home Office to get so out of touch not only with the views of MPs from all Parties, but also with the man in the street and the policeman on the spot. It was plainly a major mistake for this great Department of State to get itself into the initial position of not supporting a Private Member's Bill on this emotive issue (over 1½ million people signed the petition demanding a change in the law), declaring instead only that it would not officially oppose the Bill. It was also a mistake for the Home Secretary to seek to shelter behind the Williams Committee, though this was an obvious civil service reaction. This Committee has a major job of work to do breathing sanity and force into our muddled and outdated laws on obscenity, indecency and violence. It had its first meeting a year ago and is unlikely to report for two or three years. By that time it is likely a new Government will be ramming its legislative programme through the House of Commons. There can be no guarantee of legislation. It could be four or five years before the first criminal is convicted under legislation flowing from the work of the Williams Committee. 'Waiting for Williams' was not an argument that could convince any MP who had to deal with a rapidly rising file of constituency letters on child pornography. It is also worth remembering that the Government did not hesitate to amend the control of films by law in matters of obscenity by Section 53 of the Criminal Law Act 1977, which came into force on 1st December, 1977 though the Williams Committee is charged to consider obscenity in publication and film censorship.

The Protection of Children Act 1978 is a modest and interim Act, a finger-in-the-dyke sort of Act. It does not attempt to deal with all aspects of the sexual exploitation of children, and in particular it does not cover obscene texts that might be published alongside innocuous photographs. Hopefully the Williams Committee will be able to build on its provisions.

Under this Act it is an offence—'to take, or permit to be taken, an indecent photograph of a child (meaning in this Act a person under the age of 16) or to distribute or show such indecent photographs'. It is surely right that the courts should decide what is indecent rather than that Parliament should attempt to define that word too precisely. Section II of the Post Office Act 1953 uses the same word.

A person convicted on indictment of any offence under this Act shall be liable to imprisonment for up to three years, or to a fine or to both. One hopes that the deterrent effect of this Act will be sufficient to persuade the purveyors of pornography that it is not worth their while to stock or sell child pornography, and that there will not need to be many prosecutions under it.

The Act is not about censorship; it is about protecting children. Having met a number of children who had been exploited by pornographic photographers I am well aware of the real risks these child models face. From being persuaded to pose in the nude, a process is started which may lead on to indecent poses, to actual physical assault, blackmail, corruption and depravity, and even prostitution.

Parliament has an historic duty to protect those who cannot protect themselves. Parliament acted to prevent the abuse of little children as chimney sweeps, on the factory floor, and deep down in the mines. Surely it was right for Parliament to act last year to prevent their abuse in child pornography?

What better Parliamentary prelude could there be to the United Nations Year of the Child in 1979?

[Cyril (David) Townsend was elected Conservative Member of Parliament for Bexley, Bexleyheath in February, 1974. He has served as personal assistant to Sir Desmond Plummer, who was then Leader of the Greater London Council, and from 1968-70 as personal assistant to the Rt. Hon. Edward Heath. He has been a member of the Select Committee on Violence in the Family and was recently re-elected joint secretary of the Conservative Greater London M.P.s. He is vice-president of the Greater London Young Conservatives and is chairman of the Bow Group Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs.]

The February issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Freedom of Information—An International Movement* by Tom Riley, *Contemporary China* by Peter Temple-Morris, M.P., *Stereotypes and Scottish Witchcraft* by Hugh V. McLachlan and J. K. Swales and the first of three articles by Juliet Lodge on the European Elections, *Political Parties and Direct Elections to the European Parliament. A Profile of Feliks Topolski* by Ernle Money has been unavoidably held over and will be published in a later issue.

THE STABILITY OF DEMOCRATIC SPAIN: CURRENT ANXIETIES AND DISTURBING PRECEDENTS

by Paul Preston

EVERY major step towards democracy taken by the Spanish government in the last two years has been accompanied by an outbreak of terrorism. In early July 1976, King Juan Carlos replaced the timid Arias Navarro government with that of Adolfo Suárez, a clear commitment to speed up the progress of dismantling the dictatorial structures inherited from Franco. Immediately, there was a highly co-ordinated bombing campaign in many parts of Spain, attributed to an allegedly, but far from authentic, left-wing group, GRAPO. In mid-December of 1976, when a referendum revealed massive support for the reforming programme adopted by Suárez, two senior establishment figures, Antonio Oriol, the President of the Council of the Realm, and General Villaescusa, President of the Supreme Military Tribunal, were kidnapped by GRAPO. Although both prisoners were later rescued in extraordinary circumstances, the operation was clearly an attempt to de-stabilise Spanish politics.

In January 1977, with political parties being legalised and beginning preparations for future elections, a wave of right-wing terrorism culminated in the assassination of five left-wing lawyers. In the event, the Left and the government stood firm in resisting the provocation. Despite the fact that all of these outbreaks of violence had been followed by demands in the extreme rightist press for army intervention, the military did not rise against the constituted power, largely because of King Juan Carlos's support for Suárez. Elections were held in conditions of normality on 15 June. It seemed that the terrorist attempt to de-stabilise the democratic process had failed and the new parliament settled down to the lengthy task of elaborating a constitution.

The rightist press has continued to try to convince the army of the need for a coup. Two main arguments have been used—first, that the policies pursued by Suárez constitute a betrayal of the Francoist heritage and the victory in the civil war, and second, that democracy in Spain is synonymous with terrorism and instability. With the exception of continued tension in the Basque Country, a festering legacy of the dictatorship, there was little to justify the scaremongering of *El Alcazar* and *El Imparcial* as Spain settled into parliamentary normality. That impression of stability received a succession of savage blows in the month of July 1978—and in such a way as to suggest a concerted effort of de-stabilisation.

On Saturday, 8 July, in contravention of specific orders from the Civil Governor of the province, a local police commandant unleashed a particularly violent intervention by riot squads against a small amnesty demonstration in Pamplona bull-ring. The subsequent wave of terror left one civilian

dead and many wounded, as well as putting an end to the traditional San Fermín festival. The police officer responsible is believed to be a member of the ultra-rightist group, *Fuerza Nueva.* The inevitably much-publicised incident destroyed six months' patient progress towards peace in the Basque Country. Three days later, on 11 July, a protest march held in San Sebastián against police violence was fired on by the police. A workman was shot dead and many more wounded. A movement of parliamentary indignation was forestalled, if not dispelled, by an announcement by the Minister of the Interior, Rodolfo Martin Villa, to deputies to the effect that if parliament condemned the behaviour of the police, there could well be serious acts of indiscipline.

This rather weak and alarming announcement is a reflection of the fact that the Spanish police still includes amongst its numbers many officers who are actively hostile to democracy and even some who are members of those ultra-rightist organisations which would like to see a military coup. This was brutally illustrated two days after, on 13 July, when a company of armed police went berserk in the Rentería suburb of San Sebastián, smashing up shops and apartment buildings. This is precisely the kind of activity which increases the tendency of the Basque population to see the Spanish police as a hated foreign army of occupation. It also gives a new relevance and popularity to the activities of the terrorists of the Basque revolutionary separatists of ETA, just at a time when its activists were losing support and being isolated.

It is difficult not to reach the conclusion that there is a conspiracy under way to destroy Spain's new-born democracy. The evidence is necessarily circumstantial. However, the strategically provocative indiscipline of the police and the timing of activities by GRAPO would seem to be more than accidental. With the army, clearly a crucial factor in the Spanish political scene, ever sensitive about the question of national unity, and nervously watching the Basque situation, GRAPO struck again. On 21 July, a matter of hours before the Cortes approved the new constitution, GRAPO activists assassinated General Sánchez Ramos Izquierdo and his aide, Lt.-Col. Pérez Rodríguez. The fact that neither was militarily significant was an unmistakable way of announcing that all officers' lives are at risk in a democratic Spain.

It goes without saying that there is serious cause for concern regarding the potential stability of the democratic regime. The right-wing press is going to considerable lengths to draw the parallel with the spring of 1936, also a period of provoked disorder which culminated in the military rising of 18 July and civil war. While it would be rash to assert that the events of July 1978 have in no way undermined military tolerance towards democracy in Spain, it is possible, nevertheless, to argue that there are powerful reasons to believe that the present anti-democratic assault can be successfully repelled. This is not to say that future stability and prosperity are inevitable but that, prophecies of doom to the contrary, they are within the bounds of possibility and skilful government.

There exist both long-term structural reasons and immediate conjunctural ones for optimism that the present democratic experience will not terminate in the manner of its predecessor in the 1930s. In order to illustrate this, it is necessary to examine both the specific conditions of the breakdown of the parliamentary regime during the Second Republic and the process whereby the antiquated dictatorial structures of Francoism have given way to democracy.

Before 1931, Spain was a predominantly agricultural country politically dominated by a numerically small landed oligarchy; at its strongest in the south and centre of the country. The political monopoly of this elite was maintained by a combination of electoral falsification and the repressive power of the forces of order. By 1923, the corrupt political system, no longer able to resist popular pressure for change, was replaced by a military dictatorship under General Miguel Primo de Rivera. After an initial success, his regime managed to alienate most sectors of society, including the dominant elites, and fell in early 1930, a victim of the economic depression. Municipal elections held in April 1931 saw the victory of Republican and Socialist candidates in the big towns, the only places where electoral corruption did not guarantee monarchist triumph. King Alfonso XIII decided to leave Spain, leaving the upper classes caught momentarily without the necessary political formations to defend their economic interests from the threat implicit in the implantation of a popular Republic committed to reform and some adjustment of political and social privilege.

In the interlude while the forces of the Right regrouped, a Republican Socialist coalition government introduced a series of labour reforms which, at a time of acute economic crisis, constituted a direct challenge to the prevailing balance of socio-economic power. The introduction of the eight-hour day for farm labourers who had previously worked from sun-up to sun-down hit profit margins at a time when the depression did not permit costs to be met by increased productivity. Another law prevented the introduction of outside labour while there was still unemployment in an area, effectively preventing strike-breaking. The combination of these reforms with anti-clerical legislation and a purging of the army officer corps was to have dramatic results.

The Right's response to the challenge took two forms: a legal one and a violent one. The legal response was the organisation of a mass party to defend right-wing interests in the Cortes. Skilful propaganda managed to associate the interests of the large landowners with those of the great mass of small-holders of central and northern Spain. The Republic's laic legislation enabled rightist propagandists to present the regime to these fiercely Catholic small-holders as being engaged in savage religious persecution, which was not, in fact, the case. The Republic's militarily necessary reforms of the army left many officers, originally staunch monarchists, with a burning hostility to the regime and with the time to spend in conspiracy against it. These officers and other monarchist opponents of the Republic bought arms and plotted risings against the government such as that which failed

on 10 August, 1932 and succeeded on 18 July, 1936.

The Republic had to face other problems, among which the most acute was the hostility of the large anarchist movement. About 1,500,000 strong, a minority of its members engaged in periodic insurrectionism against the regime. This was part of a growing popular disillusion with the possibilities of parliamentary government. The skilful campaigns of obstruction carried out by the legalist right-wing parties in the Cortes managed sufficiently to block reforms to provoke mass disappointment with the achievements of democracy. The most immediate consequence of this was, paradoxically, a rightist victory in the November 1933 elections. The anarchists abstained from voting and the Socialists refused to ally with the liberal Republicans, thereby creating a three-way contest. The victorious rightist and right of centre parties immediately dismantled the reforms of 1931-1933. Alarmed by the Right's determination to establish an authoritarian corporative state along Italian fascist lines, the Left re-united. When elections were held in February 1936, after a number of tactical errors had forestalled plans for the pacific installation of corporatism, the Left, united in the Popular Front, won a narrow victory.

Not only did this herald the restoration of the 1931-1933 reforms but it also rendered likely some future revolutionary redistribution of wealth, particularly for the landless peasantry. Having vainly spent vast sums on propaganda and bribery, the Right was now convinced of the futility of legalism. It was the turn of the conspirators and the activists. An orchestrated break-down of law and order was used to convince the middle classes that their survival depended on intervention by the military. At the same time, army officers were being persuaded that national interests demanded their mounting a coup. They did so, on 18 July, 1936, anticipating overthrowing the Republic in a matter of days. Working class resistance destroyed their easy optimism. Indeed, had it not been for the decided assistance of Hitler and Mussolini, the coup would have been rapidly defeated instead of turning into a bloody three-year war.

The foregoing account of the break-down of democracy in the 1930s, although cursory, provides sufficient data to illustrate the lack of valid analogy between the Second Republic and the present democratic regime in Spain. Major changes in the socio-economic structure of Spain, which took place in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, are the basis of the fundamental differences between the Second Republic and the current situation. In the 1930s, the dominant economic forces, the landed oligarchy, were unremittingly hostile to a democratic regime which permitted attacks on its interests. Now, the dominant economic forces, modern industry and a sophisticated banking system, see a democratic regime as intrinsic to their interests. The economic crisis of the 1930s exacerbated the hostility of landowners to the democratic regime. In the 1970s, industrialists look for the co-operation of trade unions and leftist political parties to seek the social pact which permits productivity agreements and austerity programmes, so essential to the survival of the present economic system.

These fundamental structural differences are reinforced by a number of

conjunctural factors. In the 1930s, violent assaults on the regime were sponsored by the economically dominant oligarchy. This is not the case in the 1970s, when the groups involved in provoking disorder are economically insignificant remnants of the Francoist bureaucracy incapable of adjusting to the conclusion of their political monopoly. In the 1930s, the great mass of right-wing opinion was anti-democratic, as was the largest right-wing party, the CEDA. At the present moment, the most significant rightist grouping, the UCD, is not only committed to democracy, but it is also the fact that its leader, Adolfo Suárez, was the architect of democratisation. Whereas in the 1930s, the powerful propaganda machinery of the CEDA was used to undermine popular faith in parliamentary government, the even more powerful contemporary media are now directed towards strengthening popular commitment to democracy.

A deep awareness and knowledge of the experience of the 1930s informs the behaviour of the leaders of the principal democratic parties. A determination not to permit the kind of de-stabilisation that wrecked the previous parliamentary regime is clearly a factor for present stability, albeit not an infallible one. Other differences, however, suggest that optimism is not entirely misplaced. A factor which consistently weakened the Republican government and increased conservative hostility to the regime was the insurrectionary anarchist movement. Today, anarchism is numerically insignificant and not committed to violence. The two largest trade unions, the Socialist UGT and the Communist Workers' Commissions, are closely linked to political parties deeply committed to maintaining the stability of the system for the foreseeable future. Similarly, there has been a change in the role of the Church which can only benefit perspectives for political stability. In the 1930s, perceiving itself attacked by Republican legislation, the Church was virulently anti-democratic and threw its weight behind the CEDA in generating massive conservative hostility to the regime. Now the Church is politically less active, although with a growing sympathy towards a non-repressive democratic regime.

Finally, there is the crucial factor of the role of King Juan Carlos. Before he came to the throne, it was widely assumed that he would simply endeavour to do what Franco had trained him to do—that is, maintain the dictatorial regime. However, the King has shown himself gradually to be a committed partisan of the democratic process. While the parties of the Left are not monarchist as such, they recognise the central value of Juan Carlos's contribution to democratisation. More importantly, the presence of the King is reassuring to right-wing and conservative opinion, in general, and to the army leadership, in particular. Unlike in the Second Republic, anti-democratic violence cannot now be presented as part of a patriotic undertaking to defend traditional social interests. Assaults by terrorists on democratic legality are now assaults on the constitutional monarchy. The activities of ultra-right and ultra-left terrorists are rendered the isolated violence of a renegade minority by the combination of Juan Carlos and a massive political consensus of parties of Left and Right.

None of this is to suggest that recent police indiscipline and terrorist acts

do not constitute a serious danger. However, it does illustrate the extent to which facile analogies with the destruction of democracy in the 1930s may be dismissed. An examination of the disintegration of the Francoist dictatorship and the transition to democracy is also suggestive of the potential strength of the present regime.

The last two years of the Franco dictatorship saw a significant collapse of the repressive tranquillity which had previously been its proudest achievement. Beginning with the assassination of the head of the government, Admiral Carrero Blanco on 20 December, 1973, and ending with the death of General Franco on 20 November, 1975, those twenty-three months gave ample evidence of the internal crisis of the regime. Massive strikes and amnesty demonstrations saw entire provinces brought to a standstill. Consistent violence in the Basque Country assumed the proportions of a guerrilla war between ETA and the forces of order. Terrorists of Right and Left were active with assaults on individuals and institutions in both Madrid and Barcelona. These various phenomena were symptomatic of the extent to which the dictatorship was losing control over a country which was undergoing fundamental social change.

From the regime's point of view, what was significant about this death agony was the way in which threats to its existence now came not only from the traditional opponents of the left-wing parties and the working class but also from groups once considered to be faithful pillars of the Francoist system. Open conflict between Church and State had reached an unprecedented level. In the higher ranks of the army, there was a growing friction between ultra-reactionary generals and the relatively liberal 'modernisers' who were keen to play down the army's repressive political role as a prelude to entry into NATO. For the first time since the civil war, dissident middle rank officers were arrested, accused of belonging to a liberal pressure group within the army, the Democratic Military Union. At the same time, once reliable Francoists from within the regime's political elite began to add their voices to calls for liberalisation.

The fact that ex-ministers like Manuel Fraga and José María Areilza preferred to concede some reforms rather than see the regime overwhelmed in an outright confrontation with popular and working class forces was a crucial element in the transition to a democratic policy. More significantly, there were increasingly powerful calls for change from within the financial and industrial elite, of which probably the most representative came from Joaquín Garrigues Walker, one-time legal representative in Spain of several of the multi-national corporations whose very presence was central to the survival of the Spanish economy. Garrigues urged liberalisation as an alternative to chaos and disorder.

It was generally the representatives of larger enterprises who had the foresight to welcome a controlled transition. There were also many provincial landlords, small and middle-sized businessmen and bankers who viewed such a prospect with fear and tended to support those die-hard Francoists, like the Falangists José Antonio Girón or Blas Piñar, the

leader of *Fuerza Nueva*, who fiercely opposed any change of Francoism's political structure. Despite his own origins in, and sympathy with, hard-line Francoism, Carrero Blanco's successor as head of government, Carlos Arias Navarro, tended towards a timidly liberalising policy as a reluctant response to growing mass opposition to the regime and impending economic crisis. The number and scale of strikes had grown steadily in the previous decade, with political demands increasingly being linked to economic objectives. To this problem, which was already acute in early 1974, was added the complication of the energy crisis. Apart from the difficulties of meeting her energy bill, Spain was likely to suffer from the wider European recession provoked by the crisis, in the form of a reduction of her two main sources of foreign currency: tourism and remittances from emigrant workers. The prospect of increased unemployment and lower living standards heralded growing militancy and limited political reform seemed an obvious concession.

In fact, 1974 was the year in which it became clear to large numbers of people in the business world to what extent the antiquated political system built by General Franco was a hindrance to the normalisation of the country within a European context. The Franco regime had been constructed to defend victory in a civil war which, as has been shown, was fought to protect the landed structure of pre-1931 Spain. Semi-fascist and repressive political machinery was adequate for the defence of semi-feudal estates, but as Spain's social structure changed so there was a need for more modern political mechanisms. The economic growth of the late fifties and sixties created a new working class with relatively high levels of skill and income. Inevitably, sophisticated productivity agreements came to be nearer the requirements of the continued economic progress of modern industry than indiscriminate police terror. Many of the larger and more competitive industrialists hoped to follow American and Western European examples and developed hopes of integrating workers into the system by means of a reward-based economy. These hopes were frustrated as long as the Franco regime persisted in treating the working class as an enemy.

A further reason for dissatisfaction in business circles with the political mechanisms of the Franco regime was the extent to which they constituted an obstacle to possible entry into the EEC. Some industries might wither if protective tariffs were removed, but it was widely felt among stronger members of the industrial community that continued development depended on entry into the EEC. At the time of Franco's death, approximately half of all Spanish exports went to the Common Market. Thus, the traditional pressure for democratisation of intellectuals, students, workers and peasants came to be reinforced by powerful interests once thought to be tied to the dictatorial regime. This growth of a consensus regarding the need to adapt Spain's institutional framework to her changing social realities was to be the greatest influence on a smooth transition and the greatest hope for future stability.

When ultra-rightist elements within the regime succeeded, with Franco's backing, in blocking progress to reform in 1974, one relatively liberal min-

ister, Pío Cabanillas, was dismissed and another, Antonio Barrera de Irimo, resigned in sympathy along with a number of senior government officials. As ex-president of the Spanish subsidiary of ITT, Barrera de Irimo was an excellent barometer of opinion within the financial community. Moreover, the stock market plunged immediately. Significantly, shortly afterwards there began a series of meetings of prominent members of the business elite with figures from the left-wing and liberal opposition. The extreme right responded throughout 1975 by stepping up terrorist attacks on leftist lawyers and priests. In April, a state of exception was declared in the Basque Country. In August, the government introduced an all-embracing anti-terrorist law which made the entire Left subject to the most draconian police repression. Censorship was tightened. As a consequence of this visible distancing of a beleaguered regime from the rest of the population, a number of highly successful political strikes were called during the summer.

The possibility of a bloodbath that would end possibilities of Spain's acceptance in the EEC sent shares plummeting, particularly in the tense period of regime isolation which culminated in the execution of five militants of ETA and the marxist-leninist FRAP (Patriotic Anti-Fascist Revolutionary Front) on 27 September, 1975. It was not surprising that from the beginning of Franco's fatal illness in October 1975 to the handing over of the headship of State to Juan Carlos at the end of the month the value of shares on the Madrid stock exchange rose substantially.

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TWILIGHT FOR THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY

by Thomas Murphy

AFTER 14 years in power—years characterised by repressed political tension within Brazil and startling economic growth—the Brazilian military is beginning its long-awaited return to the barracks. The process may be a slow one.

The administration of General Ernesto Geisel, Brazilian President since 1974, has pursued a policy of limited, almost abstemious, liberalisation linked with promises of an eventual return to full democratic norms. The liberalisation process, however, has been ambiguous and the most recent reform pronouncements, which include the first concrete alterations in the military 'System' in ten years, will not fully satisfy the aspirations of Brazilian democrats. The handling of this year's presidential succession problem has been less ambiguous and, from the point of view of reformers, even less reassuring. Geisel's heavily stage-managed selection of another military figure, General João Baptista Figueiredo, as the country's next president stirred little enthusiasm, even among the regime's supporters, and opponents have used the 'continuism' argument more effectively than at any time in the past to attack the regime's political policies. Nonetheless, General Figueiredo was formally elected on October 15th, 1978.

Geisel's chief problem has been devising a political formula satisfactory to Brazil's increasingly vocal private interest groups and military reformers on the one hand, but unthreatening to the still powerful 'hard line' element within the armed forces on the other. Until this year the president's strategy had been essentially negative. Press censorship has been virtually eliminated, for example, but without actually altering the nation's censorship laws. The number of military officers in the cabinet has been reduced from nine in 1968 to three today and prosecutions for political crimes have declined to a fraction of the old rate, but without actually changing the national security law.

One important result of Geisel's policy of *distenção,* or lessening of tension, has been a gradual increase in pressure for reform in specific areas such as labour, health, the judiciary and others. A subsidiary result has been the broadening clamour for political reform in general which has taken on the character of an alliance of interest groups pursuing a common but very general goal—that of redemocratisation. Not since 1968 when a series of industrial strikes and bold mass demonstrations by students swept Brazil has the country been so alive to the possibility of basic change in the military system of government. In the last 12 months groups as diverse as the Catholic Missionaries Association, the Brazilian Association of Advertisers and the outspoken Brazilian Bar Association have all adopted formal resolutions calling for complete redemocratisation. The boldest reformers held their breath in the beginning and waited for the sky to fall —when it didn't, members of other groups joined the drive for liberty which may now be unstoppable.

This year, for the first time since the military took power from leftist President João Goulart in 1964, a military president has proposed, and Congress has accepted, basic constitutional changes aimed at liberalising the regime. The reform package includes the elimination of the so-called 'laws of exception', a pattern of military decreed constitutional amendments which gradually, in the years since the coup, concentrated dictatorial authority in the hands of the President. It was the decree in 1968 by then President Artur da Costa e Silva of Institutional Act Number Five, giving the chief executive power to close Congress at will and rule by decree, that gave the military 'System' its final thrust toward unadorned dictatorship, and the selection in 1969 of a third military President, General Garrastazú Médici, which confirmed the military's intention of retaining power for an indefinite period.

AI-5, the common shorthand for the 1968 decree which is now condemned even by some of the then cabinet members who signed it, was last used in April, 1977 by President Geisel. Fears that the only legal opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), would sweep the 1978 elections led Geisel to close Congress at that time and decree a set of changes in the electoral laws designed to favour the interests of the official government party, the National Renovation Alliance (Arena).

In addition to AI-5 the reform package also eliminates the chief executive's power to dismiss public officials from office without explanation and deny political rights to Brazilian citizens for periods of up to ten years. These special 'national security powers' were used extensively during the administration of the first President of the current regime, General Humberto Castelo Branco, to sweep thousands of officials, including governors, senators and ex-presidents, into obscurity. Geisel has used it sparingly, the last time in July, 1977 to end the political career of the then leader of the opposition MDB in the Chamber of Deputies—Alencar Furtado.

The reforms will also lead to greater independence for the judiciary, which had been reduced to a rubber stamp under earlier administrations, and to the return of habeas corpus in cases involving violation of the country's loosely interpreted national security laws. Finally, the President has accepted the argument of political leaders from both parties that the artificial two-party system, first created in 1966, be eliminated and that a new parties law be enacted with room for five, six or even seven major groupings.

No one, inside or out of the administration, is fully satisfied with the President's reform package, including Senate President Petônio Portella, the government party stalwart responsible for most of its details. 'Well, we know there are imperfections', he said, candidly, a few days before Congress voted its approval of the reforms, 'and we will admit some changes as long as they don't alter the essence of the proposals'. Reformers, however, remain unconvinced because, they point out, the package includes a built-in escape mechanism. The constitutional amendments approved by Congress include a set of what have been labelled 'state security safeguards' giving

the President extraordinary powers in times of crisis. As in most Latin American countries, the chief executive will be able to declare states of exercise extraordinary powers. Congressional critics demanded and won siege or, in less serious cases, states of emergency, during which he will safeguards to check the safeguards, including more meaningful congressional oversight powers during 'crisis' periods.

Despite congressional tampering, however, the reform package will not bring an immediate end to the 'Revolution of 1964'. Two crucial elements are missing: the transference of fiscal authority from the executive to the legislative branch of government and the direct election of the President and other high ranking government officials.

Since the promulgation of the First Institutional Act in the opening days of the military regime, the Brazilian Congress has been prohibited from increasing executive branch appropriations requests. The measure was originally decreed, and will almost certainly be extended into the next administration, because of the spendthrift tendencies exhibited by Congress during the period before the 1964 coup. Economic growth and fiscal conservatism have been hallmarks of the 14-year military government and it is likely that fiscal authority for Congress will be the last conventional democratic norm to be restored.

Direct elections pose still another problem. All four military Presidents have stressed the need to place only the most highly qualified Brazilians in key economic and political jobs and a major element of the military government's early popularity—popularity which had evaporated by 1968—was its out-front stance against corruption and what the regime's apologists describe as incompetence, careerism and demagoguery among conventional office holders.

The control of elections, therefore, has always been a key element of the 'System's' approach to political policy. Since 1966 Brazilians have had no direct say in the election of state governors and big city mayors and, from the outset of the Revolution, the apex job, the presidency, has been filled indirectly, always by a high-ranking military officer. In addition, this year's elections included a new restriction: one-third of Brazil's 66 Federal Senate seats were also filled indirectly, all of them by members of the government party. The indirect method of election is complex in practice but straightforward in design. At both the national and at the state levels electoral colleges which heavily over-represent conservative, pro-government rural areas fill the indirect slots. In this way the military government, and its chief executive, have been able to hand pick virtually all of the indirectly chosen office holders from the President down to the lieutenant-governors of the smallest states.

The sheer efficiency which the regime has exhibited in its administration of the indirect selection mechanism and the traditional value placed on direct elections have made the issue of voter participation the focus of every dissatisfied interest group, opposition politician and government party dissident in Brazil. The opportunity for direct elections this time has

already been lost, but the in-coming President, General Figueiredo, may be forced by a storm of popular and inside pressure to accept the notion. In his many public comments, Figueiredo has stated that he is in favour of the return of direct elections but he has so far refused to divulge a time-table.

A year ago many observers expected that Figueiredo, selected by the Electoral College, October 13, would simply inherit the prerogatives and privileges of his military predecessors. But Figueiredo's ascent was not as simple a matter as his backers had expected. This year, for the first time, the candidate of the 'System' faced opposition.

Two major political figures tried two unsuccessful, but still significant, ploys in their effort to wrest the presidency from the 'System'. Minas Gerais Senator Magalhães Pinto, who, as governor of his state in 1964 had been the principal civilian figure behind the military coup, announced more than a year ago that he would seek his party's presidential nomination. His party happens to be Arena, the official party of President Geisel and the then President-elect Figueiredo. While Arena rejected Magalhães' presidential bid at its April convention, the groundswell of support for the senator among both political figures and voters was the dramatic proof needed by many, both in and out of political life, to demonstrate the extent to which the regime was out of touch with popular and political sentiment.

A second political figure, retired four-star General Euler Bentes Monteiro, joined the opposition MDB in August 1978 in order to be nominated as its presidential candidate a few days later. Bentes' calling card—his high rank and considerable prestige within the military—was not enough to topple Figueiredo, partly because of his unpopularity among many within the opposition party itself and also because of the ironclad control of the Electoral College enjoyed by the president and his supporters. Bentes' candidacy was important, however, because of the covert support it apparently received from prominent military figures.

Figueiredo, a virtual unknown a year ago, rode to the presidency on the coat-tails of his predecessor but, for the first time in the history of five military presidents, he faced open military and civilian opposition and, also for the first time, he must govern without the aid of the 'laws of exception'.

The expectation now, a year after Figueiredo's annointment by Geisel, is that, instead of being another military president like Geisel and Médici, the new president will be a kind of transitional figure. His administration, which takes office on March 15, 1979, is expected to include an unprecedented number of civilian political figures including supporters of his late opponent, Magalhães Pinto. He may also propose new reform ideas and has expressed his 'desire' to turn over the presidency six years from now to a freely elected successor, 'if' conditions permit.

The success of a Figueiredo-backed reform programme or indeed any political reform programme will ultimately depend on the role which the military assigns itself in the future governance of the nation.

In recent months military spokesmen, including Army Minister General

Fernando Bethlem and Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Tácito Gaspar de Oliveira, have stressed that military leaders should remain outside the ordinary framework of politics. Some military spokesmen have even declared that Brazil is not governed by a military regime at all and that military officers should express no political views either inside or out of the barracks.

Nevertheless, the military High Command continues to be an active and controversial force behind the scenes. The former President Geisel, himself a retired four-star general selected personally in 1973 by then President Garrastazú Médici, another four-star general, has chosen to utilise the indirect mechanism established by his military predecessors to install a fifth general in the Palacio do Planalto. That choice was ostensibly made with the consent of other high-ranking officers but, like the occult politics of the politburo, it is often difficult to assess the intensity of debate within the ruling circle.

What is known is that, from the beginning, Geisel personally favoured the choice of Figueiredo who is viewed, although somewhat sceptically by many, as a political moderate generally favourable to Geisel's policy of gradual redemocratisation. It is also known that the January choice of Figueiredo as the 'official' candidate of the President and, therefore, of the 'Revolution' caused serious dissension within the ranks of the ten-man military High Command and among other high-ranking officers.

Most observers agree that Brazil's military leadership is divided—probably more so than at any time since 1964, the modern watershed in its history.

Two related developments attended the rise of General Figueiredo's candidacy. The first was the abrupt dismissal in October, 1977 of the then Army Minister, General Sylvio Frota. Frota, known as a hard line figure within the armed forces, had been on everyone's short list for President Geisel's official blessing as the next 'Revolutionary' President. His dramatic dismissal led, the following day, to a personal attack on Geisel's political and foreign policies by the discredited former army minister. In his lengthy, strongly worded statement to the press, Frota said the Geisel Administration had been leading the country toward chaos and subversion. He attacked what he called laxity in government internal security agencies which, he said, had led to an increase in activities by 'subversive' elements within the bureaucracy. He also attacked the administration's foreign policy, saying that Brazil's recognition of Communist China and increased trade relations with the Warsaw Pact countries were perversions of traditional Brazilian values.

While Frota may have had many sympathisers within the armed forces, he had few actual supporters. *O Estado de São Paulo*, Brazil's most respected newspaper, reported a month after the Frota dismissal that the ex-army minister had attempted to foment a right-wing coup against the Geisel Administration on the day of his unexpected dismissal. The coup effort, the newspaper reported, was a dismal failure. The only participants, accord-

ing to the report, were military officers attached to Frota's personal staff. Geisel, a 50 year veteran of the army, had no difficulty enlisting the unanimous support of the High Command and General Fernando Bethlem was sworn in as Frota's replacement within minutes of the dismissal order. The President had apparently planned his move carefully. In the days prior to Frota's firing Geisel's chief military adviser, General Hugo Abreu, coordinated the selection of Bethlem and arranged for a meeting of the High Command to take place in the Presidential palace on the day of the army minister's dismissal. When Frota tried to organise a counterstroke he couldn't even get his fellow generals on the phone—they were in conference with the President.

General Abreu, however, was to suffer a similar fate. Three months later, when Geisel announced the choice of Figueiredo as the 'official' presidential candidate, Abreu resigned his post on the chief executive's staff and was reassigned to a non-controversial administrative job. He was also passed over later in the year for promotion to the rank of four-star general of the army, the highest post in the Brazilian military.

Except for Frota's impassioned press release on the day of his dismissal, neither the ex-army minister nor Abreu has made extensive public comments. General Abreu, however, has made his views known through discreet press leaks and other channels. His major objection to Figueiredo involved various allegations. He also apparently objected to Figueiredo's rank (he was then only a three-star general) saying that a more senior man should have been chosen. In even more guarded comments Abreu hinted that many top military figures regarded Figueiredo as an unsuitable future President both personally and politically.

In an apparently administration-coordinated display of military unity earlier in the year, General Bethlem announced that the High Command had voted to express its support for the 'Revolutionary' candidate and, in individual comments to the press, a majority of the ten generals-of-the-army expressed their warm personal regard for Figueiredo.

While the effort seemed somewhat contrived, the statements of support were the apparent result of the Brazilian military's tradition of loyalty to the principal of command; and the military president, since 1964, has been formally regarded as both the 'chief of the Revolution' and as the unquestioned commander of the armed forces. Despite misgivings and internal divisions, Geisel has apparently won the support, or at least consent, of most general officers both for his candidate and for his reforms—all this despite the continued strength of the 'hard line' group within the upper ranks.

Below the rank of general, however, there is quite a different story. One military officer, not speaikng for attribution, recently stated that 'below the rank of general there is only one sentiment expressed—redemocratisation'.

While those in the lower ranks have also tended to go along with the President's policies there has been a measure of dissent in recent months.

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Late last year Army Colonel Rui Castro, noted as a 'hard liner' following the 1964 coup, was sentenced to 15 days' house arrest for his comments attacking 'continuism' within the armed forces. Earlier this year Castro retired from the army and joined the staff of General Bentes in an effort, he said, to continue the pressure for reform.

In March of last year another Colonel, Tarcisio Nunes Ferreira, was given similar treatment for his comments to a Rotary Club meeting within his southern Brazilian jurisdiction. Following a period of house arrest he said the damage to his career had been worth the opportunity to express views which he claimed are widely shared among fellow officers. Later in the year, after reassignment to an obscure post in the Northeast, he was imprisoned for an additional 20-day period. The most dramatic disciplinary move, however, came in early October when General Abreu was arrested and sentenced to 20 days' house arrest for a letter which he had circulated to fellow officers calling for fundamental changes in the 'System' and criticising both Geisel and Figueirido.

While the generals unquestionably continue to rule the Army and the President to command the generals there can be no doubt that pressure from below will have its effect. A foreign correspondent in Rio expressed the current view of observers this way: 'Geisel adopted his policies partly to please the reform group of colonels and majors because he realised that they were the generals of tomorrow.'

Now the world—and Brazil—awaits enlightenment as to 60-year-old General Figueirido's acceptance of Geisel's policies.

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FLOUNDER POWER

by John Elsom

THERE is one consolation for being male and middle-aged. Camus, who lived and died a young man, never knew what it was; and so he never understood what really happened to Sisyphus. He thought that Sisyphus was someone like himself: an eternal striver, a tireless social democrat, forever pushing the rock of civilisation up a mountain of despair. The sole comfort of Sisyphus, according to Camus, was his stoical determination. As one utopian dream after another crashed down the heavenly ski-slopes, Sisyphus simply braced his shoulders for the next struggle.

Camus never met Sisyphus. His essay, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, was based entirely on hearsay evidence. Nor did Camus know much about eternity, which he confused with timelessness. In fact, as every Indian guru knows, eternity is packed to its brimless brim with time. The fleeting, jewelled moments of first love are muddled up with the aeons from which continents are born. That is the trouble with eternity. It is very confusing. It is like listening to a scrambled tape, where you can't hear the tunes for the noise. But if you put your hands over your ears, the racket is reduced to a few penetrating signals, from which you can construct time systems. Time is censored eternity.

Nobody knows why Sisyphus got into this habit of pushing a rock. He was once indeed like Camus—a leader, left-wing and a trifle dogmatic, a good chap to have on one's side in a cricket team, except that he would insist on going in first. Legend has it that he was being punished by the gods; but it is equally plausible to assume that rock-pushing was his way of sorting out time from eternity. It took six of his days to heave the boulder, much bigger than him, through the thickly matted valley undergrowth, into the forests of the lower slopes, through the higher tundra where the gorse cut his feet, up the perilous cliffs and on to the freezing plateau, where stood the ultimate pinnacle, a slender tower of sheer ice, tapering to a pin-point. On the seventh day, instead of resting, Sisyphus forlornly chased the boulder down the hill again, after it had toppled off once more.

Any architect could have told Sisyphus (but he wouldn't have listened) that the rock could never be safely perched on a stem like that. But Sisyphus was an optimist. If the gods had cursed him at all, it was with an excess of hope. He had this theory that the rock must have one centre of gravity, which, if accurately located and balanced on the pinnacle, would keep it there for ever and ever. He also firmly believed in the curative powers of that perched rock. It is no exaggeration to say that he thought it would complete the universe.

It would shade humanity from the sun and disperse the rain-clouds before they built up into flood-bearing monsoons. It would be the world's lightning conductor. By regulating the climate, the rock would bring any

number of benefits to mankind. Nobody would starve or even be hungry. Nobody would freeze to death. There would be no wars, because there would be no need to fight. There would be no class divisions, because there would be plenty of everything for everyone. The concept of personal property would disappear, and with it, the sexual restrictions of marriage.

He was very dedicated. He undertook every endeavour in accordance with the latest scientific knowledge or mystical faith of whatever age he happened to be in. He used winches, cranes and even tanks. He once tried to disintegrate the rock with lasers and assemble it again on top by holography. On one memorable day, the rock stayed poised for at least thirty seconds. While Sisyphus stood watching it, not daring to breathe, an enormous bald eagle flapped its way up from the forests below, to see what the climatic fuss was about. It circled around the rock curiously, while Sisyphus tried to scare it away by flapping his ragged shirt. It landed on the rock which wobbled, the alarmed eagle took flight and tipped the rock down the slope again as it did so. Sisyphus yelled in fury and anguish, but, young as he was, he dashed down again, braced his shoulders heroically and started to push once more.

After a million years of striving, Sisyphus had got beyond the first pangs of frustration. He walked down, instead of running; and once, after a particularly tantalising poise, wobble and crash, he simply sighed and sat down. He felt inside his torn pockets and found a strand or so of tobacco, which he rolled with some fluff and gorse into a passable cigarette, with low tar content. The gods, to cheer him up, lit it with a timely stroke of lightning. From his position, he could have seen the entire universe but, being young, he only saw what he wanted to see—how things began and ended, and whether they related to his particular problem.

Down below, he could just detect the boulder. It was a speck, many miles away, insolently winking at him from an awkward hollow in the deepest pit of the valley. 'It was ever thus,' Sisyphus pondered, as he puffed away, 'since time began,' as he flicked his ash, 'one more heave and then another,' and he shifted his bottom to find a warmer patch of ice, reproaching himself for hedonism. He contemplated, more in pride than anger, that moral instinct which kept him pushing and shoving, when anybody else would have given up years ago.

He thought of Tantalus, that bourgeois prick, stuffing himself down there —and of Antony, the triple pillar, who had the looks and the money to be any strumpet's fool, and leave her if he wanted to—and of Job, the perfect patriarch, with his family, estates and friends who always cheered him up when things went wrong. Some people, he thought, have all the luck.

'That sod, Hercules,' he muttered. 'He could do some work for a change. I've never seen better shoulders for rock-pushing. He's getting soft, of course, going domestic, cleaning out stables.' And he just glanced at the rock, before envying that brainy squirt Napoleon, sunning himself in retirement on St. Helena.

If he had not been resenting Napoleon so much, he might have noticed

that something very odd was happening to the rock. It was getting bigger. A second—or was it a century?—before, it had barely been visible. Now it was the size of a small marble. But Sisyphus, lost to the world, saw nothing.

He was saying to himself, 'If I weren't so conscientious, I could be sitting with Van Gogh, painting sunflowers and enjoying a full sex life. If I'd played my cards right, I could be David Steel leading the Liberals to victory at the next election.' The one person he did not envy was Günter Grass, compiling a history of working-class cookery and citing as his main source, of all things, a flounder. 'He's mad!' thought Sisyphus. 'Can't he recognise a hopeless task when he sees one?'

By now, the rock was the size of a small football. Even Sisyphus noticed it. His first reaction was gloomy. 'My God, it's grown. I'll never be able to push it.' But, as he looked, he realised that the rock was not larger, but nearer. It must have landed in the valley with such force that it had bounced up the mountainside again. 'Thank heavens for small mercies,' he thought. 'I won't have to dig it out of the mud.' His relief was short-lived.

The fates were playing him another cruel trick. The rock was defying the laws of gravity. It hadn't just bounced, but was rolling slowly and carefully up the mountain. Sometimes, it would hesitate, and stop, not knowing which way to go. It kept bumping into trees, and falling into crevasses; but there could be no doubt about its general direction. That inanimate block, that *lumpen proletariat* of solid matter, had acquired a sense of purpose. At first, Sisyphus did not know quite what to think. 'What's it playing at? What's it trying to tell me? That I'm redundant? Is that all the thanks I get after pushing it for a million years? Unemployment?' He indignantly resolved that, should the rock reach the top, which was unlikely, and balanced itself, which was incredible, and stayed there, which would be an absolute miracle, he would have to push it off again as a gesture of solidarity with the working classes.

'Don't the gods realise,' he thought bitterly, 'what trouble they cause when they allow nature to behave unnaturally? Gravity, relativity and the laws of thermo-dynamics will have to be revised all over again. Ptolemy will weep, Copernicus will go berserk, and Fred Hoyle will be elevated to the House of Lords. And do they ever think of the moral consequences? They can forget about me,' he snorted, 'I'm not important. But what sort of example are they setting others? If men get the impression that they don't have to strive after ideals, they'll revert to beasts. They won't work. They'll have lost the incentive. Why should wives struggle to keep families together? Why should anybody join a trade union or a liberation army? If the gods don't want to listen to me, they should read young Camus. Rock-pushing is the highest human activity—however futile it may seem. Without rock-pushing, one might as well be dead.'

He grew so angry that he couldn't breathe. He could feel his blood boiling and clotting; and what infuriated him most was the thought that, if the rock did succeed of its own accord, and duly benefitted mankind, nobody would know who had had the bright idea in the first place. When his rage

blew over, Sisyphus felt exhausted. The millenia of physical effort had almost broken his back, but this quirk of a deviationary rock shattered his spirit. He lay back on the ice, and wrapped his loneliness, despair and infinite tiredness around him like a blanket; but comfort was hard to find. The winds were taunting him, the cold deep-freezing him, the sun roasting him and all the other elements conspiring against him, malevolently, it seemed, to reduce him to nothing. It was the nadir of his immortal life.

His mind was full of memories, all of them painful. He tried hard to forget about the time wasted on rock-pushing, but the stealthy crunch, crunch of the rock as it approached through gravel and gorse kept reminding him. He tried to distract himself by thinking of other matters. He thought about those he envied most and invented terrible punishments for them. He put Tantalus on a compulsory diet and got Antony embroiled with a slut, whose wiles and vacillations lost him the empire. He plagued Job with family problems and boils; and, in a flight of fantasy, condemned Hercules to divert a river. 'That serves them right,' he thought, before wiping out Napoleon at Waterloo.

He magnanimously forgave other rock-pushing fools. He dreamt that Grass had finished his book, which was a great success, and published in English translation by Secker and Warburg. 'Nothing is too good for him,' he thought, although he wondered whether the British would read *The Flounder** for they are not usually interested in German books which are not dedicated to the ever-interesting topic as to how Britain won the war.

He then turned his attention to the universe at large, seeking new interpretations for old frustrations. Perhaps his mountain was just an upside down valley, and that what he had mistakenly felt was up was really down; or perhaps that there was no down or up at all, only a system of attractions and repulsions, so that all his effort was due, not to the contradicting force of gravity, but simply to the fact that the rock was being stubborn. Now it had changed his mind.

'Perhaps all my pushing,' he thought, 'has lent a kind of natural energy to the rock, so that it can carry on without me. I could be just one of many million Sisyphi, labouring away at life's anarchism to transform it into civilised order. Ordinary men have the same problem. The long march of the democrats has taken them to every sheer cliff and cul-de-sac in the universe. The thegns once rebelled against their kings, then the industrialists against the thegns, then the trade unions against the industrialists, then the independent businessmen against the unions. And at each stage in the journey, new bosses have appointed themselves, new laws have been devised, new punishments invented and new mutual benefit societies have put up their membership fees. It all looks hopeless; but step by step, the democrats march on, until a momentum builds up, and even the harshest laws have to be given their liberal justifications. Popes and princes, colonels and judges,

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**The Flounder* by Günter Grass. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Secker and Warburg. £5.95.

union leaders and MPs, all learn to abide by the revolutionary process, which is nothing less than the promethean spirit of man, yearning to be released into freedom.'

It was all rhetoric, of course, and he knew that it was; but, as his mind touched the word 'freedom', he suddenly realised that in their careless way, the gods had released him. He was no longer morally chained to the rock. He could go anywhere and do anything; and a detached observer could even have described him—bending the truth, of course, but plausibly—as free.

The snag was that he had always assumed that freedom meant doing what one liked, whereas really it meant not knowing what to do. The free man is bombarded with choices, and when he chooses one of them, he stops being free. Freedom is torture, a continual white-light interrogation by circumstance; while choosing is like blurting out a confession. Harassed by opportunities, deafened by the cacophony of life, drowning in impressions and ideas, the free man gulps, twists this way and that, begs help, moans, closes his eyes, blocks his ears and finally, in a low ashamed whisper, makes a good resolution—which becomes his life sentence. 'Man,' thought Sisyphus, 'is born free, but naturally he prefers chains.'

This reasoning, when applied to his case, meant that if the rock had not existed, Sisyphus would had to have invented it. But the rock was there, and so were the ills which the rock was supposed to cure. At a certain point, the private misery of somebody who does not know what to do with his life meets the public agony of a world struggling to evolve from chaos; and Sisyphus wondered whether his apparently unsolvable dilemma was not really one of relationship and timing. The choice was not between intolerable freedom and unendurable slavery, but between absolutism and relativity. The blind clinging to a mission could be regarded as a kind of immaturity, an unwillingness to be confused by facts; and Sisyphus speculated about what evidence there was to support his theory of solutions and gods, this immortal conspiracy which had left him useless and stranded on a mountain top.

He looked around him again, and saw to his surprise how the whole world seemed to be changing, sometimes slowly, sometimes quickly. The contours of hills piled up and crumbled, as the seas ate the cliffs. Winds buried forests with sand, while old deserts blossomed. His little rock had got itself into difficulties—jammed between a tree and a cliff. In a spirit of affection, Sisyphus wanted to help it, for he too had once been stuck there. He scrambled down and gently diverted it back on to a more promising ledge.

The rock now seemed as light as plastic, and far more intelligent, for it rolled on and up, keeping away from similar impasses. It really was a remarkable rock, a paragon. It could even be said to be sensitive. When it saw the rare edelweiss, it stopped, shifted on one side and rolled around it. Sisyphus felt proud of that rock. Perhaps he could even claim, in some small measure, to have been its father.

He followed it at a tactful distance. Sometimes he helped it and sometimes it helped him, but Sisyphus, having gone through the first trauma of middle-age, was not disposed to press his luck. A friendship developed between them, for which Sisyphus, after so much melancholy and youthful loneliness, was properly grateful. When they approached the summit, Sisyphus stood to one side, to let the rock take the credit. It gathered its energy together, rolled purposefully and with increasing speed towards the pinnacle, mounted it and slammed on the brakes at exactly the right time. There it was, securely mounted, on the steeple of the gods.

Sisyphus applauded; but also felt sad that the long labour and the short friendship were over. He was walking away, as if towards a sunset, when he heard a rustling behind him. The rock was getting bored and fidgeting. It wanted to find another mountain. It rolled back down the slope, caught Sisyphus up, who leapt on its back; and together they toboganned down into the valley and trundled on, searching for other mountains and valleys. Sometimes, Sisyphus jumped off to look at rare flora and fauna—or to swim by himself in the sea, for the rock would just sink like a stone. Sisyphus was amazed at how much there was to see and do, if you weren't always concentrating on one task. They played games together—cricket. The rock was a good stonewall batsman, but, of course, it couldn't bowl. They might have gone out in the evenings together, but Sisyphus couldn't stand rock music, while the rock was petrified by jazz.

Sisyphus even found time to read Grass's book. He thought it was wonderful, not just an ordinary cookery book, but a history of Gdansk and the battle between the sexes, written in short, pithy colloquial phrases, quite unlike the Germanic sentences through which Sisyphus had previously laboured, which ran on and on before reaching the explanatory verbs. He noticed how Grass was no longer worrying about the war's aftermath and what would happen to Willi Brandt; but had decided, as Sisyphus himself had done, that what will be will be, even if women do take over.

He was so excited that he tried to write his own book. The first sentence began—'the consolation of middle-age is not being young'. 'Only another 500,000 more words to go', thought Sisyphus happily, which in his terms was just a good morning's work. Then he looked at the sentence again and wondered if it would be thought banal; and so he scratched it out and wrote—'the consolation of being male and middle-aged is not having to prove one's masculinity'. That sounded too psychological for his taste, and lacking in social content. And so he came straight to the point, and wrote: 'the consolation of being male and middle-aged is not having to push rocks.'

He could have written the rest of the book, there and then, about the follies, dangers, joys and retributions of rock-pushing; but he couldn't remember whether anybody had ever asked him to push rocks in the first place. Would the rock take offence at the implication that it needed to be pushed? He decided to postpone publication until he had had a chance to discuss the matter with his young friend, Albert Camus. But Camus, whom the gods loved, was finally and completely dead; and grass was growing on his grave.

CASA GUIDI: A PORTRAIT

by N. S. Thompson

> 'As for Pisa or Florence, or Sorrento, or New Orleans, — **ubi Ba, ibi RB**! Florence, however, you describe exactly . . . the English there are intolerable,— even from a distance you can see **that**.'
>
> (Robert Browning to Elizabeth Barrett Browning, June 1st, 1846)

ROBERT Browning and Elizabeth Barrett were married on Saturday, September 12th, 1846, after a courtship and correspondence of twenty-one months; she was forty, and he, thirty-four. The details and practicalities of the secret ceremony were left until the last minute: what did concern them more, in the course of their letters, was where they should live. Over this thorny problem they wrangled for many months. Greece, the Levant, Alexandria, Italy (which Browning had twice visited) were all discussed, with their concomitant benefits for Elizabeth's health.

> 'The medieval people, according to Valléry, attribute the black, hollow **cheeks** and **sunk** eyes and general ill-health of the Florentines to their vile water; impregnated with lead I think . . . then, why do the English all live at Florence?'
>
> (Robert Browning to Elizabeth Barrett Browning, June 18th, 1846)

Elizabeth replied, echoing Robert's letter of June 1st:

> 'As to Florence, the flood of English is the worst water of all the argument. . . . There is Pisa by the way! Or your Sorrento, Salerno, . . . Amalfi . . . you shall consider if you please—'

They both considered, and eventually decided on Pisa, which had a certain reputation as a resort for consumptives, and had been recommended to Elizabeth both by her doctor and by several friends. What none of them realised was that this reputation, earned earlier in the century, owed nothing to the climate of Pisa, so much as to the presence of one skilled Dr. Vacca who, by then, had been dead for quite some time!

But it was to Pisa that the newly-weds went, leaving behind a London buzzing with the news of the poets' marriage, on which Wordsworth wisecracked, 'Well, I hope they may understand each other—nobody else could' —a little unfairly, since Elizabeth's reputation was by then high, unlike that of Browning, which had never been able to recover from the attacks of obscurity levelled at *Sordello* (1840). A week after their marriage, they made a leisurely journey to Pisa, wintering there in an apartment in the Collegio Ferdinando, designed by Vasari; they lived quietly, 'free from domestic cares and the ordering and cooking of dinners', reading and talking.

Possibly the damp climate of Pisa, coupled with Elizabeth's illness after her first miscarriage, drove them inland to warm, sheltered Florence. They certainly seem to have forgotten their earlier misgivings.

After living shortly near Santa Maria Novella and elsewhere, in the summer of 1847 they came to rent a first floor apartment in the Palazzo Guidi, renting it after a Russian Prince, whose white satin walls, armchairs and marble consoles, 'carved and gilt', and 'noble mirrors' they enjoyed until October, when their landlord sought to increase the rent—under five

pounds a month—and they moved to less expensive rooms, firstly up the road on Via Maggio, then opposite the Pitti Palace, close by. But the next spring, on 9th May, 1848, they returned to 'Casa Guidi', taking it as an unfurnished apartment at twenty-five guineas a year, about half the furnished rate.

The Palazzo Guidi, on the south side of the river, near the Pitti, juts into its tiny Piazza S. Felice, dominating the Church which stands opposite; originally built for the Ridolfi family in the 15th Century, it had passed to the Guidi shortly afterwards.

The name 'Casa Guidi' comes from Elizabeth's pet-name for the apartment, which gained further currency upon her publishing the long poem, *Casa Guidi Windows*, which then permanently associated the name with the Brownings' home. The poem itself is a hymn to the Italian *Risorgimento*, the first part being written in the heady days of 1848, when the liberal revolution was at its height. On their first wedding anniversary, the preceding autumn, the Brownings had witnessed a tremendous political demonstration, which possibly had sparked off the poem: the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Leopold II, had granted Florence the right to form its own Civic Guard, which was seen by the people as the beginning of Italy's freedom from nearly three centuries of Austrian domination, and its unification as a state under a constitutional monarchy. These hopes were dashed after the Italian defeat at Novara in 1849, but it caused Elizabeth to write a second part to the poem, re-affirming her belief in the Italian cause, and scourging its opposers, the two parts being published in 1851,—but it was not until twenty years later that Italy achieved its ideals of liberty, unity and independence. However, Elizabeth wrote further on her land of exile: in 1860, she published *Poems before Congress*, which were again mainly about Italian politics, but included a poem against the Negro slavery in the United States. The 'Congress' named should have occurred in Paris earlier that year, to deliberate on a reduction of the Pope's powers—which would have aided unification—but Austria had withdrawn; the meeting indefinitely postponed, never, in fact, to take place.

Aurora Leigh, a poem-novel in blank verse on the struggles of women in the mid-19th Century, is another major work Elizabeth wrote at 'Casa Guidi'. Whilst purporting to be the autobiography of the woman in the title, it is a vehicle for much wider issues concerning the rights of women, and at the time was considered a very provocative book, touching, as it did, on the problem of prostitution and the plight of unmarried mothers. But Elizabeth's work evinces not so much a feeling for persons-as-individuals, as for causes, or 'mankind'—or 'womankind'—in general,—even the personal story of *Aurora Leigh* ends with the idealist hopes of:

> New churches, new economies, new laws
> Admitting freedom, new societies
> Excluding falsehood . . .

Perhaps it is fitting then, that the commemorative marble plaque, written by the poet Tommaseo, given by a 'grateful Florence' after her death (on the Via Maggio side of the Palazzo) speaks of her more in political terms,

forging a 'golden ring between Italy and England.' Her work, then, apart from the *Sonnets from the Portguese*, written earlier, was not of the personal.

Browning's work, however, is exactly that: full of insights, perceptions into character and renderings of the particular in a very psychological manner, as the major collection of poems he wrote as 'Casa Guidi', *Men and Women* (1855), shows,—a simple title for some very complex poems. One poem from the collection, ostensibly about a poet in Spain a century or two previously, gives, I think, a picture of Browning himself, a great connoisseur of the street life of Florence:

> He stood and watched the cobbler at his trade,
> The man who slices lemons into drink,
> The coffee-roaster's brazier, and the boys
> That volunteer to help him turn its winch.
> He glanced o'er books on stalls with half an eye,
> And fly-leaf ballads on the vendor's string,
> And broad-edge bold-print posters by the wall.
>
> ('How It Strikes a Contemporary')

Again, it is the street life of Florence he gaily describes in 'Up at a Villa —Down in the City', but in 'How It Strikes a Contemporary' he is more meditative, more his introspective self, giving us, I feel, a clue to his life in Florence. It does not explain the enigma of the man, but does offer some insight into his life and thought, uniquely compressed into the 115 lines.

The keen observer, it seems, was to be found on the more domestic side of life, too. Browning was a diligent seeker after furniture and artworks, and would comb the narrow streets looking for an interesting piece years after they had comfortably filled the unfurnished rooms. Elizabeth was little better, as a letter to her sister Henrietta in June, 1848, shows:

'We are getting on slowly in the furnishing dept. I reproach Robert, you know, with a drawer-plague—he was so fond of raining down drawers upon us—but when we came to compare my sofa plague, and see which evil grew fastest—it was found the other day that we had eight sofas, and only six pairs of drawers. So I have nothing to say.'

The political instability of the time meant that it was a buyer's market for goods. They were able to acquire many things at well below market price: paintings, antiques and curios were collected at very little expense, and the apartment took on the crowded, overladen aspect then so common in Victorian England. Food and drink, too, was a fraction of what it would have cost in London. So, on the few hundred pounds a year they had, from Elizabeth's investments, royalties and the allowance from her cousin—and Browning's friend, John Kenyon—they were able to live very well, with permanent man- and maid-servant and daily help.

In every respect, it was a far richer life than that offered by the England of the time, letting alone the fact that if it had not been for the move to Italy, Elizabeth would not have survived another winter in the fog-laden, polluted air of the City. It was a stifling atmosphere in many other respects. Dickens, it is true, made much of that life, but even he found it necessary to spend long periods in Italy and France, away from the all-pervading world of 'Podsnappery'. Mr. Podsnap, of *Our Mutual Friend*, it will be remembered, 'got up at eight, shaved close at a quarter past, breakfasted at

nine, went to the city at ten' and was surprised at anyone who wanted anything more out of life. 'Our poor English want educating into gladness', as Elizabeth said!

They lived without the trappings of domestic arrangements, gave no dinners or parties, did no social calling or receiving and had few friends, and those, American. They took the *piatto del giorno* from the local trattoria — which would send them complete meals — without bothering about menus. Judging by the rigorous standards of the day, they were rather bohemian, as can be seen from the upbringing of their one and only child, Robert Wiedemann ('Pen'), born in 'Casa Guidi' in May, 1849, who sported very exotic clothes and shoulder-length hair. Elizabeth was a prolific and entertaining correspondent, and much of their daily life can be found in reading her letters to friends and relations.

'Casa Guidi' was also where she died, on 29th June, 1861; she was buried in the Protestant Cemetery in Piazzale Donatello, in Florence, where, though it has been 'closed' since the end of the last century, her grave can still be seen, along with those of W. S. Landor and A. H. Clough.

After her death, Browning left Florence and did not return. However, after his death, in Venice in 1889, their son, Pen, who had married a Bostonian heiress, Fanny Coddington, bought the whole Palazzo, including the shops on the street, and refurnished 'Casa Guidi' with his parents' furniture and belongings, keeping it as a museum until his death in 1912. As no will was found, his estate was sold, which included 'Casa Guidi', the contents of which were thus dispersed. There were attempts to re-open the apartment as a memorial during the First World War, when a second plaque to Elizabeth was mounted on the Via Mazzetta side of the building, in 1916, but it was too difficult a time for this project to be attained.

'Casa Guidi' now belongs to the Browning Institute Inc., of New York, who have restored the apartment ready for a museum and study centre.

'Casa Guidi', Piazza S. Felice 8, Florence is open to the public on weekdays from 4 to 7 p.m.

Quotations from Elizabeth Barrett Browning's Correspondence are used with kind permission of John Murray.

[N. S. Thompson is a poet, currently Resident Co-ordinator at 'Casa Guidi' for the Browning Institute Inc., of New York.]

MAO TSE-TUNG AND THE SPENCERIAN DUAL CODE

by Dennis Duncanson

AMONG writers on contemporary China, opinions differ as to which feature of Maoism to regard as the most inspired or inspiring; some find Mao's greatest originality in the development of People's War, others in the doctrine of New Democracy, and so on. As a matter of fact, the very use of the term 'Maoism' is open to objection: it is not used in China, and the great man himself laid claim only to exposition of a system of 'thought' as a commentary on, or application of, the general content of an older 'ism', to wit Marxism-Leninism; he did not pretend to an 'ism' of his own. Even the expression 'Mao Tsê-tung Thought' belongs properly to the end of Mao's life—to the phase of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; before that, we read at most of 'the thoughts of Chairman Mao'.

But, whether 'ism' or humbler 'thought' (with large or small T), neither of the ideas I have mentioned is particularly original or characteristic: People's War was a retrospective theorisation of the civil-war tactics (traditional to China's political culture) which a strenuous opposition had forced on that section of the Chinese communist movement with which Mao found himself a fugitive in 1927, whereas New Democracy (in contrast to People's War, in that Mao never had a chance to put it into practice) is little more than an elaboration of Lenin's 1920 Theses on the National and Colonial Questions. To my mind, it is in the last, Cultural-Revolution, phase of Mao Tsê-tung Thought, at the climax of the Chairman's career as a statesman, that he worked out his most original idea; I mean his repudiation of bureaucracy and his attempt to rule China instead by a policy of social engineering. That policy looked like deliberate manipulation, for reasons of power politics, of Herbert Spencer's dual ethical code of Amity and Enmity: 'Rude tribes and civilised societies,' Spencer wrote, 'have had continually to carry on external self-defence and internal co-operation; external antagonism and internal friendship; hence their members have acquired different sets of . . . duties and virtues, one of which (code of Amity) is associated with ethical conceptions, and the other (code of Enmity) not.' At other times, Spencer distinguished Amity as the code characteristic of industrial societies, Enmity as that of military ones, the former assumed to be dedicated singlemindedly to internal development, the latter to external aggression.[1]

Mao Tsê-tung seldom admitted to intellectual debts to anybody, but he did once acknowledge that, when twenty years of age, he had read a translation of Spencer's *Study of Sociology* (first published in *Contemporary Review*) and, like thousands in his generation, learnt even more about 'Ssu Pin-sê's' central ideas of 'social Darwinism' through the interpretation of the political writer Liang Ch'i-ch'ao; he concentrated his foreign reading on

ethics, especially that of English authors.[2] It would be surprising if, in the period before he became acquainted with Leninism, Spencer's theories had not left a lasting mark on his mind, however perverse—and however distressing to Spencer had he lived to behold his own influence in this quarter. Conversely, whether by design or by accident, Mao's policy when in power eventually put to the test, if not the validity of the Spencerian dual code as an analysis of universal (but involuntary) social behaviour, at least the utility of the code of Enmity in the hands of a resolute statesman in China.

Two purposes in conjunction conduced to lead Mao to the dual code as an instrument of policy, one philosophical and the other constitutional. Some time before the Cultural Revolution, Professor Arthur Cohen pointed out very cogently (notwithstanding the contrary opinion of Professor Schram) that, among numerous other prevarications about Mao's authorship, his two philosophical essays *On Practice* and *On Contradiction*, allocated in the *Selected Works* of 1960 to the year 1937, almost certainly were composed on the eve of their publication in 1950-52; the motive for backdating them would be to credit Mao with a false intellectual inventiveness by comparison with the ageing Stalin, whom Mao aspired to succeed as leader of the world communist movement and heir to the mantle of Marx, Engels and Lenin.[3] *On Practice* lays down an extreme utilitarian epistemology: we can only know 'objectively' by doing, it says, and 'truth' inheres solely in what can be put to use. The interpretation of *knowledge* as practice is already found in Marx, of course, and Mao's identification of *truth* with practice sets against a Chinese background Lenin's notes on Hegel's *Science of Logic*; but the essay is significant here as the point of departure for *On Contradiction* (which draws heavily on the same Leninist source) and for a third work, penned without question in 1957 and entitled *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People*—more definitely than the first two an original contribution by Mao to Marxism-Leninism.

The three essays make a logical progression of ideas and provide a philosophical justification for their author's public policy in the final decade of his life and dictatorship. *On Contradiction* explains to a Chinese audience the inner dynamic of struggle said by Marxists to be innate in all 'things', abstract or concrete, natural or social, and said to be the active element (as distinct from external agents, which are irrelevant) that gives rise to change —a doctrine more attractive, in the field of politics, for a big state like China than for a small one. *On Correct Handling* carries on to deal with the dilemma—one might almost say the contradiction over contradictions—facing all communist parties in power, namely how to reconcile the dependence of social progress on class struggle with the ending of class 'contradictions' when the 'transition to communism' occurs. Mao's way out of the dilemma is to say that there are two intensities of contradiction, namely antagonistic ones and non-antagonistic ones, so that the antagonistic ones can be declared to be at an end in the transition to communism, while the non-antagonistic ones remain to drive society on and upwards to perfection. When applied to contemporary Chinese society, the distinction means that tensions between intellectuals or ethnic minorities and the Party-state

institutions are non-antagonistic — as are conflicts of interest between peasant and peasant or factory and factory—whereas resentments against public policy among those who were classed as bourgeois before the revolution are antagonistic. Non-antagonistic contradictions are to be resolved by argument, antagonistic ones by repression, as, in 1957, had recently been done in the 'liquidations' under the land reform. In this third essay, Mao envisages the possibility that some 'bourgeois' will knuckle under, some intellectuals and tribesmen prove recalcitrant to argument; in such cases the treatments must be reversed. In other words, the reality of antagonism or non-antagonism (echoes of Enmity and Amity) is determined by what is useful to the structure of power of the Party and the state—exactly the kind of specious argument one might expect after reading *On Practice*.

Several more years elapsed before the full implications of this theory became apparent to the Chinese masses in the Cultural Revolution. The origins of that episode will probably be disputed for years to come, but Mao himself was explicit about his displeasure with the political achievements of the Party-state institutions fifteen years after the Chinese People's Republic was set up—set up in as close imitation as could be of the Stalinist state in the USSR: 'The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is our best teacher, and we must learn from it,' Mao wrote at the time. However, for reasons it is still hard to be sure about but which may have had something to do with the firm bureaucratic traditions of China's political culture, the management organs of the new state seem on many occasions to have got the better of the Party hierarchy, so that Mao did not become the personal dictator inside China that Stalin became in Russia, still less the acknowledged leader of the world communist movement he undoubtedly dreamt of becoming. The public debate (if that is the right word for torrents of dogmatic abuse and counterabuse) between China's advocates of 'expertness', who made production their ideal, and advocates of 'redness', who made 'Revolution' theirs, centred first on the Great Leap Forward in 1958. Mao attempted, by means of that campaign, to turn the whole country into a myriad of disorganised guerrilla production bases; peasants were herded into barrack-like communes and diverted for a time from growing food so that they could build backyard steel furnaces. The childishness of the enterprise drew the world's attention to its planner's redelessness as manager of the economy and led to the withdrawal of Russian technical assistance from Chinese industry. The same lesson seems to have been borne in on Mao's Chinese comrades too. It is generally agreed that, during the years when Liu Shao-ch'i was Chairman of the State and of its 'experts' and Mao was Chairman of the Party and of its 'reds' (from 1959 to 1966), the latter was partially in eclipse because of the failure, or the unpopularity, of the Great Leap. The Cultural Revolution, whatever additional functions were or became associated with it, was chiefly an instrument by which Mao tried to resume sole leadership in China.

Although it is usual for Marxist-Leninists to justify policy publicly by reference to economic objects—'unleashing the forces of production',—it is rare for their policies to be realistically designed for any such purpose;

instead, the priority behind every policy is to deter or disarm political opponents. Mao as much as Lenin explicitly 'revised' (that is, reversed) the 'economism' of Marx by asserting that 'politics must command all': instead of waiting for the masses to move spontaneously as foreshadowed in Marx's laws of social development, the Russian and Chinese practitioners of Marxism used the Party as a tool of 'voluntarism' to make sure of the revolutionary process straightaway by goading the masses into the kind of action communists expected of them. Similarly, whereas Herbert Spencer, reasoning within the same nineteenth-century frame of social determinism as Marx, described social forces as acting spontaneously, Mao viewed the social forces I have identified as Spencerian the same way as he viewed the Marxian ones—that is, as manipulable at the bidding of *his* 'will'. He regained his position as unchallenged leader of the country—indeed, enhanced it to one of virtual dictator—by depreciating the collaborative code of Amity of the Stalinist *apparat* for 'building socialism', by stimulating in its place the code of Enmity against domestic 'enemies' instead of external ones (all 'paper tigers' in his polemics), and by sublimating the whole manoeuvre with the highminded battle-cry 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'. The opponents he evidently calculated he required to remove from his path included, at the top of the government, head of state Liu Shao-ch'i and the factional network of the latter's clients, but also—and in this he showed political shrewdness and subtlety—the scores of thousands of low-level managers whose conscientiousness in fostering productivity opposed no less formidable an obstacle than Liu to constitution of a monolithic dictatorship, for all that they were unconscious of any such intention. Trained experts and the attitude of 'expertness' (trying, in accordance with the Amity Spencer associated above all with industrial societies, to 'build socialism' by making a success of one's particular enterprise—success expressed in 'profits' that could be turned to the advantage of one's own workers for purchase of labour-saving machinery or for distribution in incentive bonuses) stood for partial and partisan social aims that collectively detracted, in however trivial measure when considered singly, from the monolithic power structure Mao obviously sought to preside over.

The Chairman's name for the attitude of 'expertness' and Amity was 'embourgeoisement'. In communist nomenclature generally no epithet could be more damning; after publication of his philosophical essays, the charge that those who tried to shine at their jobs and to pass on fair rewards for hard work to their subordinates amounted to 'taking the capitalist road', even when applicable to 'top Party persons' (that is, Liu Shao-ch'i), amounted to sentencing them to the 'revolutionary violence' of 'proletarian dictatorship'. In contrast to Stalin's methods when he purged the Russian Party in order to further his personal dictatorship, Mao could not draw, in search of enemies, on administrative records of personnel: he had to be content with random victims for his rough-and-ready injustice. So he had the schools shut, mobilised aggressive youngsters as 'Red Guards' with the right to free travel anywhere in the country, and authorised them to 'make revolution' (rampage) indiscriminately, in towns far from their homes,

against factory managers or other people in authority, smashing plant, plastering walls with 'big-character posters', and flogging—even killing—those 'black demons' unfortunate enough to be pointed out by private enemies or to attract attention by their administrative position or personal dignity. Hooliganism and bullyism were encouraged as 'proletarian culture' and signs of being 'the reddest of the reds'; the whole nation was cowed, not by terror imposed from above, but by 'the wrath of the masses' while Mao looked on, hands clean. Charges of 'capitalist-roading' against the sufferers, formulated by these haphazard means, were made true by the logic of *On Practice*: their truth was useful to Mao's purpose.

The logic was pursued to extremes and was condemned by the Russians as anti-Marxist—not without justification. On one hand, the same individual might find himself a member, during the Cultural Revolution, of more than one class: for example, the son of a former factory-owner, discriminated against as bourgeois by birth, might have been doing well enough at technical school to be classed there as an intellectual, and yet, by joining the Red Guards, have been honoured as an outstanding 'proletarian'—a confusion that could never arise if Marx's 'objective laws' on the determination of class held good. On the other hand, the Cultural Revolution was not portrayed as a once-and-for-all measure to 'rectify' the re-emergence of a bourgeois class attitude: there was to be a succession of similar revolutions stretching into an indefinite future. The Chairman seemed to hesitate between two explanations for this daunting prospect. One explanation was that 'embourgeoisement' was a recurrent evil, the other that, without it, there could be no social progress, since 'internal contradictions' are the necessary dynamic of society: progress required scapegoats cast in the role of class enemies for the workers to struggle against—the experience already in the early 1950s of many peasants liquidated as landlords even though they owned no land. There may be inconsistency between these explanations; however, it can no doubt be dismissed by arguing that 'embourgeoisement' will both cease to recur once the transition from socialism to communism is complete and also become superfluous in that final stage of the high revolutionary venture, although I have not found this argument in Mao's works.

The damage wrought by the Cultural Revolution against China's economic development was notorious, that wrought by the first of the recurrent Maoist 'storms'—the 'Flay Lin Piao, flay Confucius' campaign directed by the pro-red and anti-expert Gang of Four (headed by Mao's wife) after their elevation to public eminence at the Tenth Party Congress in 1973—has come to light only in the past year; it entailed, according to the official Peking press, fresh waves of brutality (though more selectively than at the hands of the Red Guards), and, more significantly, extensive patronage of clients by those in positions of influence in the Party, widespread corruption, nepotism and simony, and—most grievous of all—several examples of abandonment of the whole collectivised way of life by communes that quietly dissolved into private management of individual landholdings. Thus, even when it is maintained that the Cultural Revolution's high price for

China's infrastructure was justified by the moral transformation of the nation into 'socialist mankind', Mao's experiment (so original as to be unique in the history of public administration) in trying to govern by methods appropriate to revolution—to apply the Spencerian code of Enmity on the domestic stage—had failed in the end in that *avowed* purpose, not to speak of winning acclaim for its author as leader of world communism. Lenin uttered a warning, under the title *The Importance of Gold* (1921): 'The greatest danger that confronts a revolutionary is exaggeration of revolutionariness, forgetting the limits and conditions in which revolutionary methods are appropriate.' On the other hand, in so far as the Chairman's purpose was to consolidate his power over Party and nation, Lenin's further warning that 'when revolutionaries begin to write "revolution" with a big R and elevate it to something almost divine, they mostly come to grief' was proved wrong: Mao Tsê-tung died in his bed, unimpeached. His successor, it is reported, has adopted as *his* tool of moral suasion a code neither of amity nor of enmity, but of graduated pay scales.

NOTES

[1] *The Principles of Ethics*, London 1892, I pp.322-24; *The Principles of Sociology*, London 1885, II pp.568-642.

[2] Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China*, London 1968, pp.144-46. See also P. C. Huang, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Modern Chinese Liberalism*, University of Washington 1972, pp.56-61.

[3] Cohen, *The Communism of Mao Tsê-tung*, University of Chicago 1964, pp. 7-28; Schram, 'Mao Tsê-tung as Marxist Dialectician', *China Quarterly* No. 29, London 1967, pp.155-65.

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AFGHANISTAN TO HELP WESTERN EUROPE'S ANTI-DRUG DRIVE

by Thomas Land

AFGHANISTAN'S new revolutionary rulers, despite considerable internal domestic problems, are to co-operate with the UN in a programme intended to reduce the illicit flow of Middle East heroin sold on the desperate and prosperous black markets of Western Europe. A report by Dr. Bror Rexed, the executive director of the United Nations' Fund for Drug Abuse Control, has assured the International Narcotics Control Board that Western Europe can rely on the cooperation of the revolutionary rulers of Afghanistan in an international effort to stem the flood of Middle East heroin.

The UN official recently returned from consultations in Afghanistan where he signed an agreement for international assistance worth $350,000 for the prevention of drug dependence in the province of Badakshan.

His description in detail of the agreement and his related conclusions are being considered by a conference of the narcotics control board, held in Geneva during October and November 1978.

Afghanistan has emerged as a principal source of illicit heroin in the cities of the European Community. Narcotics agents believe that the Afghan produce reaches Western Europe through Iran, Turkey and Greece, and that it is being brought into the Community and into other rich European nations in small quantities by the 'guest' workers.

The new, Soviet-orientated administration in Kabul assumed power earlier this year. The attitudes of its 'Marxist' rulers towards co-operation with the international community have been something of a mystery. Now the administration has expressed its determination to stamp out illegal opium cultivation in the country within two years.

There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the government in its desire to achieve that end. But its ability to bring about such a radical transformation in the rural economy and culture of many wild hilltribe regions in the country is another matter.

A spokesman for the narcotics control board has observed that illicit opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan appears to have been on the increase for some time. It has just had another bumper harvest.

Last December, Denmark made available about $400,000 from development aid funds for a project of health care there, aimed at the prevention and treatment of drug dependence. Development aid finance had never been used for projects to combat drug abuse before a Scandinavian initiative earlier last year.

The new agreement of international assistance as described to the narcotics control board seems to be only the first of a series of imminent co-operative arrangements between the UN organisation and the new rulers of Afghanistan.

An official statement released after Dr. Rexed's return to Geneva emphasised the new government's long-term policy to eliminate the cultivation of opium poppy through various income-substitution and other compensatory schemes intended to benefit the peasants. It also promised further UN assistance in law enforcement, agricultural development and the rehabilitation of drug addicts.

Such co-operation is certain to attract the financial and political support of Western Europe. Over a quarter of all illegal heroin seized by the law enforcement agencies of the Community are of Middle East origin. There are fears that Afghanistan and its neighbours may indeed take over from the notorious 'Golden Triangle' region of South-east Asia as the main supplier of the continent.

Specialist delegates attending a recent Interpol conference in Paris were told that the movement of heroin into Europe is far easier from the Middle East than from the Far East because the supplies can be moved overland and because the traffickers make use of large numbers of migrant workers travelling to member countries of the Community.

Interpol has worked out a scheme to stem the tide through a co-operative arrangement linking the customs authorities of Western Europe and the Middle East for the first time.

There are also plans for a computerised system of data processing to digest all reports on the organisation of drug smugglers and the movement of supplies similar to the intelligence pool used by Western Europe against political terrorists.

Funds for the anti-drug drive may well come from the development aid budgets of European countries.

During its first four years of existence, the UN drug abuse control fund received $15m from the United States, $608,000 from Canada and $355,000 from Britain as well as small, token donations from other countries. Norway last year became the second biggest donor with a contribution of $5.4m, deploying development aid finance for that purpose for the first time.

The other members of the Nordic Council have followed Norway's example; and they have also urged prosperous countries elsewhere to join them in a generous and sensible approach to eliminating the supply of illicit drugs by providing opium poppy growers with an acceptable alternative means of livelihood.

Norway expects its initiative to lead to an intensified and co-ordinated international effort to reduce illicit poppy cultivation and to increase food production in the regions of crop substitution. Such projects in the past were financed from strictly limited funds but, as a Norwegian spokesman recently put it, a better use for development aid funds can hardly be found.

Dr. Rexed's message to the Geneva conference was that the new rulers of Afghanistan are seeking such development aid finance, and that they are in a position to help Europe's anti-drug drive.

THE LIVING PLANT

by Cosmo Russell

'MOLEY' (Sir Orme) Sargent wrote in October 1949: 'You people in Strasbourg worry too much. Europe should be like Topsy! Remember—she just growed.'

These words of counsel from the then Permanent Head of the Foreign Office written shortly after the first session of the Council of Europe Assembly in Strasbourg University in August 1949—an epoch-making date, —were timely. How wise he was—and how right. For since then Europe has certainly 'growed'—not physically but politically and economically till it is almost unrecognisable from the handful of pioneers who formed the original Council Secretariat. Growth was again the theme of Winston Churchill in his last great speech to the Strasbourg Assembly in August 1950: 'We are not making a machine; we are growing a Living Plant.'

As one witnesses the hosts of European civil servants passing in and out of the Berlaymont building in Brussels (total Community staff now runs into thousands but is still very much less than our own British civil service and serves nine countries: cost per head to the British taxpayer £12 a year: cost of our own civil service some £800 a year), one might think, of course, that, if all those Eurocrats have a proper job to do, Europe has 'growed' to such a degree that it is perhaps really under weigh at last.

Nearly 30 years ago the Council of Europe started with 10 Member countries; now it has 20. The European Community, generated by the Council of Europe in 1950, started with 6, now has 9 and aims to have 12. The Community started with the Coal and Steel Community in 1950, 'lost a wicket' with the European Defence Community in 1954 and then founded the European Economic Community and Euratom in 1956. In 1970 there was a Treaty merging the three Communities. How does this one Community differ from the older Council of Europe? Briefly, the Council is an intergovernmental association with the task of promoting greater European unity 'in the pursuit of peace' and the maintenance of the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Its principal task, apart from continuing discussion in the Assembly of current issues, has been to conclude European conventions; these are now more than 100.

Incomparably the most important is the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) with its Commission and Court to investigate and adjudicate breaches. Nothing of this nature has existed before, nor does it exist elsewhere in the world, for instance within the United Nations. In contrast, the European Community, all member countries of which must first be members of the Council of Europe, is designed by way of a common market, a customs union, common policies governing coal and steel, a common agricultural policy and other policies covering the whole field of economic and therefore the bulk of political life as we know it today, to further the progressive union of Europe.

The stage of pure intergovernmentalism is passed. The Community has

its own assets. Contributions to the Community budget are not just passive. They earn a proportional return. In the 26 years of its existence since the Coal and Steel Community first started to operate from Luxembourg in August 1952, the Community has inspired the greatest growth in the European economy that this Continent has ever known and has become the greatest trading area in the world. Its activities and adopted measures affect the lives of millions all over the world. Rather than economic statistics at this point, a small example of a non-economic character may show the extent of the change over 30 years. The Council of Europe started in 1949 with 3 permanent French and 3 English translators. French and English were the working languages of the organisation. Today the Brussels Commission works in six languages—French, English, German, Italian, Dutch, Danish—and there is an establishment of 90 translators for each of the first three languages, which is still insufficient to cope with the massive documentation. This is no indication of Parkinson's law. It shows that the business of Europe is no longer purely diplomatic; it has become democratic—the reflection of the hopes and interests of more than 300 million people.

It will appear a virtual truism to suggest that a democratic institution without a directly elected Parliament is a dismembered body, were it not for the fact that democracy as a description is used plentifully by the Communist countries of the world, whose so-called parliamentary institutions are certainly not democratically elected. In fact, European institutions—the Council of Europe and the Community—would never have developed as they have done without their very real parliamentary assemblies. These have every right to call themselves Parliaments. Since the first session of the Assembly of the Council of Europe the members have been drawn from the Parliaments of member countries and in principle have been chosen by those Parliaments, in most cases by election. Britain has been an exception. Members are appointed by the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Leader of the Liberal Party. The immensely valuable work of members of the Council of Europe Assembly since 1949 and of the European Parliament of the Community since 1952—it started as the Common Assembly of Coal and Steel—has never been properly recognised. They have brought knowledge, experience and therefore constructive suggestion and criticism to the work of both institutions.

There would certainly never have been a European Human Rights Convention without the members of parliament of the Council of Europe Assembly, nor would the forthcoming European direct elections ever have materialised without continuing pressure over the years from the European Parliament; nor again would the directly elected members next July be in possession of the powers of budget supervision held by the Parliament now. Here it seems fair to comment that the political parties appear to be currently lacking in wisdom in proposing that the dual mandate, which has existed for nearly 30 years, should not be permitted. Many Conservative members would be fit, able and willing to stand for election both to the House of Commons and the European Parliament. There is nothing uncon-

stitutional in standing for election to two elected bodies. This often happens in local government in Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe. It would be a thousand pities if the first directly elected European Parliament were to be deprived of a proportion of sitting members of the Houses of Lords and Commons. Their experience will be needed more than ever. There is a further reason. Human nature is such that two sets of elected members will undoubtedly find causes of dispute and quarrel unless there is a mutual leaven. Fortunately there is still time for the parties to have second thoughts on this score. Two other considerations: first, the elected Parliament will be three times larger than now. It should be possible to share out Committee work more evenly, thereby giving members with a dual mandate rather more time for their national parliamentary work and for ensuring very necessary contact; secondly, so close is Brussels, where all Committee work takes place outside parliamentary sessions, that it is possible to leave London by early plane in the morning, attend a meeting and be back in Westminster by mid-afternoon in time for division bells.

To return to the present state of the Community: in so doing one may form a preview of the tasks awaiting directly elected members. Clearly when an institution or group of institutions has expanded as the Community has done, growth brings its own problems, while creation itself begets constant change. The Community has a very large budget fed by its own resources from agricultural levies on imported products from third countries and from value added tax charged throughout Community territory while a third source of income comes from a levy on coal and steel revenues. In view of the declining state of these industries this is less than it was. The Community has an immense spending capacity, so much that is contributed by Member countries from the sources above-mentioned returns to them as part of percentage shares in a series of major Funds: the Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, the Social Fund, the Regional Fund, special benefits to firms employing redundant workers from coal and steel, loans from the European Investment Bank. These funds have one general purpose—solidarity. Where a Community region is poor, money will go from rich areas to poor regions through a strict process of selection. For instance, Britain, Ireland and Italy are net beneficiaries from the European Regional Development Fund while Germany is certainly a net donor. Yet France and Germany are major beneficiaries from the Agricultural Fund, the instrument of the much discussed CAP (common agricultural policy). At the same time, one should not ignore the considerable benefit received by Britain in recent years through compensation payments to offset the low value of the pound sterling and thereby to permit food to reach British consumers at lower prices than would otherwise be the case. Current criticism is and will continue to be directed at the CAP, firstly because it continues to absorb by far the lion's share of the Community budget, secondly because by far the greater part goes to buying in food to keep prices steady and to help farmers when prices fall below a certain level.

However, farming is changing rapidly with many small men leaving and large farms taking over and providing more production with fewer workers.

The purpose of the CAP will always be designed to aid farming but, while the system of deficiency payments once used by Britain would not appear practical in a European context, there seems no reason why Community policy should not devise methods to help the consumer since, with inflation running high, lower food prices could clearly be a major means of reducing the cost of living. Of course, the maintenance of a healthy farming industry is of common interest, whatever its size and proportion of total economic activity—a factor which once again recalls the Community's basic purpose —solidarity.

The foregoing has to be emphasised, for there is an inevitable tendency for nationals to seek their own self-interest in the Community. Though natural, if sometimes regrettable, this must be seen against the wider issue. There is an overriding mutual interest recognised for 30 years and increasingly evident the more it is questioned. Whatever their criticism, no Member government in its senses would take their country out of the Community; indeed, the prospect is further enlargement with proposed entry of Greece, Portugal and Spain bringing further problems, but none-the-less essential. A further immense question facing the Community is its relations with its overseas associates still based on the Lome convention and generalised preferences, an inevitable responsibility for the greatest trading area in the world.

The present activity of the Community is therefore quite enough to sustain its momentum and to provide ample work for newly elected members of the Parliament. But one may hope they will keep their sights high. The major issue for the Community over the next few years is not so much whether to forge a new mechanism of currency exchange as an end in itself but to deal with the rising threat of unemployment, which faces all Member countries except Luxembourg up to 1985. All is subordinate to that task. Particularly affected are the young age groups coming on to the labour market for the first time. It would appear that countries worst affected are likely to be Britain and Germany, with estimated levels well above the 2 million mark in 1985.

The Community has created unparalleled growth. It is now passing through a crisis likely to affect first of all the very generations for which it was established in hope. Churchill's Living Plant has taken root. It has flowered. The European Parliament and peoples must now ensure its survival for the benefit of Europe and the world.

[Cosmo Russell has devoted most of his working life to the cause of European union. He has served as Deputy Head of the Information, Press and Political Directorate in Strasbourg and as United Kingdom Correspondent for the Council of Europe in Brussels. Since 1971 he has been a translator for the EEC in Brussels. During 1979 Mr. Russell will be contributing further articles to *Contemporary Review* on events in Brussels and negotiations between Britain and the EEC in particular.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

The Kingdom. James Hanley. Andre Deutsch £3.95. *Jake's Thing*. Kingsley Amis. Hutchinson. £4.95. *The Pardoner's Tale*. John Wain. Macmillan. £4.95. *The Shadow Master*. Elaine Feinstein. Hutchinson. £5.50. *The Virgin in the Garden*. A. S. Byatt. Chatto & Windus. £5.95. *The Lovely Years*. Reine Kunze. (Translated by Ewald Osers). Sidgwick & Jackson. £3.95.

Although he commanded only meagre sales and was appreciated by a very small minority of the reading public, James Hanley ranked as a major novelist during the thirties and forties. His early novel, *Boy*, was impounded by the police and finally withdrawn from circulation. The book is now a collectors' piece; yet at the time, controversy over its alleged obscenity could have had a stultifying effect on his creative work. Instead, he maintained his equilibrium and produced *The Furys*, a family saga in five volumes dominated by the matriarchical Mrs. Fury, one of the outstanding characters in our literature.

Now, after an uncertain progress through the intervening years, James Hanley is re-emerging with a succession of new novels and simultaneous re-issue of past ones, providing an opportunity to assess his adaptability to changing fashions. The plot of his new novel, *The Kingdom*, is basically simple. A corpse lies in one of the upstairs bedrooms at Peny-parc, a remote Welsh smallholding, waiting to be 'screwed down'. The dead man's two daughters have been reunited for the funeral. One of them. Lucy, escaped from a life of domestic servitude by marrying a middle-aged sub-postmaster. Her place at Peny-parc was taken by Cadi, who abandoned a teaching career to care for the irascible parent. Conditions are tough on the farm and the sisters have often wondered why their father, a successful blacksmith, chose to exchange a congenial life at nearby Ty-coch for the barren foothills.

This and other personal imponderables obsess Lucy and Cadi as, in a series of revealing conversations, they seek to strip away the corrosion of long-standing acrimony. They have all but given up the struggle by the time Lucy's husband, David, arrives to endure the discomfort of sleeping on the floor and washing in the kitchen sink. With the three leading players assembled the drama moves purposefully towards its crisis—the deteriorating relationship between the sisters. Disappointingly, the anticipated climax eludes the author's grasp. Soon after Lucy and David have left to return to their comfortable home, Cadi strips down her father's bed and discovers a photograph, the subject of which is a young solicitor's widow well known to her at Ty-coch. In a flash of 'intuition', Cadi assumes this woman to be the cause of their abrupt removal to Peny-parc. Smiles, glances, not thought about at the time, become pointers to an emotional—even a physical love-affair, in the course of which the guilty pair were duly 'fleshed'.

Yet not in the open smithy, surely? And there was the difference of age and social position to be taken into account. Admittedly, anything is possible given the impetus of mutual desire, and that, at any rate, is what the sexually inexperienced Cadi assumes to have taken place. Unfortunately, this arbitrarily

introduced explanation of a very minor mystery raises more queries than it answers and is merely irritating to the contemporary reader accustomed to receive explicit information about such matters. So little emphasis has been laid on the reason for the family 'move' that this unlooked-for solution must rank as a major structural flaw, detracting from the masterly exposition of sisterly animosity and scenic descriptions, as impressive as any in James Hanley's earlier work.

No such ambiguity obscures the issue in Kingley Amis's new novel, *Jake's Thing,* in which the characters are honest to the point of exhibitionism about their sexual and emotional complications. Reduced to essentials, this is the story of a middle-aged don's sexual impotence, a situation which, although described as 'hilarious', is actually rather sad. Jake Richardson has enjoyed a generous assortment of mistresses and three wives when he gradually comes to realise that his interest in the female sex has atrophied. It is not altogether unexpected. The overweight and quintessentially ordinary Brenda, his present spouse, is not mentally equipped to match his intellectual attainments. There do not seem to be any children or young people in the family circle who might provide a sense of perspective; with the result that, trapped in the divide between youth and middle-age, all that he once enjoyed has gone sour on him and even his lectures and research have become perfunctory. Since Jake is apparently rather apathetic about his condition, he might have accepted his diminishing masculinity. Instead, he consults first his G.P. and then a specialist, thus setting down the guidelines for a brutal and witty exposition of both orthodox practitioners and quacks, in which Kingsley Amis scores a bulls-eye nearly every time. The prescribed cure for sexual inability ranges from erotic measurings to petting sessions. Some disturbingly neurotic types emerge at group therapy, like maggots underneath a rancid joint. One of them, the deranged and frustrated Kelly, attempts to engage Jake's attention and his indifference leads to her suicide.

There are two outcomes to this sorry tale. Jake discovers, in bed with one of his former mistresses, that he is not impotent after all and Brenda leaves him for a man with a spirit more congenial to her own. What will become of Jake is not clear; only, it may be surmised, a genuine affection for some woman not yet encountered will cure the forlorn man of his self-inflicted wounds.

There has been a temptation over the years to bracket John Wain with Kinsgley Amis, perhaps because they both published exceedingly witty first novels at about the same time. Now, each with a new novel appearing during the Autumn publishing season, they are linked once again by a common theme — the anguish of spiritual isolation — although John Wain, in *The Pardoner's Tale,* has a very different approach.

His central character, Giles Hermitage, a successful novelist, is in an unhappy predicament. His mistress has left him and without her he is reduced to working through a domestic ritual with the aid of a daily help. Then a window opens. An elderly 'fan', on the point of death, writes begging him to visit her and carry out a dying wish. This is that he shall write a novel based on her own failed marriage. He agrees, more from pity than conviction that the plot as she sees it is a good idea. Fortunately, the grim assignment is lightened by the woman's daughter, Dinah. Almost immediately, she and Giles become lovers and he emerges creditably from the ordeal of her sexual excesses. Dinah is uninhibited to the point of amorality. She enjoys having more than one man at the same time and has attended a V.D. clinic. Giles

should have realised, but does not, that loyalty and compassion are components missing from her emotional make-up. And when she leaves him, in as cruel and casual a fashion as his former mistress, he is left to re-assemble his life for the second time within as many months.

That could have been all; but John Wain has a conjuring trick up his sleeve. Running parallel with Giles' and Dinah's junketings is a second story; that of Gus Howker, languishing on a solitary holiday in Wales following the break-up of his marriage, and Julia Delmore, on the run from her unfaithful husband. Various similarities soon become apparent and the mid-way revelation is that Julia and Gus are fictional characters of a story within a story—in fact the plot of Giles Hermitage's 'work-in-progress'. In many ways it is the stronger and more convincing theme. In both, there is much that deserves admiration. Even so, it must reluctantly be admitted that the 'novel about a novel' is not a narrative device to be recommended, even for such an experienced and resourceful writer as John Wain.

It sometimes happens that a novelist becomes enmeshed in a complicated plot which serves only to diminish his or her particular talents. Such a case is Elaine Feinstein's *The Shadow Master,* which operates simultaneously on several planes, to the detriment of all of them. Members of the 'Golden Wonder' holiday tour have come to Istanbul, a city described with rich pictorial skill. The assortment of tourists provide excellent targets for in-depth characterisation and brittle dialogue: Paul, a student, and Patty, the tour leader, become acquainted in a defective hotel elevator and enjoy a passionate though unsatisfying love relationship: the estranged married couple, Howard and Belinda, clinging pathetically to an outworn relationship: Paul's astrologist mother, his grotesque aunt—these and many more supply the ingredients of high comedy. Unfortunately, they are mere walk-on players in a drama of international intrigue: with idealism and anarchy embodied in the personality of a mysterious individual known as 'Vee'. Much careful and scholarly thought has been given to the philosophic and historical implications of Vee's activities; yet, as is so often the case with a character used as a mouthpiece for propaganda, 'Vee' is a profound bore.

Conversely, sometimes an unlikely theme will inspire a novelist to reach unprecedented heights. The action of *The Virgin in the Garden* by A. S. Byatt, is set in the coronation year of 1953. The characters, mainly connected with a well-endowed Yorkshire school, are struggling to escape from war-time austerity while producing a verse drama about Elizabeth I, written by a member of the staff. Jealousy, ambition and seduction provide the all too familiar motivation. It is to the credit of Antonia Susan Byatt that she invests a band of mediocrities with such a degree of genuine interest and significance that the four hundred and twenty-eight pages of this mammoth novel do not seem one too many.

Ample space is devoted to the discussion of abstract and literary concerns, providing the reader with an exhilarating intellectual experience; there is also much emphasis on the high quality of mind and thought shared by most of the characters, as natural to them as breathing.

Interest centres mainly around the Potter family—dominated by Bill Potter, head of the school's English department, a progressive educationalist capable of inflicting savage psychological wounds on his off-spring—the sensitive and introspective Marcus in particular. His two daughters, Frederica and Stephanie, are the virgins of the title. Both are in love with the author of the verse-play, Alexander Wedderburn; neither is destined to claim more than his passing

interest. Stephanie, the most intellectually brilliant member of the family, settles for marriage with the local curate. Frederica, the younger yet more sexually aware, is obsessed by a craving to be seduced. She almost succeeds; first with a travelling salesman, and later with Alexander. But it is during a casually planned week-end by another member of the staff that she finally achieves her objective through what might be termed a consenting rape, followed by a hymenal haemorrhage, a sordid yet convincing episode which leaves the future of the seventeen-year-old girl very much in question. With the problems of the two sisters only partly resolved the novel seems to end abruptly, leaving behind it the taste of bitter almonds.

After the expansive virtuosity of A. S. Byatt the austere prose of Reine Kunze presents by contrast a series of understatements. As an East German writer whose work achieved an outstanding success in the West, Reine Kunze became an embarrassment to his own government. Their retaliation was to ban his work and expel him from the East German Writers' Union, thus virtually making any further publication of his work impossible. Commendably, Reine Kunze avoids any expression of bitterness. No dramas of persecution or imprisonment obtrude into the present collection of stories, dialogues and vignettes. Instead, the low-key description of day-to-day life in the DDR conveys with a frightening clarity the stultifying effect on the mentality of a repressive regime.

Also Received:

The Women at the Pump. Knut Hamsun. Translated by Oliver and Gunnvor Stallybrass. Souvenir Press. Condor Books £5.95.

Knut Hamsun, the Norwegian novelist born in 1859 and recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1920, is a writer well worth studying for his urbane account of small-town life in Norway during the past century. Oliver and Gunnvor Stallybrass have obviously done a faithful and affectionate translation of *The Women at the Pump*.

The Saviour. Anthony Storey. Marion Boyars. £4.95.

In his new novel, *The Saviour*, Anthony Storey continues his story of a modern Christ from *The Rector* and *The Centre Holds*. Jesus is now seen in maturity, moving among ordinary people, subject to universal human needs. This difficult theme has defeated many experienced writers and it must be admitted that this brief study, in which sexual deviations and excesses form a disproportionate part, is very far from being successful.

SS-GB. Len Deighton. Jonathan Cape. £4.95.

Len Deighton has chosen an unlikely setting for his new novel, *SS-GB*—the hypothetical German occupation of Britain in 1941 following an imaginary surrender by Winston Churchill. But in place of the usual fictional mythology surrounding the events of World War II the author has created a nightmare world in which the British people seek to adapt their day-to-day existence to the invading force. This is so brilliantly successful that it resembles a nightmare from which the reader is glad to awake.

The Reservation. Ward Ruyslinck (translated by David Smith). Peter Owen. £5.75.

Ward Ruyslinck is one of the foremost Dutch poets and novelists. Capably translated by David Smith, *The Reservation* tells the moving story of a modest, middle-of-the-road schoolmaster who finds himself trapped in a web of prejudice and injustice, and is an example of Ward Ruyslinck's best work.

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

POLITICAL GENIUS

Lloyd George: *The People's Champion* 1902-1911. John Grigg. Eyre Methuen. £10.50.

John Grigg was, I am sure, wise to divide this fascinating biography into four volumes. The first, *The Young Lloyd George,* was good and this is better; here we see L.G. at his pre-war zenith or as Winston Churchill said of him in 1911 'the greatest political genius of the day'. No doubt the next instalment will cover the war years and probably the final volume the years out of office from 1922 until his death. This latter period has recently been treated by a young historian, John Campbell, under the title *'The Goat in the Wilderness'* and before that *'The Wizard in the Wings'* by Kenneth Morgan.

I mention these facts because a number of other biographies have been written about this latter period — Keith Middlemas on Baldwin and David Marquand on Ramsay Macdonald (both of these would have been more readable as two volumes rather than one); Martin Gilbert's brilliant and continuing volumes on Churchill; the diaries of Tom Jones and Stephen Roskill's three volumes on Hankey. Having reviewed all the above books in the *Contemporary Review,* it is tempting to consider L.G.'s relations with his contemporaries when he was at the height of his power and how his influence haunted them when he was out of office, but that would be a separate article.

Here in volume two, we see L.G. emerging from the Welsh non-conformist rebel into the greatest British statesman of his time, possibly the finest orator of all time. So many of L.G.'s quips and retorts have become part of political remembrance that I hesitate to quote, but here are two. In his Newcastle speech October 1909 referring to the House of Lords — 'The question will be asked whether *five hundred men, ordinary men chosen accidentally from among the unemployed,* should override the judgement—the deliberate judgement—of millions of people who are engaged in the industry which makes the wealth of the country'; or again 'We will have Home Rule for Ireland and for England and for Scotland and for Wales', he said addressing some Welsh farmers. 'And for hell' interposed a half-drunken voice. 'Quite right. I like to hear a man stand up for his own country.' As A. G. Gardiner said of his humour: 'It leaps out in light laughter'. He prepared his speeches, but unlike Churchill spoke from notes and on some occasions responded to his audience and threw his notes away.

But he was also the most practical social reformer. L.G. was neither a man of dogma nor theory; was never a Socialist nor a pacifist. His approach to politics derives not from Gladstone, but from J. Chamberlain. In a Liberal Cabinet, remarkable for its talent, L.G. was the radical, often supported by Churchill but always the master. John Grigg makes all these points very clear.

In opposition to Balfour's Education Act 1902, in office at the Board of Trade and at the Exchequer he became not only a brilliant parliamentarian, but a man who could master a department, conceive and carry through complicated legislation, whether about merchant shipping, the appointment of Trade Commissioners, the famous budget, Old Age Pensions and National Insurance. How did he achieve this pre-eminence?

First of all, he was industrious. On the Finance Bill of his famous budget there were 554 divisions and he voted in 462 of them. As Grigg says 'despite the complexity of the subject-matter, he was never seriously at a loss'. Then

again he was willing to learn from Germany or any other country. Thirdly, he had an uncanny power of selecting first-rate assistants, whether from the Universities, business or the professions and making them into temporary civil servants. He not only surrounded himself with a personal think-tank, but he set them to work whether their names were Rowntree or Beveridge or whatever. Finally he was a born negotiator and reconciler of differing views. John Grigg is the first biographer to do justice to this side of Lloyd George. Too much has been made of his defects and weaknesses.

It was my privilege to know Lloyd George and Gwilym and Megan in the House of Commons and at Criccieth. I once asked him in the thirties if he detected any young man of promise then in Parliament, he replied: 'No, there is no one here who is hated as much as I once was'; he paused and then added with the famous twinkle, 'there is a young Welshman who is rapidly acquiring that asset, Aneurin Bevan'. Hated or loved, L.G. was never neutral, never a bore and always good company, polemical but no hater. Indeed he was never a strong party man and John Grigg shows more clearly than most biographers, how at the height of his conflict with the House of Lords, L.G. strove to establish a coalition of the best men from all parties by means of a Constitutional Conference which met for six months. He even inserts L.G.'s draft programme of the projected Coalition as an Appendix to this second volume. The programme included many reforms that have now become law, but others like a form of National Service, which are still in debate.

The experiment failed, but ex-Unionist Churchill on the Liberal side and F. E. Smith among the Unionists were sympathetic. L.G. also approached Balfour and Grey. It is interesting to think ahead and remember L.G.'s war and peace-time Coalitions from 1916-1922, which included Churchill, Birkenhead and Balfour, but that must be reserved for the next volume.

Other reviewers with hindsight have already proclaimed their views. For example I quote first Lord Blake because he is a distinguished historian: 'how right L.G. was to see that confrontational politics had already become even at this early stage foolish, futile and frustrating'. I happen to agree because we are both electoral reformers. Secondly, I quote Lord Hailsham: 'It was L.G.'s coalition-mindedness, already latent in 1910, which ultimately led to his prolonged and increasing isolation after 1922. It was also why L.G. destroyed the Liberal Party.' I disagree with Lord Hailsham because he has oversimplified the long-discussed question of party politics and coalitions.

John Grigg has not yet declared himself, but from some hints in his last chapters, he is not opposed in principle to coalitions.

My own view is that L.G. became less and less at home with the Runcimans and Reas, the Asquith family and the Liberal aristocracy. I was at Oxford in the post 1918 years and all the leading statesmen came to the Union; Asquith, Birkenhead, Macdonald and Lloyd George—and Haldane, who accepted office in Macdonald's first Government. His phrase 'Labour has captured the heights' rang through Oxford. It was Labour who destroyed the Liberal Party, not the Radical Lloyd George. In many a miner's house the owner took down the picture of Gladstone and put up the picture of Ramsay Macdonald. It was probably impossible for Lloyd George to create a radical party: the personalities of Ramsay Macdonald and Lloyd George were hardly compatible. But Macdonald supported the Insurance Bill of 1911. The opponents were Keir Hardie, Snowden and Lansbury. There always is and always was a wing of the Labour Party and of course Trade Unionists who were men of dogma. Neither Lloyd George nor Macdonald were doctrinaire men. If events had turned out

differently, if there had been a social democratic programme, if Lloyd George had remained a radical there might have been a closer rapport between Lloyd George and Macdonald before the war and again in 1929 if Lloyd George had not been in hospital. But history did not work out that way and we have been paying for it ever since.

KENNETH LINDSAY

AGENDA FOR A NEW SOCIETY

What's Wrong With The Modern World? Michael Shanks. The Bodley Head, London. £3.95.

There is already a massive literature on the economics of the Seventies. But Michael Shanks' book merits special attention because of the penetrative nature of his analysis, the avoidance of traditional dogma and, in the concluding chapters, his readiness to offer realistic solutions to the nexus of problems which afflict us.

Keynesianism dominates the early part of the book. The point is pungently made that mere stimulation of aggregate demand and proliferation of public works are no longer adequate to cope with the global economic malaise. The 'great inflation' has sounded the death knell for Keynesianism; to think otherwise, as many politicians still do, is to inhabit a cloud-cuckoo land.

On inflation itself there are a number of seminal chapters. The author argues that the main factor in the genesis of inflationary pressures has been the disparity between claims made on the economic system and the ability of the latter to deliver at current rates of technological development. 'Stagflation'—the combination of soaring prices, economic decline and ever-mounting joblessness —is, of course, a phenomenon unique to the Seventies, and it will undoubtedly prove to be very intractable. It is as puzzling to the economists of today as was the Great Depression to their colleagues of the Thirties, trained in the classical schools of Adam Smith and Ricardo.

On economic growth the views expressed are sensible and pragmatic. 'Zero growth' is dubbed a siren song and is deprecated for the chimera which it is. On the other hand, selective growth in appropriate areas should be actively encouraged. The leviathans of large impersonal units and institutions must be continuously assailed; gigantism in business enterprises is to be greatly deprecated; the exemplar set by the multinationals has been baneful. On the other hand the Schumacher dictum of 'small is beautiful' has a contemporary ring and is much more apposite to the final two decades of this century.

The first priority for Shanks' 'rational society' must be the restoration of economic order. This, he claims, can only be achieved by a broad consensus of opinion amongst various groups within the community. Logical discussion and debate flow from a significant degree of social cohesion; they should replace the anarchy, self-interest and weary polemic which currently prevail.

The author is guardedly optimistic about the global economic future. However, he is careful to give no hostages to fortune. He is in the vanguard of those who insist that there must be a new ideology in economics and that this must develop rapidly. Perhaps he is too jejune and ingenuous in a world beset by a unique concatenation of problems. But, as has been said before, the end of hope is the beginning of death, and there is always the possibility that an economist of genius will present himself. In the interim, Michael Shanks' book should be widely read, and I recommend it particularly to professional economists and to aspirant and practising politicians.

JOHN A. LORAINE

AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE OCCULT

Stories of the Occult. Edited by Denys Val Baker. William Kimber. £4.25.

The power of the written word to strike terror into a mature mortal has diminished. Probably M. R. James was the last of the nightmare-providers, and even the visual horrors of the screen have lost currency by an excess of explicitness, so that a film of the calibre of The Haunting (1963), where anonymous noise boomed and door panels bulged without revelation, is rare indeed. Therefore, a collection of occult stories must rely on other qualities than fear to excite the imagination. Mr. Val Baker has made a varied assemblage of stories of matters that go beyond ordinary comprehension in order to surprise and to stimulate, if not to disturb. Some are pleasurably recognised old favourites, like H. G. Wells' *The Flowering of the Strange Orchid,* and it soon becomes obvious that it is the sheer excellence of the writing that will always carry the reader the furthest distance into disturbance. A falling-off in the quality of the writing of just one story will dilute the impact of all the others in a collection of this nature—an accident which Mr. Val Baker has admirably avoided. It is still the traditional stories which are the most effective—Agatha Christie's classic and clever *The Hound of Death,* Rosalind Wade's delicately Jamesian *The Little Ghost,* James Turner's richly decorative *Fly Away Home,* ' "Ladybird, ladybird" she crooned over it, shading it with her floppy white hat, "Fly away home, your house is on fire . . . " It turned on her finger and, for a moment, its eyes were so immense that she could see her face reflected in them, like a very small miniature painting.'

Derek Stanford's allusive *The Sleep of Reason* makes effective use of the darkness that lies within the beams of the sun—'The lawn lay littered with unswept leaves, each glistening back to the moon with the light they had borrowed; and on their crisp, brittle, curling surfaces, it was as if the stars picked out the grains of frost which clung to them.' This is the mood that haunts the imagination, if not one's dreams.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

LIES, BLACK AND WHITE

Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. Sissela Bok, Harvester. £6.50.

Sissela Bok is an authoritative writer in the field of medical ethics. In her book on lying, she examines in a wider context the concept of veracity as it has evolved in society, in its application to concrete events in public and private life. The questions she asks are those central to the difficult moral and emotional choices which confront all human beings at some time. Her book is thoughtful, entertaining and at times provocative. Set in historical perspective, the common justifications for all kinds of lies are evaluated—the lies of parents to children, for instance, those of a doctor to a patient and the more public lies of politicians, governments and social scientists to those whose lot in life they may hope to ameliorate.

On so broad a canvas, Mrs. Bok's analysis of moral issues necessarily varies in depth according to the practical effects of certain public courses of action. In sections on 'Lying for the Public Good' there is a homely quality about her conclusions which include statements like 'if we can then make it clear to others that we stand in no need of white lies from *them,* many needless complications will have been avoided'. Thus isolated, such a quotation does something of an injustice to the seriousness with which the author develops answers

to the question, 'Should a government lie to promote a goal considered vital to the national interest?' For she does provide precedents to political lying in the highest quarters, notably by American presidents from Roosevelt through Johnson to Nixon, each of whose deceptions can be traced back to some earlier agreed 'justification'. But the problem which the notion of 'justified deception' leads to here is a logically intractable one and, when stated as a conclusion, it has a curious ring: 'Some lies—notably minor white lies and emergency lies rapidly acknowledged—may be more *excusable* than others, but only those deceptive practices which can be openly debated and consented to in advance are *justifiable* in a democracy'. A welter of authoritative references, indicated in a footnote, can hardly untie this particular tangle.

Compare, however, Mrs. Bok's concluding assertions on the question of telling lies to the sick and dying. 'The perspective of needing care is very different from that of providing it. The first . . . requires a stringent honesty in all but a few carefully delineated cases. The second sees the need to be free to deceive . . . It is only by bringing these perspectives into the open and by considering the exceptional cases explicitly that the discrepancy can be reduced . . .' To her chapters on medical ethics the author brings a wealth of experience and the fruits of research at a level undreamed of in her political and other inter-personal philosophising. A lecturer at the Harvard Medical School, she is a member of the Ethics Advisory Board to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Her thoughts on medical morality carry conviction and she has not hesitated to perform that most hazardous of all ethical tasks, make non-transcendental deductions from broad types of cases. The recognisably utilitarian stance exists alongside a humane, balanced judgement. The reader is left wanting a longer book on medical morality from this dedicated writer who can make her evidence and its significance admirably accessible to specialist and lay public alike.

BETTY ABEL

NOT SO COMMONPLACE

Anthony Trollope: His Art and Scope. P. D. Edwards. Harvester Press. £8.50.

'Scope' rather than 'art' was granted to Trollope by most literary critics of the past, both before and after they were stunned by a reading of his posthumously-published *Autobiography*, which spoke of novel-writing as a job to be tackled like any other, at so many words per quarter of an hour.

'Scope' could hardly be denied to a novelist who could range from the cloistered calm of *Barchester Towers* to the ruthless, sordid commercial world of *The Eustace Diamonds* and *The Way We Live Now*.

But 'art'? Surely that was another thing altogether! Had not Henry James, the high priest of fiction, deplored Trollope's frivolous attitude, had not Trollope himself said that a 'novel should give a picture of common life enlivened by humour and sweetened by pathos'? A far cry indeed from the high claims made for the novel by Flaubert, James and Ford Madox Ford. Trollope seemed condemned out of his own mouth. 'When I sit down to write a novel I do not at all know, and I do not very much care, how it is to end'.

There were always a few dissenting voices against the prevailing critical orthodoxy of consigning the creator of Barsetshire to a worthy place in the second rank. Quiller-Couch, for instance, in the Twenties spoke of Trollope's 'originality' and 'power', but in the context of deploring his relative unpopularity and the shame of there being then no collected or complete edition.

The popularity was not long in returning, starting with the war-years of the

early Forties, when cabinet ministers and lesser mortals found comfort in the fictional world of Barsetshire amid the stark realities of the Blitz and the ration-book. Since then, a new public has been introduced to Barsetshire by means of television adaptations, and a new generation of literary critics, more scholarly than the old, has seen beyond Trollope's own modest frankness in the *Autobiography*, has read the novels afresh with more than Quiller-Couch's affectionate care, and has come to realise that the 'scope' and the 'art' are really complementary.

Among these recent critics, P. D. Edwards, of the University of Queensland, commands a meritorious place. 'Art *and* scope' he insists in his excellent, well-researched study, and he is surely right. He is as frank as his subject about Trollope's poorer work: 'distinct failures' he calls a dozen of the novels, including *The Prime Minister*, which some recent critics have praised, perhaps beyond its deserts.

The Warden and *Phineas Finn* are among the novels which Professor Edwards sees as 'falling little short of Trollope's best'.

Which are the very best, then? Professor Edwards names seven, and these seven he claims to be 'among the major Victorian novels', a claim which he argues with considerable force.

It is evidence of the critic's own 'scope', his breadth of mind, that these seven include both *Barchester Towers* and *The Way We Live Now*. Another 'best' he sees, and probably justly, in *The Eustace Diamonds*—which incidentally first saw the light as a serial in the *Fortnightly Review* between 1871 and 1873.

R. C. CHURCHILL

ROCKING THE CRADLE

The Rocking of the Cradle, and the Ruling of the World. Dorothy Dinnerstein. Souvenir Press. £5.00.

Dorothy Dinnerstein, who is Professor of Psychology at Rutgers University, has laid before an unwilling and ungrateful world an unusual and difficult book whose intellectual background is Solomon Asch's *Social Psychology* and the whole range of psychoanalytical theory. In tone it is very like the humanistic analytical literature of Fromm, but she does not really share his fundamental optimism about the sanctity and beauty of life on earth. She is preoccupied with the dark future—with, no less, the pollution and ultimate destruction of our planet. She takes it as given that we are on a crash course to annihilation. If one understands her aright, and she says so repeatedly, in terms, the remedy for man's destructiveness lies in a basic restructuring of our male-female arrangements. The female domination of infant and early child care, she argues, has crippling consequences for individuals and for society as a whole: men must share equally in the child's main initial contact with humanity and with nature. Because this is a work of theory only, its *practical* implementation is relegated to one fairly breathtaking footnote, 'By "more efficient societal arrangements," I do not mean round-the-clock public nurseries. I see these as an emergency measure to help disastrously isolated mothers and children. What I mean is reorganising our primary group life into larger units, so that child care can be shared within stable close-knit communities of village or extended-family size and coherence.'

Certainly, of course, as Professor Dinnerstein says, people are, anyway, moving towards shared early parenthood; but she wants their effort to be fortified by her insights, feeling, as she does, that no societal compromise which changes *other* features of woman's condition, while leaving her role as first

parent intact, will get at the roots of asymmetrical sexual privilege. She proposes, in fact, a tampering with Motherhood, arguing that its powerful postpartum mechanisms, which are neither specifically human, nor designed to do more than guarantee the brute survival of the newborn, are forced to carry a peculiarly human, and wildly disproportionate psychological weight which produces passive, submissive women and destructive men. Dinnerstein's Motherhood gives us boys who will grow into blustering childish men, unsure of their grasp on life's primitive realities, and it gives us girls who wll grow into childish women, unsure of ther right to full worldly adult status. By Dinnerstein's family hearth, together 'cozily interdependent male and female quasi adults are letting the fate of our species slip through their fingers.' What has evolved is a *masquerade*, she says, where the adult world is merely a solemn recreation of the child's-eye view of what adult life must be like. The anger of Professor Dinnerstein's world view surfaces in the language of her assertion that 'The hate, fear, loathing, contempt, and greed that men express toward women so pervade the human atmosphere that we breathe them as casually as the city child breathes smog.' Furthermore, women actually share these anti-female feelings, because 'we, like men, had female mothers.'

MOLLY TIBBS

SHORTER REVIEWS

Western Liberalism (Longman. £6.95, paperback). This 'history in documents from Locke to Croce' in some 800 pages has been edited by Professor E. K. Bramsted and Dr. K. J. Melhuish. The former has written a long and useful General Introduction, except for that section on 'Classical economists and utilitarians' by Dr. John R. Dinwiddy. One or other of the Editors are also responsible for the Introductions to the various sections, namely Roots of liberalism—the eighteenth century, Classical liberalism, Major aspects of continental liberalism in the nineteenth century, Liberty and democracy and Epilogue: Liberalism challenged, revised and maintained 1900-1950. In this last section, apart from Croce, extracts are quoted from J. M. Keynes, Thomas Mann, Lord Beveridge, Karl Mannheim, F. A. Hayek, Gilbert Murray and Salvador Madariaga. This collection is 'intended to throw light on both the basic tenets and the variety of liberal thought and ideology'. It is certainly a very useful volume in this regard although there seem to be some obvious omissions from the extracts. Why, for example, is Burke left out? Particular interest to the Anglo-Saxon reader is the attention given to the lesser known development of liberalism in nineteenth century Germany.

The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (Fontana/Collins. £2.95, paperback). This ambitious volume of nearly 700 pages, edited by Dr. Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass, takes some 4,000 key terms from across the whole range of modern thought, sets them within their context, and offers short explanatory accounts (anything from ten to a thousand words) written by experts, but in language as simple as can be used without *over*-simplification or distortion'. All accounts have the authors' initials, and they can be identified in what is certainly a distinguished list of contributors. The general method appears to be to give a short entry to a great subject, e.g. Christianity, and then refer particular characteristics or links to other relevant entries, e.g. Catholi-

cism and Protestantism. The subject really gets divided too much into pieces. There are also, of course, numerous entries on minor topics. Over such a wide field, selection is open to doubts. Why, for example, is Watergate included and spiritualism omitted among the titles? Nonetheless the work usefully fills a big gap in reference books.

The Stuffed Owl (Dent. £3.95). This classic 'anthology of bad verse', selected and arranged by D. B. Wyndham Lewis and Charles Lee, was first published in 1930 and enlarged in 1948. It is now published in the Everyman's Library, and deserves to be widely read and enjoyed by the present generation. The compilers, in their Preface, point out that they are concerned with good bad verse, 'innocent of faults of craftsmanship', perpetrated by great or established poets from Cowley to Tennyson. There are gaps: Milton and Pope, for example, appear to be exonerated. There is, perhaps, satisfaction and even pleasure to see poetic genius lapse into the commonplace and even lower. What makes good bad verse? The compilers find that 'many exquisite *nuances* of badness unite to make bad verse. The most obvious and predominating tint, of course, is bathos: that sudden slip and swoop and slither down a well buttered slide, from the peaks into the abyss'. If this book does not irritate, it will greatly amuse.

Cardus in the Covers (Souvenir Press. £5.50). This collection of articles by Sir Neville Cardus, the distinguished writer and commentator on cricket, follows his earlier volume, *Cardus on Cricket* which reproduced pieces written between 1920 and 1929. This new collection covers also the twenties and more particularly cricket and cricketers during the late forties and the fifties, culminating in the Coronation Test series of 1953. The literary quality and style alone make Neville Cardus a pleasure to read.

The Chameleon (The Eighteen Nineties Society. £25). At the trials of Oscar Wilde, the Prosecution made effective use of his association with a 'decadent' undergraduate magazine named *The Chameleon*, which appeared only once, in November 1894, in an issue of one hundred copies. It is thus an extremely rare item, and the Eighteen Nineties Society has perpetuated that rarity in a most beautifully produced facsimile edition for collectors. Printed on Velin d'Arches mould-made paper, it is provided with a new loose section, consisting of Mr. H. Montgomery Hyde's Introduction and Mr. Timothy d'Arch Smith's recondite essay. The leading contribution is Wilde's aphorisms, *Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young*—'No crime is vulgar, but all vulgarity is crime. Vulgarity is the conduct of others.' *The Priest and the Acolyte*, the work of *The Chameleon's* editor, John Francis Bloxam, an Oxford undergraduate, is that short story which Wilde, in damaging reply to Edward Carson, considered *worse* than immoral, because it was badly written. Lord Alfred Douglas signed his contribution of two poems, whose lines, 'Of all sweet passions Shame is loveliest' and 'I am the love that dare not speak its name', were a gift to the Prosecution. Many items remain anonymous, but the names of Lionel Johnson and Max Beerbohm are hazarded as their likely authors.

The Chameleon was the last expression at that period of open urning love: a certain complacency had given a sense of false security, but from that searing time, changeable, exotic, ambivalent chameleons were banished from public mythology. Lions, but certainly not panthers, were safer to encounter. (R.W.-E.)

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CONTEMPORARY CHINA

by Peter Temple-Morris, M.P.

AS China enters the world's stage from numerous directions it is helpful to have some sort of appreciation of what is going on there, and the potential effect this can have on the outside world. Much has been written about China, ranging from the high-flown leader to lengthy expositions about the more boring aspects of the Chinese rural economy. Whilst it is impossible to cover all the ground in one article, I will endeavour here to deal with the essentials.

The basic situation today is that after 10 years of suffering and lack of progress, China feels her potential strength and wants to use it both for the benefit of her people and the improvement of her position in the world. Domestically, she concentrates on a programme headed by the 'Four Modernisations' namely, Agriculture; Industry; Defence; and Science and Technology. The magnitude of the issues and programmes involved, bearing in mind the nine hundred million population, the backward state of most areas of the economy and the absolute need not to progress so fast that political control of all these people is lost, are positively enormous.

As Chinese military and technical delegations pour into this and other countries on a mass of different missions, one example will suffice. By 1985 it is intended to send 1,000 undergraduates to the United Kingdom alone and 200 post-graduates. Even more will be going to the USA and large numbers to other countries at a cost of roughly £2,000 p.a. per student. And what of the industry to be created to use the talents of those students when they return and the political attitudes of so many people exposed to the ways of the West? These and other questions are manifest and fascinating. The central point for the Chinese (and indirectly the West, too) is not to go too far too fast. Up to now, in their revolution, the Chinese have preached and practised self-reliance. Their strength is in their self-sufficiency and their reluctance even to borrow money. This is beginning to change in the face of the programmes involved but it is absolutely essential that a leadership, which is often ageing and has wanted for a long time to be able to take its present political course, should not rush. It is not a Chinese thing to hurry any more than, to quote but one current example, it is Iranian.

A bit of history is necessary to set the stage. The so-called Cultural Revolution took away ten years (1966-76) from modern Chinese progress. What was begun for mainly domestic political reasons was allowed to get out of hand by an ageing leader and, latterly, passed right out of his control. Its effects were traumatic and felt in all institutions from school to factory to commune. Academic examinations ceased, pupils were encouraged to challenge their teachers, the political dialogue became more important than production on the shop floor, and so on. As the Red Guards ran around spreading havoc, many of the Chinese establishment kept low profiles for obvious reasons whilst others sided with the Gang of Four, and their purging is still going on. One man above all others stood out for sanity and that was the Prime Minister, Chou en Lai, and it is not for nothing that the Chinese refer to him as 'beloved', as distinct from Chairman Mao who is 'wise'. The frustration all this must have caused the present leadership, and not least Vice-Premier Ten Hsiao-ping, is relevant in assessing the vital political factor of the pace of modernisation. The drastic effects of the Cultural Revolution on the country's development and the education of its qualified manpower goes without saying.

As to the Chinese Government and administration, the Communist Party is all-important. Only about 5 per cent of the population belong to it and admission is closely controlled and limited to those judged suitable. The Chairman of the Central Committee (Hua Kuo-Feng) is de facto Head of State. The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee is the source of real power in the Party and thus the country and upon it sit Chairman Hua and the other principal figures. The Party's apparatus spreads down through the provinces to every institution so that, for example, every factory has its Party Committee which will have a considerable say in the running of it. Turning now to the Government, the supreme authority is the People's Congress, although this seldom meets. Underneath it and the source of real government power is the State Council presided over by Chairman Hua in his capacity of Premier. This was, of course, the post formerly held by Premier Chou en Lai under Mao as Chairman of the Party, so that the posts of Chairman and Premier are now united. Under the Premier on the State Council come the Vice-Premiers and Ministers of the Government. Underneath the State Council local government is on the same pattern with a series of People's Congresses and Provincial Councils going downwards and ending in the local People's Councils who, during the Cultural Revolution, were replaced or challenged by revolutionary committees. Each factory or institution will have its party committee and also its revolutionary committee, although these are now being phased out; their role increasingly passing to managers who will be responsible to the Party Committees and better able to run their institutions without constantly having to show their revolutionary ardour.

That brings us to the present domestic situation where there has been a total change of emphasis since the smashing of the Gang of Four. This is a continuing process but it can roughly be said that the present leadership got on course in 1977 and the effects became clearly visible inside and out-

side the country in 1978. What is that course and how are the major economic and social activities progressing? First of all, Education. We now see a striking resurgence of traditional values at all levels. Discipline is strong even if classes at Primary and Secondary level are too large (50-55) with far too much reliance on learning by rote. There is now an 11 plus examination when the brightest are selected for 'grammar schools' with extremely competitive examinations for scarce university places. A good example of this is in the fairly normal secondary school we visited. It had 2,800 pupils and of the 700 in the top tier of the school, 10 had sat the university entrance examination. Seven passed and of those, five obtained places which means that 0.7 per cent of school leavers from this school got to university. There is also fierce competition to get into the Army. In 1977 nobody from the school managed this but in 1976 they supplied four recruits.

For everyone else an assigned job in factory or commune in some part of the country, with strict rules as to transfer, would be the order of the day. For such a talented and attractive people who, notwithstanding this, appear extremely happy with their lot, it is striking how tolerant they are of the considerable amount of control exercised upon them. Where they work, live, when they marry (28 for men, 25 for women) and how many children they have (two seems the acceptable norm) to give but a few examples, are all matters for the State. They accept this and appear happy in spite of a lack of Western-style comfort. A sewing machine is a luxury and a television or radio even more so. That said, their food and restaurants (although surely for the privileged few) are as good as ever and ordinary people enjoy their alcohol and pack out most places of entertainment even if they are about to see yet another play or opera about the Revolution. The Chinese are extremely polite, particularly to visitors, and if any nation appears self-confident and self-possessed, it is them. The effect of change on this settled society could be very considerable and to judge the extent and pace of it correctly is absolutely vital for the present government.

The communes are by far the most impressive thing to be seen in China. Beginning as such in 1958, this system organises the agricultural population, which is 87 per cent of China's nine hundred million, into communities of some fifty to seventy thousand people. These units constitute a massive social experiment where areas are taken over, cultivated, industrialised as necessary and administered by the commune—literally a combination of district council, farm and factory, all under one umbrella. The dedication which is shown and the very high, if over-manned, standard of cultivation is a tribute to the system. Any modernisation involving almost by definition a need for less manpower, creates obvious problems for many millions at present settled in the countryside. To give just a few details of the present situation, one large commune we saw extended to over 160 square kilometres and was made up of 83,000 people in 18,000 households. Grain production was the main activity and its disposal for the benefit of the State and the commune is a complex thing about which many writers have differed in detail and we ourselves received two different explanations in two different communes.

A fair summary would be that there is a form of tax by way of a small proportion of the crop (5 per cent) being sold cheaply to the State, or cash equivalent being paid. The commune is then entitled to keep sufficient grain according to agreed formulas for its own consumption and its reserves. The balance can then be sold to the State at a substantially higher price, being a good example of the fact that one of the most commercial nations on earth has not destroyed incentives, even in the course of the world's most extreme communist revolution. Whilst the rural communities are financially worse off than their brothers in the town, they have many perks, not least that they alone can own their own homes. In the second commune we visited, the average annual household share of the commune's collective income was 750 Yuan (roughly £275, although rates of exchange mean little in terms of comparison). This was supplemented by 100-150 Yuan a year from the sale of private produce, e.g. each family can keep up to six pigs. These are sold freely at market, the only limitation being that they cannot be bought for resale by anyone other than the State.

By comparison the income of an urban family was made up as follows: the son earned over 70 yuan per month (840 yuan p.a.) in a steel mill; the wife earned about 70 yuan per month (840 yuan p.a.) in a shoe factory; the daughter earned 36 yuan per month (432 yuan p.a.); the 64 year old father, a retired steel worker, received a 42 yuan per month (504 yuan p.a.) pension which was 70 per cent of his wage on retirement. The family paid 7.90 yuan per month rent which was about 3½ per cent of the family income, spending 75 yuan on food and 7.5 yuan on utilities per month. They were able to save 50 yuan per month and were hoping to buy a television set soon, already having a sewing machine.

Industrially, China is backward and there is much scope for modernisation. However, here one is dealing with total control of the economy in a country which is virtually self-sufficient. Prices are constant, inflation is unknown, the yuan is based on five basic commodities (rice, millet, cooking oil, fuel and cotton cloth) and the Government can do anything it wants. Far easier to have a bit of over-manning than go through all the torments of 'job creation schemes'. Whilst in conventional terms it will be a long time before China can compete industrially with the world, the power of a country which decided, for example, to switch so many millions to the production of a given commodity and export that commodity at a given price, should not be underestimated. If and when China really gets going as an exporter the effects could be awesome to say the least. Whilst industrially, and for that matter militarily, China has a long way to go with her modernisation, we should not forget that we are dealing with one of the potentially most resourceful and industrious nations on earth. However, the most interesting points to arise here are political in that with all the talk of expansion and with a massive home market to absorb it as necessary, there must be some effect on the people. At present they are happy, orderly and even if they are pretty girls working in a foundry they are better off generally than before. As living standards go up and mechanisation increases, it is to be asked whether it will be that easy to give people something to do

by 'levelling the Himalayas', as mentioned by Vice-Premier Li. In the factories one saw most clearly the way that it is at present possible to run China rather like one great schoolroom. Work points, pictures, and praise on notice boards, flowers presented, small financial rewards and so on. How long it will continue to be possible to run China like a school is a fascinating question and very much bound up with the success of her industrial and, for that matter, agricultural policy.

I now turn to foreign policy. Basically, there is a realisation that for the first time in the history of China she is a world power, but a corresponding frustration that she is still under-developed and not as powerful as she would like to be. China is impatient to assume a fuller role which realistically will be as one of four Super Powers although not expansionist, if they hold true to their announced intentions. They see the other additional Super Power as Europe. Any challenge to the realisation of these aspirations is bitterly resisted, e.g. Russia, and no-one fears a totalitarian like a totalitarian.

In this regard China's mission at the moment is undoubtedly to bring the attention of the West to bear upon the fact that Russia is 'winning', which Russia certainly is. A Russia sandwiched between a united Europe and China is a very different matter. The Russian role in Vietnam, one of China's traditional spheres of influence, is a good example of current Chinese concern. The immediate success or otherwise of China's efforts will be recorded in the USA and they must have at least contributed towards the policy debate which one gathers has been going on in Washington. China's intense dislike and fear of Russia gives her some odd allies, e.g. Pol Pot's Cambodia and UNITA in Angola, but it will be a long time before Europe is able to fulfil the role China wants of her.

With a Peace Treaty at last signed, China's relations with Japan are both important and interesting. There is already much contact between the two countries, being major trading partners and with Peking swarming with Japanese tourists. That said, there is little doubt that China has no great affection for the Japanese, although there appears to be little rancour over the appalling treatment meted out by the Japanese during the War, e.g. to Nanking. Perhaps the key is that for people who have suffered so much this was but another such period of their history and now practical politics are far more important. For Japan, China is an enormous market and for China there are obvious technological advantages to be gained from the Japanese. Also Japan is an ally against Russia and no doubt a united China feels more confident with Japan than before and is therefore content to see a certain amount of Japanese rearmament and a developing commercial relationship. However, I would forecast trouble if Japanese rearmament, conventional or nuclear, or anything else at any time, removed the present feeling of Chinese confidence and superiority.

As to war, the Chinese are undoubtedly fatalistic about this, which might have something to do with the fact that orientals have a greater tradition of pessimism than us optimists! They see war as inevitable, but doubtless

if some of the things in the world happened that they want to happen, its 'postponement' would get longer and longer. I have little doubt they would fight alone if they had to and doubtless then, in the words of Vice-Premier Li Hsien Nien, 'if there is war and you die tomorrow, you can always go to a good restaurant and have dinner tonight'.

Hong Kong undoubtedly suits China's purposes and is, in the words of Hong Kong industrialist, Sir Lawrence Kadoorie, 'a free Chinese territory under British management'. It is interesting that the extremely rich Dick Lee of Hong Kong is, with others, a member of the People's Congress as an overseas Chinese. The situation can be summed up by the story of a Hong Kong Chinese who went to see Premier Chou en Lai and said: 'I am now a small capitalist in Hong Kong and so what can I do for the Revolution?' and got the reply: 'Go back to Hong Kong and become a big capitalist!' The Chinese are traditional traders, seem to enjoy a bit of capitalism and, to quote the recent example of Vietnam, they resent it being taken away from them.

Provided China continues quietly on her present path there is certainly no danger of an extreme solution for Hong Kong, which should have many years of useful service left and may even find some permanent role when 'British management' ends.

The effect China can have on the world is considerable in every way. We must be aware of this and ready to face up to it. At the same time the key is really as to whether or not we accept what the Chinese most vehemently say, that they are not expansionist. Naturally this does not apply to their own traditional sphere of influence and they obviously wish to win friends and influence people, e.g. Tanzania, and would do so more if they could afford to. That said, I don't think that they are at present expansionist in any sort of menacing sense.

I end where I began by saying that it is essential for China to modernise in such a way that she keeps control of her nine hundred million people. Up to now the Communist Revolution has justified itself as the best method of effecting such control. The Chinese seem happier and more content than most of us. A new chapter in one of the world's longest national histories is about to begin. Wherever it ends, the consequences for all of us will be enormous.

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THE HAPLESS GIANT: THE CDU OPPOSITION IN WEST GERMANY

by Gordon Smith

OF all parties serving out their time in opposition, the position of the West German Christian Democrats may appear the most enviable. At the last federal election, in 1976, the CDU-CSU almost won an absolute majority of the vote on its own account (48.6 per cent as against 44.9 per cent in 1972), a performance which in most other countries would have easily ensured that the party was returned to power. The strength of Christian Democracy is confirmed in other ways as well. The CDU-CSU now controls six of the ten Länder, and that superiority is reflected in the federal upper house, the Bundesrat, which—in directly representing the voice of the Länder governments—gives the Christian Democrats a potential stranglehold over a wide range of the federal government's legislation. To support the conclusion that Christian Democracy is the dominant force in the Federal Republic, we only have to refer to the forthcoming contest for the federal presidency. That election (decided by an electoral college composed of the Bundestag deputies plus an equal number of delegates from the Länder) is already regarded as a foregone conclusion in favour of the CDU-CSU candidate.

Faced with this evidence, we might recall Churchill's rallying-call to the Conservatives before the 1951 election—only 'one more heave' should be needed to throw out the coalition of the Social Democrats and the tiny Free Democratic Party which has tenaciously held on to power since 1969. But the impression that the Christian Democratic Union, with its Bavarian sister-party the Christian-Social Union, is just about poised to resume its 'rightful' place in government is quite misleading. From 1949 until 1969 the Christian Democrats came to regard themselves as the natural party of government—it could just as well be the case that the full sequence requires a twenty-year spell in opposition.

The paradox of the 'hapless giant', electorally strong yet denied governing power, can be explained in various ways. One immediate answer is to be found by contrasting the leadership of the two major parties. Whilst Helmut Schmidt has gone from strength to strength since he replaced Brandt as chancellor in 1974, the CDU leader, Helmut Kohl, has never quite been able to overcome his origins—a provincial minister-president whose sole experience of government has been in Länder politics. Schmidt has been able to develop the stature of a European statesman and to win the reputation of being a 'strong' chancellor in dealing with the domestic problems of terrorism and the economic difficulties of the past few years. Kohl, on the other hand, has had to be content with sniping at the government's record, exposing the lapses which have certainly occurred, but without being able to offer a convincing alternative.

Above all, the SPD stands out for the unity of the party leadership, a

division of labour between Chancellor Schmidt and Willy Brandt who has remained chairman of the party. Kohl, in contrast, continually has to watch for signs of erosion to his authority; since its foundation under Adenauer the CDU has always had a decentralised character which allows the CDU Land leaders a fairly independent position of power, and any one of them to any CDU leader is provided by the CSU in Bavaria, and for many years may see himself as a potential chancellor-candidate. An additional vexation Franz-Josef Strauss (now heading the Bavarian government) has been able to exploit the wrecking potential of 'his' CSU. Unable to win the CDU-CSU federal leadership for himself, he is at least able to ensure that the incumbent has a difficult time: Kohl is the one now made to suffer.

The leadership question helps to explain why the Christian Democrats lack conviction at critical junctures, but it is perhaps the present balance of the party system which presents the CDU with its most intractable problem—just how to overcome or disperse the SPD-FDP alliance. Only three parties are represented in the Bundestag, a pattern which looks unlikely to change, so that the range of coalition possibilities is sharply restricted. For the CDU there are effectively only two favourable chances: either to gain an outright majority in the Bundestag or to win over the Free Democrats. In fact, the 1976 election gave the CDU-CSU its second-best result ever; only in 1957, with Adenauer at the height of his popularity, did the party manage to achieve an absolute majority of the vote. There is a nagging doubt: can the party realistically expect to repeat, let alone improve upon, its result in 1976?

That uncertainty increases the attraction of working for a coalition with the Free Democrats. The Länder elections held in 1978 were widely regarded as a pointer for the future, for if the FDP were to be severely mauled in the Länder then it would have to reconsider the party's position as the loyal and junior coalition partner of the SPD, a role which can easily lead the electorate to treat the FDP as a mere appendage to the larger party. The first two of the four 1978 Land elections did show the FDP to be in a sorry condition, for the party was excluded from the Land assemblies of both Hamburg and Lower Saxony. The CDU was naturally cock-a-hoop: if the FDP were to disappear on a federal level as well, then in the resulting two-party situation the CDU-CSU would almost certainly be in a majority. Alternatively, the FDP would have to extricate itself quickly from the SPD alliance to preserve its identity—and so fall willingly into the waiting arms of the Christian Democrats.

Yet the two subsequent elections, in Hesse and Bavaria, did not maintain the hopes of the CDU. One reason was that the 'Green list' ecological movement which had cost the FDP critical support in Hamburg and Lower Saxony seemed already to have become a spent force by the time of the two autumn elections. In Hesse and Bavaria the fortunes of the FDP appear to be on the mend. Perhaps, after all, the party should not take precipitate action; a rash move to independence or 'changing sides' might only succeed in alienating FDP supporters who, since 1969, have become attuned to the social-liberal alliance. For the CDU the prospects in the run-up to the 1980

federal election are discouraging if the FDP is not to be wooed over. As long as the Free Democrats make a reasonable showing in the six Länder elections that have yet to be held and the governing coalition can avoid a major political crisis, there is no good reason for deserting the SPD.

Does that conclusion mean that the CDU-CSU has no alternative but to soldier on just as it has for the past ten years? Are there no chinks in the party system which can be levered open? Interestingly, two possible answers have been presented by Strauss. One, the less plausible, is that Strauss himself would be the fitting chancellor-candidate for the combined CDU-CSU. That the 'Strauss solution' should be unconvincing derives less from an assessment of his political gifts—arguably he is the one leading figure in the opposition who has a proven political presence—but rather from the unacceptability of his right-wing views for a large section of the CDU faithful. That barrier is compounded by the hindrance facing any potential leader from Bavaria—the particularist image cultivated in Bavaria is tolerated, but it could hardly be favoured as a tone-setter for the Federal Republic as a whole. The outstanding success of the Christian-Social Union in Bavaria, where the party takes 60 per cent of the vote, can be largely ascribed to its ability to play upon localist loyalties, but by the same token the federal role of the CSU is also circumscribed.

The second solution propounded by Strauss takes a different tack altogether and is based on the fact that over a range of issues the CSU is well to the right of the CDU as a whole. His alternative may be described as a 'block strategy', the hard alternative to the 'soft strategy' of attracting the FDP into coalition. Strauss's formulation is based on the premise that the FDP is indissolubly wedded to the coalition with the SPD—a view which is difficult to dismiss. The conclusion that Strauss has drawn is quite radical: if the SPD-FDP block has taken on an air of permanence, then Christian Democracy should respond in kind by fashioning its own 'block' alliance—not, however, by stamping another party out of the ground but in simply refurbishing the CSU as a fourth party, by letting it 'go federal'.

On that model of the fourth party the CDU and CSU would compete alongside one another. Whilst the CDU would continue to attract the moderate vote, thus acting in competition with both the SPD and the FDP around the centre of the electoral spectrum, the CSU would be free to cultivate an explicitly national-conservative following. In aggregate, the two 'union' parties would only need a marginal increase on the present CDU-CSU vote in order to gain an overall majority.

It has to be admitted that Strauss's version of the block strategy has plausibility. The reservoir of right-wing support may not be large, but with the bastion of committed support in Bavaria a federal CSU (or the same party under another label) would not run the risk of becoming just one more splinter party on the nationalist or extreme right of which there have been several examples in the Federal Republic. Yet, despite the attractions of the block strategy, could not the scheme just as easily misfire?

It is one thing to devise a 'theoretical game' way of winning, but quite

another coolly to contemplate the deliberate demolition of the strongest Christian Democratic party in Western Europe. Moreover, once the process of division was set in train, the momentum might prove impossible to control: memories of the disastrous fragmentation of the party system in the Weimar Republic are quite sufficient to give politicians in all parties the cold shudders.

Strauss has been forced to realise that his alternative block system is a non-starter unless the CDU gives positive agreement, and that blessing is likely to be withheld. So much was made apparent when, shortly after the 1976 election, the CSU made a move to complete independence by unilaterally dissolving the common CDU-CSU parliamentary party in the Bundestag: in the end Strauss and the CSU were forced to recant. Kohl's reaction to the attempted break was particularly and naturally hostile: he realised that his own credibility as party leader was at stake, and Strauss has made no secret of his views on Kohl in this respect. But the alternative is that the animosity between the two rivals has to be contained within the 'union' alliance, without any sign of a permanent resolution, and a continuing debilitation of CDU leadership from which only the SPD benefits.

These internal difficulties of the party and the failure to make headway in weakening the governing coalition do not necessarily mean that the CDU-CSU is bound to lose the 1980 election, even though the pattern for that contest is rapidly taking shape. It is conceivable that the party will sweep all before it in the coming Länder elections, and it may take new heart in winning the presidential contest. Perhaps Christian Democracy could benefit from a rise in the temperature of political conflict—the continuing issue of law and order, the employment of radicals in the public service, evidence of growing trade union militancy.

Will the Christian Democrats continue hopefully to look towards the centre and wait for the Free Democrats to become disenchanted with their role in keeping the SPD in power? Or will they willy-nilly choose the hard line so long advocated by Strauss? Those questions remain unanswered for the moment, and perhaps in some convoluted fashion the CDU will seek to play it both ways, a discordancy which may nevertheless prove electorally effective besides maintaining a precarious unity within the party. It is that effectiveness and that unity which, after all, has typified West German Christian Democracy for the whole period of its existence. Its ramshackle appearance should not hide from us the fact that liberal democracy in Germany has shallow roots and that, in power or not, the CDU has been a powerful agent in securing a democratic integration to the political system. That may not be much comfort to Helmut Kohl, but 'the giant' does not need to feel too frustrated.

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POLITICAL PARTIES AND DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

by Juliet Lodge

BETWEEN June 7 and 10, 1979, voters throughout the European Community (EC) will be entitled to directly elect their country's quota of representatives to the European Parliament. Hitherto, it has been the prerogative of national governments to appoint their country's quota of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from among the ranks of members of Parliament. In September 1976, the Heads of Government of the Nine agreed to take steps to facilitate direct elections by May-June 1978. Political problems stemming from difficulties associated with securing the passage of the requisite enabling legislation through the national parliaments coupled with controversy over the implications of direct elections for both the EC's institutional balance and the powers of national parliaments led to the postponement of direct elections until this year.

Few political parties appear, however, to have taken advantage of the delay to advance their preparations for contesting the elections, even though many of them throughout the EC welcomed the delay. Over and above questions associated with the politics of and procedures for selecting candidates to contest elections to the European Parliament on behalf of national parties, a number of additional problems confront the parties. These can be divided broadly into two categories. The first relates to the nature and conduct of the campaign and the campaign issues; the second, to the relationship both before and after the elections between the three levels at which political parties are active in the EC—namely, the national, supranational and transnational levels.

How will direct elections be contested? In each EC member state national parties have the responsibility for selecting candidates to contest the elections according to usual or adapted electoral procedures. Although it was the intention of the framers of the Rome Treaty that a common electoral procedure should be adopted by the EC for direct elections to the European Parliament, the type, content and provisions of a common electoral system proved so contentious that the member governments would only agree to hold direct elections if they were free to determine the electoral procedure to be used in their country. This means that in most member states MEPs will be elected according to systems of proportional representation, whereas in the United Kingdom the simple majority in single member seats ('first-past-the-post') system will prevail. As British Liberals have repeatedly pointed out, the use of this system means that they are unlikely to secure even a single seat in the European Parliament, especially since several Westminster constituencies have been merged to create so-called European constituencies. The size of the 66 constituencies in England will average out at 514,067; the eight Scottish constituencies at 470,399; the four Welsh constituencies at 511,601; and the three Northern Ireland con-

stituencies at 344,413. However, the electoral system in Northern Ireland will be different to that employed elsewhere in the United Kingdom. There, three MEPs will be elected from one three-member constituency on the basis of the single transferable vote. By contrast, France, Luxembourg, Denmark and the Netherlands will elect MEPs by systems of proportional representation on national lists.

Similar discrepancies are also apparent regarding the franchise. In both Belgium and Luxembourg voting is compulsory: turn-out in these countries is, therefore, likely to be high and candidates will not face such a difficult task as they might in countries like Britain and Denmark where the unpopularity of the EC will probably make it difficult for candidates to mobilise voters to turn out. Whereas Denmark and West Germany have accorded their citizens living in other EC countries the right to vote in direct elections, and France has extended this to all its nationals resident abroad, Luxembourg and Britain have restricted the vote to resident nationals only (including Irish nationals in the British case). This means that unless special provisions are made for British officials working, for instance, in the Commission and European Parliament in Brussels and Luxembourg, many British will be deprived of the vote unless they are eligible for a postal or proxy vote. By contrast, the Dutch have granted the franchise to Dutch nationals abroad and to EC citizens living in the Netherlands but lacking a vote elsewhere. Minor as such discrepancies may seem, they will nevertheless affect the representativeness of each country's quota of directly elected MEPs.

This was recognised by national governments which, despite affirmations to the contrary, came to regard the elections to the European Parliament as a significant political event, and one whose outcome might have undesirable reverberations on their national standing in the event of 'opposition' parties securing an 'electoral victory' at the European level. Anxious to minimise these, governing parties attempted both to ensure that the electoral system did not favour rival parties, and that they themselves secured as many votes as possible. Alert to the possibility of portraying in each of the member states the result as a vote of confidence in the government, a number of national parties—and especially the Christian Democrats in West Germany —began to publish information booklets designed to mobilise public support for their party on the occasion of direct elections. In Britain, the Conservatives were very quick off the mark in setting their selection processes in motion so that by the summer of 1978 they had a short-list of candidates to contest the elections before them, whereas the Labour Party had yet to implement appropriate measures. Indeed, whereas the Conservatives underlined the very high calibre of their possible Euro-candidates, it seemed as though the Labour Party would be content to select MPs retiring or about to retire from national politics, trade unionists, and Labour Party members who had failed to secure election to the House of Commons.

Similar attitudes towards the selection of candidates to contest the elections were apparent throughout the EC. However, in view of the way in which the European Parliament's work is organised, and its attention to

detailed scrutiny of policy proposals in its specialised committees, it is likely that qualified and specialist MEPs will be a boon to their respective parties. This is because it is through the committees that the parties wield significant influence in the European Parliament.

Apart from problems concerning the selection of candidates, the parties face a number of additional problems in contesting elections to the European Parliament. Because the European Parliament is not a legislature, because it lacks the power to either initiate or pass EC legislation, and because the Rome Treaty limits the areas in which the EC may act, parties will be unable to seek support on the basis of appeals to matters of traditional voter self-interest such as education, housing, health and social security. Instead, candidates will have to campaign on the basis of vague undertakings and references to European ideals. While it is likely that candidates will also be tempted to commit themselves to the ardent defence of parochial regional and national interests, their ability to fulfil any such promises is circumscribed both by the European Parliament's severely limited powers and by the fact that in a Parliament of 410 members they are unlikely to be able to muster a majority in their support—especially when competing interests are taken into account.

Moreover, there have been fears that the public in the newer EC member states would be insufficiently informed about the EC in general and the European Parliament in particular to want to vote.

It has been thought that public dissatisfaction with the EC (especially if coupled with adherence to mythical stereotypic images of the EC as a monolithic, omnipotent and marauding bureaucracy unsympathetic to national interests and blind to national needs) would translate itself into an unwillingness to vote in direct elections in countries like Britain and Denmark. Given the European Parliament's claim that its direct election would afford it democratic legitimacy and, hence, the right to exercise real—and preferably legislative—power in the EC, low turn-out in any member states would undermine its case and furnish national governments, disinclined to increase the European Parliament's authority, with a further excuse to procrastinate over such matters. It is clear that direct elections are expected to stimulate reappraisal of the way in which power is exercised in the EC, and to herald a shift in the EC's institutional balance. Specifically, greater cooperation between the European Parliament and Commission during the pre-legislative stages of decision-making is expected so that Commission proposals would, upon their submission to the Council of Ministers for decision, already possess the additional support and legitimacy afforded by parliamentary endorsement. Certainly, it is hoped that such cooperation between the Commission and European Parliament would herald the acquisition of a power of legislative initiative for the latter, and induce the Council of Ministers to subordinate the intransigent defence of national interests to the benefit of 'communautaire' considerations. This is perhaps a pious hope given that the Council's membership comprises national Ministers keen to ensure that the EC does not impinge upon their interests. However, until the European Parliament shares more of the decision-

making power vested in the Council, this hope remains.

The prospect of a shift of power in the distribution of authority in the EC to the European Parliament's advantage has implications for the activities of political parties *vis-à-vis* the EC. In particular, it has alerted them to the increasing importance that must be attached to a party's (or to a coalition of parties') ability to muster a majority in its support in the European Parliament. Mindful both of the opportunities afforded for influence in the directly elected European Parliament, and of the fact that only those MEPs attached to the European Parliament's party groups can occupy parliamentary offices and exert effective influence, candidates drawn from national parties will have to define their relationship to those party groups as well as to their national parties, and the 'newer' European party federations (such as the European People's Party (EPP)). The federations go back to the Council of Europe and European Coal and Steel Community but have, in response to direct elections, reorganised themselves, and taken steps to define their European electoral images.

One of the most vital questions that will face directly elected MEPs concerns their relationship to their national party. Will and should they agree to adopt and follow the latter's policy prescriptions, or should they take their cues from either the European Parliament's party groups or the European federations? Much of the concern expressed in Britain in connection with the EC's decision to drop the rule that MEPs should hold a dual mandate (that is, be simultaneously members of a national parliament and the European Parliament) derived from fears lest non-dual mandated MEPs not only omit to seek guidance from, or be controlled by, national parties but instead develop competing political loyalties which they would owe to the European Parliament's party groups.

Just how national parties and MEPs will regulate their relations remains to be seen. At the moment, however, it is hoped that it will be sufficient—at least until the second direct elections in 1984—to rely on MEPs having an interest in retaining close links with their constituencies (where relevant) and national and regional party organisations, especially if they hope to defend their seats in 1984. In addition, steps are being taken to guard against MPs and MEPs becoming isolated from each other.

While it is clear that at least for the first elections, the national parties are going to be in a stronger position to determine both who shall contest them and what the campaign issues will be, they have been obliged to accommodate certain developments in respect of European transnational and supranational political developments. Indeed, since the European Parliament makes funds available to its party groups from which component parties benefit, there is at a minimum a small pecuniary incentive for such cooperation. However, of potentially greater political significance are the developing enhanced cohesion within the party groups and the efforts of the European federations to project common electoral images and campaign manifestos. In considering the party groups and the European party federations, it is important to remember that neither of them will have the direct roles and influence in the elections that the national parties will enjoy.

This reservation notwithstanding, party groups and federations are assuming increasing importance and stature.

The increased importance of the party groups lies largely with their control of the European Parliament's business. MEPs sit as members of the groups not as members of national delegations and, depending on the group's cohesiveness and discipline, vote according to the party line when appropriate rather than according to their nationality. There are six political groups. The Socialists with 66 MEPs drawn from the socialist, social democratic and labour parties of the Nine form the largest group. The Christian Democrats comprise 52 MEPs drawn from twelve parties in West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg. The Liberal and Democrat group consists of 23 MEPs drawn from all member states bar Ireland. The 16 European Progressive Democrats, sitting to the right of the Christian Democrats but to the left of the Liberals, include members of the French *Rassemblement pour la République, Fianna Fail,* and one member of the Danish Progress Party. At the far left is the 18-strong Communist and Allies group drawn mainly from Italy, with smaller contingents from France and Denmark. Apart from five 'independent' MEPs not affiliated to any party group, there is the 18-strong European Conservative group which is all-British but for one Danish Centre Democrat.

Following direct elections to the European Parliament it is expected that the 81 MEPs apiece from France, West Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom will join one of these party groups along with the 25 Dutch, 24 Belgian, 16 Danish, 15 Irish and six Luxembourg MEPs. There has, however, been speculation that nationalist, regional and ecological forces will gain representation in the directly elected European Parliament. Unless they constitute a sufficiently large and multinational group, they will not secure recognition as a 'party' and will thus lack the concomitant privileges.

Since the days of the European Coal and Steel Community, the party groups have developed internal party organisations and procedures enabling their members to determine and contest party positions. There are now four main federations: the European People's party (EPP), the European Democratic Union (EDU), the Confederation of Socialist Parties (CSP), and the European Liberals and Democrats (ELD).

Of the four main transnational party federations, the EPP is arguably the most cohesive. It grew out of the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales* which grouped together Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe and which was later transformed into the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD). Whereas the EUCD embraces Christian Democratic parties in non-EC countries, the EPP's membership is restricted to EC Christian Democratic parties and draws its support from all EC countries except the United Kingdom and Denmark. However, it is not entirely divorced from the EUCD since the EUCD President, and the Chairman of the European Parliament's Christian Democratic group (both of whom, incidentally, are German) are among its Vice-Presidents.

The EPP's party seat is in Brussels, and its organs are the Congress

(which first met on 6 March, 1978, and is empowered to adopt guidelines, political programmes, and especially the EPP's manifesto for direct elections), the Political Bureau (comprising the Executive Committee and other representatives of national delegations of the European Parliament's Christian Democratic group, and which is charged with liaising with the EUCD, preparations for and the coordination of the election campaign) and the Executive Committee (which is the EPP's directing organ and comprises the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Presidium of the Christian Democratic group in the European Parliament, one member each of the national delegations and the presidents of the recognised associations). The EPP is clearly the party of Christian Democrats in the EC, and hopes to become the strongest political force in the EC as a result of direct elections.

The likelihood of the EPP being able to form a one-party majority in the directly elected European Parliament is undermined by the fact that its natural electoral allies—the British Conservatives—are not EPP members partly because of the EPP's confessional bias. However, the expectation that the EPP and British Conservatives will seek to form informal voting coalitions at the very least in order to secure majorities in the directly elected European Parliament led the West German CDU in particular to search for ways to facilitate cooperation between the Conservatives and Christian Democrats within an institutionalised setting. For their part, the Conservatives perceived the usefulness of links with EPP members even though they were not enamoured of their confessional and supranational biases. They were particularly sensitive to the possibility that without such links they would become increasingly isolated—especially in the enlarged, directly elected European Parliament. There were reservations on both sides about a formal alliance between the EPP and Conservatives but some progress towards an interim solution was made upon the establishment in April 1978 of the European Democratic Union (EDU).

The EDU is looser in structure, membership and goals than the EPP. It comprises parties of centrist and conservative persuasion both from EC countries—West Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark—and non-EC countries—Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. Unlike the EPP it cannot hope, because of its diverse membership and inter-governmentalist nature, to become the umbrella organisation for its member parties in the European Parliament. The latter could not, for example, be expected to follow any policy cues it might initiate since these would be determined by non-EC countries. Moreover, the British Conservatives did not intend the EDU to fulfil this function. Rather, the EDU's great merit for them lay in the opportunity it provided for forging links with the influential West German Christian Democrats.

On the other side of the political spectrum is the Confederation of Socialist Parties which was founded as a sub-organisation of the Socialist International on 13-14 February, 1975. Like the EDU, it is looser in structure than the EPP. It has its origins in the Liaison Bureau of EC Socialist parties dating from 1957, and the Luxembourg meeting of 5 April, 1974. It has

experienced the greatest of difficulties in determining both its electoral role and manifesto guidelines. This is partly due to discrepancies concerning the connotations and policy implications of 'socialism' and 'social democracy', and partly due to the division between left-wing socialist and centre-inclined social democratic parties like the West German SPD which broadly favours integration and the British Labour Party which eschews supranationalism and its concomitants. Its development, and agreement on a common manifesto, was also hindered by the non-participation of the British Labour Party during the time of Britain's 'renegotiation' and the 1975 British referendum on EC membership. Despite its problems, the Confederation of Socialist Parties was able on 23 June, 1978 to make a common declaration concerning its political vision for the EC, and outlining areas which it felt required immediate action and attention. These included traditional socialist concerns and emphasised the need to deal with unemployment. The Confederation held a Congress in January 1979 and adopted 'An Appeal to the Voters', rather than a manifesto, and campaign guidelines.

Of the four federations, the European Liberals and Democrats form the most fragmented group. Drawing its members from 13 parties and all EC members except Ireland, the European Liberals and Democrats (ELD) group was founded in Stuttgart shortly before the EPP on 26 March, 1976, and originally intended to be a regional organisation of the Liberal International Congress. In spite of problems associated with disagreement over the nature and content of an electoral programme, guidelines were adopted by the ELD Congress in November 1977.

Apart from the French Gaullists who formed the European Parliament's group of European Progressive Democrats (EPD) in 1973 later expanded to include *Fianna Fail* and the Danish *Fremskridtsparteit* (*Fianna Fail* was beaten by *Fine Gael* to join the Christian Democratic group and later the EPP), the Scottish Nationalist Party, Plaid Cymru and the Belgian *Volksumie* formed a so-called 'mixed group' to represent cultural and regional interests. However, of all the supranational electoral alliances, the EPP and ELD are likely to be the federations most capable during the campaign period of projecting cohesive images.

After direct elections to the European Parliament, the incentive for MEPs of similar political persuasions to act cohesively will increase largely because the balance of power between the EC's institutions is shifting in the European Parliament's favour. Moreover, unlike their part-time predecessors, directly elected MEPs not holding a dual mandate (and it is estimated that over 50 per cent will fall into this category) will have more time to devote to their European parliamentary tasks. In other words, the directly elected MEPs and their parties will turn the European Parliament into a force that the Commission, Council of Ministers and national governments will have to reckon with, acknowledge and respect.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION—AN INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT

by Tom Riley

FOR a citizenry to be truly aware about what its government is doing and why, it is necessary that they be as fully informed as possible.

The achievement of such a desirable goal is only possible through legislation that allows access to public documents, which would mean that the individual or group who wanted information on a certain department or a specific report would be able to approach the department or agency involved and request and receive what was being sought. This is a problem that would involve the citizen and the government in a truly democratic government.

It means that the businessman would be able to study the latest economic reports or forecasts put together by government; that environmentalists would be able to be as fully informed as possible on environmental studies; that consumers could be aware of the benefits or hazards of the latest products tested prior to going on the marketplace and that civil libertarians could be watchdogs in all areas of government to ensure that the rights of individuals and groups were being protected. It means, in summary, that any sector of society would be able to interchange ideas through the free flow of information and it would not matter what were their reasons for wanting the information or their field of interest. Certainly under such a system there would have to be exemptions, as governments can not be run in a fishbowl, but these would be narrow and clearly defined.

It is now recognised by many observers in the world that in these times fraught with rising crime, overpopulation, inflation, unemployment and many other crucial problems, the necessity for open government, with less secrecy and more communication with the people they serve, is important if not vital.

Yet, incredibly enough this basic right to know does not exist except in very few countries, such as the United States, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, all of which have freedom of information acts. And only in the United States and Sweden is it recognised that the right to know is as fundamental a right as the rights of freedom of speech, religion, assembly and freedom of the press. These two countries have strong legislation whereas Norway and Denmark have what is known as publicity acts, but the rights are not as clearly defined as in the other two countries.

However, freedom of information is sweeping the democracies and legislation is seen to be coming in most countries, though in many places it is being met with resistance and stalling tactics. In Canada the Government introduced a Green Policy Paper on access to public documents in the House of Commons, which was to be referred to a Parliamentary Committee for public discussion. However, a full six months later the Paper had not yet gone into committee and groups were still waiting to present their

views and to openly discuss the proposals—the very thing that the Green Paper said the government wanted—discussion.

In the United Kingdom Prime Minister Callaghan had committed his Government to an information bill and reform of the Official Secrets Act but under pressure opted instead for an announcement in the Throne Speech in November, 1977, that a White Paper would be introduced in its place. Thus on one hand he can say he supports it and on the other stall action, as a White Paper will be only for discussion purposes. An Act is not excepted before the next election.

Australia has conducted more studies on Freedom of Information than any other country in the Commonwealth. It has been a long standing subject of debate there and was an issue as far back as the 1972 election. The Government of Prime Minister Fraser was to have introduced a Bill but these plans were thwarted by the calling of an election for December 10. Prior to this an extensive report had been prepared by an Interdepartmental Committee and then a draft Bill was presented with a full report by another Commission in 1977.

The Council of Europe's Legal Affairs Committee has the subject under study with a sub-committee headed up by UK Labour MP Arthur Lewis while their Human Rights Commission held a full Colloquy on the subject in Graz in September, 1976. Meanwhile, last Autumn France introduced a Bill that will protect the information on individuals stored in computer data banks.

The long delays in Australia represent a very common symptom of most governments in the Western world and that is to talk about the need for open government—to declare themselves solidly committed to the people's basic right to have information, to share the knowledge so that people can truly participate in the democratic process, to bring in studies, White Papers, Green Papers, draft Bills, adoption of the principle in resolutions, but in the final analysis to do very little—brought about, probably by the fear that legislation allowing access to public documents will reveal who knows what skeletons and scandals in the closet.

In the United States there has been trepidation in the halls of power about the revelations that have been coming out about the CIA. the FBI and all that goes with the post-Watergate era where many politicians are viewed with scepticism. But the American Act (first passed in 1966 and amended in 1974 to strengthen it after the bureaucrats used the Act to stonewall requests) has created a new moral climate. People are convinced now of the need for open government and it is generally recognised that a government that is under scrutiny, that knows that its actions could become public knowledge, is one that will act with greater responsibility. It is this climate of accountability that is allowing more and more wrongdoings of government to surface and is creating change that can only benefit the people. Bureaucrats who initially opposed the Act with vigour, now admit that the spirit of the Act is good and necessary.

The Act also means that people can participate in the democratic process at will instead of having to wait every four years for an election and then

taking part for that one brief moment when their ballot is cast. Information is, as Ralph Nader has said, 'the currency of democracy'. It means that people can not only receive information from their government but with the knowledge once gained can then actively contribute back. For example, in the case of a waterway in New Mexico which was contaminated by Nuclear waste, the Government claimed it was not, but reports revealed under the FOI Act showed that it was and environmentalists were then able to disseminate this information and bring about a change that has contributed to the health and well being of thousands. A dramatic example than can only be cited for the United States because in places like the United Kingdom and Canada, details on nuclear sites are state secrets and the reports on them are not available for public consumption. This has been widely demonstrated in the UK with their site, Windscale, which many pressure groups are trying to stop but are being met with a cloak of secrecy. This is in some ways the new iron curtain that has descended in the Western world—the iron curtain of secrecy between those who govern and the governed. It is as though civil servants have forgotten that they are servants of the people and that people are not their servants.

As the past President of the Canadian Bar Association, Boyd Ferris, said in a speech last year 'it is time to put government back in the hands of the people rather than the people in the hands of government'.

There are many principles that need to be embodied in a good freedom of information act such as the burden of proof to be on the government to show why a document should not be produced, reasonable reproduction costs of documents, requests complied to within reasonable time limits, clearly defined exemptions (for if they are not clearly defined then a government official could use the law to stop an information request by referring to a vaguely defined exemption) and, in the eyes of many a good appeal process when the request is denied is considered to be the most important principle of all.

In the United States the appeal is to the counts. The people who drafted the information law recognised that if a request was denied it was necessary for it to be reviewed by an impartial body and in the United States this is the role played by the courts. In addition the appeal, at the discretion of the judge, goes to the top of the court list and thus is dealt with quickly, as it is seen that information is timely.

In Sweden the appeal is to the Supreme Administrative Tribunal or to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, depending on what agency turned down the request.

In Parliamentary systems opponents of appeal to the courts say that it is not possible, as under the Westminster style of Government the Minister (in theory appointed by the Crown) is responsible to Parliament and Parliament alone, and, in turn, he is responsible for the actions of each civil servant under him. Thus comes the concept of ministerial responsibility. It is argued that the executive and the legislature are not divided as in the case of the United States, and that an appeal to the courts is not constitutional or fitting with the traditions of parliamentary control. Proponents of

strong information laws argue that there are constitutional precedents and that the system can be amended.

Critics say that the argument of ministerial responsibility is dragged out so that the Government can ensure that the control of information remains within their jurisdiction. Thus if a piece of information requested is potentially embarrassing to the Government of the day then the Minister can use an exemption such as 'in the interests of national security' to stop the release of the information. It is an argument favoured by many mandarins as it means that they too will not be in the embarrassing position of bureaucratic wrongdoings coming out in the light of day.

The American and the Swedish Acts are prime models for freedom of information. Norway and Denmark, as stated above, have quasi-information acts called publicity laws but the difficulty in both these countries is that the appeals are to administrative bodies of the civil service and so do not leave room for impartial adjudication.

Austria too allows the release of information under their Federal Ministries Act but again this is not a true Freedom of Information Act as information that is termed 'officially secret' does not have to be released. In addition if the Minister either approves or denies the request in writing there is no appeal. Even if a request is denied in the form of a document entitled 'an administrative decision', which can be appealed in a six week period to the Administrative Court, there is no real definition of what comes under Federal jurisdiction.

The Swedish right to information is a part of their Constitution that dates back to 1809. The American Act is a reaffirmation of the principles outlined in their Constitution. It is this recognition of the very basic rights of Americans that is causing such profound change in America as thousands of requests are made to agencies. It has come to be recognised that the true test of a democratic society is not in the maintaining of the basic civil liberties (though this is not to suggest that they are not an essential, integral part of a free society) but in the tenet that a society can only be truly democratic with a free flow of information. It is postulated that a society can only make rational decisions on what its government is doing and why by being truly informed.

To come closer to bringing such a philosophy into a reality there are many groups that have been formed around the world. In Great Britain there is an All-Party Committee of MPs headed up by Labour MP Arthur Lewis. The public arm of the Committee is the FOI Campaign and that has many individuals and public interest groups as members. It is chaired by Conservative MP Kenneth Warren. In addition to these two influential groups there are FOI Committees like Public Secrets, Justice and a campaign by the National Council for Civil Liberties. The Trade Union Congress has adopted a FOI resolution and called for a strong information act. This represents a powerful voice from the unions and they are joined in this call by others such as the Civil and Public Services Association. A spokesman for that group has said that the Association is fully committed to opening up the files of Government and getting a free flow of data going

between the civil service and the public—a situation that certainly does not exist at present in Great Britain.

In Canada Conservative MP Gerald Baldwin, former House Leader of the Opposition, has led a campaign to end Government secrecy for the last decade. His private members Bill on the subject was studied by a Parliamentary Committee for two years. That Committee has made its Report to Parliament this year after hearing submissions from private groups responding to the Government's Green Paper. There has also been support from fifty major groups and associations from across the country who have actively campaigned for legislation or passed resolutions at their annual conventions calling for the Government to initiate legislation.

One powerful voice has been that of the Canadian Bar Association who have taken their demands to the Prime Minister of Justice but were rebuffed. They also produced an extensive study entitled: *Freedom of Information in Canada: Will the Doors Stay Shut*? by Professor Murray T. Rankin of the University of Victoria.

Citizens' groups have formed across the country. The national lobby group in Ottawa has been Access: A Canadian Committee for the Right to Public Information who have prepared briefs for presentation to the Government, and sponsor public forums to get out the message that FOI is good for the country. Though their group membership Access represents three million Canadians and includes unions like the Canadian Labour Congress, the Public Service Alliance of Canada and Associations like the Canadian Daily Newspapers' Publishers' Association, the Canadian Community Newspapers Association, and the Newspaper Guild—Canadian Section. It is significant that the media is widely represented in the press lobby in the United States. This was very influential in the initiation of an Act in that country.

Australia and New Zealand both have All-Party Committees of MPs for FOI. In Australia there is a National Freedom Group in Canberra that has put out a regular newsletter called *Rupert's Newsletter*, while there are five smaller groups lobbying at the state level across Australia.

New Zealand's Committee is headed up by National Party MP. Michael Minogue, barrister and solicitor and former Mayor of Hamilton. He said, when speaking before journalists last year about FOI legislation that; 'in the so-called democracies there is much concern that information about government affairs should be freely available, not merely to the public but to the elected representatives. In the final analysis, it seems we have evolved a political system which we call a parliamentary democracy but which is controlled in its vital functions by an increasingly powerful executive. Political power is not in fact vested in Parliament; it is vested in bureaucrats and the Cabinet.'

In France recently a committee was formed from members of the Assembly and media, legal and other representatives, to lobby for an act in that country. A spokesman for the group said they will lobby to have extended the current bill before the Assembly (dealing with computer data

banks) to assert that all files will be open to the public, along the lines of a Freedom of Information and Privacy Act. (In the United States there is, in addition to the FOI Act, the Government Data Privacy Act which, among other things, allows an individual to inspect and correct their government file. American experts recommend that, in other countries enacting legislation, the two be combined, as the experience in the United States has been that a bureaucrat can use one Act to prevent the release of information under the other.)

Germany, along with Norway, Denmark and Holland, has FOI groups. The groups in Denmark and Norway are seeking reforms to the current publicity laws, especiallly some form of independent judicial review. Holland had an Act brought before their two Assemblies but it was passed by only one and has now gone back to a Government Committee for further study.

Thus there is vast support throughout the western world for more Government accountability and less secrecy. The idea expressed long ago by Abraham Lincoln stands as true today as when he uttered it: 'The people, if given the truth, can be depended upon to meet any national crisis. The great point is to bring them real facts.'

Gerald Baldwin, the Canadian MP, recently visited the UK to meet Labour Government Ministers and members of the FOI groups and press. He commented that there was a creeping move towards totalitarianism throughout the Western World, and he expressed concern over this move in modern governments saying that if changes are not made by governments themselves then history will be sadly repeated and people will throw away their democratic institutions replacing them with something far worse. He said that it was admirable the way groups in the western countries were lobbying so hard for the much needed change and voiced the idea that it was perhaps now time for an International Commission, headquartered in London, to further the idea and co-ordinate the efforts of supporters around the world. Such a Commission is now being formed, to be headquartered in London.

The seeds of change have been planted by many groups and now it is only a matter of time to see what will grow from this great movement. For it is possible that what we are witnessing is one of the greatest non-political, grass roots movements in recent times—a not too unlikely statement when you consider that what is at stake is either creeping totalitarianism or true participatory democracy.

[Tom Riley is a Canadian journalist who has written and researched widely on the movement for Freedom of Information. He is originally British and has returned to England where he is continuing his work, specialising in the international move towards more open government.]

PANAMA CANAL RETROSPECTIVE

by Barry Rubin

OVER the last two years, the Panama Canal controversy loomed larger and larger, coming to dominate the American political horizon for several months. With passage of the treaties, it seems that this huge iceberg, which threatened to sink or force a major course diversion in Administration foreign policy, has rapidly melted out of sight.

Still, the broader ramifications of such an emotional and symbolic issue should not be so quickly forgotten. During the Senate debate, after all, statements were common along the lines of one made by Senator John Chafee (R-R.I.), 'Just as the building of the Panama Canal demonstrated our world outlook at the beginning of this century, America's action on these proposed treaties will demonstrate how we see the world today.'

Well, what does the whole affair tell about America's contemporary self-image and worldview?

One clear implication was that much popular concern over the treaties related to a feeling that an American retreat had been taking place in the post-Vietnam era and that this phase should be ended. A new basis for American overseas activism should be established.

Such beliefs were by no means the monopoly of treaty opponents. Writing in the *Washington Post*, Harvard political scientist William Schneider concluded that their main motivation was 'legalistic and defensive,' rather than militaristic. Supporters, polls showed, were 'well-educated internationalists who feel that the pacts will be seen as an act of fairness and generosity, that the ultimate pay-off will be improved relations with the Third World and increasing U.S. influence there.'

This was the approach stressed by Senator Daniel Moynihan (D-NY): 'We're not withdrawing from the world,' he argued. 'We're clearing up matters in our rear so that we can go forward.' The objective would be to avoid becoming bogged down in another guerrilla war, to regain the support of international public opinion, and to re-establish the American tradition of anti-colonialism. Like the human rights policy, then, passage of the treaties was seen by liberals as constituting both an ideological point and a rededication to what were perceived as traditional American standards.

Here is a second important lesson about the debates over the treaties. One is indeed struck by how little the *premises* of American diplomacy have changed in the last 75 years. Whether regarded as naïve or noble, the issues of justice, morality, human rights, and the American urge towards overseas reform, are as much a part of U.S. foreign policy today as they were in the time of Woodrow Wilson or even of Theodore Roosevelt, that militant moralist in realpolitik clothing.

The post-Vietnam era has seen a tendency to dwell, sometimes to the point of self-flagellation, on the blindness and arrogance to which those qualities sometimes lead. In reference to the Canal, Senator Mike Gravel

(D-Alaska) called the time of the original Canal treaty 'a most disgusting page in American history.' Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) said, in reference to Panama: 'It was the United States that breached every one of the agreements and understandings and treaties of the last 70 years. We are almost like the Soviets.'

The 1903 treaty was remarkably favourable to the United States, primarily due to the eagerness of the French canal company (which Philippe Bunau-Varilla represented more ardently than he did Panama) and their law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell to unload their concession while their option still had value. If the United States was guilty of anything, it was of not being able to resist such a marvellous, though tainted, bargain.

Yet Roosevelt was also right when he later wrote that the United States had provided the only effective policing of the Isthmus over the preceding 50 years. America's treaty commitment with Colombia had preserved its Panamanian province for it on more than one occasion. Was it more immoral or aggressive for the U.S. to help Colombia than to turn around and support Panamanian aspirations for independence, including the construction and payments of the Canal for themselves, rather than for the neglectful Bogota government? Today, Roosevelt's 1903 action would be called support for a national liberation struggle.

Nor were Roosevelt's motivations as cynical as they have been made to seem. For two long years, negotiations had been carried on with Colombia, which several times had upped its demands. Finally, an agreement was reached.

Then, as Frederick Marks records in *Diplomatic History*, the Colombian dictator prevented the treaty's ratification by his puppet legislature, demanding more money and opening Canal negotiations with European powers. Outraged by the Colombian blackmail, Roosevelt ordered American forces to protect, rather than put down, the Panamanian revolt. A European diplomat would probably have paid off Colombia, but Roosevelt wanted to teach Bogota a lesson about the penalties for shady behaviour in international dealings. The 'taking' of Panama was the product of indignation and self-righteousness, not venality or empire-building, from Washington's point of view.

If there is a lesson here on the historical judgment of moralistic impulses. U.S. intervention in the Caribbean and in Latin America, regardless of intention, left a legacy of hostility and mistrust. Neither radicals nor conservatives seem to grasp the point that this had nothing to do with whether the United States was supporting 'good' or 'bad' men, but simply the fact of intervention *per se*.

Enemies of the treaties seemed to believe in the plantation philosophy that the Panamanians really love us and only want Washington to protect them against the dictator Torrijos. Of course, those same Panamanians, if they came to power, would, by the logic of Third World nationalism, demand an even more unfavourable treaty for the United States.

If the option of change *within* Panama was foreclosed, what additional factor might force abandonment of the status quo? Here was the third

major implication of the debate: the Panamanian weapons against a more powerful United States and the response to them of the American government. The applications elsewhere of these tools—international public opinion and guerrilla warfare—are obvious. The difficulty for American strategy is to cope with these dangers without broadcasting to enemies and allies alike that, if pushed, America will withdraw or cave in elsewhere. Needless to say, the Administration has not compiled a sterling record on this point.

Without doubt, the Vietnam experience had a large influence here, as it has had with every foreign policy debate over the last five years. 'Vietnam should have taught us,' said Senator Allan Cranston (D-Calif), 'that we cannot guarantee the transit of commercial shipping through the canal if ships were subject to guerrilla attack in passage.' Indeed, the idea was to *use* the Canal, not to martyr it.

Equally, when Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nevada), a leading opponent of the treaties, said that 'we presently have . . . in Panama sufficient troops to quell any serious disturbances', alarm bells and unpleasant memories were set off for many.

Two hard questions, then, cannot be avoided. On one hand, strategic readjustments are necessary in a number of areas. How can they be made, however, in the framework of indecision and over-sensitivity to pressure which plagues current American policy, without portraying, and inviting, further weakness?

Conversely, given this weakness, and the present lack of international confidence in the United States, it would only be foolish to seek unnecessary confrontations on an issue which could be peacefully resolved without damage to American interests.

On this latter issue, treaty proponents suggested that a Canal settlement could be an important step in maintaining American relations with Latin America and in improving the U.S. image. One should also be aware, though, that Communist propaganda will try to use the treaties to demonstrate, as the party in Panama has already done, that Carter 'is trying to portray the legitimate victory of the Panamanian people as his own victory', whereas all this is really happening because the treaties are pictured as simply an 'important step forward' in an on-going struggle to eliminate the American presence in Panama, and presumably elsewhere.

In short, the conclusion of the treaties does not have any innate meaning. The way it is interpreted, as with any single policy, will depend on the overall context of U.S. actions. This is not to deny that the 'linkage' argument has much validity. No one, including the Western European nations, would have supported an American attempt to maintain the status quo in Panama. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 'I find it significant that no Western Hemisphere leader, regardless of what his private feelings on this issue might be, feels able publicly to take any position other than that of strongest support for the modernisation of the 1903 treaty.'

And, when Senator Carl Curtis (R-Nebraska) warned that ratification of

the treaty would not wipe out the desire of the 'have-nots' to possess what the 'haves' do, Senator Daniel Moynihan (D-NY) replied, 'No, sir, you cannot wipe out that desire, but you can wipe out the judgment of the world that we are in the wrong.' After the way things have gone in the last decade, that is something not to be taken too lightly.

Moynihan goes so far as to believe that if the U.S. gains that point, the Russians—who act 'as if it were still 1903'—would be exposed as the last true imperialists. They have been able to dampen international opposition for the last 30 years, he continues, because 'the issue of world debate has been the colonial legacy of the West, and not the colonial reality of the Soviet empire'.

Yet, again, this presupposes an ideological offensive which most members of Congress and the Administration seem incapable of understanding, far less of carrying out. There is a distinct danger of over-selling the idea of moral or political linkage of the type described above. It slides too easily into an idea, all too prevalent in American thinking on international affairs, that if we are simply nice to the rest of the world, they will be nice to us. At the same time, Moynihan's call for a more militant and systematic foreign policy highlights the rift that exists among liberals over this idea.

The same point can be made with regard to the whole issue of the American right to intervene to protect the Canal's neutrality and continued operation. The debate over how to word this claim overshadowed the question of whether it would ever be put into effect. Many Americans and many Senators currently favour an attempt to escape from some other, less onerous, commitments. How much will the pledge to protect the Canal be worth in a dozen years?

It is nice to pretend that the treaties will create a legal basis for intervention which, in turn, would gain international acceptance for such an action. Yet if, as is quite likely, a Panamanian government were to oppose intervention—or if it was engaged in an internal conflict—one can imagine the reaction in the UN and from the Russians.

The human rights issue in relation to the treaties also proved hard to cope with in simple terms. Panama is, without question, a dictatorship, though less harsh than are many others. Passage of the treaties will supply revenue which should help perpetuate the Torrijos' regime. Naturally, the misdeeds of that government were often greatly exaggerated by treaty opponents, most of whom have never been avid advocates of human rights elsewhere in Latin America.

Still, it was equally ironic to see some treaty supporters practically apologising for Torrijos' methods. Senator Thomas McIntyre (R-NH) stated that 'the hard truth is that there are times when diplomacy, like politics, forces unfastidious bedfellows upon us whether we like it or not'. This is quite true, but it is precisely the vague nature of the Carter human rights policy which drew the opportunistic attacks from the right.

Similarly, while the invocation of a Russian menace in Panama involved a good amount of demagoguery, the existing political situation—the concern over U.S. weakness, the rise of the Soviet Navy, Cuban intervention in

Africa, public wariness over an active foreign policy, power shifts in the Third World—makes almost anything seem plausible. When Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind) said that Cuban troops in Ethiopia and Angola were 'predicated on the understanding . . . that those places are not just that important to the United States', this may encourage Latin Americans but will scarcely elate Africans.

International events often move far faster than even well-informed observers can predict, and positions not backed by power will eventually be challenged.

In June 1936, Sir Miles Lampson, Britain's High Commissioner to Egypt, confidently recorded in his diary that if, 20 years hence, Britain wanted to keep troops on the Suez Canal, she would surely be able to do so. Twenty years later, almost to the day, Nasser nationalised the Canal. A British attempt to intervene, opposed by the United States, ended in a political fiasco.

If, then, the illusion of the opponents was to think that hardening the treaties to the point of Panamanian rejection would protect American interests, the illusion of some of the proponents is that the American strength and determination which must stand behind the treaties might be safely neglected. This last point will undoubtedly be the theme of Senators Moynihan, Jackson, Hayakawa, and several others who voted in favour of the treaties.

While the passage of the treaties was widely portrayed as a White House victory, real credit for the success should go to Senators Byrd and Baker, the Majority and Minority Leaders, and to Senators Church and Sarbanes, the floor managers for the treaties. Carter's lobbyists are so poorly regarded on Capitol Hill that they were virtually barred—for their own good—from the Senate's bartering and bargaining process. Finally, the treaties were only put over the top by an appeal to the Senate's conscience. They were well aware, as Byrd put it, that rejection would have been 'a serious blow to the United States in its future conduct of world affairs' and would constitute 'a repudiation of the administration'.

The ultimate significance of the Panama debates were as the opening round in a profound and bitter battle over the future direction of American foreign policy.

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THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES TODAY

by T. Mervyn Jones

THE nationalised industries today are industries and services on which all others depend. Transport, air, rail, and, in part, road; energy, coal, electricity, gas and, in part oil; water supply; steel;—all are essential to the whole of industry. In themselves, they play so large a part of the economy, in the total value of the investment in them, in the employment given, in the extent of Government loans and grants to them that all agree they must continue. No one would seriously propose their return to their original private ownership. They have enjoyed real achievement and successes. But all is not well with them. There have been increasing conflicts and tensions between them and Government. These have been all too manifest and much publicised, but not so their intended public accountability. There are few who would claim that today the 'public' regard them as *their* industries, in the sense originally intended.

They were created bodies independent of and distinct from direct official government. Rightly, it was realised that Departments of State were not the organisations most suitable for owning and operating industries. Day-to-day administration was to be entirely the responsibility of the independent Boards; Ministers and Parliament were never to be involved.

The B.B.C. in its original Charter in 1925 was the first major precedent for this concept. John Reith dourly and sturdily fought off all attempts by Government to control its operation, even that of Winston Churchill at the time of the General Strike. Herbert Morrison, as Leader of the L.C.C. and leading member of the Labour Party, achieved the same independence for the London Passenger Transport Board in 1933. The principle was firmly established by 1946 in the Labour Government's nationalisation legislation. Herbert Morrison, as one of its leaders, insisted on the Boards being made responsible for day-to-day administration and resisted all demands by his own Party and the Opposition for giving Ministers and Parliament direct control over their operations. Ministers, of course, were made responsible for the selection and appointment of Board Members, for approving or not of their capital development programme, and providing the industries with such additional finance as they needed. The Boards were required to make Annual Reports to their Minister and he in turn was required to place these before Parliament for it to consider and, if desired, debate them. Finally, each Minister had the power to give directions to the Board. But, in practice, this was rarely used. The more the Minister gave directions, the more Parliament, to whom he had to report, would have the opportunity of gaining day-to-day control over the industries. They would tend to become the equivalent of Departments of State, directly subject to control by Parliament, so destroying the object of the concept of the independent nationalised industry.

Since these early days much has happened to give Ministers and the Department and the Government of the day far greater powers over these

industries. Ministers have used their powers of appointment of Members, particularly of Chairmen, to get the industry to comply with their required desires and policies. Chairmen have not had their appointments renewed, or have resigned, because of differences with their Ministers. These conflicts which in earlier years were relatively minor and were always contained within the Minister's private office, have now come out into the open and naturally received much publicity. The effect within each industry has been marked. The board, for most of the industries, is inevitably the sole employer for all who choose to make a career in that industry. When, therefore, it is seen that the Chairman loses his job and career because he has expressed views in the interests of the industry that are different from those of his Minister and his Department, the aspiring executive must become chary of independent thinking and its forthright expression. So he tends to become compliant to the senior Headquarters executives of the responsible Departments, who, naturally, in practice advise and speak for the Minister. The Civil Servants dealing with each of the nationalised industries always tended to favour a single unified centralised structure. They see in it the best and neatest administrative mechanism to ensure unity in the whole industry, free as it is from the complications and conflicts of Area Boards which might and occasionally did arise. They were never happy about the separate existence of Area Boards with their own authority, which originally were established for a number of the Nationalised industries. Such Boards had great advantages in enabling and encouraging enterprising experiment within the industry and in providing more than one single employer for those in its service. Their abolition was hastened by the then fashionable Management Consultants' reports, the most elegant of which always prescribed virtually the same form of centralised structure for all their clients, public and private industries and Government Departments. The urges for devolution of recent years have not affected the Nationalised industries. Within them the trend has been the exact opposite.

Naturally, every Nationalised industry must be subject to the policy of the Government of the day. Their independence never entitles them to the right to run contrary to what Parliament and the Cabinet decide.

But in recent years they have been used by the Government directly as instruments to further immediate policies, particularly the Government's economic policy.

The dominant position they have in the economy by their very size, and the immediate close links between them and the Government because of the contact between Minister and Chairman, have made them easy and obvious regulators of the economy, particularly in their pricing policy. Originally, it was generally accepted that the price to be charged should be sufficient to cover the cost of supply; that, taking one year with another, the industry should be in balance. For some, e.g. the Railways, this was impossible, as indeed it is so in all other countries. The admittedly high cost of subsidising Railways in Britain is still less than the increase in costs for other industries—and for the Government in their development policies, were the Railways to be abandoned. In 1961 the White Paper

on the Financial Obligations of the Nationalised Industries required each industry to achieve a prescribed level of return on capital and to be profitable, comparably with private industries. In spite of this, successive Governments have required Nationalised industries to peg their prices to help the Government achieve its desire to keep down prices, generally for political reasons. For the Nationalised industries whose costs have materially increased, this has meant that inevitably they have had to get into deficit and failed to achieve the financial results required of them. Even the salaries of Board Chairmen and Members similarly have been kept down below the level of comparable positions in private industry, and indeed below that of the salaries the Nationalised industry has had to pay to its own senior executives to retain them.

Ministers' actions in using the Nationalised industries as instruments for short-term political policies have made it well nigh impossible for the industries to operate as bodies with real authority, or to plan ahead and operate in the long-term interest of the industry. There should be no permanent conflict between the interest of the industry and that of the country; they are complementary, not conflicting. The more complete centralisation of the Nationalised industries today has had significant consequences for the political parties and the balance between them. In May 1968 *The Times* in a leader commenting on the then new success of the Scottish Nationalist Party in local elections said it was due to the feeling in Scotland that decisions vitally affecting its well being were being taken in a remote London. We would say that this is true of both Scotland and Wales and is particularly due to the impact on the public of the actions or inactions of Nationalised industries in those countries. In both countries the Nationalist Party are getting a support in Parliamentary and local elections far beyond what could have been contemplated by political thinkers a few years back. Keir Hardie's constituency, Merthyr Tydfil, traditionally a Labour stronghold for most of this century, now has a district council with the Welsh Nationalists in the majority!

In July of 1977, Mr. Tony Benn declared that perhaps the highest priority in his political life was the principle of public accountability. He, and others of like thought, would presumably wish to increase the number of Nationalised industries. Today there is a growing unease about the practice of public accountability as seen in the actions of those industries, Public accountability must work and be manifestly seen to work in practice.

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STEREOTYPES AND SCOTTISH WITCHCRAFT

by Hugh V. McLachlan and J. K. Swales

IN historical and sociological studies, witchcraft suspects and witchcraft trials of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe are often described in a very stylised way. Those charged with being witches are almost always thought to have been old women of the lower classes who lived alone. The trial of a suspected witch is usually represented as taking place as part of a witch-hunt: the accused was assumed to be named by an earlier suspect and thought to name, under torture, more suspects herself. Finally, witchcraft trials are normally regarded as perfunctory. Those formally charged with witchcraft are thought to be almost always found guilty and subsequently executed. These stereotypes are often presented with no quantitative evidence in their support. A recent study has collected data on 3,069 Scottish witchcraft suspects. This information relates to Scotland in the period between 1560 and 1730. We shall look at evidence drawn from the 1,891 cases where suspected witches were brought to trial, in order to test whether the stereotype view of the witchcraft suspects and of the witchcraft trials are confirmed by these data.

First, it is instructive to consider the defendants in witchcraft trials. The defendant was usually thought to be female, single, old and of low social status. The defendant's sex is given in over 90% of the Scottish witchcraft trials. These data suggest that 86% of all those formally accused of witchcraft in Scotland were women. Whilst this seems to show that women were over-represented as defendants in this type of trial, it might be thought that more men were accused of witchcraft than is suggested by the stereotype. What is more, when witchcraft suspects in Scotland are compared with those in England and the rest of Europe, Scotland is found to have a relatively high percentage of females. In the European studies summarised by E. W. Monter, the proportion of witchcraft suspects who were female varies between 71% and 92%, the average being around 80%. Whilst the available quantitative information substantiates the notion that the majority of those tried for witchcraft were women, certainly not all were. Also, the proportion that were women varied markedly, not only between the courts in different countries, but also over time and geographical location within the same country.

A second feature of the stereotype view of a suspected witch is that she lived alone. This might suggest that the person would either be single or widowed, rather than married. The marital status of the accused is known in 318 Scottish witch trials. There is a serious problem if the information in this sample is used to infer the overall proportions of single, married and widowed Scottish witchcraft suspects. This is primarily because there is no reason to believe that these 318 cases are a random sample of all Scottish witch trials. In particular, as with all the other characteristics which are infrequently recorded in the witch trials, there might well be a tendency to

report them only where the case is unusual. This having been said, of all the Scottish witchcraft suspects whose marital status is known, about 80% were married: almost all of the remaining 20% were widowed. We have argued that caution must be used in interpreting these figures. Moreover, even if this information is taken at face value, we cannot say whether widows and unmarried people are over-represented as defendants in witchcraft trials. This would depend on the marital status breakdown of the population from which witchcraft suspects were drawn. However, these data do suggest that the typical Scottish witchcraft suspect was in fact married and therefore unlikely to be living alone.

Legge claims that in nearly every instance Scottish witches were old women. The Scottish court reports seldom contain precise information on the age of witchcraft suspects, so that it is difficult to substantiate such a claim. However, whereas it is not rare to discover that a particular accused witch was an old woman, it is rare to hear of one's being a young woman or a girl. It is similarly difficult to make judgements about the social status of those accused of witchcraft in Scotland. First, we have information on the social status of the defendant in only 150 Scottish witchcraft cases. This number is small and most probably unrepresentative: it seems reasonable to assume that if the witchcraft suspect were of high, rather than low, social status, this would be more likely to have been noted by the court. Secondly, the information we have is often vague and not a statement of the defendant's relative income or occupation. Finally, even when the information is more precise, it is often difficult to evaluate. For instance, in a number of cases the accused witch was said to be the wife of, say, a smith. It is difficult to assess the social status of such a profession in 16th and 17th century Scotland and, presumably, there were differences in status and income amongst smiths. However, the data, for what they are worth, are as follows. Of the 150 cases where some indication of the witchcraft suspects' social status is given, 11 cases involved members of the nobility and a further 5 involved defendants who were said to have employed servants. On the other hand, in 20 cases the accused was said to have been poor, or a pauper, and in another 13 cases the defendant was a servant. It is impossible, given our vague and probably unrepresentative information, to say very much about the social status of those tried for witchcraft in Scotland. However, we do know that not all witchcraft suspects were poor: a number were of the highest social status. Moreover, we have no reason to believe that most of those suspected of witchcraft were particularly poor.

It is appropriate to deal here with another common belief, presented by Ehrenreich and English. This is that witchcraft persecution was an attempt by the male dominated legal authorities and medical profession to suppress female healers. (We shall not discuss the question of whether there was a medical profession in Scotland in this period.) Of those tried for witchcraft in Scotland, we know of only six who were midwives, and another one who was described as a 'wise woman'. Whilst members of these categories might have been over-represented as defendants, we have no evidence that persecution of women healers was a major force behind the Scottish witchcraft

trials. Moreover, of those healers accused of witchcraft in Scotland, not all were women.

The conventional view of the witchcraft suspect is not strongly confirmed by our information on Scottish witchcraft trials. This information seems to show a much greater variation amongst defendants than the stereotype would allow. Moreover, one particular aspect of this stereotype, the notion that those accused of witchcraft were generally single, seems to be refuted by the evidence. We shall now consider whether the generally accepted view of the witchcraft trial itself is supported by the available evidence.

It has been stated already that witchcraft trials are commonly thought to share two features: individual trials are thought to be invariably part of a wider witch hunt and the chances of a defendant's surviving a formal charge of witchcraft are regarded as having been very slim. Neither of these beliefs is substantiated by the Scottish data.

We have some information on the Scottish witchcraft trials that occurred between 1560 and 1730. There are reports of witchcraft trials in 103 of these years. Of these 103 years, 71 had fewer than ten witch trials: in a large number of years, the courts only dealt with a handful of isolated witchcraft cases. This is not to deny that witchcraft panics did occur. In Scotland, over 1,100 witchcraft trials took place during the four panic periods 1628-30, 1649, 1658-59 and 1661-62. These years accounted for a little over 60% of all known Scottish witchcraft trials. However, although witchcraft panics were quantitatively important, a sizeable proportion of Scottish trials for witchcraft do not appear to have taken place as part of a wide-ranging witch hunt.

Our impression is that there were broad differences between witchcraft trials in the panic and non-panic years. In the panic years, we think that the defendant is likely to have been accused of meeting and having sex with the devil, renouncing Christ and her baptism to him, and of attending meetings with the devil and other witches. In this kind of case, we suspect that the defendant was forced, under torture, to name those fellow witches who attended the supposed meetings. In the non-panic years, we think that individual witchcraft suspects were more likely to be accused primarily of causing specific harm to other particular individual people. Although such suspects were also accused of meeting and having sex with the devil and renouncing Christ and their baptism to him, they were not so likely to be accused of attending meetings with the devil and other witches. Examples of the specific harm (or *maleficium*) would be the mysterious death or illness of an individual or of his or her animals. The case, in 1700, of Jean Drummond from Kilbarchan is an example. It is said that she fell out with Jean Houston, spouse to John Young in Glenlyein, and cursed her and threatened that the devil would make her as great as the Kirk of Kilbarchan and clasped her hand and spat in her face. Within a quarter of a year, Jean Houston contracted a strange sickness and swelled prodigiously until she died. All the neighbours blamed Jean Drummond for having bewitched her.

Perhaps the strongest preconception about witchcraft trials is that they invariably ended with the death of the defendant. This is certainly a mistaken view, according to the available Scottish evidence. Table 1 gives the data on Scottish witch trials, broken down into various periods and the fates of those accused. Again we must stress that such information should be treated with some caution: these data are not a random sample drawn from all witchcraft trials. In particular, information on a suspect's fate is given more often in the records of some courts than others. For example, in the High Court we were able to get information on the suspect's fate in 70% of the cases, whilst we were unable to obtain any information on the suspect's fate in the Circuit Court. A quick glance at Table 1 shows that the amount of information on the fates of witchcraft suspects varies markedly between different time periods. Although over the whole period the defendant's fate is known in 36% of the trials, this percentage varies between 10% and 80% for the time periods given in Table 1. Generally the information is more scanty for the earlier witchcraft trials and for those witch trials undertaken in the panic periods.

Bearing these limitations in mind, we can comment on the data given in Table 1, (p.92). Let us look at the figures for the whole period, summarised in the final column. These show that the notion that almost all formally charged witchcraft suspects were found guilty is incorrect. In the Scottish witchcraft trials where information on the defendant's fate is known, over a quarter of the suspects were acquitted. We have said already that our information on the fate of those accused of witchcraft is unrepresentative. However, even if we make the extreme assumption that none of the 1,203 witchcraft suspects whose fate is not known were acquitted, about 10% of those known to have been tried for witchcraft in Scotland would still have been found not guilty. The assertion that it was extremely uncommon to be acquitted in a witch trial is unsupported; and so is the claim that all those found guilty in such trials were executed. We can see that a number of witchcraft suspects were given some form of non-capital punishment: for those Scottish witchcraft trials where the fate of the accused is known, 9% of those found guilty were not executed.

Thus, the idea that suspected witches were invariably executed is not supported by the aggregate Scottish data. When the figures are broken down into various time periods, it appears that the treatment of witchcraft suspects by the courts varied markedly from period to period and it becomes difficult to sustain the argument that most witchcraft trials can be characterised by one particular stereotype. In Table 1, the Scottish data are presented for the panic periods and the intervening non-panic years. We have stated already that the witchcraft trials of the panic years seem to us to differ from the trials in the non-panic years. Is this reflected in a differential treatment of witchcraft suspects by the courts in the panic and non-panic years?

We have looked at the court judgements in the panic and non-panic years. That is to say, we have looked at those cases where the defendant's

TABLE 1

SCOTTISH WITCHCRAFT TRIALS BROKEN DOWN BY VARIOUS TIME PERIODS AND THE DEFENDANT'S FATE

Fate	Date of Trial								TOTAL
	Before 1627	1628* –1630	1631– 1648	1649* –1650	1652– 1657	1658* 1659	1661* –1662	After 1663	
Executed	51 (67.1)[1]	22 (75.9)	57 (77.0)	72 (90.0)	8 (10.4)	52 (41.6)	56 (73.7)	51 (34.7	369 (53.9)
Non-capital Punishment	5 (6.6)	2 (6.9)	2 (2.7)	5 (6.3)	1 (1.3)	6 (4.8)	2 (2.6)	10 (6.8)	33 (4.8)
Acquitted	10 (13.2)	2 (6.9)	11 (14.9)	3 (3.8)	67 (87.0)	11 (8.8)	15 (19.7)	64 (43.5)	183 (26.8)
Miscellaneous[2]	10 (13.2)	3 (10.3)	4 (5.4)	0 (0.0)	1 (1.3)	56 (44.8)	3 (3.9)	22 (15.0)	99 (14.5)
Unknown	198	289	37	224	28	34	278	115	1,203
TOTAL	274	318	111	304	105	159	354	262	1,887

* These periods are panic years.

[1] The figure in brackets is the percentage of the defendants whose fates are known in that time period with that particular fate. For example, of all the defendants before 1627 whose fates are known, 67.1% were executed, 6.6% received non-capital punishment, etc.

[2] This category includes cases where the suspect fled, died in prison, etc.

TABLE 2

WITCHCRAFT CASES IN SCOTLAND, BROKEN DOWN BY SEX AND FATE OF ACCUSED†

	Executed	Non-Capital Punishment	Acquitted	Miscellaneous*	TOTAL
Male	45	9	17	17	86
	(52.3)	(10.5)	(19.8)	(17.4)	(100)
Female	268	24	104	84	480
	(55.8)	(5.0)	(21.7)	(17.5)	(100)
TOTAL	313	33	121	99	566
	(55.3)	(5.8)	(21.4)	(17.5)	(100)

The figure in brackets is the percentage of the cases in that row with that particular fate. For example, 52.3% of male suspects were executed.

† There are 1,325 cases when either sex and/or fate is unknown.

* This category includes cases where the suspect fled, died in prison, etc.

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fate is known but is not miscellaneous. In non-panic years, the available data suggests that witchcraft suspects had a 50% chance of surviving witch trials with their lives. In panic years this chance fell to just less than 20%. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level of confidence. However, care must be used in interpreting these data. Known court judgements in the individual panic years appear to be quite similar: there is a degree of uniformity in the proportion of witchcraft defendants executed in individual panic years. This is not the case for non-panic years. The later non-panic periods, 1652-1657 and post-1663 show a much lower proportion of witchcraft suspects executed than the earlier non-panic periods.

It is an interesting exercise to compare the fates of male and female Scottish witchcraft suspects, because a number of theories imply that witchcraft persecution is a form of anti-feminism in which the legal authorities play an important role. If this is the case, we would expect the treatment of female witchcraft suspects to have been harsher than the treatment of male suspects. The available Scottish data, presented in Table 2, suggests only random differences between the fates of male and female defendants in witch trials. And although a slightly larger percentage of all female witchcraft suspects were executed than male suspects, a larger percentage of female suspects were acquitted than male suspects.

A number of theories have been put forward to explain witchcraft persecution in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. Such theories generally present a single, often simplistic, explanation for witchcraft persecution. The existing evidence goes against such theories. Witchcraft trials were not uniform and did not correspond at all well to the commonly held stereotype. We have suggested that it might be useful to distinguish witchcraft

trials in the panic and non-panic years. But, caution should be observed in applying this distinction lest another over-simplistic stereotype view emerges.

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THE GOLD OF EL DORADO

by Ernle Money

GOLD featured prominently among the aims of the conquistadores. It was, claimed Columbus, the most exquisite of all things, 'Whoever possesses gold can acquire all that he desires in this world. Truly, for gold he can gain entrance for his soul into paradise.' The early history of the Spanish infiltration of Central and Southern America was closely identified with the pursuit of this most elusive but rewarding of metals.

For the indigenous population who occupied these regions at the coming of the Spaniards it bore an equal importance, more perhaps on account of its beauty and utility than for the rarity value which appealed to Europeans. The Indian tribes who lived in the area of Muisca, round about what is now the city of Bogota in the Republic of Colombia, used it not only for purposes of design and decoration but as a regular votive offering to their gods. It was, in particular, their custom to bring their newly designated rulers to the circular lake of Guatavita in order to render a votive offering of golden and other precious objects by plunging these into the depths of its waters. From this ceremony and its traditions came the legend of the 'gilded man,' *El Dorado,* and his treasure, which has come to stimulate more than four centuries of scientific curiosity, romantic imagination and simple greed. 'He went about all covered with powdered gold, as casually as if it were powdered salt' wrote Gonzalo Fernández de Oriedo early in the sixteenth century, 'for it seemed to him that to wear any other finery was less beautiful, and that to put on ornaments or arms made of gold worked by hammering, stamping or any other means, was a vulgar and common thing.'

The legend may in itself have been largely illusory. Its basis is to be considered in a remarkable exhibition, currently on view at the Royal Academy, Burlington House, of gold and other artefacts recovered from sites in Colombia. Three aspects of this seem to me to be particularly interesting. First of these is the extraordinary technological achievement of a civilisation which had no ostensible contact with the rest of the known world but obtained a degree of technical facility which embraced all the processes known to the modern craftsman, save only that of electroplating. Second there is the comparison of decorative processes not only with other cultures such as the Minoan-Mycenean civilisation, the Thracian Kingdoms, Ur of the Chaldees and even Ancient Egypt. Third there is the fascinating coincidence of distinctive developments in design among so many of the objects involved which anticipate solutions, both in linear and spatial terms, which were not applied in European art until the era of Klee, Picasso and Miro.

Two other side-issues have been posed by the exhibition. In a challenging recent article, the distinguished critic and art historian Mr. Edward Lucie-Smith has posed the question regarding these pre-Columbian artefacts—

'precious, but are they art?'. He points out that the Indian civilisations concerned had no concept of art as such as opposed to the creation of objects which were intended to be handled and, in a large proportion of cases, worn as well. Further, to what extent were these particular manifestations the product of the halucinatory character of a culture largely influenced by the stimulation of widespread use of drugs?

Mr. Lucie-Smith's conclusion, which will find general consent, is that we must treat these objects not only as evidence of a remarkable civilisation or series of civilisations but also as *art* in the full sense of the word in which we now use it. This is borne out not only by the striking quality of so much of the work on view, its variety, its close observation of nature and the extraordinary rhythmic or even abstract character of so many of the metal articles, but in the very beautiful forms used for so much of the pottery and other carved pieces discovered.

It is tantalising that we know so little of the civilisations which produced these. It is equally true that we have only a scanty knowledge of the peoples who left us Stonehenge or Lascaux. There, however, the problem is largely one of distance in time. Here the gap must be accounted for by the immense amount of random destruction which must have occurred after the Spanish invasions, the widespread commercial exploitation of sites which has taken place, particularly by professional grave-robbers and their clients in more recent times and the haphazard nature of the finds which in fact have taken place. It is almost as if we had to assess the nature of civilisation of a series of isolated 'digs' in places as far apart as Brighton, Bristol, Thetford Chase, the Lake District and the Isle of Skye.

Nonetheless, it is possible to obtain from this exhibition a picture of the achievement of these peoples which is coherent at any rate in the very high standard of the skill which it represents. Take, for example, the extremely elaborate nature of the design of the ear ornaments recovered from the Sinú region, the flowing Tairona necklaces, and the spiral ornaments from the same area; these are the work not only of highly accomplished craftsmen but of designers of power and considerable imagination. The use of human and animal forms in many of the pendants and other ornaments included is also astonishingly beautiful. For sheer force of impact the funerary masks found in Quimbaya or Calima or the lime-containers in the form of human figures could rival anything found by Schlieman at Mycenae or Evans at Knossos.

One of the most beautiful objects in the exhibition represents, fittingly, the ceremony of the gilded man himself. This is a tiny model of a raft, bearing a number of figures in semi-abstract shape, which was recovered from Lake Guatavita itself. It is made of cast gold and is believed to be a *tunjo* or votive offering. The central figure, who is seated, wears elaborate jewellery and in front of him stand smaller figures carrying lime-dippers and lime-gourds and others holding rattles and masks in front of their faces. In it we are likely to get as near as we will now be able to the basis of the culture which gave us El Dorado and his legend.

THE MONTHLY DICKENS AND THE WEEKLY DICKENS

by R. C. Churchill

THE relation of Dickens to eighteenth-century novelists like Fielding and Smollett was noticed even before he gave readers the hint in a famous autobiographical passage in *Copperfield*. What has not been so generally perceived is his relation to Richardson—and the relation of his public to Richardson's public—though it formed the theme of a celebrated speech by the Scottish painter Sir David Wilkie in 1839.

The speech was made at a dinner to honour the completion of *Nickleby*. Among those present being Dickens's future biographer John Forster, from whose *Life* I draw this account. I quoted Wilkie in a different context in my very first writing about Dickens in 1937, without, however, fully realising the significance of the speech from the point of view of Dickens as a serial novelist.

Wilkie belonged to the Regency period rather than the early Victorian age into which he survived. He had his roots in the eighteenth century almost as deeply as his elder contemporary Scott. What struck him about his young friend Dickens's phenomenal success was its parallel with the career of Samuel Richardson. He pointed out that there had been nothing like him issuing his novels part by part since Richardson issued his volume by volume, how in both cases people talked about the characters as if they were neighbours or friends, and how as many letters were written to the author of *Nickleby* to implore him not to kill poor Smike as had been sent by young ladies to the author of *Clarissa* to 'save Lovelace's soul alive'.

'Why, Sir,' said Dr. Johnson, 'if you were to read Richardson for the story, your impatience would be so much fretted that you would hang yourself. But you must read him for the sentiment, and consider the story as only giving occasion to the sentiment.'

The 'impatience', however, was part of the secret of both Richardson's and Dickens's original success, if occasionally, in the case of Dickens, to his ironical satisfaction only, as when the dramatist W. T. Moncrieff, before *Pickwick* had completed its monthly course, produced a play entitled *Sam Weller or the Pickwickians*, where Jingle turns out to be the missing Mr. Bardell and where Mrs. Bardell is only saved from a trial for bigamy by the generosity of Mr. Pickwick.

The sentiment and the story 'hang together' in a meaning different from Dr. Johnson's. We know today how *Clarissa* ends, and Dr. Johnson knew in 1772. But the original readers in 1747 did not know—and had no means of knowing. They could not cheat, as we can, by turning surreptitiously to the end, because in 1747 there was no end yet in sight. The end came along in due course, but only in the final volume—Volume VII—issued during the closing months of the following year. No reader of Richardson in 1747

could have guessed what the novelist intended to do—and this uncertainty was a great part of the attraction. In Dickens's case, if not in Richardson's, the author often did not know himself, as when in *Little Dorrit* he had completed as far as Chapter XXIV before he 'finally resolved to make Dorrit rich'.

The 'imploring letters' both novelists received cannot be regarded as entirely a waste of time and postage. We know that Dickens changed his mind over the future role of Miss Mowcher in *Copperfield* after receiving a letter of reproach from the original of that character. In *Bleak House* he tried to lessen the resemblance between Skimpole and Leigh Hunt after receiving letters from Forster and Procter. He was deluged with letters over Little Nell as the fate of that angelic child became a source of anxiety to readers who feared the novelist's probable intentions. 'I am inundated with imploring letters recommending poor little Nell to mercy. Six yesterday and four today . . . '

It was no part of Dickens's original intention, however, that Nell should die—any more than he intended originally that Young Martin should go to America or Little Em'ly to Australia or that Walter Gay should marry Florence Dombey and Edith spurn Carker with the melodramatic words: 'We meet and part tonight. You have fallen on Sicilian days and sensual rest too soon'. The 'imploring letters' should have been addressed to Forster, not Dickens, for the biographer tells us that Dickens 'had not thought of killing Nell' until 'about half-way through I asked him to consider whether it did not necessarily belong even to his own conception . . . to lift her . . . out of the commonplace of ordinary happy endings . . . '

Like Pharaoh, and like Richardson, Dickens hardened his heart, as he did in the parallel case of Dora in *Copperfield*. 'Still undecided about Dora', he wrote on 7 May, 1850, 'but *must* decide today'. On 20 August: 'I have been very hard at work these three days, and have still Dora to kill. But with good luck I may do it tomorrow'.

The sentiment and the story 'hang together': Smike has to die, Dora has to die, even Little Nell has to die, as Little Em'ly must expunge her 'Sicilian' shame in the healthier climate of New South Wales and as a century before Clarissa has to die and her seducer Lovelace has to be killed in a duel, however many letters were sent to Richardson imploring a happy ending. The stress must fall on the sense of power enjoyed by the novelists as a result of the delayed action of their stories, on the excitement which Dickens shared with his readers, as number followed number with neither the novelist nor his public being quite sure what was going to happen next. Dickens, after all, might well have *disagreed* with Forster, both as to the necessity of Little Nell having to die and the need for Walter Gay in *Dombey* to remain a good character, for it had been Dickens's original intention, only abandoned after a struggle, to let him gradually go to the bad.

Dickens, too, could have disagreed with Lord Jeffrey over the seduction of Edith by Carker in the same novel. The seduction, in fact, was already settled, before at the last moment Dickens adopted Jeffrey's idea and wrote

'a kind of inverted *Maid's Tragedy*', as he put it, instead.

The decision, nevertheless, might have gone the other way, in both Walter's case and in Edith's, as he might have decided to let both Nell and Dora live, to retain his original ending in *Great Expectations*, and in *Bleak House* let Esther Summerson lose her beauty for ever instead of regaining it (albeit equivocally) on the very last page. Dickens's friends appear to have been as free in their advice in regard to his novels, as they proceeded on their way, number by number, as total strangers were in writing letters imploring him to spare their favourite characters. Forster seems never to have doubted the wisdom of his own advice, but he did once have the grace to compare Dickens with Ben Jonson's Shakespeare, saying that both the earlier and the later writer, instead of being (in Jonson's words) 'stopped', might 'with more advantage have been left alone'.

Dickens defended the serial method in the Postscript to *Our Mutual Friend*: 'That I hold the advantages . . . to outweigh its disadvantages may be easily believed of one who revived it in the *Pickwick Papers* after long disuse and has pursued it ever since'. Among the advantages, he must have reckoned his own excitement in being often only one step ahead of his readers. Perhaps piqued by the success of Moncrieff's Pickwickian drama, he resolved to be his own dramatist when he was in the middle of *Pickwick's* successor, *Oliver Twist*, writing to a manager proposing a dramatised version of the half-finished story. 'I am quite satisfied that nobody can have heard what I mean to do with the different characters in the end, inasmuch as, at present, I don't quite know myself'.

There is a difference, of course, between novels written in volume instalments and novels written in monthly instalments. There is a smaller but still significant difference between novels written in monthly instalments and novels written in weekly instalments. Dickens tried both, and while he himself much preferred the monthly form, most critics agree that some of his best novels were those written in weekly instalments, where he may have had less room to manoeuvre, as he complained, but where equally the temptations to improvise were much less numerous.

Let us look at this matter in more detail. Dickens wrote in all fifteen novels, including the half-finished *Edwin Drood*. Of these fifteen novels, eight were originally issued in monthly parts spread over nineteen months, with a 'double number' (XIX-XX) at the end. These eight novels are *Pickwick, Nickleby, Chuzzlewit, Dombey, Copperfield, Bleak House, Little Dorrit* and *Our Mutual Friend*.

One novel, *Edwin Drood*, was intended to be completed in twelve monthly parts, of which Dickens had written six at his death.

One novel, *Oliver Twist*, ran originally as a monthly serial in *Bentley's Miscellany*—not a *weekly* serial, as Trevor Blount maintains in his British Council pamphlet *Dickens: The Early Novels* (1968; pp.9, 15-16).

There are, then, ten 'monthly Dickens' altogether out of the entire fifteen novels. The remaining five are 'weekly Dickens'. Two of them, *The Old*

Curiosity Shop and *Barnaby Rudge*, were originally weekly serials in *Master Humphrey's Clock*; one, *Hard Times*, ran in weekly instalments in *Household Words*; while the remaining two, *A Tale of Two Cities* and *Great Expectations*, ran in weekly instalments in *Household Words's* successor, *All the Year Round*.

With one obvious exception, it is evident that the 'weekly Dickens' is the more planned, the less improvised Dickens. Although the first thought of *Hard Times* goes back to the period when Dickens was writing *Nickleby*, we know that when in 1854 he really got to grips with it he produced a novel that kept to the main theme with scarcely any deviation. The two historical novels, with the probable reservation noted about *Barnaby* by Edgar Allan Poe, are also planned from beginning to end and carried out with little or no improvisation. While only the false ending of *Great Expectations*, for which we can blame Bulwer Lytton—or Dickens for taking his advice—prevents that novel, too, from following the 'weekly Dickens' formula of keeping steadily to the main theme without much variation.

The exception here is *The Old Curiosity Shop*. This was originally intended to be a short story told by Master Humphrey, the 'old man' narrator of the opening sentence. But Dickens became intrigued with its greater possibilities and changed his mind *en route* almost as much as he was to do later on with *Chuzzlewit*, *Dombey* and *Little Dorrit*. There is manuscript evidence to suggest, for instance, that he originally meant the Marchioness to be the unacknowledged and forsaken daughter of Quilp and Sally Brass.

But 'the monthly Dickens' is 'the impromptu Dickens' *par excellence*, though there can be two opinions as to the 'excellence' of the result in at least one instance. Dickens had worked out a very impressive plan indeed for *Dombey and Son*, and if *Dombey* had been a 'weekly Dickens' I believe he would have kept to that plan without much deviation. But *Dombey* is a 'monthly Dickens', and inevitably the impromptu novelist ('cooking' what Dickens in his original plan called 'all kinds of things' to be added to 'the stock of the soup') begins to crowd out the planning novelist, as was noticed at the time by the 'many readers' whom Forster reports as finding the more melodramatic parts of the novel 'to have fallen greatly short of the splendour of its opening'. That splendour remains, and the main theme of the novel is, after all, not lost sight of. But a 'weekly *Dombey*' would probably have meant a great deal less melodrama and perhaps the entire omission of those unconvincing characters, Carker the Junior and his sister Harriet.

Precisely the opposite can be said of *Chuzzlewit*. Here, too, Dickens had a plan, but luckily he did not adhere to it at all slavishly but kept on adding such episodes as the American journey and such characters as Mrs. Gamp, so that we value the novel more for its added ingredients than for its 'stock' A 'weekly *Chuzzlewit*' would have kept to the main theme of selfishness, as I believe a 'weekly *Tom-all-Alone's*' (the 'earliest title', Forster says, for *Bleak House*) would have had Jo as the principal character and a 'weekly *Nobody's Fault*' (the original title of *Little Dorrit*) would have emphasised the Clennams and the Meagles family, not the Dorrits.

When Mr. Pecksniff knocks on Mrs. Gamp's door in Chapter XIX of *Chuzzlewit*, Dickens had no more idea of what he was going to do with this new character than any of his original readers. We may today, before we have actually read the novel, have some idea, because Mrs. Gamp and her umbrella have passed into the language. I seem to remember that I possessed Mrs. Gamp on a cigarette card before I first met her in print at about the age of fourteen, and thousands of people of a younger generation must have seen her on television before they read the book. But Dickens and his original readers proceeded hand in hand, in that pact of mutual generosity which Jean-Paul Sartre speaks of as one of the necessities of literature.

Characters, said E. M. Forster, 'whom we recognise the instant they re-enter'. And they re-entered originally, in many cases, after a month or two months had elapsed. The reader's memory had to be jogged, as would not have been so necessary in a novel, however lengthy, published complete. The characteristic saying, or the characteristic gesture, was one way of doing it, a way that must have appealed to Dickens's essentially dramatic genius. We notice a lesser emphasis, and on the whole a more subtle approach, in the 'weekly Dickens'.

There is thus no question of Dickens's having written, as has been claimed by Mrs. Q. D. Leavis, a 'first batch of impromptu fiction before *Dombey*' (*Dickens the Novelist*, 1970, p.48). The improvisation occurs throughout Dickens's monthly career, in no novel to more disastrous (or near-disastrous) effect than in *Dombey* itself. But more often the improvisation *improves* the novel, as it obviously does in *Chuzzlewit*, *Copperfield* and *Little Dorrit*. And in all the 'weekly Dickens', save the extended short-story *The Old Curiosity Shop*, the improvisation is much reduced.

[R. C. Churchill's latest book is *A Bibliography of Dickensian Criticism 1836–1975* (Garland, New York; Macmillan, London).]

The March issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Centre-periphery Relations in Europe* by Avi Shlaim, *Putting Animals into Politics* by the Rt. Hon. Lord Houghton of Sowerby, C.H., *The Myth of 'Left' and 'Right' in Slav Literature* by Robin Kemball and *Walking The Terrorist Tightrope*, Paul Preston's second article on Spain, (held over from the February issue).

QUARTERLY FILM REVIEW

by James Morton

FILMS from the last London Film Festival are starting to trickle into the commercial cinemas. Following its policy in recent years the BBC has shown one of the major films from the festival on television. Joseph Losey's *Les Routes du Sud* follows his own *Mr Klein* Resnais' *Stavisky* and the British film *Akenfield* as the film chosen for BBC2. Whereas all the others had moderately successful runs in one art house or another there seem to be no plans for any commercial release of this one. It is not surprising. Yves Montand, looking a bit baggy under the eyes but otherwise fit and well is the writer who has spent the years since the Spanish Civil War providing a safe house and a courier service for anti-Franco exiles. Now with Franco terminally ill he is asked to provide one final journey for a partisan. His estranged son is visiting him and his wife goes instead. Franco dies as does the wife in a stupid car accident. So far so good. The trouble is that the rest of the film is devoted to Montand and the son mooning around Brittany and Spain seeking the truth about each other and the accident.

The truth about the wife's death is that it was a genuine accident and the truth about them is that they are a fairly boring pair. The son provides his girl friend Minou Minou, one of the current starlets of the French cinema, to solace Dad and the film ends on a generally hopeful note. Unfortunately by this time I had started to read *Ruff's Guide to the Turf 1978*. The trouble with films on TV is that they have to be riveting to overcome the viewer's tendency to go and make coffee or worse still to doze off. Losey's latest doesn't. I would probably have seen it out in the cinema — but only just.

Newsfront, the Australian film, directed by Philip Noyes, was chosen to open the Festival and is now having a commercial run at the enterprising Screen on the Hill in Hampstead. This is the story of two rival newsreel companies in Australia before the arrival of television which signals their death. The Australian cinema, never strong, is having something of a critical resurgence and as such it must be welcomed. In the last couple of years there have been nearly a dozen films which have been shown commercially over here including three or four which have had a general release on the major circuits. Although there are no plans at the time of writing I expect *Newsfront* to join them.

One of the troubles with Australian films is that the players are not International stars easily recognisable by the audience and the films have therefore to rely on solid teamwork. *Newsfront* is an example of this. Who has heard of Bill Hutton and Wendy Hughes, the principals? The other difficulty with the film is that the characters are all grey, good honest people with, it seems, limited thought processes and motives. Hutton plays Len, a cameraman married with an increasing catholic family. He is a good old-fashioned socialist opposed to the anti-communist backlash of the late

forties. This costs him his wife and ultimately his faith which is eroded as reel follows reel. It looks as though the film had financial troubles for it alternates, for no clear reason, between colour and black and white. Finally Len has the option to make money at the betrayal of his bosses. There is never any doubt, given his character, and he ends as a minor hero standing alone and by his Marxist philosophy, in the best sense of the phrase, having lost everything.

The film, like Len, is hopelessly naive. I find it difficult to understand why antipodeans require everything to be spelt out for them in words of one syllable or pictures. A good example by way of contrast is *Paper Moon* which was recently shown on television. Both films make use of contemporary music. *Paper Moon* has a strong thirties and country music score. At the end Tatum O'Neal is left alone, not knowing her father. The opportunity to play the depression song *Nobody's Child* is admirably resisted by Bogdanovich. In *Newsfront* the hero has an emotional crisis when his girl is about to defect to his brother, her former lover. Just the cue for the nightclub pianist to play *Smoke gets in your Eyes*. The arguments, both religious and political, are naive in the extreme and are conducted on a sixth form debating society level. Indeed the final question of Len's integrity has been championed by the left wing papers as one of almost earth shattering intensity. In fact it has the same moral problem as the school cricket captain asked to sell the Old Boys' match.

But the film does work. The teamwork of the acting sees it through. Perhaps you don't care quite as much as you should for the characters but this may be because of the lack of characterisation of the female parts. Wendy Hughes, the mistress of both brothers, consecutively as opposed to concurrently, is always a shadowy figure who never materialises into anything more than a cipher. What she does, she does well but one feels that one is still in a man's Australia where the Sheila's place is to keep silent and not to be allowed any thought independently of her Man.

Away from the Festival, Ingmar Bergman's penultimate film to reach the screen is the *Serpent's Egg*. It bears close resemblance to the Curate's. This is a multi-national and multi-lingual look at Berlin in the early twenties when inflation was rife and Hitler was about to stage his first abortive coup. David Carradine is a Jewish trapeze artist whose brother has damaged a wrist, and who is himself an alcoholic. Carradine is unwilling to take a return step to the Circus and is even more unwilling to accept the corruption going on around him. Liv Ullman is his sister-in-law with whom he has a brief and hopeless relationship. Now that her husband is injured she has taken a job in a cabaret (synonymous with brothel). By no means unhappy in her work, she loses her job when embryonic Nazis raid the place and beat up the owner. She and Carradine are given an apartment in an hospital run by our old friend the mad scientist. Indeed the whole film is laced with references. A complete remembrance of films Pabst. The principal one is *Dr. Mabuse*. For example the police inspector, Gert Froebe, refers to a subordinate as Inspector Lowman, who was the detective who trailed the

infamous Doctor in Lang's films. Unfortunately Bergman seems to pay homage to the Lisa Minnelli vehicle *Cabaret*. I say unfortunately, but in fact these sequences are among the most enjoyable in what is a very depressing but never uninteresting film. I can't see why a director of Bergman's standing has to borrow quite as much as he does. Indeed, the voice over ending is in parts word for word that of *Borsalino*, the enormously popular French pot-boiler of a few years back. That said, Liv Ullman is stunningly good and Carradine extends his repertoire. He is on record as saying that the film is the ultimate cure for insomniacs but he is unfair to a compelling piece.

I gran (if there is such a word) and bore the first ten minutes of *Outrageous*. If anyone asked me which film I was paying to see on a Saturday night (since I missed the press show) I would have been ashamed to tell them it was the one about the girl who escapes from a mental hospital and goes to live with a gay hairdresser who has a drag act in a Montreal bar at the weekends. Put like that it sounds dreadful. There again, if you describe *Gigi* as the story of two ageing prostitutes who train a younger one, it doesn't sound too good. In fact *Outrageous* has a great deal going for it. For a start it has Craig Russell as the drag artist. He is quite brilliant as he runs through his repertory of Judy Garland, Mae West, Bette Davis and all the other Hollywood Queens in what is an extended cabaret performance. The film is in part the old story of the out of town hick who takes Broadway by storm. On the other hand he is also extremely good as the gay who is the only one who can help the poor mad girl, Lisa.

If one can disregard the basic concept that only the gays have the ability to find sanity in this mad world then this is an entertaining and ultimately extremely touching film. You really do feel for Lisa in her madness. More than can be said for ninety-nine out of a hundred films.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

THE TORY PARTY IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY

The Foundation of the Conservative Party—1830-67. Robert Stewart. Longman. £12.

Disraeli, Derby and the Conservative Party. The political journals of Lord Stanley 1849-69. J. R. Vincent (editor). Harvester Press. £18.50.

'It is sometimes said,' Robert Stewart so begins his study, 'that Conservatives suffer from the want of a permanent ideology and a doctrinal literature.' As if to fill this gap, there have appeared over the last decade a considerable number of volumes, all telling us what this most undoctrinal of parties believed in and believes. Apart from the researches of Messrs. Cook and Vincent, this reviewer can count at least three such explicit works, and no doubt there are and soon will be many more. (Lord Blake's *The Conservative Party: From Peel to Churchill,* Eyre & Spottiswoode 1976; T. F. Lindsay and Michael Harrington: *The Conservative Party 1918-70,* Macmillan 1974; Andrew Gamble: *The Conservative Nation,* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1974.)

Dr. Stewart's is the first of a series of four by different authors designed to provide a complete history of the party up to our own day (by, in order, Paul Addison, John Ramsden and John Barnes) and appearing under the distinguished *imprimatur* of Lords Blake and Boyle. If none of the worthy works thus far published matches in style and in insight Lord Hailsham's *Conservatism,* written—it now seems—a long time ago (1946) they all thicken the texture of the political story of the last century and bring to life some little-known figures. And from Dr. Stewart's footnotes and bibliographical apparatus it is clear that a considerable number of graduate students are busy on doctoral dissertations exploring other unworked areas. He cites no less than 15 unpublished theses on party aspects of the 40 years between 1830 and 1870. The good old cause is at last receiving a proper historical foundation.

It is no criticism of Dr. Stewart to say that he does not quite succeed in his task. His is the hardest job of the four writers charged to cover the Conservative story since 1830. There was not a 'party' in any recognisably modern sense until 1867, and relations between those who accepted the label 'Conservative' or 'Tory' in Parliament, whether 'ultras' or just pragmatists, and those who could and would vote for them in the country were erratic. Liverpool had no interest in party organisation and never made a speech in his life outside Parliament; Canning, by making many, perhaps lost as much popularity as he won. Peel—the ablest of them all by far—was first and last the administrator, Disraeli—it is clear—was first and last the opportunist. One thing recent research is doing is to put that wily operator in perspective, and if there is a hero here it is the 14th Earl of Derby. Moreover, the influence and pressure which we nowadays assume is brought by the people on Parliament (though we and the press often deceive ourselves here) was then a feeble influence going the other way: in so far as elections were managed, they were managed from the House, mainly by the whips. The Conservative Party, much more than its rivals, has always been a Parliamentary party; it is there—by whatever route its members reach Westminster—to govern, not to be directed. What is clear, however, is that this influence from the centre was waning before the Reform Bill. And—as Dr. Stewart concedes—there was little class difference between Whig and Tory until well into the nineteenth century, and 'class' was not to be a factor for

another generation. This is thus first and last a study of Parliament and of those in it.

This is, however, to cavil. Dr. Stewart's volume is one of careful research and will prove of great value to other tillers in the field. Perhaps the most valuable sections in it are those on the role of Sir William Jolliffe as Chief Whip in the 1850s, and of men like Philip Rose, Disraeli's solicitor, and Markham Spofforth working not from Westminster but from Victoria Street, the real predecessors of the more professional Central Office of 1867. Indeed, Jolliffe is the only Chief Tory Whip for the 40 years from 1846 to 1886 of whom we have any real knowledge. In exploring this tangle of relationships, Dr. Stewart is pioneering and he does so with obvious authority and with daunting command of detail.

Yet it is possible to draw a worrying conclusion from his Introduction that puts his volume—and its successors—at risk. Presumably all four volumes, when they appear, are designed to offer a continuous narrative of the evolution of 'the party'. But the purpose of the Conservative Party in the four decades of the mid-nineteenth century was to defend the monarchy, the landed interest and the Church of England. When Lord Randolph Churchill was asked in the 1880s how far towards liberalism a Tory democrat could go, his reply was 'to any extent', provided that he did not abandon the monarchy, the House of Lords, the union of Great Britain and Ireland and the connection between Church and State. Some of these guidons have long since been abandoned by this time on the field of party battle. Are those who rally to the banner today —for the most part middle-class and grammar school in background—remotely comparable with the landed scions who walk these pages? Are they keepers of the same conscience? There is continuity in name perhaps and in attitude of mind; but the differences are so profound that at times they imperil the pretence that there is an inherited central faith.

These hesitations are reinforced by Professor J. R. Vincent's edition of the Political Journals of the Lord Stanley who was the son and heir of Disraeli's companion, the Fourteenth Earl. Because it is a personal journal it is fresher and more vivid reading than a narrative history can be. It tells us little of the author and nothing of the reasons why he so carefully doctored the diary for 1849 to 1855—what was there for him to hide? He seems to have been genuinely disinterested, somewhat lonely and aloof, and fascinated by politics. Himself detached, he had the merits of a ringside seat. The diary is rich in vivid references to the Parliamentary and non-Parliamentary figures who are the raw material of Dr. Stewart's pages. Derby, here again, is the most important figure, and not just because he was the diarist's father. Again, to an extent forgotten today, the Queen mattered, as did Chartism, which—it seems—by putting the idea of revolution high in every politician's mind, probably ensured Free Trade. And the Gladstone of these pages is high-tempered and impetuous, far from the awesome and Christian figure of legend; Peel is 'pompous and plausible', Disraeli—playing the part of a Burke to Derby's Rockingham—always busy, and firm in his pliant conviction that 'Politicians neither love nor hate'. And Parliament? Some things do change. In the session 1852-3, of 1,106 speeches, 81 were for longer than an hour; of these, 3 exceeded 4 hours in length. But some things remain unchanged. In the same session, of 646 members, 342 did not speak at all. 'More than one half of the House still consists of silent members' (p. 122). There is a continuity after all.

ESMOND WRIGHT

RUSSIA'S REVOLUTIONS

Black Night, White Snow: Russia's Revolutions 1905-1917. Harrison Salisbury. Cassell. £12.50.

There is a widespread academic prejudice against journalists venturing works of contemporary history on themes already amply covered by professional historians. In many cases this attitude is based on perfectly valid criticisms of superficiality, sensationalism and shoddy workmanship. Yet, it must be admitted, academic suspicion is sometimes grounded on more ignoble considerations such as professional jealousy and envy of the skilled investigative journalist's privileged access to special sources, lucidity, and sheer readability. Mr. Harrison Salisbury's new book invites respect for its strengths rather than condemnation for its many weaknesses, for none of its faults is serious enough to obstruct the *tour de force* of its compressed historical narrative of the Russian revolutions.

Those familiar with the author's earlier works on Russia such as *An American in Russia*, which won him the Pulitzer Prize in 1955, and *The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad* (1969), will know of his remarkably deep understanding of Russian history and culture. Although he has also written on China and other subjects there can be no mistaking the fact that Mr. Salisbury has experienced a kind of intellectual love affair with Russian history and society ever since his first visit to Moscow as a war correspondent in 1944. I do not mean to imply that he was bowled over or duped by Communist Party propaganda in the manner of the fellow-travellers of the 1930s. When Mr. Salisbury arrived in Russia he was already a seasoned journalist, able to bring to bear all the best qualities in American journalism—acute and detailed observation, humanity, and a certain calm detachment. These made him an invaluable interpreter of Russia under Stalin, when that country was as enigmatic to the West as the surface of the moon.

Harrison Salisbury's latest work is a remarkable production for a writer in his seventieth year. There are no startling historical discoveries or interpretations but in a mere six hundred pages he has provided a dramatic and concise narrative, based almost entirely on Russian sources, covering over twenty years of revolutionary turmoil, and ending with the murder of the Tsar and his family. Written in colourful and fast-moving prose, the work makes a lively introductory survey, both for the young history student and the general reader.

Mr. Salisbury's wide knowledge of Russian literature is admirably deployed to enrich understanding of changes in mood and intellectual climate. His title is taken from the beautiful lines of Alexander Blok:

> Black night,
> White snow.
> Wind, wind!
> A man can't stand.
> Wind, wind
> All over God's world!

There are numerous delightful vignettes. For example, we glimpse the life of the literary intelligentsia in February 1917, with the mad and passionate Mayakovsky dressed in a yellow tunic and reciting his poem 'A Cloud in Pants', and Konstantin Paustovsky being instructed by his Moscow newspaper editor: 'Go to some Godforsaken place in the provinces and write what Turgenev's Russia is thinking now.'

Yet while the book is strong on transformations of thought and feeling, and

on the development of key personalities such as Lenin and Stalin, it almost totally neglects detailed political and economic changes, and problems of policy and administration. The Kadets and the Liberals and the moderate Socialist Revolutionaries hardly get a look in. Prince Lvov, Milyukov, and Kerensky appear only in passing, their personalities and ideas unexplored. Even in the treatment of relations between the author's 'major' characters such as Trotsky and Lenin there is very little mention of doctrinal and policy differences. Economics and foreign relations are only sketchily treated, despite their importance in relation to Mr. Salisbury's subject. In short, what is lacking is the denser, more comprehensive political, social and historical background. There is none of the solidity and detail of E. H. Carr or Adam Ulam.

Yet despite these weaknesses, Mr. Salisbury's dramatic story has a haunting power. It has two recurrent themes. First, there is the decisive role of Lenin in October 1917. The author writes 'that Lenin—and Lenin alone—backed the idea of the October coup; that almost all of his associates opposed him and thought him violently mistaken; that he singlehandedly overcame their opposition and was prepared to go to *any* lengths (including conspiring against his own party) to achieve his goal; and that the historical record has been deliberately suppressed and distorted for sixty years to conceal the dimensions and depth of the conflict' (p. 462).

Second, Mr. Salisbury emphasises the stark fact of Lenin's readiness to use the weapon of mass terror to serve his will to power. Lenin condemned individual terror, on the grounds of tactical expediency, yet he deliberately promoted and accelerated the mass terror in the wake of the revolution on the pretext of eliminating 'counter-revolutionary elements'. On learning that a leading Petrograd Bolshevik had been shot by an SR terrorist, Lenin wrote to Zinoviev, his lieutenant in Petrograd, in June 1918:

> 'Only today we have heard . . . that in Petrograd the workers wanted to reply to the murder of Volodarsky by mass terror and that you . . . restrained them.
> I protest most emphatically!'

Alexander Solzhenitsyn and other courageous dissident writers have revealed the horror of the Gulag Archipelago. Harrison Salisbury's new book helps us to understand how Russia arrived at its terrible destination.

PAUL WILKINSON

CHRISTIANITY'S LOST CONTINENT

The End of an Era: Africa and the Missionary. Elliott Kendall. S.P.C.K. £4.50.

This is an important and significant book from one who has had considerable experience in Africa as missionary and administrator. It covers the missionary period from the early 19th century to the present moment, a period when the west discovered Africa and left its stamp on the whole continent. Mr. Kendall's Africa is mainly sub-Sahara Africa and perhaps the weakness of his book is its almost total omission of reference to the growing power and prestige of Islam which threatens the life and future of Africa as a possible Christian continent.

Although the western powers are now out of Africa, their old Islamic rival is still well established, with the mosques and minarets rivalling the gothic spires and imitation cathedrals. From the Cape to Cairo it is Islam all the way. The Portuguese Christian thrust faded out and while the modern missionary movement succeeded in indigenising Christianity, to a certain extent, it still seems to

need the props which the western churches are still willing to give any evangelistic movement that will work in Africa.

It is surprising to learn from Mr. Kendall that there are still some 30,000 missionaries of varying Christian allegiances at work in Africa, and it may be as many as 40,000. It looks as if a new 'missionary movement' is establishing itself in Africa, one that is not 'free lance', as in the previous century, but is linked in various ways with the churches which have taken root in African soil. This is the issue, as Mr. Kendall is careful to point out. Are these African churches strong enough to evangelise the continent? Are they African enough to be powerful in the face of Islam, or are they mere off-shoots of western Christianity, and therefore doomed eventually to succumb under the weight of imported western secularism?

As a continent capable of absorbing vast quantities of human dedication in terms of personal service and financial offerings, Africa would appear to be prepared to receive all she can get from the West. Giving help to Africa would appear to some to be the quickest way of losing the continent altogether. Those 40,000 missionaries could be an asset, but they could also be a liability and according to Mr. Kendall probably are.

CECIL NORTHCOTT

THE CARTLAND AFFAIR

The Cartland File. Jeremy Cartland. Linkline Publications. £4.50.

One remembers the relentless Press saturation, the proliferation of rumours of the most intriguing nature, the haunted, bearded face, and one turns now, five years later, with a fresh interest and curiosity to Mr. Jeremy Cartland's own account of the Cartland affair of 1973. The lapse of time is precisely right. It must be said at once, however, that this is a particularly bleak and worrying book, of the type known as 'disturbing'. Jeremy Cartland was, at the time, suspected of the murder of his father, John Cartland, and therefore his book is full of the pain, anger and disillusionment of the entrapped. There is no objective screen through whose filter the criminologist, removed and assured, can evoke the most horrifying circumstances and leave the reader coldly fascinated.

The cause of Peremy Cartland's ordeal was what he calls the 'maleficient machinations' of the French police, who may have wished to avoid the stigma and the ramifications of the not dissimilar Dominici affair. When John Cartland was killed with an axe, and his son, Jeremy, stunned and stabbed, on a caravan trip in the South of France, the police, *ab initio,* selected the son as the guilty person, and persisted in describing his injuries as self-inflicted. Building doggedly upon this premise, they appear to have pursued no other line of enquiry, and to have concentrated upon a harassment of Jeremy Cartland, with the lively assistance of the French Press. The seven-hour interviews and the deprivations to which he was subjected while still being treated for his wounds in hospital, all directed, naturally, towards the extraction of a confession, are an object lesson for those who would resist our own Judges' Rules. A statement of his right of silence was withheld from him. The transcribing of his statements left much to be desired. The forensic evidence—fingerprints, blood-testing—was botched, and the scene of the crime early trampled as if by a herd of mastodons.

Mr. Cartland, aided, as his plight improved, by a powerful team of French and English lawyers, extricated himself from the more pressing attentions of

the police by the device of taking out a *partie civile,* that is, by launching a civil action against the person or persons unknown who had killed his father. The benefit that accrued therefrom was that once that action had been taken, he could not be interviewed again by the police. His sole permitted inquisitor, and then only with his lawyers present, was the *Juge d'Instruction,* who conducted the several Hearings which led to his being charged with murder at a time when he was advisedly absent in England. The 'secret of the instruction' was breached in the most alarming manner by the French Press, which, before each Hearing, printed a list of the questions that were to be put to Cartland, and, even worse, a dissertation on the way in which he would be unable to answer those questions.

An extradition order for Cartland to face trial in France did not follow the murder charge. The French Establishment, evincing a degree of disquiet, examined all the evidence, and transferred the entire case to the Director of Public Prosecutions in London. Scotland Yard duly made further enquiries, which appear to have concentrated upon the guilt or innocence of Jeremy Cartland rather than upon a more global approach. Finally, his sufferings were ameliorated by the official statement that there was no evidence to warrant the institution of criminal proceedings against Jeremy Cartland in respect of his father 's death. It was clearly the unusual character of his father that generated some of the rumours. Mr. Cartland tells us that to protect himself against possible terrorist attacks in London, John Cartland once, in a car, wore a metal saucepan on his head. Mr. Cartland sets out the material regarding his father's connection with British Intelligence and the Resistance Movement, but it is inconclusive. His points of argumentation to refute the official French reports which form Appendices would obviously have contributed to a strong Defence brief in the event of a trial.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

MEMOIRS OF A HIGH COURT JUDGE

A Law Unto Myself. Sir Neville Faulks. William Kimber. £5.95.

Judges and barristers, entoiled in the niceties of law, may rarely disclose their human, humorous side in court—Sir Neville Faulks does so frankly in his second volume of memoirs covering his years as QC and High Court Judge. Two cases in which he appeared as counsel concerned Tommy Steele's and Bruce Forsyth's relations with agents, and he quotes with relish Mr. Justice Melford Stevenson's quip: 'I have often heard it said that it is more difficult to get rid of an agent than a wife.'

Specialising on libel, Sir Neville, led by Gerald Gardiner, found himself up against the exotic Liberace who claimed damages from a newspaper columnist who had called him, among other virulent things, 'the biggest sentimental vomit of all time.' When Gardiner deputed Faulks to take on a witness because 'you've got a lighter touch than I have' Faulks' bland opening was: 'My learned leader thinks that we should have a change of bowling to see if we cannot get a quick wicket before the close of play' which 'went rather well.' Penitentially, he had to sit through a vast number of Liberace's TV recordings which were 'not for me.'

In the most satisfying libel action he ever fought, the plaintiff was General Anders, the Polish wartime hero who commanded the Poles at the battle of Monte Cassino. Amid a welter of complicated political issues, Faulks had to

show that Anders was an enemy of Sikorski's government. The jury agreed but found it was not defamatory for the defendant to say so, and awarded £7,000 damages for the rest.

The book affords the lay reader some rare insights into the often baffling processes of the law: the pros and cons of paying money into court as a kind of bet on contingent damages, and of accepting retainers; the financial and social considerations involved in becoming a Bencher — 'a great thing' — a Commissioner sent out on circuit 'on sale or return' according to performance, and finally a full-wigged judge. Sir Neville defines his function in the old Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division as 'a cross between a parson and a probation officer, with enough legal knowledge to enable me to make my solution acceptable.' Advice given him when, at 54, he joined the Western Circuit at Winchester as Commissioner was: 'Don't get drunk in the lodgings', though the facts he gives on the cost of living in lodgings make one doubt if any judge could often afford to get drunk at current prices.

Sir Neville is illuminating on his family, two marriages, travels and leisure pursuits. He says he has had 'a long and happy life getting happier with every year that passes' and that gives tone to the human side of his reminiscences, relief to the tedium of strictly legal expositions.

TREVOR ALLEN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Broken Star (Christopher Davies. £4.95). James Avery Joyce's latest book is a short history and evaluation of the League of Nations, 1919-1939. No account of international affairs between the wars can fail to acknowledge the part played by the League. Mr. Joyce deals with the creation of the League following the end of the First World War, and the hopes of a great future. He discusses the formal structure and the part played in the successive crises. Its failures were more prominent than its successes. It lacked teeth and it had diminishing support, in face of Hitler and Mussolini. Mr. Joyce stresses the impact upon the League of the economic blizzard that started in 1929-30 and swept across the world. 'It was not noticed at the time that the world crisis wrecked the League beyond repair. Many later critics of the League's political collapse ignored its economic causes, which were **fundamental** to everything else.' The author regards the League as an invaluable forerunner of the United Nations, providing many of its ideals and objectives in international affairs. Upon this foundation the UN has gone forward in fields barely touched by the League, in, for example, their specialised agencies and technical organs, and peace-keeping forces. This is a study of much value which puts the League in a fair perspective.

British Drama (Harrap. £8.00). Professor Allardyce Nicoll's classic 'general survey of the drama in Great Britain from the earliest times to the present' was last revised and reset in its fifth edition in 1962. Now the sixth edition is revised by J. C. Trewin. He is particularly responsible for the last chapter on the twentieth century which has been completely re-written, to take special account of developments in the theatre since 1962. There also has been some stylistic and factual emendations in the earlier chapters. Mr. Trewin, of course, writes with much authority, although no doubt there will be some differences of view or emphasis. On the present

state of the theatre, he concludes: 'What the time (and with it the drama) lacks as much as anything is an unflawed faith that moved "the northern Guildsmen, these/That were the makers of our Mysteries". We cannot perpetually believe in disbelief. We need, too, the rediscovery of a certain symmetry and grace; of language that can lift heart and mind ' . . . the full tide will return'. The bibliography has been revised and brought up to date.

The Half-Mad Lord (Jonathan Cape. £6.95). Nikolai Tolstoy has written a fascinating and well-researched biography of Thomas Pitt, the second Baron Camelford, who died in a duel in 1804 at the age of 29. He was extremely wealthy and a cousin of the great Pitts. His sister married another cousin, Lord Grenville, who was also William Pitt's Home Secretary. It is doubtful whether, without the support of the establishment and his highly placed connections, Lord Camelford could have continued so long his mad career. As Mr. Tolstoy shows, he was a man of considerable talent, great courage, prone to take offence at the least excuse, was violent in his behaviour, utterly independent and determined to achieve some great undertaking, yet sensitive and generous to the poor. His short career in the Royal Navy was calamitous. On the *Discovery*, he was flogged and he vowed revenge on his Captain, Captain George Vancouver. In due course, he thrashed him publicly in London. He was also court-martialled for killing a fellow officer and finally was obliged to resign from the Service. Camelford became interested in violent sports, and Mr. Tolstoy describes his promotion of the prize fight between Joe Bourke and Jem Belcher. The most interesting part of this study relates to Camelford's interest in the French emigrés, his hatred of Napoleon and his secret visits to France, from which he was rescued by his family. There appears to be little doubt that the French security police regarded Camelford as a potential assassin of the First Consul. Mr. Tolstoy speculates that Camelford's death resulted from a duel contrived by the French. His former mistress, Fanny Simmonds, falsely accused to him that his great friend, Captain Thomas Best, had insulted him in public; she appears to have persevered in these allegations despite their falsity. In the result, Camelford insisted upon a duel. Best was well-known as one of the most accurate shots and Camelford feared for his life. The latter missed but Best shot and killed him. Mr. Tolstoy concludes: 'Spies watched Lord Camelford's every movement; could they have fixed upon the volatile Fanny Simmonds as the instrument that would bring about his downfall? There is in the nature of the case little direct evidence on which to proceed.' This would not be expected. No doubt this will remain an unsolved mystery.

Can You Find Me? (Oxford University Press. £5.95). When asked by his publisher to write the story of his childhood, Christopher Fry decided that, although he grew up in the interesting period of World War I, this in itself did not provide sufficiently significant material for a full-length autobiography. Instead, he set to work on a history of his family, based on letters, diaries, memoirs and photographs. This might have seemed a meagre basis for a detailed account of a group of men and women who were not in any way remarkable. It is to Christopher Fry's credit that his meticulous handling of events long ago builds into a genuinely compulsive narrative.

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CENTRE-PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN EUROPE

by Avi Shlaim

THE Mediterranean basin has always been an area of special interest and special responsibility for the European Community. But the Community's interest in forging close economic relations with her southern neighbours and in promoting conditions of peace and stability which would safeguard the security of her southern flank, has not been translated into a coherent policy embodying clear economic priorities and political guidelines. Indeed, given the importance which both groups of countries attach to this mutual relationship, the random and almost accidental manner in which the EEC's policy towards the Mediterranean has evolved is most striking. Lacking an agreed overall conception of her own, the Community simply reacted to the requests of her neighbours by taking little steps of scant economic and political significance. Since the early 1960s it concluded a series of association agreements, trade agreements and preferential trade agreements with nearly all the island and coastal states of the Mediterranean. The end product is a mosaic of unrelated agreements with complex and divergent commercial content, an assortment of institutional modalities and different provisions regarding the political future of each bilateral relationship.

The so-called 'global policy', adopted by the EEC in June 1973, was an attempt to replace this piecemeal and haphazard approach with a more systematic and comprehensive policy. But under the impact of internal discord and conflicting external pressures this global policy disintegrated into a series of bilateral deals which do not reflect a common pattern.

The Community claims that the recently concluded or re-negotiated agreements all reflect her resolve to create a new model for relations between developed states and developing countries in line with the declared aim of the international community of moving towards a more just and more equitable international order. The sincerity of this aim is not in question, nor is the Community's actual progress in this direction which compares very favourably with that of other industrialised states. But the fact remains that, far from being based on interdependence and equality, the relationship is one of profound inequality and one-sided dependence. The EEC provides a market for over 50 per cent of the total exports of the

Mediterranean countries. It is also their principal source of financial and technical aid and virtually the only outlet for their surplus labour. On the other hand, only 12 per cent of the Community's own exports go to the Mediterranean and although the Maghreb countries supply some of the Community's oil needs, the degree of EEC economic dependence on these countries is negligible. The effects of this one-sided dependence are accentuated by the fact that the Mediterranean countries negotiate with the EEC individually and not as a group. Individual weakness and limited diplomatic leverage is thus confronted with the collective strength of the Nine and the outcome of the negotiations inevitably reflects these underlying power relations.

In essence, the relationship between the EEC and the countries of the Mediterranean basin remains a centre-periphery relationship with the economically backward and predominantly agricultural Mediterranean periphery structurally dependent on the technologically advanced and predominantly industrial European centre. This dependence is evident in all the principal aspects of the economic relations between the two groups of countries.

The first and most important aspect is that of agricultural trade. All the countries of the Mediterranean basin share the predicament of having to compete in the same market for the similar agricultural products which they grow. But in the case of the countries of the southern shore this problem is particularly acute since 64 per cent of their exports to the Community consist of farm products and this ratio cannot be easily changed given the structure of their economies. Overall, agriculture accounts for a substantially larger share of both employment and GNP in the Mediterranean countries than in the EEC and the latter's Common Agricultural Policy consequently affects the most vital interests of the Community's partners. The inordinately complicated rules of this policy, however, were framed with the interests of the domestic farmers in mind. Essentially, the system of giving preference to the farm products of member states consists of manipulating the price level of key products in accordance with politically determined criteria and tightly regulating and restricting the access of outside producers to the Community market. Under such a system a rational division of labour based on comparative advantage is not possible. The device of variable import levies means that outside producers cannot sell more by lowering their prices and thus strengthening their competitive position. Heavy protectionism in the agricultural trade thus restricts the exports of the Mediterranean partners in the one field in which they enjoy comparative advantage.

The concessions offered to the Mediterranean partners in the industrial field are widely regarded as being much more generous than those offered in the agricultural field and Community spokesmen like to point out that a liberal policy on industrial imports provides some sort of compensation for the protectionist policy they have to pursue in the agricultural field. But in practice this liberal policy is rather less impressive than it is on paper.

Preferential access to the Community market for the exports of industrial goods means very little to Mediterranean countries where the process of industrialisation is just beginning. Where advantage can be taken of the preferential access offered, as in the case of textiles and processed petroleum goods, other regulations and safeguard clauses are usually brought into play to protect domestic producers. If all else fails, it is always possible to impose quotas to check foreign competition. When this happens, the adverse consequences for the developing country can be significant. The principal benefit which developing countries derive from industrial tariff preferences granted by the EEC lies in the stimulus they provide for exports and investment. Import quotas imposed by the EEC, however, fix a ceiling beyond which there will be no additional stimulus either to exports or to investment. The textile industries of Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey and Cyprus are all affected in this way. But it is Spain which has the largest industrial structure of all the Mediterranean associates, which also feels most acutely the impact of the EEC's industrial protectionism. And the EEC concessions which are carefully engineered to limit the extent of Spanish industrial competition provide the clearest evidence that the EEC's neo-mercantilist orientation is not confined to agricultural trade.

Capital flows are a further aspect of the relations between the Community and the developing countries of the Mediterranean basin. These fall into two principal categories. One is official aid in the form of grants and loans from the European Investment Bank. This is a potentially powerful instrument for assisting the development process of the Community's associates particularly by helping them to finance the infrastructure which is necessary for industrialisation. But the actual sums involved have been small and have inevitably fallen short of the expectations of the associates. The other category is that of private capital flows. These flows are stimulated by special investment guarantees which the recipient countries sometimes grant in order to attract foreign investment. But here too the extent of the flow is not particularly impressive. European countries make only 19 per cent of their total foreign manufacturing investment in the Mediterranean (compared with 48 per cent which goes to Latin America) and half of this is concentrated in the oil industry.

In addition to trade and capital flows, the free movement of labour constitutes a factor of considerable importance in EEC-Mediterranean relations. For the Mediterranean countries with surplus labour—Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Spain and Portugal—this outlet into Europe carries the double advantage of relieving unemployment at home and providing them with an important source of foreign currency. For France, Germany and the Benelux countries the availability of migrant labour helped to maintain the momentum of their export-led growth throughout the 1960s. But the onset of the world economic recession in 1973 and the growth of domestic unemployment has gradually been leading the European countries to lay off foreign workers and to introduce measures to control and restrict the movement of labour into their territory.

Even when the system did work, prior to 1973, it carried disadvantages as well as advantages for the labour-exporting countries. Leaving aside the social problems to which it gave rise, the fact that on the whole it was the younger and more skilled workers who tended to emigrate impeded to some extent the process of industrialisation in their home countries. What recent shifts in Europe's migratory policies have made clear beyond doubt is that far from being a permanent service and a major contribution to the economic development of the Mediterranean countries, migrant labour constitutes a pool which is profitably tapped by the European centres during periods of labour scarcity and ingeniously topped up again during periods of recession.

Furthermore, the ease with which relatively low-cost foreign labour can be tapped in the politically stable industrial centre of Europe considerably reduces the attraction of, say, Turkey or the Maghreb countries to foreign investors. This fact goes a long way to explain why there has been so little European investment in the Mediterranean and so little decentralisation of industry from the centre to the periphery. For without this recourse to low-cost manpower, the more backward labour-intensive European industries would have been faced with the choice of either going out of business or moving to the periphery.

When all these different but closely inter-related aspects of EEC-Mediterranean relations—agricultural trade, industrial trade, capital flows and labour movements—are looked at together, the general picture which emerges is unmistakably one of a centre-periphery relationship. It is the wealthy and advanced industrial centre which derives from the association considerable benefits in terms of cheap labour and secure markets for its manufactured goods at relatively low cost to itself in terms of financial transfers and effective competition. This is not to say that the countries of the periphery derive no benefits. For the semi-industrialised countries of the area, notably Greece, the association with the Community is of significant economic value. The predominantly agricultural countries, too, would have been worse off without their agreements with the Community, notwithstanding the highly protectional character of the Common Agricultural Policy.

The real point of this analysis is to suggest that the Community's claim that its relations with its southern neighbours represents a new mode of equitable relations between advanced industrial states and developing countries does not stand up to critical scrutiny. And it is not necessary to deny either the Community's genuine efforts to move in this direction or the benefits which accrue to her Mediterranean partners to conclude that the relationship between the two groups still corresponds in all essentials to the classic centre-periphery model and that some aspects of this relationship have the effect of freezing the export structure of the countries of the periphery, impeding their economic development and perpetuating their structural dependence.

The recent applications of Greece, Spain and Portugal to join the EEC introduced an entirely new and crucial element into this centre-periphery

relationship. These applications signify, in effect, the desire of these three countries to reverse their economically peripheral and dependent role by becoming fully integrated into the European centre. For the Community itself the task of absorbing these three backward countries of southern Europe with their inadequate industries, outmoded farming and low living standards poses the greatest challenge it has had to face since its inception two decades ago. The road leading from a community of nine to a community of twelve is fraught with pitfalls and uncertainties.

The cost of enlargement is difficult to quantify, but it has been estimated by the Community officials that an additional sum in the region of £3,000 million will have to be spent in order to bring the living standards of the three applicants to about 60 per cent of what would be the average for a community of twelve countries.

Not surprisingly, therefore, there is very little enthusiasm among the present members for the prospective enlargement of the Community. The poorer members, such as Ireland, worry about the new competition for shares in the Community's social and regional development funds. The richer ones, notably Germany, which contributes 37 per cent of the Community budget, are reluctant to incur the additional cost involved or to grant foreign workers unrestricted rights of entry and full social security benefits. The Mediterranean members, France and Italy, resent Spanish and Greek agricultural competition and insist on a better deal for their farmers as a condition for enlargement. The Benelux countries fear that enlargement would compound the institutional problems of the Community and transform it into a much looser association of sovereign states with no prospect of ever realising the declared aim of European Union. The Danes are worried that the whole centre of gravity of the Community will shift southward and that it will assume a predominantly Latin Mediterranean character. Britain, on the other hand, favours enlargement precisely because it would dilute the cohesion of the Community and hopes for lower food prices while remaining slightly apprehensive about the prospect of industrial competition from the three applicants.

Why then enlarge? The answer was given by the late Anthony Crosland who, as President of the Council of Ministers, told the European Parliament on 11 January, 1977:

> Because, simply, the political benefits of enlargement outweigh all the practical difficulties. I do not refer only to the accretion of power which the new members will bring to Europe's common pool. Far more important is the new strength which enlargement will bring to European democracy. By sustaining the fledgling democracies at the most crucial stage in their evolution, we shall protect them against their enemies within and without. . . . Enlargement is an investment in the democratic future of Europe; and in the long run the benefits will far outweigh the costs.

The Nine, whatever their specific reservations, broadly share this conviction that the buttressing of democracy in Athens, Lisbon and Madrid constitutes an overriding political imperative. What is lacking is any clear consensus on the political future of the Community and an agreed strategy for meeting the challenge of enlargement. The Commission has been giving

serious consideration to the problems and long-term implications of further enlargement and has come up with some constructive ideas such as the setting-up of a special fund to help prepare the three candidates for membership. But there is little evidence of forward planning by the national governments. Such planning is vitally important, given that enlargement involves a radical restructuring of the relations between Europe and its Mediterranean periphery. This is bound to have serious consequences for the Community, for the prospective members and for the other Mediterranean countries who will remain outside the club. Fundamental political choices will, therefore, have to be made about the Community's institutional structure, its external relations and its ultimate destination. In short, the Nine are faced both with a threat and an opportunity. The threat is that unless further enlargement is accompanied by a reinforcement of the Community, its cohesion will be seriously weakened and it will amount to no more than a loose free trade area. The opportunity is to effect the fundamental readjustment in a way which will give substance to its claims to represent a new and progressive model for relations between developed and developing countries. In 1973 the Community absorbed three new members—Britain, Denmark and Ireland—without passing the long-awaited internal reforms and without facing up to the critical issues. But the task then was altogether more manageable, given the political stability and level of economic development of the northern candidates. It would be foolhardy to assume that further enlargement can be successfully accomplished simply by 'muddling through' without serious consequences for the Community itself, for its Mediterranean partners and the whole future of this region.

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WALKING THE TERRORIST TIGHTROPE

by Paul Preston

THE mid-1970s in Spain witnessed a steady isolation of the Franco dictatorship. The traditional, left-wing anti-Francoist opposition was joined in its democratic aspirations by powerful elements from within the financial and industrial elite. Liberal Churchmen, some one-time Francoist politicians and even a few army officers were to be found swelling the growing movement in favour of democratic change. The ultimate outcome, however, was not inevitable. After all, many die-hard Francoists entrenched in the army, the police and the Civil Guard had access to considerable firepower. In 1976, over 100,000 Falangists were still authorised to carry guns. Many thousands of bureaucrats and members of the repressive apparatus had made their livelihood through the Franco regime. Others had actually made substantial fortunes. All were tied to the regime by networks of corruption and complicity in the great repression during the post-war years. To a large extent, the resolution of the crisis without bloodshed and the neutralisation of many rank-and-file Francoists depended on the skill of King Juan Carlos and the ministers he chose.

The King's first government, presided over, like its predecessor, by Carlos Arias Navarro, seemed at first content to limit itself to timid liberalisation. However, it was significant that this first ministry of the monarchy contained a higher representation of business interests than had ever been the case under the Franco regime. What forced the government to realise that a more positive commitment to democratic change would be needed was a considerable wave of popular militancy in the first half of 1976. Mass demonstrations in favour of amnesty for political prisoners and large-scale industrial strikes spread in the first quarter. Although Madrid, Catalonia and the Basque Country were in the forefront, there were few areas of Spain not affected. The culmination of the confrontation came in March, when police shot five people in Vitoria, in the Basque province of Alava, at the climax of a two month strike.

In general terms, the democratic opposition was growing in strength as the government lost the initiative. After the Vitoria incident, the two main opposition groupings, the Communist-dominated *Junta Democrática* and the Socialist-dominated *Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática,* united to form the *Coordinación Democrática.* To a large extent, the opposition worked to control popular militancy, refraining from convoking a nation-wide general strike. Nevertheless, the rising wave of popular pressure for democratisation and the growing confidence of the opposition persuaded Juan Carlos to dismiss Arias Navarro and replace him with the young and dynamic ex-Falangist, Adolfo Suárez. With a cabinet made up of elements linked to progressive business, Suárez rapidly set about introducing plans for more rapid reform. At first distrustful of his origins in the Francoist establishment, the opposition stepped up the pressure for change with massive demonstrations for amnesty and political liberty in Bilbao, Cata-

lonia, Pamplona and Valencia. Moreover, left-wing political parties were 'capturing' democracy by emerging out of clandestinity as a challenge to the continued existence of Francoist legislation. The Socialist Party (PSOE) was being re-born as a mass party and declared its intention to hold its XXVII Congress with or without government permission. The Communist Party held a public plenum of its central committee in Rome on 30-31 July, with the participation of cadres from Spain. Major Communist leaders were openly returning to Spain and Santiago Carrillo was actually living secretly in Madrid.

It was in the second half of 1976 that the depth of coincidence between the democratic opposition and the progressive capitalist forces represented in Suárez's government became clearer than ever before. In November, the prime minister announced his project of reforms and plans for a referendum to confirm them. The project contained most of the demands made by the opposition. This clear commitment to democratisation was recognised by a large majority of the Spanish people who voted 94% in favour of Suárez's programme of political reform. Soon newly legalised political parties were able to debate their ideas in a dynamic and open press. Political prisoners trickled out of the jails and exiles drifted back to Spain.

The right-wing backlash which was generally feared took the form of the highly orchestrated attempt to de-stabilise Spain along the lines favoured by rightists in South America and Italy, and already described in Part 1 of this article. In the event, the attempted de-stabilisation was a failure. Juan Carlos's support for Suárez clinched the military's reluctance to rise against the constituted power. Too many influential figures in both military and financial circles realised that a return to authoritarian politics could block the roads to both the EEC and NATO. In fact, in January 1977, when the provocation of the five murdered lawyers took place, a four-man commission from opposition forces was negotiating the details of future elections and constitutional change with Suárez. The assassination actually widened the common ground between government and opposition. Nineteen political parties of Right and Left joined in making a public appeal for serenity in the forthcoming elections. Thereafter, the left-wing parties were formally legalised: Socialist, Liberal and Christian Democrat groups were legalised on 18 February. The Communist Party was legalised. As the target of thirty-six years of Francoist propaganda, the normalisation of the situation of the Communist Party constituted a considerable risk for Suárez. The fact that the army acquiesced in the legalisation of its traditional enemy was an encouraging indicator of military acceptance of the democratisation process. Suárez also took the even more drastic step of dismantling the Falangist *Movimiento*, Franco's single party and the fount of patronage for his supporters.

Accordingly, it was with a high degree of political consensus that Spain faced its first elections since 1936 on 15 June 1977. The heavily financed and skilfully manipulated electoral campaign gave overall victory and 34% of the vote to Suárez's loose coalition, the *Unión del Centro Democrático*. The Socialist PSOE was not far behind. The two most significant features

were (1) that extremist groups of both far Left and far Right made virtually no showing at all, and (2) the vast proliferation of parties which had flourished in the previous two years was reduced to manageable West European proportions. Even within the small circle of relatively successful parties, those with a link to the divisive politics of the past, the Communist Party on the Left and *Alianza Popular*, with its many Francoist figures, on the Right, were left on the fringe.

Election Results, 15 *June* 1977

Party	*Seats*	*Votes*	*% of votes cast*
UCD	165	6,057,797	33.98
PSOE	118	5,087,633	28.54
PCE	20	1,634,991	9.17
Alianza Popular	17	1,459,767	8.19
PSP (Socialist group since fused with PSOE)	6	764,638	4.29

The remaining seats (23) were divided among various Basque and Catalan Nationalist parties.

The nature of the transition to democracy illustrates the greatest strength of the present democracy: its wide consensus. Democracy returned to Spain as a consequence of the coincidence of two separate, but powerful movements. Popular pressure and the activities of the democratic opposition coincided with the needs of a Spanish capitalism seriously hindered by the antiquated political mechanisms of the Franco regime. It might be argued that this is only a temporary coincidence of interest; that democracy is an end in itself for progressive industrialists but merely a step on the way to a complete transformation of society for those on the Left. This is true in theory. However, the events of the last year and the public and private pronouncements of senior left-wing leaders suggest that revolutionary ambitions are so far postponed as not to enter into meaningful discussion. The pattern seems more likely to be that set by British Labour and followed in the Moncloa Pact agreement on austerity policies. Obviously there will be debate over the kind of social and economic organisation sought by parties of Right and Left, but it will be debate within the parliamentary arena.

Events during the last quarter of 1978 and the first weeks of 1979 have shown clearly that threats to democracy do not come from the Socialists and Communists who have proved themselves its most determined guardians. The anti-democratic onslaught has come from the Basque revolutionary separatist organisation ETA, which seems to have taken over where GRAPO has, for the moment, left off. Once again, the pattern of de-stabilisation and provocation is familiar: at moments of progress towards the consolidation of democracy, terrorist actions strain the fragile loyalties of the forces of order. ETA activists seem to hope that a military intervention will lead to a popular uprising in the Basque Country and the establishment of an independent socialist republic. This utopian scenario, with its objective of a Basque Albania, is hardly likely to be realised. On the other hand, a military intervention, turning the area into a Spanish Ulster, could be

provoked, thereby seriously threatening the new democratic regime.

The last three months of 1979 were concerned with the parliamentary ratification of the new democratic Constitution and the organisation of a referendum to demonstrate its popular acceptance. This entire period was marked by a constant counter-point of terrorism and right-wing reaction. ETA's hostility to the 'bourgeois' and insufficiently federalist text was apparent from early October when an escalation of violence against the forces of order began. The reaction of the police seemed to be directed less against ETA than against the democratic regime. On 13 October, an ETA commando attacked a police jeep in Basauri, killing two policemen and seriously wounding another. At the following day's funeral ceremony, the Director-General of Security, the Civil Governor of Vizcaya province and various senior officials were barricaded in the Basauri barracks by hostile policemen chanting insults. This mutiny led to 344 policemen being posted outside the area and 25 being expelled from the force. Despite the consequent tension, however, the Constitution was overwhelmingly approved by the Cortes on 31 October. The Cortes voting was 363 for, 6 against, with 13 abstentions; the Senate voted by 226 for, 5 against, with 8 abstentions.

The optimism generated by this positive step was dissipated by a serious crisis in mid-November. ETA having declared its intention to disrupt the referendum campaign, violent clashes in the Basque Country began to increase. On 15 November, at Mondragón, some Civil Guards attacked and killed two ETA gunmen. In the process, they shot dead an innocent woman bystander and wounded four others. ETA struck back on the following day by assassinating a magistrate, José Francisco Mateu Cánovas, one-time president of the Francoist Public Order Tribunal. On that same day, prime minister Adolfo Suárez was informed by Colonel Casinello of the Civil Guard Intelligence Services that a military coup was imminent. A Lieutenant-Colonel, Antonio Tejero, of known extreme rightist sympathies, together with a Major and two Captains, planned to capture Suárez and his entire cabinet at the Moncloa Palace on 17 November and force Suárez to form a government of 'National Salvation' to put a stop to the democratic process.

Known as *Operación Galaxia,* having been planned at the Cafetería Galaxia in Madrid on 11 November, the plot smelled more than a little of cheap operetta. Nevertheless, the potential scandal, had it succeeded even in its initial plan to threaten the cabinet, could have been extremely damaging to the prestige of the regime. Although no key units were involved and despite the fact that it was easily dismantled, the repercussions of an early success could have been wide-reaching. 17 November had been chosen carefully for the coup. On the day, King Juan Carlos, the key to Army loyalty, was leaving Madrid for a tour of Mexico, Peru and Argentina. Army Chiefs of Staff were expected to be out of Madrid. Finally, many thousands of ultra-rightists, some of them armed and in para-military uniforms, were flooding into the capital for a show of force to mark the third anniversary of the death of Franco. The potential hostility of some sectors of the Army to the democratic regime was revealed later on the

same day. General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, vice-premier and Minister of Defence, on a tour of military posts to explain the Constitution, was publicly vilified by General Juan Atarés Peña, head of the Civil Guard in the Levante region.

It was thus with some uncertainty that the government saw out the rest of November. On the 19th, the demonstration of the extreme Right took place as planned, with savagely anti-democratic speeches being heard. On the day after, ETA attacked a company of policemen doing physical exercises on a football pitch, leaving two dead and thirteen wounded. The referendum, scheduled for 6 December, was held in an atmosphere of intense nervousness. The result, although a clear popular ratification of the Constitution, left a number of doubts, largely on account of the low turn-out.

The high level of abstentions in the Basque Country, and to a lesser extent those in Galicia, leaves the government in a difficult position. The only course now open is to negotiate a final autonomy statute with the Basques which will isolate ETA. If the political aspirations of moderate Basques can be satisfied, then ETA will be reduced to a problem of public order, difficult but not insoluble. In order to follow this line, the government needs more authority than its present parliamentary position gives it. Accordingly, Suárez has opted to call a general election in March in the hope of securing that authority. Assuming that he gets it—and the possibility of a Socialist victory in March cannot be discounted—then the defeat of ETA is likely to require a more politically neutral and efficient set of police forces than Spain presently possesses. The difficulty of the task was highlighted on 3 January when, with apparent ease, ETA assassinated General Constantino Ortín Gil, the Military Governor of Madrid. This provocation was followed by an increase of violence against Civil Guards in the Basque Country.

The three greatest problems facing Spanish democracy—GRAPO, the extreme Right and, above all, the Basque question—all involve in some way the police. If the government can puts its own security house in order, eliminate the remnants of Francoism within the police and Civil Guard, thereby creating loyal and efficient forces of order capable of dealing with ETA, stability should be assured. This is clearly a tall order, but still within the bounds of possibility given the widespread popular determination among Spaniards to make democracy work. If the government fails in this primordial task, despite the powerful reasons for optimism elaborated in these articles, Spain's democracy will face serious danger.

[Dr. Preston's previous article. 'The Stability of Democratic Spain', was published in *Contemporary Review* Vol. 234, No. 1356.]

THE PAINTED TUNNEL

by John Elsom

CIVIC planners, before they die, should certainly not go to Naples. They would only be depressed. They should go to T-Centralen in Stockholm, to spend their final hours among the over- and under-passes, the traffic-free precincts, the stations and arcades of a planned city centre which actually works. They can take their wheelchairs with them.

Symmetry starts at the airport. The bus leaves at precisely 15 minutes past the hour; and takes 45 minutes precisely to reach central Stockholm, arriving at T-Centralen on the hour exactly. The bus stop is unprepossessing, a mere shelter; but across the road is the main railway station, which offers to take you to any Swedish town susceptible to rail, while under the road, and under all the buildings nearby, is the main underground station, from which you can go, without changing, to all the other stops in Stockholm's archipelago of districts—out to the suburbs where white wood houses stand in square family plots, to the narrow cobbled streets of Gamla Stan, to the wooded slopes of Bagarmossen or to any of a dozen stately avenues flanking the lakes.

It is all deceptively simple. You have to look at a map of Stockholm to appreciate it, for the city sprawls ungeometrically over rivers and islands, incorporating ancient townships with new housing estates. T-Centralen provides the key to the maze. It is the common pattern, the travellers' guide and friend. You slot T-Centralen into your mind, like a plastic access card, and it churns out destinations. It takes five minutes precisely to learn how the underground works—the flat-rate fares, the simple labelling of directions; and then it is almost impossible to get lost.

I am very good at getting lost. I am an expert. I can drive around the ring roads of Sheffield and Birmingham, within sight of where I want to go but never getting there. In Warsaw, I never knew where I was, even after I had arrived. In Stockholm, I only got lost once; and even then I was not exactly lost, only mislaid temporarily. I was on the right line, travelling in the right direction, but on an inner city train, which did not go as far as I wanted to go. Just past Zinkensdamm station, the train veered from the main line and into a tunnel, with primeval walls of hewn rock.

The train stopped. The carriage was empty and the lights were turned out. There was an eerie glow on the jagged stone, as if we were approaching the customs barrier to hell. Then the glow faded. Darkness and silence and panic. Minutes passed—or some very long seconds. Then footsteps. A light flashed into the carriage. A guard with a torch stood in the tunnel. He beckoned me to follow him through the train to the driver's cabin, where he switched on a pilot light. I leafed through the phrasebook to find the Swedish for 'you have shunted me into a siding'. He was a tall, blond guard, with Nordic eyes, blue and searching. 'It's easy to get lost in a foreign country, isn't it?' he said, in English so perfect that it included Home Counties tact. He drove me back to T-Centralen, to start again.

Nearly everybody at T-Centralen spoke some English—the waitresses, the girls in the shops, the inspectors and businessmen, for T-Centralen is more than a station. It leads to the main shopping district; and you can wander through parades of boutiques and restaurants to NK, Stockholm's central department store, which faces an open-air ice-rink. Other exits led to the red-light district. In November, bands were playing carols and marches in the square by the Klara Theatre, an adjunct of T-Centralen, where the drunks and drug addicts congregate on Saturday night. All human life was there—and bi-lingual. The political graffiti sternly told the Russians in two languages to get out of Lithuania.

No mixed-development programme in Britain can compare with T-Centralen and its surroundings. Birmingham's Bull Ring is too garish and commercial. London's South Bank is too concrete and cultural; and if we look at that bare, windswept roundabout between Waterloo and the National Theatre, where the plants wither in concrete boxes and buskers dare not play lest their caps freeze to the pavement, while retaining in our mind the merest whiff of T-Centralen's piazzas (which are also roundabouts), our reaction must be of ashamed shock, guilt almost, that we have made such a mess of a simple civic project, when the Swedes have been so successful with a complicated one.

Other awkward comparisons can be made. The sandwich bars in London's stations are sordid, selling existence food for those who do not rate existence highly. T-Centralen's cafés offer tempting open sandwiches, neatly cellophaned. Our tube platforms are decorated either with banal tiles or equally banal posters. The Swedish authorities commissioned murals for the T-Centralen platforms (and others); and though opinions may differ about them, on the merits of Platform 5 as opposed to Platform 1, they all leave the impression that somebody has bothered about the appearance of a public service, as well as its function. The murals lend personalities. One may be starkly polemical; while another plunges you into a Disneyland, with bare rocks painted bright blue, with greenish tints, like a tunnel of love.

The stylish efficiency of T-Centralen reflects other sides to Swedish life. It should be generally admired; but when I talk with friends about Stockholm, their reactions, like mine, are distinctly mixed. They may love sad, talkative, boozy Dublin; revel in frenetic New York; adore Paris; feel at home in London; but when they mention Stockholm, the slopes of their admiration are covered by a forest of 'buts'. 'Stockholm's a beautiful city, but it's rather dull'.

Outsiders generalise about the Swedish character in a way which would be considered racist if applied to blacks. Eisenhower long ago set the trend with some macabre political one-upmanship. He pointed out that Sweden may be a country where socialism seems to work, but Swedes top the world's suicide league. That odd statistic was challenged at the time; and the Swedes retorted that, even if it were true, their suicide rate was lower than the murder rate in the United States. If you have to kill people, it is more civilised to kill yourself than others.

In May 1975, a delegation from the British Regional Arts Associations visited Sweden for three days to look at the way in which arts are subsidised in the regions. Their report, drafted by Anthony Phillips, was published as an appendix to the Redcliffe-Maud proposals. Phillips found much to admire in the Swedish system, but commented on 'a degree of conformism . . . unthinkable in Britain'. 'However impressed you are,' he wrote, 'with the thoughtful practicality of the planning, you cannot help feeling that the results often do not match up to the planners' ambitions, and this was certainly true of the disappointing artistic productions of whatever genre that we were shown. This might be saying no more than the trite (quite possibly untrue, as well) generalisation that the Swedish people are not aesthetically imaginative'. Yes, it is trite, and untrue, and a curious remark to include in a more or less official report, based on a three-day visit to Ostergötland, which is not the best vantage point from which to survey the entire aesthetic imagination of the Swedish people.

Well, we all have mixed feelings about Sweden, even the Swedes. Swedish girls told me that Swedish men have the bad habit of getting middle-aged and anxious too young: they worry about their marriages and love affairs till all the fun goes. No male visitor dare comment on that; but he does notice the dry theatres, the state liquor shops and the zeal with which they tackle real (and unreal) social problems. He may come, as I did, with certain preconceptions about Swedish culture. We know about the gloomy Swedes, Strindberg and Ingmar Bergman, but not about the cheerful ones, like Bellman. Somebody from Britain also wonders about how much individuality has been sacrificed to make the planning succeed. How many small shops and private homes were acquired—and by what means—to build T-Centralen? Swedish society depends upon a high degree of co-operation on all levels—between central government and the local authorities, between managements and employees, between state enterprises and private ones.

That co-operation can be mistaken for conformism. Perhaps it is conformist. Recently, an Act was passed, similar to the recommendations in our Bullock report, which gives employees a direct say in how their firms are run. This admirable extension of democracy relies on a general sense of responsibility. But the Swedes usually are responsible. Successive British governments might well envy the forty-four years of Social Democratic rule which solved so many problems which pester us still. Where is good old British bloody-mindedness?

The Swedes can be bloody-minded, of course, but in a Swedish way—anxiously, idealistically, morally. While Phillips was writing his report, sections of the theatre were behaving most unconventionally, by breaking away from the system. The 'free theatre' movement began in the early 1970s and now accounts for more than a third of the performances given in Sweden. It was a founder member of IFIT, the international association of free theatres, to which none of our fringe theatres belong. But the Swedish 'free theatres' are not quite like our fringe. Our fringe theatres were started mainly by newcomers, eager to break into the profession. Their 'free

theatres' were established by leading actors who wanted to break out.

Why did they exchange secure jobs in state-subsidised theatres for a very precarious life indeed? At the Fria Proteatern, an actor—indeed, the chairman of Swedish Equity—passed the hat round after one performance I attended. In a country where most theatres are subsidised by British standards very highly, the free theatres have had to struggle for their grants which even in 1978 were very low. Forty-four free theatres were then receiving about £600,000 between them, whereas the Swedish national theatre, Dramaten, had a state grant of £4 million, with large civic grants as well. From what repression did the 'free' actors escape to live on a diet of brown rice? They could not complain about censorship—or could they?—for Swedish cultural policy expressly forbids censorship.

Some free actors hold pure socialist ideals, similar to our Workers' Revolutionary Party. They wanted to set up acting communes. Others simply resented the way in which local *quangos* appointed their artistic directors. The underlying reasons, however, may have been more emotional but less clearly defined: a dislike of state paternalism, a fear that their old security was getting them nowhere, a vague worry that the Swedish form of socialism would turn out to be another mural disguising the harsher realities of life and even a panic that the painted tunnel in which they were living would suddenly change course, to leave them staring into the blackness beyond some spiritual Zinkensdamm.

If these were also motives (and I am merely guessing), it could explain why these maverick groups have caught the imagination. Established theatres are imitating them, even the Dramaten. Last year, Dramaten staged a most untypical agit-prop documentary, *The Seventh Question*. It caused a scandal and could even have been one of many factors contributing to the downfall of the Centre-Right coalition, which replaced the Social Democrats about three years ago.

By British standards, the current Swedish political crisis seems very moderate. I am writing in the depths of a British winter. We are surrounded by snow, strikes, the threat of a national emergency, IRA bombings and secondary pickets. We face a divisive election, Weimar-like inflation, threats to law and order, and the collapse of political parties. Someone sooner or later will have to uncork the Dunkirk spirit to see if a drop remains in the bottle. Our crises are immediate—about next week's food and tomorrow's army; and from the distance of London, it requires some imagination to believe that the Swedes have a crisis at all.

From a greater distance, however, that of future history, the Swedish crisis may seem of more importance than ours. It began with the shortage of energy. The Swedes have no large resources of fuel; and they, like us, were badly hit by the rise in oil prices. Their economy suffered accordingly; and continues to do so. The long-term answer is to build nuclear power stations; but even with fast breeder reactors, there remains a residue of radio-active waste, lethal to all life, whose virulence decays in power very slowly, over tens of thousands of years.

Scientists have not yet discovered a safe way to get rid of this dangerous

stuff. At one time, we were simply encasing the waste in concrete blocks and dumping it in the Atlantic. Sooner or later, these blocks will break up and then whole areas of the Atlantic will become polluted. Safer methods have since been devised, to turn the waste into a heat- and water-resistant substance like glass; but even so these glass blocks have to be placed in thick canisters and buried in parts of the country where the rocks are not subject to geological shifts and movements. The Windscale enquiry in Britain decided that the risks on balance were worth taking. The British atomic energy programme has been established for a long time at great expense. The prospect of getting some money back by disposing of radio-active waste from other countries must be very tempting—in the short term.

The Swedes, however, are not so sanguine or so deeply committed. They are more alarmed than we are at the prospect of buried poison which could return to plague and destroy future generations. If they have to build their whole industrial economy on nuclear power, the deposits could build up alarmingly. The Swedes are strong environmentalists: they have a vision of the good life, rural in inspiration. Their political parties are deeply divided. The Social Democrats were committed to a nuclear power programme, but were then unseated by a party who claimed to be against nuclear power, but changed their minds in office. Those who favour nuclear power argue that Sweden has very little choice in the matter. Without such a source of energy, Swedish industry will eventually collapse or be priced out of world markets. Those who are against it, envisage a hard return to a poor, pastoral but clean Sweden. But could it stay clean, if the surrounding countries adopted nuclear power programmes?

There are, of course, compromise solutions. Some believe that the solution lies in developing alternative technology, using the power of the sun, wind and waves. Such methods might work, in an ideal world, without competition from other industrialised countries. In Sweden, they talk about an industrial diasarmament programme, like a military one. Others fear that an inevitable consequence of nuclear power would be the dismantling of those democratic structures which Sweden has laboriously established. Local councils will not want radio-active material dumped on their land; while firms handling the waste will have to provide better safeguards against industrial action than those provided by an act whose purpose was to establish workers' control.

The consequence of that act was illustrated by *The Seventh Question*. The Dramaten company forced it on the artistic management by outvoting them. This polemic against nuclear power made an impression even on those who did not set foot inside the theatre. The imposing façade of Dramaten, an almost Edwardian mixture of pomp and circumstance, was shrouded for the occasion by scaffolding and brown paper, of the type used in Stockholm to protect passers-by from the fall-out of brickwashing. Unexpectedly, the gods helped the set designer by sending a thunderstorm one night. Shafts of lightning threatened the metal rods. Violent gusts of wind tore the paper apart, and left it flapping wildly. A mad, tattered monster on skinny legs roared drunken warnings across the sedate city.

A week later, the coalition which changed its mind fell. For the past few months, Sweden has been governed by the smallest party in their parliament, the Liberals, with the tacit acceptance of the Social Democrats. Under the Swedish system, a government does not need a positive majority, but it cannot have a negative one, a majority against it. The Social Democrats have been abstaining.

Political vacuums can be dangerous; and symbolism, misleading. But I rather respect politicians who do not pretend to be certain on matters where there can be no reasonable certainty. The decision on nuclear power, either for or against, represents a limit to good government, for its consequences extend to the unforeseeable future, while its immediate repercussions will affect every aspect of Swedish life, to the composition of the land. Human beings cannot take such decisions, except in fear, trembling and blind faith. Britain may be ruining itself with problems which can be solved, with restraint and self-discipline; but in the midst of our troubles, we should remember that the Swedes, who have travelled further along the road to utopia, have reached a place where there are no signposts and the maps are confusing. They, not we, are truly facing the modern tragic dilemma.

The April issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Three Kings of Orient: I Prince Norodom Sihanouk* by Roger Kershaw, *Arabia — The British Connection* by Gregor Grant, *The Decade of Revolt* by Robert Eccleshall and *The European Convention on Human Rights* by Cosmo Russell.

PUTTING ANIMALS INTO POLITICS

by The Rt. Hon. Lord Houghton of Sowerby, C.H.

A NEWSPAPER correspondent attending one of the political party conferences said that the slogan 'Putting animals into Politics' was misplaced. 'There are', he said, 'too many animals in politics already'. Quoting a fair example he said there were snakes in the grass, leopards who cannot change their spots; elephants who never forget, and lots of Parliamentarians who think they are the cat's whiskers.

Many people listening to sound radio reports from Parliament have complained that all the M.P.s 'make noises just like animals'. On the whole, animals make much less noise than human beings and complain a good deal less, but of course, 'putting animals into politics' really means putting animals into the policies of the political parties.

As far as I am aware only the Labour Party has ever given any pledge to introduce a government measure of animal protection. That was on the prohibition of live hare-coursing with hounds—(after two unsuccessful attempts the present Labour Government has not yet fulfilled this promise —due, it must be admitted, to its weak position in the present Parliament).

Apart from that no political party has regarded animal welfare and protection as important enough politically to make election promises about it. This apparent neglect of the politics of this subject has only one explanation: the absence of political pressure. There can be no other. Politics today are very much influenced by pressure groups, especially in areas like social welfare, environmental and similar problems which are relative free of ideological differences.

In recent years *causes* rather than political philosophy have attracted the interest and activities of the young. Societies have sprung up, many with substantial financial support to press upon public notice and Parliamentary opinion reforms and remedies in defined areas of dissatisfaction or deprivation. Such bodies as Shelter; Child Poverty Action Group; The Single Woman and her Dependants; Age Concern; Action for the Crippled Child; Spastics Society, and many more actively though neutrally further their aims with politics.

Political action is becoming less a matter of ideology and more the response to the variegated pattern of pressure groups. The Trade Unions and the N.F.U. are, of course, the biggest of them all. With our 'first past the post' electoral system, the narrowing of the gulf between the major political parties, the lowering of the voting age and the consequent loosening of party ties, the electorate has become less committed to party politics. (In Canada, Mr. Trudeau put off the widely expected General Election last June because a public opinion poll revealed that the 'Don't Know' response was one-third of the electorate!)

While charity vocal groups concerned with human welfare have become bolder in stretching to the full the limitations of political and Parliamentary action imposed by the Charities Acts, animal welfare societies (especially

the RSPCA) have been slow to emerge as militant bodies. This does not apply to all of them for the reason that some of them (League Against Cruel Sports, for example) are campaigning societies and are therefore not charities for tax and rating concessions.

Even so, all bodies espousing causes and particularly those in animal welfare have to respond to the political or non-political composition of their membership and traditional supporters. Animal societies have had bitter experience of this. Animal welfare and protection has been a middle-class concern and working people have been too absorbed with the poverty and discomfort of their own lives to devote themselves to the finer points of stress and suffering among animals. They have flocked to circuses and zoological gardens and even to hare-coursing for relaxation or sport, and their contempt for fox-hunting has been more a matter of social and class prejudice than compassion for the fox.

Animal welfare societies have in consequence tended to be 'middle-class' bodies containing a substantial element of conservative opinion and support. Legacies, for example, on which animal societies rely much, much more than upon the subscriptions of the living, obviously come from people with money to leave. Ninety per cent of the legacies left to the RSPCA are from women who are not, we may surmise, Labour women.

Many people who want their animal societies to 'keep out of politics' dislike party politics anyway or fail to understand either politics or Parliament, or they are in the conservative tradition themselves and do not take kindly to the leftish militant groups like Hunt Saboteurs, Animal Liberation, Young Socialists and others who are now threatening 'establishment' behaviour. Quite bitter internal struggles are going on in some societies and the aim to 'put animals into politics' may result in putting them into *party* politics. This may be inevitable. There is little in animal affairs, as there is little in human affairs, which can be kept out of politics when once the parties give way to pressure to put them in.

Fox-hunting is the classic example of a matter of animal protection becoming a party political issue simply because it has its roots in the social history of England. The export of live food animals for slaughter in Europe could divide the parties on economic grounds, coupled with the 'farming vote', which is traditionally conservative. For these reasons some voluntary societies are fearful of what 'putting animals into politics' may do to disturb or even disrupt the peaceful unity of political neutrality.

This is all very understandable, though the real aim is the protection of animals and not the preservation of well established, comfortably off, empires of voluntary effort and service. The hope of an all-party and non-partisan movement among active politicians and MPs which will get legislation through Parliament by popular vote and to general acclaim, is, in my opinion, false. It will not happen. It has not happened simply because cruelty to animals is fundamentally a moral issue which arouses deep emotions and convictions and those are the issues which the political parties have long wanted to push to one side. Governments have never wanted to bring forward government sponsored legislation on animals simply because

they could not be sure of what Parliament would do to it on the floor of the House—or in the House of Lords. The consequence is that animal protection is regarded as 'suitable for a Bill introduced under the Private Members' Bill procedure'.

That is pure cynicism. At the very least it is escapism. It simply means that no Bill containing contentious clauses will get through. With limited Parliamentary time, limited help in the complexities of drafting procedure and no party whips to marshal support in the lobbies, the fate of most Private Members' Bills is sealed from the start. Yet deluded supporters of voluntary societies are urged to write to their M.P.s to support Mr. So-and-so's Bill when everybody with knowledge of the absurdities, futilities and time-wasting procedures of Parliament knows that Mr. So-and-so's Bill stands no chance whatsoever. The truth is that many voluntary societies have no understanding of either politics or Parliament and they don't make it their business to find out.

My mission just now is to grasp the opportunity of the forthcoming General Election to attempt what has never been attempted before. That is: to make animal protection an election issue without making it a party political issue. In other words, to put animals into the electoral consciousness of candidates of all parties and to persuade the political *parties* to formulate an official policy on animal protection and make their position clear before polling day. Party *commitment* on this is now as necessary as on many aspects of human affairs and social policy—the first party to make a crusade of this will gain an enormous following of dedicated people.

This is how the idea of a General Election Co-ordinating Committee for Animal Protection came into being. Only by mobilising the full united strength of the voluntary societies on an agreed area of policy to be put with one united voice to the parties and the candidates can there be any hope of obtaining firm commitments. Commitments by political *parties* to strive for the achievement of stated aims through Parliament is the only way forward. To know what the parties stand for in this field is an essential preliminary and to help the parties to decide what they stand for is the chief purpose of arousing people and public opinion. That is what G.E.C.C.A.P. is all about—a degree of unity among the voluntary societies never attained before, to undertake a task never attempted before.

We know that a General Election must be held not later than October, 1979. We know that the policies of the parties are now being formulated. We have arrived in time if we mobilise now and keep up the pressure. What then is the General Election Co-ordinating Committee for Animal Protection and what is the plan of the campaign?

GECCAP (for short) was formed in April, 1978 when an October General Election looked to be almost certain. Its representatives come from the Joint Groups who came together at the end of Animal Welfare Year. It was Animal Welfare Year which opened the door to unity. For the first time it gave societies an opportunity to meet on a regular basis, exchange information and learn about the problems confronting others. Many of those involved in the Year were quick to realise the value of collective action.

Societies with similar interest and problems joined together to find common ground and speak with one voice. The first task of GECCAP was to attempt to ascertain which areas of abuse were causing the greatest concern. Where was the greatest exploitation? How many animals were involved? A public opinion poll indicated that six areas were in need of immediate Government attention. Several of them not requiring legislation.

The six selected are:

1. Horses.
2. Experimentation on living animals.
3. Intensive farming.
4. Export of live food animals.
5. Dogs in the community.
6. Blood sports.

Having selected our priorities, the next thing was to bring together all the representative societies. For this purpose the joint groups already formed out of Animal Welfare Year were conveniently available to consider fully co-ordinated electoral action.

The six 'areas of concern' are covered in GECCAP by the following Joint Groups of Societies operating in those particular matters.

Christian Consultative Council for the Welfare of Animals.
Committee for the Reform of Animal Experimentation (CRAE).
Farm Animals Welfare Co-ordinating Executive (FAWCE).
Humane Education Council.
National Joint Equine Welfare Committee.
The League Against Cruel Sports.

Some societies whose activities straddle several groups are represented on more than one. The RSPCA, being the largest multi-purpose society, is on almost every one.

Already several of these groups had involved themselves in political action. FAWCE (Farm Animals Welfare Co-ordinating Executive), for example, has been in a joint effort to secure the banning of live food animals for slaughter abroad. This group with the financial support of the RSPCA, conducted a large and sustained campaign of press advertising, posters and demonstrations on this issue. The Government has still not announced their conclusions, due undoubtedly to the complexities of EEC legislation which now comes into our National policy.

Another group, CRAE (Committee for the Reform of Animal Experimentation), of which I am Chairman, comprises scientists, veterinarians, MPs and anti-vivisectionists. This group was successful in obtaining periodic meetings with the present Home Secretary who has shown himself sympathetic to our suggestions and concern. Indeed, a great deal of valuable work had already been undertaken before GECCAP was formed. A recently completed investigation into methods of toxicity testing by the Advisory

Committee to the Home Office, was instigated by CRAE. The report was due to be published in February.

The co-ordination of the central machinery of GECCAP having been established, the next step was to throw the full weight of all participating societies behind a formal request to the political parties to consider putting animal protection into their official policy and to declare publicly what those policies were. However, the announcement in September that there was, after all, to be no immediate Election, slowed down the momentum of our activities. It did, though, give us a bonus. No autumn election meant that the Party Conferences would be held as usual and we were represented at all three. This proved to be a particularly worthwhile exercise. We were able to gauge delegates' reaction to the campaign and were happily surprised by the numbers who attended our fringe meetings. The support we received at all three Conferences proved that whatever their respective Parties decided to do in the field of animal welfare, many delegates were very much aware of the growing public disquiet on matters of animal abuse and exploitation.

There can be little doubt that this exploitation has reached unprecedented levels, especially for commercial gain. It is no longer realistic to expect voluntary societies or a handful of dedicated MPs to go on striving in vain year after year. This may have been the only way 25 years ago, but new and threatening trends now make it a matter for Government responsibility and Government must take it seriously. Frustrated pressures tend to erupt.

The tangled web of current legislation which lies in indigestible slabs in the Statute Book is often difficult to construe, let alone enforce and as a result offers little protection to the animals involved. The 1876 'Cruelty to Animals' Act is a fair example. This 102-year-old legislation has been stretched to meet every requirement of modern research and every commercial development of chemical substances. Much of this 'research' is undertaken for no better reason than to produce a new lipstick or a 'whiter than white' household product. Hardly the reasons envisaged by those in 1876 who were concerned to protect animals used for fundamental research.

Another tangled web is found in the various Acts relating to dogs. They apparently do little to control the unwanted and stray dog problem—only about a third of our dogs have a current licence. With a severely undermanned Police Force, it is little wonder that these unwanted animals, in the main, end up in the hands of voluntary societies who do their best to home as many as possible. Even so, many thousands are destroyed every year and it is ironic to realise that the people whose lives are pledged to the protection and care of animals are the very ones who are left to do the dirty work of destruction. If all these rescue societies were to close their doors tomorrow, Government would find itself in an impossible situation. Yet all this work is done by those whose only finance comes from legacies and voluntary donations. No Government subsidies here. No political levy. The Working Party on Dogs submitted its findings to the Minister of State in 1976. Many were realistic and could be implemented *now*. The Minister is still considering them!

Whilst welfarists attempt to battle with problems which have grown larger over the years, new areas of concern are adding to their difficulties. Until recently, legislation pertaining to horses was deemed adequate—now the sudden upsurge in the horse carcase trade to the Continent puts a very different complexion on the matter. This trade is currently topping £5 million annually and is divided between only 5 EEC licenced slaughter-houses in this country. Horse meat is big business—and yet the legislation which affords protection to cattle in markets has not been extended to horses. The eye of authority must be more than occasionally cast over an area which now involves thousands of animals. A complete Government assurance must be given that these creatures, destined for slaughter, are afforded full protection and humane treatment in markets and during transit.

In order that Government can be kept up-to-date with developments which could lead to yet further problems, GECCAP has asked the political parties to consider setting up a Standing Royal Commission which would be most useful in this context. Information to the Commission could ensure that matters relating to animal welfare were kept under constant surveillance and undesirable practices could be halted before they got out of hand. Those involved in the day-to-day business of animal protection are so busily involved in coping with existing problems that they have little time to act effectively when they see a new danger to animals on the horizon.

The fact that the General Election did not take place when expected has meant that GECCAP has had, to some extent, to revise its strategy. We were originally working to a fairly short time scale. The present, albeit uncertain situation, does have advantages. It is giving us more time to put our case more fully to politicians, press and public. We are currently inviting interested M.P.s to meet us and to think along the lines of starting *Party* groups to exert pressure from within (e.g. a 'Labour Group for Animals', a 'Tory Group for Animals'). If such groups could be formed they could exert much influence.

Whilst it is not the intention of GECCAP to make animal welfare and protection a Party Political football, it is necessary for those of us involved to know what support we have in each Party and where that support comes from. I firmly believe that when the Election does come, candidates will be asked more than ever before where they stand in the field of animal welfare. A recent public opinion poll showed clearly that 9% of those questioned would be prepared to change their voting habits on the animal question. In a marginal constituency 9% is a big swing. Candidates will need to have their answers ready and a better informed public will require the answers to be good. Those people who voiced their protest against the Orkney seal cull are part of the 'new look' animal welfare movement. They are not likely to be easily fobbed off with evasive election talk or empty promises.

There can be no doubt that the time for animals has arrived—the younger and more militant members of animal welfare are waiting patiently to see what GECCAP can do to persuade Government to act. The patience of the young is often short-lived and for many of them the wheels of Parliament

LIGHT IN WINTER

by Bryn Gunnell

THE prying light rims the shutters and grows whiter. The rafters crack as the old house braces itself against the rising wind.

There is a smell of wax and apples and mildew—a new, warm smell —and on the pillow a green lace-wing fly.

The tall shutters fold cunningly back into the thickness of the wall (handsomely made, those shutters—the catches like sprigs of lightning let into the dark wood) and a plank of sunshine falls across the smoky old fire-back.

Europa and the bull. Buxom Europa, firmly placed on the bull's back—her solid country girl's legs lifted above the bushy waves—is grasping his horns, and the man-bull is looking up at her, boss-eyed with anticipation, while, on the shore, a farmer's lad shoots up a broad hand in horror and opens a fleshy mouth from which no sound comes.

The window is open. The raw air steals in. Outside stands the February morning, clear and sharply bright, as if presented.

Suddenly there is a sound like crockery being stacked and shuffled: the jackdaws talking in the great plane trees opposite the house.

Below is the garden, waiting for my attention—grass to be sown—and on the sandy path where voles were puttering last night, sits a hawfinch, cracking hornbeam seeds.

The startling intensity of those warm, soft colours: the heather breast; the inky wings slashed with purest white; the silver-blue beak; the crush of amber on his neck when he turns his head; the pearl grey nape. Take a good look; you won't often see him so close.

But he has heard me and flies off towards the bare woods, silently.

February. . . . Short but sweet. The fag-end of winter and the first foot of spring. Not a treacherous month, anyway: it lays its cards on the table and is, in its quiet, grave way, momentous. A month of change? One could call it that, but perhaps it is only a bodying forth; a process always there, now gradually becoming visible.

This year it began with a cruel wind and dirty low-travelling clouds that spat snow. The trees—black iron against the grey sky; the hedges a twiggy blur; the ground iron hard. Everything locked and gagged.

Then came a west wind, flinging its crystal rain. The trees staggered; the whole land was bowed away under the gale, gulping rain.

When the wild sunshine leapt out, the ivy tods glistened; the holly stood hackled in silver; the woods were suddenly bright with little braided streams that swilled quietly along or chugged out into the light, carrying swabs of foam.

The land was still sodden and chill—the tacky tug of the paths made walking slow—but, in two days, the honeysuckle was out in jets of jade;

might be produced from sea water, is a possible source of energy with almost limitless supplies of fuel. The scientific problems of producing fusion may be overcome by 1983, but it will take a further 30 years to harness that process to the economy.

Burning as the issue is, the world is faced with the fact that nuclear power exists—in fact commercial nuclear power is a quarter of a century old—and the technology has long been available internationally. Furthermore, five states have nuclear weapons and 30 more derive, or are on the point of deriving power from nuclear plants. Supplying and servicing this industry is an important and growing source of income and influence to Britain, France, West Germany, Canada and the United States.

In some measure the opposition to nuclear power has hindered the industry's progress in the West, although not irretrievably. West Germany, relying now upon nuclear power for some 10% of its electricity, has been particularly hard hit. The United Kingdom, with a dependence at present of 13%, much less so. Other countries, like Denmark, have decided against the development of nuclear power until the disposal problems of nuclear waste have been solved at an international level. But the Danes employ an aggressive conservation policy and a mandatory building code to conserve energy, the Belgians do not and already rely for 25% of their electricity on nuclear sources, a dependence which is expected to rise to 50% in 1985. Whereas the democratic expression of doubt in the future of this particular form of energy production should be most carefully weighed and allowed wide publicity, the exploitation of this deeply held concern by minority political interests, or *a fortiori*, by potentially hostile foreign powers is the gravest of matters. Exploitation has occurred; the more serious-minded environmentalists are aware of the danger and some have taken steps to isolate the extremists.

Yet there is a trend within the anti-nuclear lobby in Europe and the United States for demonstrations to increase, and as numbers grow and as international linkages are extended, manipulation for other ends becomes easier, particularly when environmentalist groups themselves turn to politics in an attempt to influence decisions democratically. In countries as diverse as France, Spain and West Germany environmentalists have contested parliamentary elections. They made little impact at national level, but in local politics they have done better—polling, for instance, 12% in France in 1977. Yet in Sweden mishandling of the nuclear issue, principally in failing to inform the public of a programme to build 13 nuclear stations, contributed in 1976 to the fall of the Social Democrat government, and in October 1978 caused the fall of the Conservative Coalition. Furthermore, the political confusion surrounding the nuclear issue in Austria resulted in Chancellor Kreisky's defeat in a referendum in December.

Here, as elsewhere, the argument cuts across the normal political divisions of left and right. The Danish Government abandoned its 1976 Energy Plan, which called for six nuclear power stations, partly as a result of pressure from 120 autonomous groups running exhibitions, demonstrations, bookstalls and street theatre all over the country. The sticker *Nuclear*

the currant bushes had put on leaves, and the catkins hung like a jag of solid rain at the edge of the woods.

Everywhere a creeping restlessness. Across the misty sky, paned with blue and banded with marigold light, bow after bow of buzzing lapwings passed, flying north.

In February the darkness steps back; the darkness that was in ourselves is washed away. The stillness of winter is jogged into motion.

For the first sign of change, look into water. In winter the water is black, but gradually, as scum begins to rise and little bubbles come wriggling up, it becomes oil green.

No shadows yet; no smells—except the dead leaves and the wet ground—but sounds; faint at first, strengthening with the length of days; sounds pure and distinct in the clear air.

The missel thrushes lead off. Posted high on some reeling tree, they troll out their throaty song—up down, down up—then stop and seem to be thinking out the next phrase, which always turns out to be the same.

The robins hold song contests, outbraving one another. Their song is firm and rich, with pearly glides and long, pregnant pauses.

The star performers, though, are the song thrushes. Hearing them on a cold grey day, it is as if the long empty silence of winter had suddenly found a voice; as if a way of expression that had long lain dormant were all at once revived.

They are the messengers of light. Cold thrushes. They wing up to a high bough, perch and unfold their song: a harp-ripple; a liquid phrase, delicately hinged, that swings slowly out; a tantivy; a tripping note; an angry base note, like a boat grating on a reef, that still has darkness in it.

Fire-pure, their song; measured out drop by drop to wear away winter's heart.

You listen, and you know that something important is being said, without words, and therefore said definitively. A voice, a reiteration out of the bare land.

There is no one in the high, bare kitchen (I'm on my own, care-taking while the owners are away). Coffee for breakfast; nutty bread cut from a cart-wheel loaf, and honey in a stone jar.

When I have finished, I wash up, put the loaf back into its linen bag, open the door and walk out into the stiff white light.

The puddles in the yard are still fronded with ice, but the sun is warm, the wind punches steadily from the south-east and there is a blue vigour in the sky.

High up, a ball of crows turns silently. They spin out in spokes, diving and playing in the bright air.

From the sandy road that runs past the house comes a tuneless whistle and there, just entering the half-ruined gate, and pedalling with slow, leaden strokes, is *le père* Milou.

He bumps cautiously across the yard, pretending he hasn't seen me, flings his leg over in fine style and stops within inches of the timbered barn with its herring-bone pattern of rosy bricks.

Power? No Thanks was a Danish invention.

Because of the widely shared suspicion of nuclear development, the Spanish Basque separatist organisation ETA tried to regain popularity by turning its terrorist attacks on the nuclear plant at Lemóniz (Guipúzcoa). A four-man ETA commando stormed the Civil Guard post in December 1977, but failed to gain entry. Later, in March 1978, an explosive device inside the plant killed two workers. Other terrorist groups, in Italy for instance, might adopt similar tactics, for it is not the first time that nuclear facilities have been subject to terrorist attacks in Europe. They were motivated in the past by a search for publicity, and not by a stand against nuclear energy. The first bomb in the name of an anti-nuclear group exploded on 31 May, 1978, damaging the Municipal Court building and the German Church in Göteborg, Sweden. It promised further attacks until the nuclear industry was dismantled. 'We will explode one charge a day in Göteborg city centre until our demands have been met.' The threat was never carried out.

There is every indication that as a disruptive issue nuclear energy will grow, and as an unresolved problem continue in the 1980s to exacerbate tensions. The largest occupation of a nuclear site in Britain took place in early May 1978, 30 miles from Edinburgh at Torness Point. Four thousand people gathered, some from West Germany and France. Some talked of calling large numbers to the site within hours to stop work taking place—a new form of flying protest group. Larger numbers demonstrated in Trafalgar Square, London, on 29 April when Edward Goldsmith, editor of *The Ecologist*, called for objectors to commit themselves to a programme of non-violent civil disobedience.

No violence erupted at these demonstrations, and indeed the main argument at the Carnsore Point, Co. Wexford rally in Eire in August 1978 was to proceed with non-violent opposition. As in Scotland, protesters came from Germany, France, Sweden, Holland and even the United States. Some 5,000 turned up for the three-day protest, which was organised by Friends of the Earth and the Irish Nuclear Safety Association, led by the veteran Nobel prize-winner Sean Macbride. Large numbers have assembled in more accessible places. For instance, 35,000 people demonstrated in Copenhagen following a three-day fifty-mile march from Hoejerup to the capital on 28 August 1978, whilst a crowd of 40,000 in Amsterdam was reported in April to have been the largest in Holland since the war. In North America protest has been peaceful in Canada, but less so in the United States. In early September 1978 ten anti-nuclear campaigners were gaoled in California for their part in a mass protest against the siting of a nuclear plant near an earthquake fault. A further 477 people faced charges after scaling fences and trespassing on the newly erected nuclear plant at Diablo Canyon. Nine arrests also followed a demonstration on 5 September at Seabrook, New Hampshire, accused of trespassing and of disorderly conduct.

More dramatically, a 43-year-old teacher attempted in November 1977 to burn himself to death in front of a church in Hamburg. Earlier in the year, in Vienna, nine women aged between 18 and 68 had started a hunger

Now he has put his bike away and comes over to shake my hand.

'Fine weather. A bit too early, though,' is all he says, then turns away and makes for the tool shed.

An anorak; a checked shirt; blue dungarees caught in at the ankles with pieces of twine; bulbous boots and a cap—this is how he is always dressed.

He is a short, burly man with a firm jaw and a kink in his large nose. He seldom looks at you, but when he does, his eyes are of a deep, startling blue, and kindly. *Le père* Milou is used to looking at the earth and the sky, not at people.

I think he is seventy. He lives in the nearest village, four kilometres away, and he is the only local man who still comes, when the spirit moves him, to give a hand on the estate.

Yesterday we worked together most of the day, preparing the ground for grass seed. For the first hour or so we used the ordinary garden rakes I had found in the tool shed, but I could see he wasn't pleased with the result—too little headway for too much sweat. Eventually he put down his rake and stumped off towards the barn. When he came back, looking very pleased, he was carrying two muck rakes.

'Now this is what we need,' he said. (He calls this tool *le croc*: the hook.) 'You'll find that these will really tickle the ground. They'll run easy, too.' And he was right.

I doubt if we spoke more than twenty times during the whole day, but that didn't matter. I have known *le père* Milou for quite a while and we understand each other very well, in a wordless kind of way. Sometimes, though, he gives me fatherly advice while we're working—'Don't forget to scrape your spade now and then'—or has a good grouse to keep his spirits up. He is the most pessimistic man imaginable—always ready for the very worst and therefore agreeably surprised if things go well.

'Of course, the grass won't grow. The ground's too dry and there won't be any good rain now till the end of Lent, not with this east wind. And look at the chemical rubbish they've spread on—as if there wasn't enough good dung round here.'

The rhythm of his work is good to see: steady, unhurried, pleasurable. He fits in with his surroundings. All his life he has been a hedger and ditcher, and the only time he left his home was when he was taken prisoner during the war and almost froze to death in a German camp.

In a region like Sologne with its poor sandy soil, the farmer wages a constant war against the heather, bracken and broom that are always encroaching on the fields, and the man who understands the bewildering, intricate work of hedge-trimming is much in demand.

Ditching, of course, is absolutely essential or the whole area, which is covered with lakes and ponds, would soon become what it once was—a bog of Scandinavian proportions. Nowadays most of the drainage work is done by machines, but they are clumsy and often create more problems than they solve; nor can they go everywhere.

It takes years of patient observation to know exactly where the water lodges and where it runs naturally, so as to get the ditches right. The com-

strike outside Chancellor Kreisky's office. Austria produces no nuclear energy at present, for, as already mentioned, the programme which was begun in 1971 was rejected in last year's referendum held on Nocember 5th. Fifteen years ago the construction of three reactors in Italy evoked no protests. The Government abandoned the expansion of this nuclear start for reasons of cost, but the present programme provides for 7 per cent of Italy's energy needs by the mid-1980s. It was against this that Prince Nicola Caracciola organised last March a vigorous *festa della vita* north of Rome at Montalto di Castro, where the government planned to site two further reactors. Once again the concern was over waste products harming farm land and fishing. Seven thousand demonstrators turned up with accordions, flutes, guitars and drums providing the accompaniment to Italy's first large-scale protest meeting. The hippie element was present, but extremist politics were absent.

Australia has large uranium deposits, the mining of which has become a contentious issue in politics, although not one where opinion divides along traditional political lines. The nuclear debate and the technique of direct action involving large numbers has brought Australian politics on to a common international platform for the first time since Vietnam. A crowd of 20,000 gathered in Melbourne on 1 April 1977 and lay on the ground simulating a nuclear disaster. Over the year a number of violent demonstrations where arrests were made occurred at the docks in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane protesting the export of uranium. Yet the actual mining in the Northern Territory at Jabiluka was held up less on account of such action than through delays in working out satisfactory compensation for the aborigines, under whose sacred land the deposits lay. Public opinion polls in 1977 showed 60% of those asked favoured mining and only 28% were against, soundings which backed the government's decision to go ahead. The trade union movement was split on the issue, so that the leadership favoured a national referendum—a call also made in similar circumstances by the French Socialist Party. In both instances the respective governments dismissed the idea. Austria and Switzerland, in 1979, submitted the nuclear issue to a national referendum. At one time it seemed probable that the Belgian Government might also resort to this since a mini-referendum held in early October in Andenne, 45 miles from Brussels, showed a high poll of 75% of whom 83% were against the building in the area of a new nuclear plant.

The fundamental nature of nuclear issues is still more clearly seen in Japan, which suffered the holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet Japan is 100% dependent upon energy imports and must in order to safeguard the future of its 110 million inhabitants invest in nuclear power to avoid an energy gap. The nuclear issue at its military level is in Japan older than anywhere else. In 1954 the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, *Gensuiko*, was set up and immediately became the target of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), which infiltrated it, broadening the movement into one which opposed 'imperialist policies' generally and which supported 'national liberation movements'. Moderate elements withdrew

plex network of small drains and culverts deep in the woods—the feeders—are the most important, but they are hard to track down, and they have to be cleared by hand.

Le père Milou is about the only man round here who still has the patience and the knowledge required for the job.

This morning, anyway, I did the rolling while he put wire netting round the shrubs and rose bushes to keep the rabbits out ('Of course, it won't. They'll make nice little nests in there. On summer evenings I've counted as many as fifty rabbits in the kitchen garden alone')—but not the hares, for they seem to be able to jump any low wall or fence.

The sun went higher; the sandy soil threw back its warmth and we worked on in the white light.

A sparkle and a gloss on everything. The oaks leaned back, keeping their heads steady against the racing sky. The other trees moved with a reeling roundward motion and rattled their branches. Sometimes there was a silent skip of dry leaves on the path.

When I stopped working to wipe the sweat from my eyes, there came the blackbird's swinging, taunting phrase, the chaffinch's jingle and, from all around, the calls of the woodpeckers. The grey-headed woodpecker's call suits this time of the year—a sunny, falling fluting that slows down to a stop, and then the loose, easy drumming. Curious creatures, woodpeckers: the great spotted with his ivory face and the flush of blood under his tail; his pied back jigging like an African mask: the lesser, chasing each other in spirals round a tree, light as silver leaves, and, most elusive of all, the middle spotted that keeps to the topmost branches and only gives himself away with a strangled cry or a clear hoot.

As I dragged the roller up and down, a large glossy bee kept bulleting by, sun-crazy, and the tortoiseshells came to spread their wings on the warm powdery earth.

Noon. *Le père* Milou rolls up the wire netting and puts his tools into the wheelbarrow.

'Well, it looks as though it might be a lawn one day,' he says, as he looks round. He is going home to lunch. '*A la soupe.* Sha'n't be coming this afternoon. We've broken the back of it, anyway.'

We walk out into the yard together. Just before he gets on to his bike, he takes a crumpled paper out of his pocket, carefully smooths it out and hands it to me.

'Have a look at that.' It's the list of candidates for the local elections.

'Well, what's unusual about it?'

'Why, not one landowner this time,' he says, and winks. 'Look, he's a bricklayer; he's a gamekeeper; he's retired. and he's, well, an unknown quantity.'

For generations Sologne has been a feudal community: large estates neglected by run-down gentry, people who are stiffly conservative even by conservative French standards; estates mostly fenced in to protect the precious pheasants that are bred like barnyard fowl to provide amusement for the newly rich.

and formed a new group. Years later, *Gensuiko* sought in 1977 to merge with the moderate group and adopt a policy of absolute opposition to nuclear weapons. At the same time *Gensuiko* attempted to internationalise its position seeking to promote identical views through the Pugwash Conference network and the International Peace Bureau.

Outside JCP influence has been the growth in Japan of environmentalist protest, which culminated in 1978 in the attack made on the new Narita airport north of Tokyo. Following 12 years of disputes, during which four policemen and one militant were killed, the airport was eventually opened in May, but not before the opening ceremony had been delayed two months on account of a 'guerrilla' attack on 26 March. Some 300 helmeted militants crashed a truck through perimeter fencing and slinging fire bombs at police guards made for the control tower, which six of them scaled. With steel pipes they destroyed sensitive equipment worth in the region of a quarter of a million pounds sterling. They, along with 109 others, were arrested. During the fracas 56 people were injured.

Such violence, attending an environmentalist issue, was quite new and unknown in Europe and America. It was organised by militant left-wing groups, particularly, according to reports in *Le Monde* (11 May 1978), the Trotskyist Fourth International. Thus penetrated, the environmentalist cause was used to attack the establishment. As one demonstrator put it, 'Our basic drive is the same—to overthrow the oppressive establishment'.[1] Another pointed to the future: 'The point is that Narita is the forefront of a nationwide struggle against unlawful seizure of land for the government's development of things like power generating facilities and nuclear reactors'.[2]

Those behind it had linked up with the Japanese Red Army movement, which since the release from gaol of some of their number in return for hostages taken in a hijack in October 1977 had been seeking a way back into Japanese militancy. These elements appear to be behind the 'ecorillas', who subsequently established 31 'solidarity huts' and two 'fortresses' bordering the airport and which were linked by a network of underground tunnels. These various encampments contained para-military formations known as the Red Army Proletariat Revolutionary Faction, the Anti-Airport Youth Action Squad and the Anti-Imperialist Student Council. Throughout the critical months, no fewer than 14,000 police guarded the airport complex. The next target will almost certainly be nuclear, since the issue is already a live one with fishermen, who naturally fear the effect of radioactive materials on their livelihood.

Part of the reason for these developments worldwide lies in the public's ignorance and fear of the whole nuclear process or 'fuel cycle' Those protesting are numerous and fall into several categories. They may be purely local objectors, people whose immediate livelihoods and property are affected by the siting of the plants. To these are added the voices of those, many of a younger generation, who see nuclear power as further proof of the first world's selfish concern for growth at the expense of the third world. In Europe and in the States these people emerged in the student

turbulence of the mid-1960s; now in their 30s, many hold responsible positions which they use to advocate withdrawal from a materialistic world concerned solely with consumerism. For them the ugly fact of capitalism is best represented by nuclear power, which also somehow mirrors the power of the state, remote, impersonal and unresponsive, and accentuates too the declining value of the individual. It is the emotive juxtaposition of industry versus agriculture, city versus field, bureaucracy versus citizen, capitalism versus freedom, all of which is irrational feeling. Amongst the objectors is a core of sensible questioners, whose queries have frequently been inadequately answered by government and by nuclear authorities. Most significantly there are the manipulators from the far left of the political spectrum.

Manipulation is a well-tried political tactic most obviously pursued through infiltrating spokesmen into a movement. Their task in the first place is to politicise the pressure group and then to radicalise its demands. At the same time these agents build links through a solidarity programme with other possibly like-minded movements. The term 'entryism' is sometimes used by Trotskyists to describe this tactic but other political groups employ the same methods. The manipulators remain, as far as possible, hidden from view, or at the very least disguise their affiliations.

This would matter less were the nuclear industry not important to western economic and social stability. Although North Sea oil has temporarily transformed the energy requirements of the United Kingdom, Norway and Holland, West Germany imports well over half of its energy and France and Italy three-quarters. Japan, Belgium and Denmark are still more dependent on imports. According to OECD estimates, if the economies of the industrialised nations grow at four per cent per year, by 1985 they will require a total energy equivalent of more than 100m oil barrels a day. Neither the North Sea (with an estimated production of four million barrels per day in 1985) nor the OPEC countries (with an estimated production of 38 million barrels per day) can supply this requirement. Coal and natural gas production cannot make up this shortfall and at best a conservation programme can be aimed to bite in the late 1980s, for it takes time to invest in capital equipment designed to cut fuel bills.

There will therefore in the 1990s emerge an energy gap, which will affect dramatically worldwide economic factors, particularly production and employment. The only technically and economically viable new energy source is nuclear power. In opposition to this critics have called for a no-growth, or zero growth policy on the part of Western nations. It is not generally recognised that zero growth would effectively impede the first world from aiding the third world, far from redistributing further global wealth, no such wealth would be produced.

Opposition to the process of deriving energy from nuclear fuel, which in several of the stages involves dangers which have not yet been fully overcome, takes the form as we have seen of rising demonstrations and direct action on the one hand, but also legal interventions on the other. In Sweden, West Germany and the US injunctions taken out to prevent or delay the

construction of a nuclear power plant has affected national energy programmes. In the case of the US 16% of planned capacity has been lost thanks to the protests of citizen actions groups and uncertainty in state legislatures. As a result the construction of plants has been delayed by up to ten years. Although the court costs are high, an injunction in the US may be sought by an individual. A planned programme of injunctions with the consequent setback to nuclear industry could impose severe restrictions on growth. Clearly this legal process could, at minimum cost, be exploited for political reasons by a power anxious to inhibit Western growth while it catches up in vital technological fields.

The Soviet Union is such a power, and derives direct benefit from Western weaknesses. It already enjoys the strategic advantage of enriching much of Western Europe's uranium. With France, it is pushing ahead with the construction of a commercial size fast breeder reactor; it brooks no opposition to its nuclear programme, which it hopes to expand rapidly with the help of Japanese technology. If as a result, the USSR does not experience an energy gap in the 1990s, while the West does, the West's present economic advantage will be diminished and possibly even disappear. A consequence could be the total defeat of liberal democracy.

The Soviet Union has in the West a number of Communist Parties closely allied to it. This is the case with the Swedish Left Party (VPK), and the Danish and Norwegian Communist parties, all of which are hostile to nuclear power. It is even more especially the position of the West German DKP, which receives substantial funding from East Germany. Yet the East German regime is committed to forge ahead with nuclear power, whilst its spokesman in the West is arguing against this course. Why, indeed, are the Scandinavian and West German pro-Moscow parties critical of nuclear development in their own countries, yet say nothing of the very same process in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe generally? The answer lies, of course, in double standards, one law for 'people's democracies', another for the capitalist world. Some of the Western Communist parties most critical of the Soviet Union, notably the French, favour nuclear development. Moscow's tactic is naturally to embarass and and hinder the West on energy, as on anything else, and to explain all misfortunes and shortcomings in terms of the natural consequences of the 'inevitable' decline of capitalism. In the last analysis, the Soviet Union stands to gain from anti-nuclear turbulence—no matter how it is provoked—if this gives rise to an energy gap in the West. There is at present insufficient evidence to determine the level of Moscow's support for the anti-nuclear movement in the West, but that it has an interest there can be no doubt.

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[1] International Herald Tribune, 30 March 1978.
[2] Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 April 1978.

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A DECADE OF REVOLT: FROM LIBERTARIAN SOCIALISM TO CLASSICAL LIBERALISM

by Robert Eccleshall

DURING the summer of 1968 some of us left the silence of our last Finals Examination to join the occupation of the University Administration. Geographically, the distance travelled was small. Emotionally and politically, it seemed a step into another world: from individual striving to fraternity; from the deferred satisfactions of a career-orientated education to the festivities of the present; from a patterned hierarchy, where we passively received knowledge transmitted from on high, to a spontaneous event in which collectively we called the tune; from a predictable routine of lectures and classes to a fluid situation charged with possibility.

Many who were caught in the clamour of this disruptive moment believed that its verberations would extend far beyond the doors of the university. They were convinced that a recipe for renovating the structures of everyday life was contained in the package of demands for greater participation within the context of their immediate studies. It was felt that a prototype had been discovered for eliminating every bastion of hierarchy and privilege until society had been refashioned *in toto*.

That apprenticed intellectuals, a privileged strata from an affluent society, should have situated themselves in the vanguard of a looming contestation might appear as conceit of mammoth proportions: even more so when they chose to weave a thread which ran through the oppressed of advanced industrial societies (women, blacks, gays, the poor) to form an emotional alliance with the liberation movements of the Third World. Yet student activism did make an impression on the Old World. In France, it fomented a general strike which brought society to the verge of collapse. In America, coinciding with the revolt against racism and the war in Vietnam, it succeeded in seriously fracturing the dominant value-system. It was there, to a greater extent than elsewhere, that the upsurge of generational protest culminated in an exotic complex of dress, music and gestures. Doing one's own thing became for a host of the young an irresistible alternative to the rule-governed behaviour enjoined by the dominant culture. Pot-smoking came to signify the entrance of Hippies and others into a counter-culture at odds with straight society. A cultural space was sought that was dreamy, gentle, sensuous and affective: a world within world enshrining those expressive values which the host society depreciated. There emerged, in opposition to the traditional virtues of sexual restraint, thrift and individual achievement, an anarchic life-style: a hedonistic celebration of existence as a merrygoround of eroticism, spontaneity and fellowship.

Some theoreticians of the left were quick to inflate this novel life-style into a strategy for overthrowing capitalism. The latter, in orthodox socialist

vocabulary, is perpetually digging its own grave by generating contradictions it cannot resolve. Dialectical advance to a higher stage of social development is guaranteed by the system's inability to secure basic needs. For increasing poverty creates within the working class a profound sense of hostility towards structures which reward their toil by depriving them of the means of subsistence. By the 1960s, however, the classical Marxist picture of society, as an arena where two classes are locked in inevitable conflict until one precipitates a revolutionary rupture, had lost its plausibility. No class was ready to storm the barricades and the dialectic had apparently stumbled to a halt. Related crises of over-production and mass poverty had been overcome by the generation of non-durable commodities —from lamp-shades to deep-freezers—on a massive scale. Lulled by affluence, the working class fell into a slumber from which it might never awaken. As an integrated and stabilizing element in society, it had disqualified itself from performing the historical mission solemnly charged upon it by the Old Left. This was why Herbert Marcuse, together with other members of the New Left, was able to proclaim that capitalism's contradictions had been contained, at least temporarily, in a steadily expanding universe of prosperity where class conflicts were minimal.

Yet, just when consumer society had apparently obliterated all opposition by promising to deliver the goods, its legitimacy was again called into question. If the working class had fallen prey to false consciousness by voluntarily submitting to its own servitude, affluent youth were eager to take up the struggle on behalf of a qualitatively better way of life. Here was an unexpected interruption which the left, never reluctant to find signs of capitalism's senility, quickly assimilated into their programme for achieving a socialist society.

The world was, after all, on the move. But its motor of development was no longer located in a failure to secure immediate interests. It stemmed, rather, from the system's ability to produce material abundance. For there now existed, on the one hand, a technological capacity for nurturing a new human sensibility beyond the toil, misery and discipline associated with economic scarcity. On the other, this capacity was emasculated by structures which condemned people to degrading and exhausting work, subjected them to the brutalities of the domestic family, and shackled them to the shallow gratifications of an endless round of consumption. It was the educated young, their extended length of training itself symptomatic of technological advance, who were now said to have exposed this frustrated potential of the present moment.

Having carved for themselves a more open and playful pattern of existence, the young were hailed by many of the left as the *philosophes* of a new age: where the drudgery of work would be submerged in an abundance of leisure and enjoyment; the dull grind of daily routine silenced in an orchestrated outburst of feelings and emotions; and the competitive scramble for commodities displaced by a mutual discovery of the creative potential of human life. Rebellious adolescents were feted as an *avant-garde* who, busily undermining the work-ethic of entrepreneurial capitalism

and dismantling its outmoded structures, were pioneers exploring a terrain that was soon to be inhabited by the populace at large. Operating in 'liberated zones' on the margins of a decadent system, imaginative youth was said to be highlighting those compelling human needs which existing society could not satisfy. Cultural protest, therefore, would act as a catalyst spreading disaffiliation to a widening circle of groups until there was a massive, and irresistible, demand for radical change. Here was proclamation that the impending revolution was to be a multi-class affair born, as Gabriel and Daniel Cohn-Bendit put it in their book *Obsolete Communism*, of joy rather than sacrifice; and undertaken on many fronts—in families, schools and factories—by those who had already tested some of the fruits which the future would yield in plenty.

Within the space of a few years, however, these optimistic predictions had suffered a serious setback. By the early 1970s it was becoming increasingly difficult to portray the young as carriers of values capable of reconstructing society on a grand scale. Instead of forcing the frozen circumstances of advanced capitalism to dance to a new melody, cultural opposition had been partially tamed and neutralized. For one thing, chunks of the new life-style had broken off to be re-absorbed into the culture of which it was allegedly subversive. The demand for a more expressive way of life had been incorporated into existing structures. This was especially visible in the manipulation of sexual permissiviness. Sexual licence, which was supposed to act as a flashpoint igniting dissent from puritan values and from authoritarian conditioning generally, was carefully stage-managed to form a rich vein of profit. Sex was suddenly a lucrative commodity. It was packaged and sold by the advertising fraternity as a set of images: the sexually vibrant male, for instance, who displayed his prowess by consuming an appropriate brand of cigarettes and a suitable style of dress, and whose performance was accompanied by fashionable rhythmic blasts issuing from the latest in hi-fi equipment. Consumer capitalism could, it seemed, offer time for love and play without destroying itself from within.

In addition, some radicals turned from the task of changing society to preoccupy themselves with self-fulfilment. Self-transformation, the de-programming of one's own repressively conditioned responses, had been pronounced a central tactic in the revolutionary struggle. This is what distinguished the New from the Old Left. The former set out to tackle not merely the dominant class but also the enemy within which, lurking in the shape of rigid character-structures, is said to make victims of us all. By the early 1970s, however, liberation for some had become primarily, even exclusively, a private matter. Some of the former leaders of youthful rebellion began to publish autobiographical accounts of their retreat from an aggressive onslaught against society to indifference towards it. This transition is nicely conveyed in two works by the one-time American Yippie, Jerry Rubin. The first, *Do It!*, written at the height of radical activism, was a call to contest bourgeois society on every front. The second, *Growing (Up) at Thirty-Seven*, published in 1976, documents his desertion

of overtly political activity in search of his authentic self.

This voyage inwards has taken various paths. For some, aided by a plentiful supply of gurus, it has led through Eastern religion into mysticism. The goal has been that perfect knowledge which, yielding inner peace and harmony, supposedly shields the ego against the hurly-burly of the workaday world. Some, yearning for an organically wholesome and romantic mode of life, have tilled a patch of ground in order to cultivate macrobiotic foods. Some, trying to get in touch with their feelings, have explored the inner self through the medium of psychedelic drugs. And others, hoping for psychic integration and loving relationships, have joined in consciousness-raising sessions and group therapy. Usually, as in Rubin's case, the journey to the interior has followed several such routes. All converge in search of elemental, subjectively unadulterated experiences which the dominant culture allegedly conceals and distorts. The belief is that a pure, irreducible ego awaits discovery by those who persist with the journey. Once the enemy within has been eliminated by application of the appropriate home-grown therapy, the true self will be released from its bondage to social conditioning.

If the impetus to get in touch with one's self does not quite amount to the co-option of cultural opposition by the host culture, it does signify its defusion. The so-called liberation zones of alternative living have come to resemble reservations which, inhabited by a small number of people who practise weird customs, are a source of amusement to the members of the wider society. A television programme like 'Citizen Smith,' which ridicules the far left by portraying it as naive, clownish, ineffective and harmless, is probably an adequate barometer of the current state of public opinion in regard to youthful dissent generally. During the late sixties, in contrast, youthful enthusiasms sent a chill of horror and apprehension running along the spines of countless respectable citizens.

1978, the tenth anniversary of the high-point of youthful protest, brought fresh examples of its diffusion. Most students, only too aware of the effects of economic stagnation, had no inclination to indulge in rebellion. Many, intent on obtaining a passport to success in a competitive world, were pouring into vocational subjects like Accountancy and Business Studies. The more dedicated and organized left had splintered into factions and energies were consumed largely in making militant noises across the sectarian divide. Of greatest interest was the evidence which the British media, in a kind of valediction to the events of 1968, provided of the counter-culture's disintegration. Remnants of opposition were still to be found scattered in squats and communes across the land. But many, taking self-improvement to its logical conclusion, had returned into society to play at its own game. Some had found lucrative posts in advertising and other service industries. One, a former editor of an underground magazine, had become a dealer in expensive antique rugs, justifying his new occupation on the grounds that it was better to rip-off the rich than to exploit the poor. The ethic of the market-place was alive and well. Its custodians were those who had formerly found in the entrepreneurial

spirit the modern equivalent of the doctrine of Original Sin. They were now propagating that message of self-help which Mrs. Thatcher was busy preaching on behalf of the Conservative party and the oppressed middle classes.

It is a strange irony that some of those who have trekked through a decade of revolt now present a mirror-image of the bourgeois individualism they had set out to eradicate. Of course, they have been propelled to this unexpected destination by a different impulse from that which has persuaded the traditional right to resurrect the cult of the self-sufficient individual. Conservative leaders have been using an old tactic in order to make a sectional appeal on behalf of their electorate. Self-help for them is a convenient ploy by which to defend the privileges of the culturally advantaged. Riches, on this view, are the due reward of those who have deployed the maximum skill and energy in providing a comfortable life for themselves. The original inspiration of cultural revolt, in contrast, was a version of libertarian socialism where the recreation of the human self is inseparable from the revolutionary process, not something to be shelved until power has been snatched from the hands of the ruling class. But once the revolutionary project failed to materialize, it was natural for disillusioned radicals to find refuge in the idea that self-transformation may occur independently of social change. Confronted by structures which refused to dance to their new tune, youth retreated to seek techniques of self-improvement.

Whatever the impetus of this cult of the self, it does bring sections of radical thought perilously close to those tenets of classical liberalism which Conservatives are now intent on embracing. The classical liberal picture of society is of a collection of independent individuals, each using his own capacities to make provision for himself. Hence the tendency to make private property sacrosanct and to advocate minimal government intervention in the economy. For, by a cunning of reason, social harmony and progress are supposed to emerge from the free interaction of sovereign individuals. Similarly, much recent radical thinking detaches individuals from the system of social relations in which they are involved. The implication is that society's well-being will be guaranteed by permitting each person a space within which to cultivate his individuality.

The fallacy of this conception is that it severs the intimate connection existing between the self and the social milieu that it inhabits. The individual is not a self-enclosed unit owing little to society for his development. Repression or fulfilment of potentialities vitally depends upon the objective environment in which the human subject is situated. Individuality may be thwarted and mutilated by structures which, for example, perpetuate gross material inequalities or confine people to debilitating forms of work. It was this insight which led later liberals like Hobson and Hobhouse to question the absolute sanctity of private property and to abandon the ideal of *laissez-faire*. Recognizing with socialists that there was a social dimension to all activity, including the creation of wealth, they advocated redistributive taxation and social welfare in order to provide

all with the opportunity of enjoying a satisfactory life. This insight, from which the radicalism of the 1960s emerged, is now in danger of being lost. The notion of self-help, when perpetrated by the left as well as the right, fosters the illusion that individuals are entirely responsible for their life-chances. But individual failure is not to blame for every inhospitable feature of the human world. Obsessive preoccupation with the immediacy of the human subject diverts attention from its embodiment in a wider context. The outcome is a sort of intellectual conspiracy with those structural impediments which inhibit the potential of some individuals.

For all this, perhaps we should not dismiss the cultural explosion of the 1960s too hastily. It may have provided a glimpse of what a post-scarcity society, with its drastic reduction of necessary labour time, could be like. Before enthusiasms ebbed and radicals began to look inside their own heads for cures to social ailments, they might have engaged in communal experiments which anticipate the future order of things. Perhaps they did rehearse a life-style that, being more adjusted to an age of cybernetic technology, will eventually encompass all social actors. The problem with much of the left is that, in making predictions about the future, it severely contracts the time-scale of the historical process. Massive social transformation is not always just around the corner. Social change is usually more prolonged and messy, less cataclysmic and dramatic, than some of the left care to imagine.

Social upheaval in the short term is likely to follow a more traditional pattern of conflict between capital and labour. The immediate question on the agenda is not, as radicals of the 1960s believed, of how to initiate vast structural changes on the basis of technological abundance. It is whether capitalism can, after all, satisfy the material needs which it generates. The working class is not likely to follow the lead of youth in designing the blueprint of an abundant society when the issue for many is that of avoiding scarcity and a falling share of an apparently diminishing economic cake. For near full-employment and higher wages, to which manual workers have become accustomed in the last few decades, are now jeopardised by a combination of minimal economic growth and inflation. The course of events in the immediate future is likely to be determined by a growing refusal of many to accept an erosion of what they have come to accept as the basic requirements of a decent life.

It would be premature to predict the eventual outcome of such conflicts. Meanwhile, there is still much to be done by those who object to the current social deprivations which people suffer. There are always opportunities to be seized by those who desire a more open and vigorous society. The ultimate sin is that kind of resignation which, judging society too complex and overwhelming to be changed, seeks to have nothing to do with it by withdrawing into an illusory realm of privacy.

[Dr. Robert Eccleshall is author of *Order and Reason in Politics: Theories of Absolute and Limited Monarchy in Early Modern England* published in 1978 by Oxford University Press].

CANADA—A POLITICAL ANALYSIS

by Tom Riley

THE current controversy between the Province of Quebec, whose Government is actively seeking a special separatist's status, called 'Sovereignty Association', and the Federal Government tends to occlude the overall nature of Canada. For essentially, throughout its history, the provinces have always been in constant conflict with the Federal Government over various rights in governing.

This long term conflict stems from the very nature of Canada itself, a land of diversity once called by a sociologist, referring to its multitudinous ethnic groups, as 'a melting pot.'

Unlike the United States, which has a strong sense of identity and kinship with their country as a great and influential world power and who have submerged their North-South differences to internal political struggles, Canadians often have a difficult time over their 'identity' and what this means to them.

In the late 1960s there was a trend towards defining Canada as a nation distinctly different from the United States in both cultural and economic terms and many writers, especially Piere Berton, a well known Canadian author and broadcaster, wrote on this theme extensively. This was an attempt to separate out Canadian values from the American culture which literally submerges Canada because of its proximity. The argument runs that Canadians, though they do have characteristics distinctly Canadian, are so similar to the Americans because of this very proximity of the two cultures. After all, there are over 225,000,000 Americans as opposed to 23,000,000 Canadians. Over 80% of the Canadian population is on the American border and most Canadians are just as likely to tune in to an American TV station, buy a book published in the States, read a magazine or buy an American product. It is felt that this is inevitable.

To cap it all American businessmen, followed closely by the Japanese, are big investors in Canada. The majority of the American corporations have Canadian subsidiaries. It was this very American dominance which was the source of so much conflict in Quebec. In the forties and fifties and right in to the sixties a French Canadian could rarely get a top management job in an American firm in Quebec because of a lack of proficiency in English: or the job would go to an American imported in specifically by the company. This trend has changed and the Americans are much more sensitive to the local ethnic brought about, through economic necessity, by the recent rise to power of the present separatist Government.

However, in terms of an actual Canadian identity and the relationship between the provinces and Ottawa the American influence is really only a partial cause.

In reality many Canadians far away from Ottawa feel a deeper kinship towards their own province then to Canada as a whole. For example, a long standing view in British Columbia, separated from the rest of Canada

by the Rocky Mountains, is that British Columbia is more or less a country on its own and somewhat different from the rest of the country. British Columbians often say that the mountains are a true barrier and not necessarily just a symbol and that Ottawa is not sensitive to their needs. Farmers on the Prairies, who have for years been electing a majority of Conservative MPs (the Opposition Party) feel a deep anathema for Ottawa. There is a popular misconception on the Prairies (containing many kernels of truth) that Canada is run, from a business standpoint, from Bay street in Toronto (Canada's financial centre) and that the Federal Government pays far more attention to Ontario and Quebec than to the rest of the country.

People in the four maritime provinces (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland) are again a distinctly different people and each province has its own individuality. As a matter of fact, they are so independent in each of the provinces that attempts at a Maritime union under one Government over the years has consistently failed as each province tends to distrust the other.

With the development of modern technology (especially the electronics medium) and national magazines and newspapers the country is somewhat closer than it ever was. An event occurring in Vancouver, British Columbia is known about in St. John's, Newfoundland, on the Atlantic, within minutes if it is carried over the news wires. Television has further broken down the barriers especially through the production of Canadian public affairs' shows and entertainments written and produced by Canadians (though these are few in number as most shows are American imports with a limited number from the UK). Thus, progress has brought some change and a greater sense of cohesion and unity but the old ethnic and provincial characteristics remain.

Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau, well aware of the make-up of Canada, sensed this need for cohesion and the difficulties Canadians were having when he was elected leader of the Liberal Party in 1968. He had only been elected as leader for a few days when he took the country to the polls and proceeded to charm the voters everywhere and appear to be all things to all Canadians. He was the dashing hero who said that through him separatism would become a dead issue and disappear. He offered himself as the saviour of the Canadian nation and the champion of national unity. He proclaimed himself as a French Canadian who firmly believed in Federalism (a direct reversal from a few years earlier when Trudeau was editor of a separatist magazine called *Cité Libré* along with two fellow Quebecers who had followed him to Ottawa into the Cabinet, Gerard Pelletier and Jean Marchand). He went on to win that election overwhelmingly.

In the same year that Trudeau was sweeping the country off its feet a well known Quebecer, who had been a former provincial Cabinet Minister in a Liberal Government, had left the provincial party over a disagreement on their stand to be Federalists who would work out a special relationship with Ottawa. He went on to form the Parti Quebecois and in November,

1976 (after two failures at the polls in 1970 and 1973) led the party to victory to form the first separatist Government in Quebec. His name was Rene Levesque. It is ironic all this occurred in the period when Trudeau was Prime Minister, the very man who said separatism was a dead issue.

Trudeau has never been as popular as he was in the first election of 1968. However, he has managed to maintain power for over ten years and is currently the longest standing leader of the western world. In 1971 he made a famous statement in the House of Commons which enraged both politicians and public alike. He said that when the Members opposite left the House and walked a few feet away from the Parliament buildings they were no longer 'honourable members' but a bunch of nobodies. Trudeau has often been criticized for his disdain for the Parliamentary process and seems much more comfortable entertaining and meeting with foreign dignitaries and travelling around the world and the country than sitting in Parliament, to whom he is accountable, answering questions.

However, in the House of Commons, he is the undisputed master of debate and his flourish and style has warded off many an attack. In early 1978 during the height of questioning regarding the scandals that had arisen over 'dirty tricks' by the RCMP, Trudeau was away in Western Canada. His Cabinet Ministers were having trouble deflecting the Opposition but when Trudeau returned he took control of the situation, deftly handling questions and the issue defused for the moment. (This scandal is still haunting the Trudeau Government who it now appears knew about the tactics of the RCMP but had been denying this all along. However, in late 1978 a former Commissioner of the RCMP, William Higgit, stated before the MacDonald Inquiry into the RCMP that he had told the Solicitor General in 1973 what they were doing. Also, the RCMP claim the Government knew all along that they were illegally opening the mail of Canadian citizens.)

The mail opening scandal of the RCMP brought out another side of Trudeau which caused a lot of upset amongst civil libertarians and other groups. In response to the fact that illegal mail openings were occurring, Trudeau said the solution was to bring in a Bill which would make it legal. This Bill is now before Parliament.

Prior to becoming Prime Minister Trudeau said any country's Government which dealt in secrecy was one doomed. He spoke during the election of 1968 on the need for participatory democracy and said he would implement this. Yet, a full ten years later the country is still waiting for a Freedom of Information Act and the Government, now bowing to public pressure for a Bill, are expected to introduce one which will be weak and ineffectual, not bringing the ideal scene of more open government closer.

In the 1974 election the then leader of the Official Opposition, Robert Stanfield, campaigned for wage and price controls, saying this was the only way to beat inflation. The Prime Minister grabbed onto this issue and ridiculed Stanfield for suggesting such a solution and said his Government would not condone any such thing. The attack weakened the Conservatives considerably as it became the major issue of the election. Trudeau

(who had been reelected in 1972 with a minority Government) swept to power with a healthy majority. The wage and price controls issue was thought to be the major one that brought him his victory. Yet, in 1975 the Prime Minister proceeded to introduce wage and price controls, which lasted until the autumn of 1978. When asked what brought about the change from 1974 when he so adamantly opposed controls he replied that the economic climate had necessitated a reversal of the stand. There was never any full explanation as to the change and some cynics maintain that the Liberal Government had planned this as early as 1974 because of the then rampant inflation but, knowing the unpopularity of the move, attacked Stanfield for his suggestion, seeing it as a good political tactic to defeat the Conservatives.

Since Trudeau has come to power the bureaucracy in Ottawa has swelled to gigantic proportions. His own Office (the Prime Minister's Office) has in it over eighty staff members as opposed to just over ten in the days of his predecessor, Lester B. Pearson. Giant new complexes have sprung up in Ottawa and across the river in Hull, Quebec, attesting to Trudeau's true bent as a bureaucrat. His policies reflect this also as the Liberals have sought to mainstream Canadians and bring them under tighter and tighter Government control. Businessmen have to conform to a multitude of regulations and a common complaint of the small businessman is that much production time is lost because of the numerous department and agency forms one has to fill in and send to Ottawa. Taxes have escalated right along with inflation.

Since 1968 there have been more Federal-Provincial meetings over the Constitution than ever before in Canada's history. At one point the Prime Minister said he would bring the British North America Act (Canada's Constitution is lodged in Westminster) home to Ottawa with or without the consent of the Premiers of the ten provinces. This caused so much consternation and debate that he has not done so to date. Meanwhile, his Government has written a new Constitution which is under discussion with the provinces. It proposes to abolish the Senate (which has the same powers virtually as the House of Lords) and to have representatives elected by the Provinces and from the House of Commons. Agreement has not been reached on this. However, the main issues surrounding the meetings have been over the distribution of powers of the Federal and Provincial governments and the sharing of the tax dollar.

In a summary of the latest Constitutional meetings Canadian lawyer Ron Atkey said in an article published in the *Toronto Star* on November 4, 1977:

> Last June, Ottawa moved with its boldest constitutional initiative to date—a Constitutional Amendment Bill designed to carry out major constitutional reforms in two phases. Phase I would replace the Senate, reorganize the Supreme Court, establish a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, define the role of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and strengthen the office of Governor-General. Phase 2 would cover all those sections of the constitution definitely requiring agreement between Ottawa and the provinces, primarily distribution of powers. Meeting in Regina this past August, the provincial premiers unanimously

opposed the two-phase approach and demanded that distribution of powers be put on the table immediately setting the scene for recent events.

This is the kernel of the controversy between Ottawa and the provinces and the outcome of these meetings will determine the future of Canada as throughout the debate Premier Rene Levesque will continue to demand 'Sovereignty Association'. To obtain this he is planning to take a referendum to the people repeatedly until he gets majority approval. Though he came to power on an election platform of government corruption and improving the declining economic state of the province and not on a mandate to separate, he is still strong enough politically to win the next election, not constitutionally due in Quebec until 1981, though it is expected to be held before this.

On the Federal scene 1979 is definitely election year as the Prime Minister's mandate runs out in July. Last year there was a general buildup in the media and the House of Commons as an election was expected in the spring. The Prime Minister let that run its course, toyed with it and then announced that there would be no election in 1978 but there would be one in the spring of 1979.

The results of the election will mean a great deal to Canada. The Liberals have been behind the Conservatives in the opinion polls for months now. In the recent by-elections held in October, 1978, of fifteen contested seats the Progressive Conservatives won 10, the New Democratic Party three (and they picked up one in Newfoundland, the first time they were ever elected Federally in that Province) while the Liberals won two, both in Quebec. The Liberals took one seat from the Conservatives in Montreal.

Historically, Quebec has been a Liberal province in Federal elections, though provincially they have alternated different governments ranging from the Union National (a rightist party), to the Liberals (centre) to the present Parti Quebecois (considered by most to be a socialist party). It is this persistent support in Quebec that has continued to give the Federal Liberals their power to govern. It was because of the seats gained in Quebec in 1972 that the Liberals were able to form a minority government and rule under the auspices of the then leader of the New Democratic Party, David Lewis.

Across the country Trudeau is now considered politically dead for a variety of reasons, including continuing inflation, rising costs, government secrecy, the 'dirty tricks' of the RCMP and the weakening of the Canadian dollar on foreign markets. However, pundits are not discounting the possibility that Trudeau will pull yet another trick out of his magic changing act and turn the electors around to him and the Liberals once again.

The Liberals have had very little representation on the Prairies for years, while in British Columbia they have shared the seats with both the Conservatives and the New Democrats (Federally the New Democrats get only 17 to 18% of the vote but have a few strong areas such as British Columbia and a few places in Ontario, especially Toronto and Northern Ontario.) It is expected that the Conservatives, judging by the overwhelming majority they got in the by-elections, will sweep the nine provinces

with the exception of Quebec. The main fight for seats will be in Eastern Ontario (which includes Toronto) and Quebec. It is expected that they will take most of the seats in Toronto, but Quebec is another matter. The Conservatives have held only a few seats in Quebec in this century with the exception of 1958, when the then Prime Minister John Diefenbaker came to power with 205 seats out of a 265 seat House of Commons. This was because he was able to take over many of the Quebec seats, sharing them with the then popular Social Credit Party (who now call themselves the *Creditistes* and hold only a few seats in Northern Quebec. They have not been a potent force in Federal politics since the death of their charismatic leader, Real Caouette.)

The current leader of the Progressive Conservatives, Joe Clark, was elected in 1976, narrowly defeating a dynamic personality from Quebec, Claude Wagner. Wagner had said he would rally Quebec voters to his side, but after his defeat was in dispute with Mr. Clark and in the by-elections of 1976 did not produce the promised results, as Liberals again took the Quebec seats being contested, with the exception of Montreal-Hochelaga, where the Liberals made the mistake of appointing the candidate to the Cabinet before he was elected. Mr. Wagner has since resigned as an MP and been appointed to the Senate. His constituency went back to the Liberals in the by-elections of 1978.

Mr. Clark, since coming to office, has made many forays into Quebec and has learned to speak French. He has said he understands the problems of Quebecers, yet to Quebecers he is still an English Canadian and an outsider. The current speculation in Canada is that in the forthcoming election the Conservatives will get a majority in the nine other provinces, but that Quebec will once again go Liberal. Trudeau is campaigning on the basis that he is the man to save Canada; yet it will be ironical if the Quebecers return his party with a majority in their province as well as the source of an ever widening split in Canada. No matter if the Conservatives come in without any worthwhile representation in Quebec (though because of the number of seats in Quebec it would mean they would have to get over 140 in the rest of Canada to form a majority government) it would still cause a split, as it would be a definite French-English structure. And if Trudeau came in with a majority it would mean that the French minority in Quebec would be keeping him in power while the English majority had rejected him.

At the same time Mr. Clark, who has proved himself to be a good debater in the House of Commons and an inverate campaigner, is not to be dismissed. Though some consider him stiff and a bit robotic in his style and presentation of himself he has made few mistakes since the polls have shown the rise in popularity of the Conservatives.

Whatever the results, the Election of '79 in Canada promises to be an interesting one and, perhaps with all that is at stake, crucial for the political future of Canada as a nation from sea to sea.

ARABIA: THE BRITISH CONNECTION:

Part 1: The Awakening

by W. Norman MacDonald

SAUDI Arabia is one of the most influential countries in the modern world. With its enormous income from oil, and the distinct possibility of another of similar magnitude from hitherto untapped mineral resources, it commands a respect out of all proportion to its population, military expertise, or industrial muscle.

A century and a half ago however, it was a land of enigmatic fascination to Europeans. The few maps available were mere expressions of cartographical fancy, and the odd European who had ventured beyond the Red Sea ports did so mostly under duress, usually as a slave.

From eighteen hundred onwards however, adventurous Westerners—the great majority British—would hazard their lives in awakening this contrasting land to the outside world.

This connection was to survive two world wars, the advent of oil, and the eclipse of empire. To trace this development is to trace the history of modern Arabia.

In the early years of the nineteenth century Ibrahim Pasha, son of Egypt's renegade Albanian ruler Mehemet Ali, led an army into Arabia to crush the fanatical Wahhibis and restore Ottoman authority, a somewhat specious suzerainty to which his father paid nominal lip service. These adherents of the long dead Abdul Wahhab, whose advocacy of a stricter, purer Islam had swayed the house of Saud—the leading family in the Nejd—had also extended his teachings to the Hejaz in the west, Oman and the Gulf in the east, and Syria in the north.

Ibrahim's ability and vigorous brutality rapidly brought results. He captured and partially ruined the Wahhibi capital Dirriyyah—a state in which it remains to this day—and, as a result, aroused the interest of the British.

To them, any undue activity in the Gulf threatened the *raison d'être* of empire; India. At this moment that ancient trade route—perhaps the earliest navigable waterway in history—was cluttered with pirates, and the emergence of a soldier of Ibrahim's ability meant—to India at least—that this pestilence could be removed in a combined operation.

Accordingly in eighteen-nineteen an emissary was dispatched to proffer congratulations on the Pasha's conquests and—hopefully—redirect his energies to other pursuits. India's choice was altogether an unfortunate one, for Captain George Forster Sadlier of the Forty-seventh Foot was the John Bull of legend in military finery.

His detestation of the inhabitants was only marginally more than his loathing of the country, and his haughty contempt for local customs coupled

with a fussy policemanship of Arab muddle, made his task all but impossible. Consequently, it is surprising that he got beyond Muscat—his original landfall—even more so that he met Ibrahim, and utterly startling that in so doing, he made the first crossing of the peninsula in the process.

From Muscat he moved to Qatif where he discovered that Ibrahim was possibly at Hofuf. Journeying there, he learned of the Pasha's departure for—again possibly—Rass. Pressing on with increasing exasperation, he found on arrival at Rass that he had again missed the fast-moving Ibrahim, this time by two days. His fury now boundless, Sadlier decided that he had done enough grappling with a hellish terrain and its slothful inhabitants.

He was going back to Basra. The local commander however said this was impossible, as he had no authority to provide the large escort his infuriated guest would require. Now in the centre of Arabia, Sadlier let duty over-ride fury and rode on, finally running Ibrahim to ground in Medina, eleven weeks after leaving Qatif. Despite his immense stamina, Sadlier completely lacked the diplomatic equipment necessary for handling the deviously complex Ibrahim, who had no need of British help nor indeed congratulations, and so the journey was a failure.

Eventually he reached Yenbu, where he took ship for Jeddah. On arrival his intransigence again delayed him. Insisting that only a British ship was good enough for a British officer, he spent three months in the steaming Red Sea port awaiting one. On his return to India, he received the grudging thanks of his superiors and—briefly—the limited lionisation of the Bombay literary society.

For all his manifest faults, Sadlier was an acute observer, and his topographical information—if sparse—proved useful. He also gave an interesting cameo of the destruction wrought by Ibrahim's army, noting that in some parts of the interior however, the tribes still controlled events, despite the Pasha's ferocious visitation.

The next Briton to venture into the peninsula did so for a reason at once more difficult and progressively more dangerous as he neared his goal. That he survived to write a book on this experience says much yet not nearly enough, for he was a fabulous original.

Richard Francis Burton was a startling man in an age crowded with startling men. He was a scholar, linguist—among the twelve tongues at his command was Jataki, an Afghan dialect of which he had written a grammar —rebel, lover, and iconoclast but, before all else, an Arabist and a romantic.

Yet he remained an amateur of Islamic culture due to his incredible restlessness, physical, spiritual and intellectual; a form of torment that would rule his life until his death, in of all places Trieste in the role of British Consul. More Arab than the Arabs, far less Victorian than the Victorians, he fascinated and repelled both with equal facility.

After education in France, Italy and at Oxford—his only distinction being that of expulsion—he spent seven years in the Indian army, where he

developed his astonishing linguistic ability, and a lasting interest in Eastern cultures and mores.

In eighteen fifty-three he offered his services to the Royal Geographical Society for 'the purpose of removing the huge white blot which, in all our maps, notes the eastern and central regions of Arabia.'

Having dyed his body, and endured the painful operation of circumcision, he travelled to Cairo to perfect his Quranic knowledge at the Al Azhar university. His preparations complete, he set out from Suez disguised as a Rangoon-educated Afghani doctor, accompanied by an Arab boy from Mecca, one Muhammad, whom he had met in Cairo.

Burton spent a month following religious ritual before becoming the first European to travel to Mecca by the eastern route, reaching the holy city in September. With his companion's prompting, he performed all the rites of the pilgrimage.

'Nowhere,' he later claimed had he seen 'aught so solemn, so impressive as this spectacle.' His account of his journey, like all his other subsequent publications, is a horn of plenteous detail and learned observation, the whole sustained by a battery of footnotes.

A decade later, another Briton ventured into the peninsula, this time from the north. Like Burton, William Gifford Palgrave was a man of many attainments. The son of Sir Francis Palgrave, the founder of the Public Record Office, he was a scholar, artist, and amateur botanist. Another Oxford man and former Indian army officer, he was also a convert to Roman Catholicism. Like Burton, too, his driving force was a consuming restlessness, and he would meet death in an equally incongruous set of circumstances; as Minister Resident in Montevideo.

Like many converts, Palgrave tended to the extreme and eventually became a Jesuit missionary.

It was as such that this enigmatic man was commissioned by Napoleon the Third to explore central Arabia. Setting out from Ma'an disguised as Abou Mahood el-Eys—(the quiet one)—an itinerant doctor and druggist, he was accompanied by a Greek-born teacher Geraigeri, whose Arabic was as fluent as his own. They visited Jawf, the Jebel Shomar, and Ha'il where they learned of the Wahhibi dynasty and their history from the local ruler, who was related to them. Determined to study them further, Palgrave and his companion journeyed on to the Wahhibi capital, Riyadh. During a sojourn spiced with petty intrigue, Palgrave probed the tribal population figures, observed the tax-gathering and military systems, and learned something of the attributes of the Arabian horse. His choice of disguise was a shrewd one, for medical men in the East have long wielded an influence out of all proportion to their calling.

This, coupled to a knowledge as profound as Burton's, made for a relatively trouble-free journey. Having visited Hofuf and Qatif, he took ship for Bahrain, voyaging down the Gulf to Sharjah and Muscat, surviving shipwreck and near-death on the way. A year later, his much disputed

Narrative appeared, a great deal of it—certainly in St. John Philby's view —as enigmatic as the man himself.

Two years later, Britain opened relations with the house of Saud, supporters and protectors of the Wahhibi reformers. Latterly, their zeal and determination had been expressing itself in an attempt to seize Bahrain Island, a minor piece of imperialism halted by the intervention of British naval units. The treaty stipulated that the Saudis would not molest British subjects, nor the tribes of the Nejd interfere with British treaty arrangements in the locality. This event marked a change of emphasis in the exploration of the region, as indeed had Palgrave's trek, with its political-religious undertones. Henceforth enquiry would be quasi-governmental, its purpose nevertheless masked by the curiousity inherent in men of an adventurous mien.

In May of that year Colonel Lewis Pelly, the political agent in Bushire, deeming it his duty to get acquainted with the leading men in the area, and intrigued by the Royal Geographical Society's view that no European could travel in safety to Riyadh—indeed its exact position was unknown, despite Palgrave—led an expedition from Kuwait to the Saudi stronghold. Another of the Indian army's small corps of wandering soldiers, Pelly had already made a name for himself by riding alone from Teheran to India via Kandahar.

The party was one of the most organised and efficient bodies ever in desert exploration, and contained a naval officer whose astronomical observations finally fixed the position of both Riyadh and Hofuf. They also collected a considerable number of rocks and plants.

Through chatting to his escort, Pelly learned of the Sulayb, the gypsies of the desert, who are regarded as outcasts by the rest of the nomads, They carry out much simple tin-smithing as the tribes require, and intermingling is forbidden on both sides.

Having called on the Saudi ruler—who informed Pelly that whilst he admired the British, he abominated their religion, and advised the adoption of Islam, for Pelly at least, if not for the entire nation—the expedition continued its trek, eventually discovering the ruins of the city of Sadus. A tall column was all that remained of an urban complex upon which Arab chroniclers of the tenth century had waxed lyrical, deeming it the equal of Palmyra in grandeur and magnificence. The city had stealthily vanished, the victim of the locals, who had removed the stone for more pressing needs than that of meandering savants, a form of 'natural' decay that still occurs.

The Society was duly impressed by the expedition; its secretary, Sir Roderick Murchison, remarking that it had 'added data of great value to the original sketch of inner Arabia communicated to us by Mr. W. Gifford Palgrave.'

A decade later, Charles Montague Doughty, that zealously obdurate Christian, began his journeying in north western and west central Arabia.

Of all the travellers in this contrasting land, he more than matched the environment. Early in life he had decided that he would devote himself to the service of his native tongue. After studying at Cambridge—among his subjects being the poetry of Chaucer and Spenser—he wandered forth in quest of a theme to which the English language could do justice. Disguised as a Syrian 'of the middle sort of fortune,' this ruggedly refined loner was one of the first Europeans to cross the Jebel Raal, the valley of which was a dry river bigger than the Tigris and, he thought, the greatest valley in Arabia.

His further wanderings—fraught with hardship due as much to his intransigence as anything else—took him to Buraydah and Taif before he stumbled into the British Consulate in Jeddah and safety in August eighteen-seventy-eight.

In the following year, the aristocratic Blunts—a husband and wife team who took the Grand Tour to its ultimate conclusion—took the desert route to Ha'il, becoming the first of the undisguised travellers to do so. Their observations were acute and extensive, and enabled existing maps of the area to be corrected.

Three years later in the palace at Riyadh, a son was born to the leading prince of the house of Saud. In time Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud would grow into a tall, well-built man, a poet of note, excelling at war games and all outdoor pursuits. His birth was auspicious, for in eighteen-eighty-seven Saudi power in the Nejd was blotted out by the Rashidi rulers of Ha'il. Whilst living in exile, father and son were invited to Kuwait by its ruler, Sheikh Mubarrak. The Sheikh's relations with the Rashidis was abysmal, due to the Rashidi determination to add Kuwait to their dominions. In this ambition they were aided and abetted by the Turks, who resented Mubarrak's treaty of friendship with the British, a connection that remained unbroken until nineteen-sixty-one.

It was during this period that young Ibn Saud first came into contact with the arbiters of the Gulf, a contact destined to have lasting effects on the peninsula, Ibn Saud, and indeed on the British themselves.

In eighteen-ninety-seven Muhammad Ibn Rashid, ruler of Ha'il, aspirant to Kuwait, and conqueror of the house of Saud, died. Almost immediately a Saudi-Kuwaiti force marched into the interior, only to be crushingly defeated near Buraydah in February nineteen-hundred and one.

Against the advice of his father and his host, Ibn Saud set out with forty followers to capture Riyadh. He spent some months in the desert bordering the empty quarter, attempting to enlist Bedu support. His success was minimal, twenty men only joining his original party. Nevertheless, with Ibn Saud's qualities they were enough, and on the fifteenth of February nineteen-hundred-and-two this small party seized the Governor's palace, killing him and half his men, and making themselves masters of Riyadh. The house of Saud had returned to its capital, and as consolidation of this cheekily brilliant feat went ahead, so Turkish support for the Rashidis waned.

Six years later, the Government of India made an appointment which had far reaching consequences for Arabia. They sent Captain William Henry Irvine Shakespear to Kuwait as their political agent. Born in India and educated at Sandhurst, this gifted and inexorable soldier was the high-noon of empire personified. Like Burton and Palgrave, he was a many-sided man; former Consul in Bander Abbas—at twenty five the youngest ever appointed by Delhi—Bengal Lancers officer, enthusiastic photographer and pioneer motorist, above all explorer extraordinary.

He had made his reputation as a traveller in nineteen-hundred-and-seven when, on his first leave for nine years, he shipped his single cylinder Rover to Bushire, and from there drove to the Channel coast. It was during a dinner given by Sheikh Mubarrak that he met Ibn Saud who told him that 'as a true friend of Mubarrak, you are my friend' and invited him to Riyadh.

During his appointment, Shakespear began a series of journeys which penetrated the eastern hinterland with increasing thoroughness. His own acute observations were abetted by another soldier-diplomat-wanderer, Gerald Leachman. This Boer war veteran had travelled in forbidden Tibet prior to his arrival in Arabia. Later, he spent some months travelling with the Anayzah tribe, and was taken prisoner when they were attacked by the Rashidis. Eventually sent to Basra, he returned to India via Kurdistan and Anatolia, covering the five hundred miles between Damascus and Bagdad in a record nine days on camel-back.

In nineteen-twelve Ibn Saud formed the Ikhwan, or Brethren whose slogan was 'back to the Quran and the land.' He had long been aware of the military potential of the tribes, provided their customary resistance to central control could be overcome. His solution was to settle them in military encampments termed hijrahs, numbering as many as two hundred. The brotherhood regarded all non-Wahhibis as infidels, and this contempt developed into a fanaticism that would make them superb irregulars.

Whilst Shakespear continued his probing of the interior, Leachman trekked from Damascus to Bahrain by way of the Nafud, Aneiza, Buraydah and Ayun. He was the first European to traverse this route since Sadlier, and during a brief stay at Riyadh, he met Ibn Saud. In all, he had covered one thousand three hundred and eighty miles in a swift fifty-two days. With that sublime stupidity which, at times, they are wont to display, his army superiors returned him to regimental duties.

As Ibn Saud consolidated his hold on central Arabia—he ejected the Turkish garrison from Al Hasa and the eastern shore of the Gulf in nineteen-thirteen—and conflict loomed in Europe, Shakespear came to the end of his tour of duty in Kuwait. In December, the Viceroy in Delhi wrote to the Secretary of State in London; 'Captain Shakespear has asked permission to attempt the journey through Arabia to the Red Sea. He knows Arabic well, and has received an invitation from Ibn Saud, who is a personal friend. . .'

Organised with his usual care, the assembled expedition struck south-

west to Zilfi, through the gorge of Ghat and arrived in Riyadh in March, nineteen-fourteen. Throughout, Shakespear carried a copy of Palgrave's narrative, commenting in his notes on the accuracy or otherwise of his oft-disputed 'inner sketch.'

Travelling along the edge of the Nafud and the land of the Shammar, he arrived at Jauf on the twenty-sixth of April. Now in misery from stomach pains—brought on by drinking brackish water—he found that staying in the saddle required a superhuman effort.

At Jauf he met the Rualla Emir Nuri Ibn Shalan, an ally of Ibn Saud, and Shakespear was the first European to whom he extended his friendship. Having acquired fresh camels, he pressed on, crossing the evil flint plain of Harra in early May. Whilst engaged in this wearying struggle, he was set upon by raiders and, although he broke free of them, he found that his initiative brought but illusory relief, for he fell into the hands of the Abu Taiya and their piratical chief Auda, who would later be lauded by T. E. Lawrence.

Auda took what he regarded as his obligatory present; twenty pounds of Shakespear's remaining twenty-seven, although he did provide guides and fresh camels for what would be the most difficult part of the journey. By the twelfth of May, Shakespear had crossed the Hejaz railway and the Wadi Musa, afterwards enjoying a stroke of luck; he stumbled upon the direct route to Kontilla, Suez, and Egypt.

He snail-paced his way across the frontier on the seventeenth of May, rested for a day—recharging his batteries with a superb meal—before riding the last few miles into Egypt by taxi.

He had covered one thousand eight hundred and ten miles, more than a thousand of which was an entirely new route, in the first crossing of the peninsula since Sadlier. His notes, photographs, and maps were encyclopaedic and—writing eight years later—Douglas Carruthers, the secretary of the Royal Geographical Society summed them up as 'many errors put right; many a problem solved.'

By the outbreak of the 1914 war, northern Arabian exploration had got down to the minutiae of nature and people. Gertrude Bell, the noted Arabist and tribal expert, trekked to Ha'il in nineteen thirteen, crossing the Great Nafud en route. European political events however would change Arabia as fulsomely as they would change Europe itself, and in this change Britons were to play a major part.

[An engineer by profession, W. Norman MacDonald has lived and worked in the Persian Gulf for many years. He will be contributing two further articles tracing The British Connection in Arabia].

THREE KINGS OF ORIENT: THE CHANGING FACE OF MONARCHY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Part I: Handing over the Old Firm: Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia

by Roger Kershaw

THERE are no easy generalisations about the circumstances which have caused the monarchies of mainland Southeast Asia to survive or succumb at particular moments in the past one hundred years. Whereas the British abolished the monarchy of Burma in 1886, having failed to find an eligible puppet after their final conquest of the whole country, their rivals to the East (the French) preserved the three monarchies of Indochina (Annam or Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) as a legitimating façade for colonial rule. In non-colonised Siam in 1932 a non-aristocratic, nationalist elite rose up against monarchical absolutism but, not unlike the French, quickly realised the prudence of obtaining royal forgiveness and the protection of the royal aura. The Laotian nationalist movement (in which the nobility played a leading role) declared the King deposed in October 1945 —before the restoration of French control after the Second World War— but in November 1949 most of the dissidents were reconciled with the monarchy. By contrast, a Vietnamese nationalist, Ngo Dinh Diem, used his power as Prime Minister in the post-1954 independent state of South Vietnam to unseat the last Emperor of Annam, Bao Dai, in October 1955 and make himself President. But in further contrast to Diem, a more subtle, Communist Vietnamese, Ho Chi Minh, had prevailed upon the same Bao Dai to make a 'voluntary' transmission of authority to an independent Republic in Hanoi in August 1945—a fact which goes in a small way to explain why Ho's successors and not Diem's now rule throughout Vietnam. In Laos in December 1975 a rather similar transmission of authority was obtained from the King at the moment when the Communist Party shook off the trammels of its coalition with the heirs to the former nationalist movement.

If any common pattern at all can be traced in these briefly enumerated events, it may consist of the care observed more often than not by non-royal aspirants to power, either to operate behind a monarchical façade or at least to appear to be the heirs to monarchical legitimacy. If the British failed to do the former in Burma, they quickly learned to regret it: pacification proved a heavy and unwelcome burden to the Government of India. And if the French faced even worse problems in Vietnam, this owed much to the fact that French administration was too direct, in practice, for the monarchy to provide effective concealment of imperialist realities or to be reconciled to its own fate. (In fact, the nineteenth century Empire of Annam lost Cochin China in the south entirely to French sovereignty and retained only nominal sovereignty over Tongking in the

north). Two things appear certain from the above record. Firstly, that monarchy has been recognised, or has proved itself, as a crucial if not indispensable fount of authority in Southeast Asian societies even in—perhaps especially in—this era of rapid modernisation and upheaval. And secondly, that these kings have only divided or surrendered their sovereignty under pressure.

But what of Cambodia? As a member of the *Union Indochinoise* the Cambodian Protectorate was not much less directly administered than Annam; but it was administered in a spirit of relatively 'benign neglect'. The relations of Cambodian society were thus little disturbed by the 90 years of French protection (1864-1954). The charisma of the monarchy was highly intact when the 18 year old Prince Norodom Sihanouk ascended the throne as the choice of Admiral (or Madame?)[1] Decoux in 1941. But the monarchy had also preserved a good name in a nationalist sense in that Sihanouk's great-grandfather, King Norodom, had led the resistance to the Treaty of 1884 which consolidated French control. Sihanouk exploited and improved on these assets between his accession and Independence in 1954. He declared a short-lived Independence under Japanese prompting in March 1945 and enjoyed a taste of absolute rule. After Japan's surrender and the return of the French he was involved in several years of conflict with nationalist politicians, nominally over the choice of tactics in the struggle for Independence but more profoundly over the position of the monarchy in the independent state of Cambodia that was to be. It looked as though Sihanouk's wish for a powerful, 'non-constitutional' monarchy would prevail, after he took over the government with emergency powers in mid-1952; dissolved the Assembly to launch a one-man international crusade for Independence in January 1953; won *de facto* Independence by November 1953 and *de jure* Independence without any international liabilities, at Geneva in July 1954; and finally, in early 1955, fortified by the retrospective approval of a referendum for his assumption of full powers, put forward a *Projet Royal* for a Constitution under which the cabinet would be responsible to the King, not to the democratic Assembly. In short, the vitality of monarchy in Cambodia had no parallel on the mainland of Southeast Asia at that time. If 'fount of authority' seems an inappropriate epithet it can only be because it errs on the side of modesty in relation to an institution which had added the charisma of epic achievement to the more institutionalised charisma of an ancient tradition. It is therefore paradoxical, at first sight, that precisely this monarchy of Norodom Sihanouk should have handed over its enormous assets to its Communist enemies without a struggle. But it has been a long and complex process whose outcome was not foreseen or intended by the protagonist at the start. Above all we must bear in mind that Sihanouk's opponents were divided between a Communist and a 'bourgeois' camp and that the latter were more consequential at first.[2]

Although Sihanouk's bourgeois rivals were not strong enough—nor did they mainly desire—to abolish the monarchy as such in 1955, they were able to obstruct the adoption of Sihanouk's preferred Constitution. Sihanouk

the would-be absolutist was thus in a sense already under pressure when he abdicated in March 1955 to organise his own political party and prepare for elections in which his constitutional proposals would be put to the test of popular support. But abdication itself rendered the proposals superfluous (and they were moderated out of recognition long before the elections in September): the power which Sihanouk coveted was assured but would henceforth rest on a combination of mass organisation and charismatic authority, without the impediments of formal monarchical office. Indeed as the monarchy was preserved, with Sihanouk's father Suramarit as the new incumbent, it was now necessary that the monarchy should *not* be too powerful and pose any threat to Sihanouk's position. His caution was manifest when, upon the death of his father in 1960, he contrived to leave the throne vacant (his mother, Queen Kossamak, henceforth 'symbolised' the monarchy) and make himself Head of State. But such manoeuvres and such concentration of power added to the long-standing enmity against Sihanouk amongst liberal democrats and office-seekers alike.

Whether Sihanouk would have brought himself to the point of placing one of his sons on the throne or at least of cultivating a credible heir apparent, in the normal course of events, is a moot—and essentially academic—question.[3] Developments in the Cambodia of the 1960s were far from 'normal'. Sihanouk had prolonged the life of semi-divine monarchy beyond its time, in a secular guise. Such a personalised regime, surrounded by opportunistic flatterers and frustrated opponents both altruistic and selfish, was poorly equipped to deal with the mounting problems of a developing economy in the shadow of the war in Vietnam. Matters were made worse when, because of the advance of Communism in Vietnam, Sihanouk identified the Khmer Left as a more deadly, long-term threat of his regime—and to Cambodia's neutrality—than the bourgeois politicians and bureaucrats. He did not, in response, cultivate a defensive coalition with patriots of the Centre, but gave the Left unintended credibility and prominence by incorporating them temporarily into his government and later by adopting their economic policies (nationalisation of banks and the import-export trade) and renouncing American aid.[4] If ever the Communist movement enjoyed 'objective' advantages in the countryside, one cannot help but wonder how much was due to the effects of the incompetent and corrupt application of these drastic, socialist measures! But in no way was the minute Communist movement ready to seize power by 1970. It was the frustrated bourgeoisie who overthrew Sihanouk, convinced, however unreasonably, by his economic and diplomatic policies that he had it in him to sell out completely to Communism.

From the point of view of the bourgeois elite this coup of 18 March 1970 was perhaps also the fulfilment of the natural process of replacement of absolute monarchy in Southeast Asia by popular—or at any rate bourgeois—power. The monarch had refused to 'constitutionalise' himself and thus had to be deposed, for Sihanouk's abdication in 1955 had not been, in a functional sense, abdication, but simply a transposition of monarchical absolutism into a new medium. The elite took steps also to abolish the

remaining formal aspects of monarchy by declaring a Republic in October 1970 (Queen Kossamak remained in Phnom Penh under house arrest but was allowed to join Sihanouk in Peking in 1974 and died there in 1975). But so far as Sihanouk had indeed continued, until 1970, to exercise many of the traditional attributes of monarchy and had not formally abolished the throne, the usurper regime of Lon Nol started out with substantial disadvantages, even had Sihanouk decided to retire to the South of France as he was expected to do. He did not, but became instead the head of a 'Royal Government of National Union' based in Peking—a variation on the theme of the Communist popular front which was both unprecedented and extraordinary, considering Sihanouk's previous animosity towards the *Khmers Rouges* and his efforts in the later sixties to wipe them out, but is surely explicable, in part, as the action of a truculent absolutist who could devote his life to avenging *lèse-majesté*, whatever the cost.[5]

At all events it was the *Khmers Rouges* who stepped forward from 1970 onwards to organise rural society for total revolution in Sihanouk's name —but backed, especially in the early stages, by Vietnamese guns. The parallel should not be pressed too far (and the sequence is quite different) but were the *Khmers Rouges* not playing a kind of Cambodian Ho Chi Minh to Lon Nol's Ngo Dinh Diem in relation to Bao Dai? The biggest difference between the Cambodian and the Vietnamese case has been that whereas Ho Chi Minh simply obtained Bao Dai's abdication and simultaneous transmission of authority in 1945, the *Khmers Rouges* fought five long years for victory *in Sihanouk's name* and arranged the transmission of authority from a captive but willing Sihanouk as head of the R.G.N.U. only in April 1976, nearly a full year after their victory over the army of the Republic. It may be significant that even then they did not declare themselves to be Communists but postponed this declaration until September 1977—as if some Cambodians (perhaps parts of the soldiery?) were not ready before that to be told that the ideals they had been fighting for, and were now killing fellow Cambodians for, were not those of Sihanouk (the subject population of course realised this well enough). In late September 1978 Sihanouk was 'resurrected' from his house arrest to attend a banquet in Phnom Penh, and on 2 January this year reputedly issued a statement supporting the Cambodian Government's stand in its by now defensive war with Vietnam. But the audience which these moves were designed to impress may have been an international rather than a domestic one, as when, four days later, just before the arrival of the Vietnamese tanks, Sihanouk was dispatched from Phnom Penh to champion his country and the Pol Pot regime at the United Nations: Pol Pot maintained his domestic stand of 'class unity' rather than 'national unity' almost unchanged up to the fall of Phnom Penh, in spite of China's urgent advice.

In return for his release, but consistently with most of his actions since 1970, Sihanouk has defended not only his country's territorial integrity against the Vietnamese invasion but also Pol Pot himself as the 'symbol' of that integrity. And in early February Deng Xiaoping in New York

added a new diplomatic coup to the Security Council's 13-2 condemnation of the invasion[6] by persuading Sihanouk to go back to Peking instead of the South of France (as had been announced) to do what comes naturally to His Highness and is done with obvious relish: act as international spokesman for the Cambodian regime of his choice. Truly, *au Cambodge, plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*!

The international response to Sihanouk *redevivus* has been warm to overflowing, and who could fail to be moved by the reemergence of a diplomatic favourite on the world stage after he was rumoured dead, even without the particular displays of theatrical virtuosity witnessed on 8 January in Peking and subsequently at the UN? He has won much sympathy and credibility by taking his distance from the Pol Pot regime in respect of 'human rights' while doing his 'patriotic duty' in supporting that regime against the Vietnamese. One writer has evoked the memory of Sihanouk's return to Phnom Penh on New Year's Day 1976, after the revolution, characterising it (in a phrase of distinctly Christian imagery) as an 'unconditional gift of his person to his people', as he could have no certainty that the *Khmers Rouges* would spare his life:[7] he becomes, in this view, essentially the Communists' victim, not their sponsor, and shares that fate with the rest of his people. In an interview, Sihanouk himself has maintained his innocence of all responsibility for the victory of the *Khmers Rouges* in the 1970-75 war: it was the fault of Nixon and Kissinger who, by accepting his deposition in 1970 and later refusing to talk to him, prevented him from uniting the people under his leadership for peace (and implicitly *against* the *Khmers Rouges*) before it was too late.[8] The editor of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* has pointed out in a eulogistic commentary on Sihanouk's patriotism that 'even during his exile in Peking he made his personal distate for the "Stalinists" of the Khmer Rouge abundantly clear in private conversation'.[9]

In reality, some of those 'confidences' were made in the course of on-the-record interviews[10] and it is difficult to doubt that their purpose was to make his increasingly independent Communist partners pay more attention and respect to him. He had no serious intention of abandoning their cause. Perhaps also he was signalling to the Americans to take him more seriously, in the interests of a less 'Stalinist' post-war order. Yet as he pointed out at the time, and has reiterated this year, the *Khmers Rouges* were not given to compromise — far less, he could have added, than the Americans and Lon Nol! (Sihanouk was referring specifically to the compromise entailed by the act of negotiating with the Lon Nol government, but the observation would apply with equal force to the Communists' future relationship with Sihanouk and their revolutionary plans for Cambodian society — which incidentally were of earlier date than American bombing and surely not designed as 'retaliation' against it.) The more fundamental weakness in Sihanouk's apologias is their tendency to omit his own intransigent role.[11] Negotiation with Lon Nol was as unacceptable to Sihanouk himself as to the Communists; the compromised bourgeoisie could expect no olive-branch from Sihanouk nor the Americans a face-saving formula. Instead, starting

from his own distinctive premise, the justice of avenging *lèse-majesté* by hanging the 'super-traitors', Sihanouk lent his royal charisma to a cause whose premises were, to him, utterly alien and meaningless: the 'scientific necessity' of the victory of the 'oppressed classes'. But it was an alliance of *mutual* benefit. Early this year his concern for 'human rights' seemed confined to freedom of religion and family life, freedom of movement, freedom from forced labour, the right to public trial. He refused to condemn the Cambodian genocide—though lamenting the disappearance of his own children—and claimed he might be 'too old-fashioned to understand the new type of revolution'.[12] Even now he campaigns against a Vietnamese intervention which—if it was not in fact too late—may be recorded in history as the rescue of the Cambodian people from extinction.

Sihanouk's attractiveness to the Western world lies most conspicuously in his patriotism. Even if Mao's patronage flattered his ego enormously, it had an undeniably patriotic function in offering some guarantee against Vietnamese hegemony, once the die was cast and Cambodia drawn into the war in 1970. Moreover, the *Khmers Rouges* turned out to be as uncompromising towards their Communist Vietnamese allies as towards the Lon Nol government; their 'patriotic' reputation has enhanced Sihanouk's own. His very craving for revenge takes on a patriotic complexion because his personalised regime was so closely identified with 'Cambodia' that he defines the act of usurpation as a blow against the nation with complete sincerity. Indeed the fact that he reconciles patriotism with an improbable alliance with the ultra-Left does not apparently detract from his credibility but redounds to it: his essential 'selflessness' is confirmed because his restoration to the throne is excluded by the ideology of his allies. If we examine our response to Sihanouk at the deepest level we may find that what appeals most of all is his oft-repeated sentiment that it is not for him, a former king, to question or obstruct the march of progress. Deep down in our own, modern political culture there runs a belief that change *Will Be*—and thus is right in any form; that what threatens the present division of wealth cannot legitimately be challenged by those who are in any way advantaged by it, because their advantage disqualifies them from expressing a view. It seems to matter little, at times, that the political order erected in the name of 'progress' and 'the will of the people' may be tyrannical, or insane, or destructive of basic human values and of life itself. If the country on the newest frontier of revolution is far away, our lack of qualification to comment is compounded. We ignore the strangled cry and await the reassuring official statement. Some observers even play an 'historic role' by writing 'authoritatively' in defence of the revolution. But presumably their innocence constitutes an excuse of sorts. How shall one judge a man who enters a popular front as its nominal leader, and keeps his compact with the revolution long after its nature was revealed to him? The case of Sihanouk is not an easy one to pass judgement on, or even to understand. In Southeast Asia, *noblesse* 'obliges' in ways known best to itself.

NOTES

1. Norodom Sihanouk, *L'Indochine vue de Pékin. Entretiens avec Jean*

Lacouture, Paris, 1972; p 33. Apart from Sihanouk's attractive and seemingly docile personality, he had the advantage of being descended from King Norodom his great-grandfather (1860-1904) on his father's side and from another great-grandfather, King Norodom's half-brother King Sisowath (1904-1928) on his mother's side. By appointing Norodom's half-brother in 1904 instead of one of his sons the French had launched a potential rival dynasty, whose pretensions were consolidated when Monivong (1928-41) succeeded to his father Sisowath. The Norodom line was favoured in the appointment of Sihanouk (1941-55) but his mother, Princess Kossamak, was the daughter of King Monivong; there was some hope that discord would be brought to an end by a 'unifying' appointment. As it turned out, dynastic tensions were to resurface later in the guise of political faction.

2. The term 'bourgeois' is used in this article as a short-hand for the small educated class of both commoner and aristocratic origin who occupied the bureaucratic and military hierarchies and aspired to political influence and office in post-colonial Cambodia.
3. He did designate a son, in 1963, as his successor as Head of State, but failed to give him appropriate grooming.
4. Pol Pot, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, on the occasion of the proclamation of the Party on 27 September 1977, claimed the renunciation of American aid (November 1963) as a victory for the as yet clandestine Communist movement. But while there was obviously an imitative aspect to the economic policies, the renunciation of American aid looks more like an expression of Sihanouk's own, cherished neutrality principle. The fact that renunciation would *worsen* the payments imbalance which the nationalisation measures were designed to tackle points to the likelihood that its roots were mainly distinct.
5. On the internal and international significance of the popular front in 1975 and the beginnings of class extermination, see the author's 'Cambodian National Union—a milestone in popular front technique', *The World Today*, February 1976. For a selection of balanced commentary and analysis on Cambodia's 'Great Terror' see House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, *Human Rights in Cambodia*, Washington, 1977. The Leninist absolutism of the 'Khmer Rouge' or Khmer Communist movement makes a curious and striking counterpart to the royal absolutism of Sihanouk.
6. . . . the Soviet veto of which added, if anything to the moral victory. Cf 'Echo-slovakia', *The Economist*, 20-26 January 1979, pp 56, 58.
7. Carlos Widmann, 'Der Prinz als Hausierer für sein Volk', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12 January 1979.
8. Interview with William Shawcross, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 February 1979, pp 20-21.
9. Derek Davies, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 January 1979, p 17.
10. Cf T. D. Allman, *The Guardian*, 18 September 1973; Alain Bouc, *Le Monde*, 27 October 1973.
11. See T. D. Allman, *The Guardian*, 24 September 1973 for illustrations of Sihanouk's personal intransigence.
12. *The Daily Telegraph*, 9 January 1979.

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BEYOND THE NETWORKS

by Leigh Jackson

IN 1978 a nude man was standing in his own front room in a suburb of Belfast, playing the saxophone in an effort to try and shut out the pain of Northern Ireland; there was a class of London schoolboys who had frightened their teachers sufficiently to be left alone to their own devices, and a loose collection of people, open to an experience, who were sailing an empty oil tanker towards the Bermuda Triangle in one man's effort to find the anti-christ and a solution to the world's problems. It will come as no surprise to some people that all these images were to be found on the stage of the Royal Court Theatre. Elsewhere, Tom Stoppard had nipped the ear of realism with his last two plays and Harold Pinter had returned from a very long and dry pause to give us information in such quantities as to make the middle-east look barren.

In January 1979 there was a reading of *Such Impossibilities*, a television play by Trevor Griffiths. The reading was held at the Royal Shakespeare's Warehouse Theatre and was one of a series of readings of plays which had never seen the light of day after being commissioned by television companies.

Trevor Griffiths had been commissioned for a series called *The Edwardians*, a collection of vignettes for the period. Griffiths decided to write a play on Tom Mann whom he described as 'the most important and able working-class leader this society has thrown up'. The period was the summer of 1911. London had just experienced a major dock strike with dockers, railwaymen, seamen and firemen joining in to close completely the London docks and eventually to win their case. Mann worked ceaselessly for this dispute and then went north to Liverpool for a strike there. The play recounts how hard won was the final victory, with one terrifying incident when two hundred and fifty police, armed with wooden staves, charged an unarmed crowd estimated at one hundred thousand including many women and children, inflicting injury on hundreds of people. After seventy-two days of the strike and after troops had been called out and a gun-boat despatched to lie anchored off Liverpool, a Board of Trade Inquiry Committee found in favour of the workers. Tom Mann was sent to jail under the charge of trying to cause a mutiny amongst His Majesty's forces.

The play was commissioned in 1971, the year prior to the proposed Industrial Relations Bill, so not only was it interesting from a purely historical viewpoint but, in relation to Unions and their powers, it was of great significance to a contemporary audience. Also, it was an important piece of history which had never been tackled dramatically. The play was never produced, A reading of the script was evidence enough that the writing was quite adequate. Trevor Griffiths has never hidden the fact that he is a socialist writer. It comes as a shock, if you watch much English

television, to see the dangerously biased picture which the majority of television material presents.

The News Documentaries and individual play slots account for only a small percentage of viewing time and they are presented in the same manner as the Sunday 'God Slot'—part of the token commitments which the company have to go through to retain their licence, an interruption to the real entertainment. Ignoring the American imports and looking at the Situation Comedies and home-grown series like *The Edwardians* and the countless *Son Of . . .* which they have spawned, it is appalling to see how reality has to take a back-seat to what will make a programme sell. There is nothing wrong with escaping from the reality of our world at times, but it seems we are storing up trouble for ourselves when we give people regular five hour doses every night. In America the iron rule that nothing must divert the viewer's attention from the adverts has led to an endless diet of regurgitated pap which offends nobody—the viewer is lulled into a semi-conscious state where he is only capable of making the decisions required of him, which new car to buy and what colour toilet paper his home should never be without. British television is not lagging far behind. In this context it is surprising that a few heart attacks weren't reported when Trevor Griffiths' script landed on the desk—'we couldn't possibly have scenes of police charging a crowd and hitting people over the head with wooden stakes, not unless it was abroad.' Television should have a responsibility towards making people aware of the society that they are living in—that they themselves are helping to create—and if things are going wrong with that society it is morally wrong to paper over these cracks merely so that you can sell soap powder to lobotomised housing estates.

Television people would, on the whole, say television works fine. Theatre people, on the whole, say that television is a second-rate medium. When the two meet it is not always an easy birth. 1978 was an annoying year for television as not only were there continued mutterings over the banning of Denis Potter's *Brimstone and Treacle,* but he was joined by Barrie Keefe with *Gotcha*—a young boy frustrated by the way he is lost in a large comprehensive school (the headmaster doesn't even know his name) holds two teachers hostage in a store cupboard by ingeniously holding a lighted cigarette over a petrol tank of a motorbike. It was neither sophisticated nor very clever in its language; it certainly wasn't violent by television standards, nobody got blown up, mutilated or killed; there wasn't even a rape, yet it was banned from having a second viewing through the representations of Mary Whitehouse. *Gotcha* was frank—it called a spade a spade, and it was truthful—in fact Mary Whitehouse might have realised what useful propaganda the play could have been for the Conservative Party. *Gotcha* started off life in the theatre—at the Soho Poly Theatre Club. As well as this play there was *Scum* by Roy Milton, a sort of 'X' rated *Within these walls,* which was 'spotted' just in time and removed lest it offend the viewer . . .

By far the most effective American television in recent years was news

film coming out of Vietnam, where cameramen were at the elbow of the soldiers. The reality of seeing your father, husband or son dying in the corner of your own front room shocked and disturbed audiences. It had nothing to do with that other reality—the presidential speeches selling patriotism, the dividing of the country into Americans or communists. It is not that this example is extreme but rather that television's abdication from responsibility towards the problems that face our society make it seem so. Television takes those problems and makes them into a series, distorting and trivialising them in the process, and because television has chosen this path the role of theatre, as one means whereby people can express their concern without the paranoia of 'ratings', has increased in importance. As one of the characters in Hugh Leonard's play *Da* says, 'From people too ignorant to feel pain may the good Lord deliver us.'

It is somewhat ironic that, having said all this, the first play I went to see after returning from the United States was by a television writer, Brian Clark's *Whose Life is it Anyway* is enjoying success in the West End. It started life as a television play and for me, though not for most of the critics judging from the notices, it lacked a true theatrical force. It was slick, well-written but totally safe when you consider that the centre of the play was whether a man who had been paralysed in a road accident could now, one year later, have the life support machines turned off so that he could die. There is a natural in-built tension (or there should be) to any play in which a man is fighting for the right to die, even if it is only morbid curiosity as to whether or not he succeeds, and one thinks of the theatrical meat Chekov or Shaw would have made of this. But Brian Clark turns the proceedings into a soulless debate with the play making its points for and against and ending up by calling a judge in to make the final decision. This is a pure television rule for approaching dangerous ground but theatre is the opposite. Theatre should be a dangerous experience; all our views should be called into question. We ought not to be sure of the ground on which we stand. The main character, played by Tom Conti's head (a technical feat considering that is all he moved in two hours) is so clever he even catches out the judge by sheer power of argument. From the very beginning Brian Clark had obviously set out to provide no shadow of doubt on the mental state of the patient, so all we are left to admire is the flow of logic coming off the page. Compare this to David Edgar's *Mary Barnes* at the Royal Court Theatre, where the core of the play shows a woman trying to regain her sanity within an experimental commune run by the psychiatrist R. D. Laing in the nineteen sixties as part of the alternative medicine movement. There are occasions during this play when you wonder whether Mary Barnes, played by Patti Love, should not indeed be in a mental hospital, judging by the effect she has on the other people in the house, but what a revelation it is when you see her 'cured' and trying to show others the path to the same recovery. More is said about life by her impatience towards any fear these other people still have, than in all of Brian Clark's arguments.

Harold Pinter, alongside Tom Stoppard, has provided some critics with

their most exciting moment of the year as they point to both writers abandoning their usual esoteric style in favour of something in the way of naturalism. The Stoppard play drew earnest analysis and talk of defection to the left and you were left thinking the occasion could only be rivalled by David Hare and Edward Bond both accepting invitations to the Queen's garden party.

Harold Pinter's *Betrayal* at the National Theatre takes us on a mahogany polished trip through the private lives of his three characters. Bob Dylan frequently justifies his silence over the meaning of his work with the simple argument that he only writes about what is important to him; the fact that other people listen to his work makes no requirement upon him to explain it. In some ways Harold Pinter operates in a similar manner. Because he refuses to supply explanations we are left to manufacture our own. However, in *Betrayal* Pinter has changed tack, and rather like Edward Bond, he covers his ground carefully to ensure that we do not mislead ourselves. There are still the pauses, and underlying the play is the old territory game—who is making incursions upon whom—but in the script itself most things are explained as Pinter takes us backwards over the years of betrayal between a husband, his wife and his friend. In the programme Pinter inserts a line to say how long he has been living with Lady Antonia Fraser. This is tantamount to the Pope revealing that he uses after-shave. Recently, Pinter had a television interview with Melvyn Bragg to discuss his work and perhaps also to put into focus his position as a dramatist. It was not very long ago that Pinter's private life, his divorce and all the other details were being splashed across the pages of the gossip columns . . . with no mention of his work.

Betrayal has three characters. An agent, a publisher and his wife. All three depend in some way upon the fourth, unseen character—O'Casey, the writer. On the surface the play is about how the agent, a friend of the publisher, has an affair with his wife and how the publisher discovers this half-way through the affair but never mentions it to the agent. Allegations, suspicion and discovery are neatly slotted between pauses and glasses of whiskey and trips to Venice. The whole canvas is carefully coated with lacquer and about twenty minutes into the play I had decided that I didn't really care what happened to any of them since they didn't seem to care much themselves. O'Casey, the writer, however, was a different matter. Never appearing, he was the only character who seemed to be going through any sort of crisis. We discover that he had a short artistic life. Success and then within five years all burnt up. So he then proceeds to disrupt his whole life, breaking up the cosy family to go and live in a room alone, where he can write about the pain to which he has just subjected himself. The artist suffers while the smooth coterie who gather round him just go through the motions. I'm not sure what Pinter was trying to say but writers do, sometimes, like O'Casey, take a scalpel to their lives and what you are watching on stage is the result. Rather like the snake who eats itself, the problem is what happens when it reaches the tail. The design was as cold and precise as the play. Perhaps it is just that in the end I don't like

suffering to be served up luke-warm. Robert Wilson, when he brought his show to the Royal Court in the summer of 1978, made four hundred grown-ups sit in silence for five minutes while he reclined, studying his finger-tips, so welcome back Harold Pinter, and you've some way to go yet.

In *Masada* by Edgar White, (Theatre Upstairs at the Royal Court) written and acted by an entirely black acting company of Keskide you have the rather disturbing experience of seeing how black people see white people when given the opportunity to act a white role. The first half of the play where the servant of a rich family is taking the son on a journey from Paris to South Africa, where he is to have an operation for his blindness, is somewhat bewildering and to be honest even two visits didn't make it any clearer to me. I put it down to a gap in my understanding of black culture and was then rather alarmed to hear it being criticised for being too European.

The second half is as if it was a different play; set in Masada, where the first massacre of the Jews took place, and now a township in South Africa —not entirely remote from Capetown—where the people are waiting for the crucifixion of Christ. The whole play suffers, like a lot of American drama, from being top heavy with symbolism but what makes *Masada* so worthwhile is the air of naturalism which gradually seeps through until suddenly you find yourself watching what life must be like for the majority of the population in that country.

We are in the backyard of Babaleke's shebeen. Babaleke is an Asian who is allowed by the government to sell liquor to the blacks. There is a Leper, Mantiss (David Haynes), and a half-caste girl whose father is the Judge in the trial of Christ and who finds herself trapped between being neither black nor white. There is a black man who has not got the money to bury his wife and there is Sophie, an excellent performance by Millie Kiarie, of a girl whose only future is to find somebody to buy her a drink. It is difficult to say what exactly the ten scenes from the second half are about but somehow, from the scattered pieces, you do gain a picture. Babaleke, because the government grant him a licence and could take it away at a moment's notice, enforces their drink laws more ferociously than they do themselves, until Sophie turns on him saying 'You don't own anything, you are just a government servant'; yet Babaleke believes he is better off than the Bantu. There is also a white liberal-minded woman who wants to set fire to herself outside a police station as a protest against the regime and cannot understand why the blacks are not interested in her gesture, and an Africaaner policeman whom Sophie sums up with the words 'Those who read become the government, those who cannot become the police'. It is a lesson on the old maxim of 'divide and rule'.

It is left to Mantiss, the Leper, to sum up. Commenting on Christ's entrance into the city he advises; 'Enter the city low, not as a hunter but as a mongoose. Come on them like a mongoose.' And we all know our Rudyard Kipling and what the mongoose can do to the snake! This is not a sophisticated play. In places it is badly written and badly acted but there is an honesty and a truth to it which puts many much glossier, but totally

meaningless, shows to shame. This is the sort of theatre to which the Royal Court should be giving its support.

The National Theatre has profferred its support to Edward Bond by staging his epic *The Woman*. Bond started the year with *The Bundle* staged by the Royal Shakespeare Company. Both plays were rich and dense although you were left feeling after *The Bundle* that you had not seen a play but rather been given a cogent lecture on how oppression and the ownership of the means of production work in tandem. In *The Woman* Bond takes the Trojan Wars and fashions a play of truly epic proportions. Yet here we are shown clearly why both sides are fighting. There is never the easy division into the good and the bad which the generals would like us to believe and religion is shown in all its hypocrisy. Through both plays there seems to be the same message—that it is the innocent who suffer but also it is the innocent who cause so much suffering by allowing themselves to be so innocent. I think Bond would say that we have not yet earned the right to be innocent. Hecuba, widow of Troy, challenges the Greeks just before they entomb her in the walls of her city, 'You have caused so much murder, you must know the answer, you must be sure. You must know what justice is.' Of course, they cannot answer. Is it a coincidence that the two plays of merit recently presented at the National Theatre, *Plenty* and *The Woman*, were both directed by their authors? Could this be the beginning of a new 'closed shop'?

[Leigh Jackson is resident writer at the Royal Court Theatre who staged his play *Eclipse* in the summer of 1978. He also receives financial support from Thames Television].

The May issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Ghana: From Protest to Participation* by David Brown, *Three Kings of Orient: (2) A Little Question of Dynastic Survival: King Bhumiphol Adulyadej (Rama IX) of Thailand* by Roger Kershaw, *E. M. Forster's Commonplace Book* by Elizabeth Heine and *Devolution: The Prospect for Scotland* by Tam Dalyell, M.P.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

A Room with a View. E. M. Forster. Edward Arnold. £6.50. *Howards End*. E. M. Forster. Edward Arnold. £6.50. *A Passage to India*. E. M. Forster. Edward Arnold. £7.95. *The Manuscripts of the Passage to India*. £37.50. All edited by Oliver Stallybrass. *Familiar Passions*. Nina Bawden. Macmillan. £4.50. *Miss Stippelkin*. Eva Jones. Bachman & Turner. £4.50. *Hasen*. Reuben Bercovitch. Sidgwick & Jackson. £4.95.

There is an enormous advantage in re-reading the novels of E. M. Forster in a consecutive run. When they were first published, there were uneven gaps between them; four between 1905 and 1910 and then a hiatus until *A Passage to India* in 1924. The short stories, with a few exceptions, did not appear until 1974 when fourteen were issued under the title *The Life to Come and other Stories* (reviewed in *Contemporary Review* No. 1284 Volume 222) to reveal some of the most interesting aspects of Forster's work. The homosexual novel, *Maurice,* was published for the first time only quite recently and although not greeted with high praise it is an essential ingredient of the overall study. The early novels seem curiously uneven in qualty, although quite favourably received at the time. It was as though critics and public held their breath in anticipation of *A Passage to India,* one of the most exacting and memorable novels of our time.

Since the publication in 1908 of *A Room with a View,* World War I had all but swamped England with an avalanche of change, leaving in its wake much need for reassessment in the creative mind, E. M. Forster's in particular. This could be why he ceased writing fiction at the peak of a major triumph, finding the need to make 'moral judgments' a challenge he did not wish to accept. Letters and diary entries reveal him as constantly in doubt as to his own performance; nor did he worry overmuch about his personal image, as anyone will testify who recalls the dishevelled figure scurrying along the Surrey lanes. Yet his was a sharply variable disposition, as was revealed in Paul Vaughan's BBC Radio 4's centenary programme, *Aspects of a Novelist,* to an extent which is only now being fully appreciated.

But to return to the first of the novels listed above, *A Room with a View,* which has been described as 'two books' and may have caused E. M. Forster more anguished heart-searching than anything else he wrote. Either half of this curiously constructed story, which divides its action between Florence and Surrey, could have been satisfactory as a long novella. As it is, a combination of the two results in a novel sadly lacking balance. Early twentieth-century Florence, beloved hunting ground of the British tourist, is a vanished world now, but one E. M. Forster knew and understood. Pension-based, he had experienced at first hand the insensitive onslaught made upon a civilised community by men and women who embarked upon the 'art tour' purely for what they themselves could get out of it.

'"This meat has surely been used for soup", said Miss Bartlett, laying down her fork.' This gem of reportage sets the tone for young Lucy Honeychurch's trip to the fount of culture. Her own innocent foibles and emotional

entanglements are all that are required or offered for narrative and situation. The end of Part I finds Lucy and her chaperone, Miss Bartlett, departing for Rome having endured all they can stomach of the companionship of their fellow guests.

Continuing Lucy's story in her native Surrey is the kind of bold, unpredictable stroke which characterises much of Forster's later fiction. In this case, unfortunately, it fails to weld the story together. Lucy is by this time engaged to pompous, uncongenial Cecil, surrounded by straight-laced relatives and friends. These kindle a certain degree of interest while acting out a ritual of social etiquette and hagiarchy, while the pre-1914 Surrey landscape is fascinating to explore. Yet none of it comes anywhere near to matching the Florence section, and even Lacy's turn-about in jilting Cecil for an equally synthetic young man fails to save Part II from exploding like a very damp squib.

What a shock it must have been for novel readers of the period when, only two years later, in 1910, *Howards End* burst upon the literary scene to a sustained paean of praise. The source of the novel's inspiration is particularly interesting. A house called Rooksnest, a few miles north of London was visited by Forster as a boy and described by him at the time in a very capable short essay. Buried in his sub-conscious must have lain the knowledge that this house was once known as 'Howards'; an item of information which, when he remembered it years later, must have come as a distinct surprise.

Whereas in *A Room with a View* social attitudes provide a mainly comic basis, in *Howards End* they receive serious consideration. Once again, the plot is ostensibly simple. Two wealthy orphan sisters, Margaret and Helen Schlegel, come fortuitously into contact with the Wilcox family of Howards End, at a time when Helen imagines herself to be in love with the younger Wilcox son. The affair quickly subsides yet is destined to leave a permanent mark on all concerned. Nothing is forseeable in the unfolding of apparently straightforward family saga. The sisters are products of a privileged and protected childhood yet they do not run true to form and are not at all the same. Mrs. Wilcox, an amiable non-person, is required only to die so that Margaret and Mr. Wilcox can marry. As a sub-character, poverty stricken Leonard Bast serves his creator's purpose by seducing Helen and getting her with child. It is in the handling of this situation that E. M. Forster's limitations are most sharply revealed. The flouting of moral convention is greeted with almost comic protestations from and against the transgressors. Untenable positions are taken up and held on to; although whether this is due to E. M. Foster's own inability to comprehend the implications or to the prevailing attitude of the period is not easy to decide. At any rate, the handling of Helen's predicament is a sad let-down at the end of one of the most thought-provoking novels in our literature. Yet, taking the overall view, perhaps it does not matter too much when set against Forster's dexterity in keeping some outwardly very unpromising characters revolving on a kind of fictional roundabout.

It must have seemed a tantalisingly long interval between the publication of *Howards End* and *A Passage to India*. To-day, the novel strikes the contemporary reader as being virtually without a flaw. Time and again Forster's talent for building up tension through alternating rhythms is apparent, as is his predilection for unrelated incidents which interlock with the precision of a child's constructional top. As in *Howards End*, in *A Passage to India* he focuses the interest on two very dissimilar women; although Adela Quested and Mrs

Moore are more subtle creations than the Schlegel sisters. If it is true that Forster wrote predominantly about women to mask his own homosexuality the deception was never apparent and has only recently been revealed to us. The sources of his information remain a mystery.

Adela Quested has arrived in India to become engaged to Ronny Moore, accompanied by her future mother-in-law, Mrs. Moore. Ronny is a highly respected local administrator, totally committed to his responsibilities. Adela is well aware that once married to him she would be deprived of almost everything she values in the English way of life, and so hesitates to sanction a formal announcement. Meanwhile, Mrs. Moore pursues her own policy for integration between the races by befriending an Indian doctor named Aziz. He repays her interest with a fervent devotion which arouses immediate misgivings in the minds of the Anglo-Indian community; and with good reason. No doubt that Aziz overreaches himself in an attempt to provide hospitality for the Western visitors. This takes the form of an exhausting all day excursion to the mysterious Marabar caves. Whether Aziz actually 'assaulted' Adela in the noisome cavern remains one of the great enigmas in modern fiction, for the circumstances are never actually described. What matters is that the resulting court trial provides a platform for the most significant of all E. M. Forster's 'moral' pronouncements. At the eleventh hour, Adela Quested's innate honesty compels her to withdraw the charge against Aziz. The ensuing scenes of disorder and revolt can have only one outcome. Ronny breaks off the engagement.

People knowledgable about the British presence in India have complained over the years about a hazy, even inaccurate picture gleaned by E. M. Forster on two fairly brief visits; yet he always insisted that *A Passage to India* was not a 'political' novel. The small garrison town of Chandrapore, a hot-bed of snobbery and social aspiration, is not so different in essentials from one we might discover in Britain to-day. Over and over again, in presenting it E. M. Forster's dexterity delights and surprises.

For the serious study of *A Passage to India* the *Manuscripts* are an essential aid. Here, the late Oliver Stallybrass achieved a degree of scholarship even more impressive than in his illuminating and informative Prefaces. The Abinger edition of the works of E. M. Forster will shortly be complete and the only chagrin is that he did not live to see publication of the final volumes.

It is not easy to transfer from the remote world of the early 20th century the present turbulent times. Nina Bawden is one of the best of the modern novelists and usually shares E. M. Forster's shrewd observation of character. So it is disappointing to find her new novel, *Familiar Passions*, rather less incisive than usual. The opening is interesting enough — a middle-aged businessman announcing to his young wife, Bridie, that he is going to leave her. Without waiting for an alimony settlement she quits his house and returns to her adoptive parents, Muff and Dada. Bridie is warm-hearted and lovable, though singularly lacking in intellectual acumen. Apart from a liking for marriage and domesticity she makes few demands upon her fellow humans and has little to offer them in return. In her new, disturbed emotional condition she becomes obsessed by a determination to seek out her 'real' parents. Muff and Dada place no obstacles in her way, and the scene in which she gate-crashes into the home of the cigar-smoking harridan who gave birth to her is quite one of the most effective in the novel. For the rest, events run along a little too smoothly. Attempts to build up a life for herself, while keeping in touch

with the step-children and her own daughter, are only moderately satisfactory. Soon, a new romance looms on the horizon for Bridie in the person of honest, presentable Philip; encountered and re-encountered by pure coincidence—a circumstance not unusual in real life but invariably suspect in fiction. Philip remains a shadowy figure, whose purpose is to provide a happy ending along with some stability for Bridie and hope in the future.

Miss Stippelkin, by Eva Jones, is a far more down-to-earth affair and goes far to fulfill the promise of her brilliantly successful *Thirteen.* Gret Stippelkin is described as a physical freak—although her deformities are never actually itemised. Courageously, she decides to make some impact on a community bent upon rejecting her. Established as a teacher, she soon gains mastery over an unruly class. But she is out to win a bigger prize—a handsome husband. This she achieves by ensnaring Tonio, a failed novelist on the verge of hypochondria. He becomes totally dependent on the grotesque Gret, bearing her no ill-will even when she annexes his profession and writes a best seller. Gret and Tonio even produce a baby daughter, physically perfect and bearing no sign of Gret's abnormalities. Not surprisingly, problems proliferate but all are capable of solution in this briskly-reported fable of mind over matter. Only the end disappoints, when Gret purges her basic egotism by rescuing a party of school children trapped in a water logged bus, injuring herself, though not too seriously, in the process.

No such palliatives are available in *Hasen,* Reuben Bercovitch's poignant story of two small boys eking out existence on the periphery of a German concentration camp during World War II. After decades of emphasis on the plight of the inmates in these horror institutions, *Hasen* comes as a sad intimation that not only prisoners suffered from the system. As Reuben Bercovitch reminds us, children invariably attempt to create an acceptable universe for themselves, even in a hostile environment. This concentrated study of warped youth is very satisfyingly presented in the form of a long novella.

ALSO RECEIVED:

Herr Nightingale and the Satin Woman. William Kotzwinkle. (Illustrated by Joe Servello). Hutchinson. £4.95. Surely one of the strangest publications of the present season, *Herr Nightingale and the Satin Woman* resembles a surrealist 'coffee-table' book rather than anything approaching a coherent novel. All the same, the grotesque characters, drifting from one dream state to another exercise a curious compulsion. This is largely due to the illustrations by Joe Servello, which occupy considerably more space than the text. William Kotzwinkle is the author of seven other books, having such provocative titles as *Dr Rat* and *Elephant Bangs Train.*

Our Mutual Friend. Frederick Busch. Harvester Press. £4.95. It was an original and rewarding idea to present Charles Dickens in his later years through the eyes of loyal companion and factotum, George Dolby, as he remembers his idol, 'warts and all', many years after Dickens' death in 1870. Frederick Busch attacks his subject with energy, even exuberance, ranging from the sordid side-issues of the novelist's declining health to the spectacular success of the famous 'readings'. The picture which emerges is not an attractive one yet it strikes nearer to truth than the usual romanticised version.

A Different World. Zulfikar Ghose. Macmillan. £5.95. Although *A Different World* is the third of a trilogy about the turbulent sixties in Brazil, it can be read satisfactorily on its own. Gregorio, one of three brothers, is obliged to work out his own salvation on a political quicksand. The pointless confusion over minor and major issues is far from encouraging. What raises the novel to epic proportions is Zulfikar's swiftly moving narrative and power of scenic description.

The Collector. John Fowles. Jonathan Cape. £4.95. Admirers of John Fowles' recently published *Daniel Martin* will welcome the re-issue of one of the best of his early novels. This publication completes the uniform presentation of John Fowles' fiction.

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

THE TORY PARTY FROM BALFOUR TO BALDWIN

The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902-1940. John Ramsden. Longman's. £13.

This is the second volume to appear, and the third in chronological sequence, in Longman's four-volume series *The History of the Conservative Party*. The strength of the series thus far rests in the degree of detailed research done, drawing notably on private papers and University dissertations, in the vividness of the portraits sketched of the key figures and, notably, in the analysis of Conservative Central Office and its relations with the House across the street. We are being given here for the first time an awareness of the strength and power of Tory party organisation—and its fund-raising, the importance of the role of the agents—and their awareness of that importance, and the significance of the relationships between Party Leader and Party Chairman. In the past, as today, the relationship of volunteer to professional, of gentleman (or is it gentleperson?) versus player, is central in the Tory party structure, at both local and national levels. It is a story rich in tension, stimulus—and recurrent threats of resignation.

Dr Ramsden is right to salute Bonar Law and Baldwin as the two 'heroes' of his forty-year story. Yet neither could have been predicted to emerge as a Tory party leader. Law was in 1911 a compromise choice between Austen Chamberlain and Walter Long—the contrasting worlds of Birmingham and Wiltshire—and in manner and accent unschooled in party elegance; his roughness in debate—product of Glasgow and Canada—was itself a positive merit against the tiredness of Balfour and the sophistication of Asquith. As Lloyd George put it, 'the fools have stumbled on the right man by accident.' Baldwin too came late to politics, and by a very curious and hesitant road to the leadership. What they both had was great skill in knowing the limits of the possible, absorption in the business and mood of the House of Commons (contrast Baldwin and Macdonald here) and—not least—total party loyalty. Loyalty is a recurring and warming theme in the book.

And yet? There is still another theme. Total loyalty is not always necesary. Neville Chamberlain, Baldwin's heir-apparent for 7 years before succeeding him, and the ablest man by far in the shaping and execution of Tory social policy in the 1920's and 1930's, was not a Conservative at all. He had been a Liberal and then a Liberal Unionist, and as the candidate selected and backed by the Birmingham Unionist Association he was never elected to Parliament as a Conservative. He was by nature a planner, close to Fabian socialism in his thinking, and he took to National Government more readily than to partisan-

ship. Churchill, called to power in the crisis of 1940, was clearly more a nationalist than a party regular; indeed he had twice been an apostate. And Macmillan (though then not seen even as potential leader) was on the left of the party, and allowed by his Stockton constituency to play any part he cared and accorded a remarkable degree of trust.

In the 'type' they call to the top, and in the road they follow to reach it, the party of the House of Cecil has become remarkably 'comprehensive'. In all of the leaders, however, is it cynical to detect a recurring pattern of loyal declarations and strong patriotism behind which hides, on social issues, a left-of-centre emphasis? It is helpful if the leaders are, like Baldwin and Macmillan, natural orators and natural actors. But class, the graces, even accent, matter little. The party of Salisbury is the party of Disraeli too, so there is ample room amongst its leaders for Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher.

Dr Ramsden explores some interesting topics. He is skilful in suggesting the tortuous path Baldwin followed on the free-trade issue in the late 1920's and has much that is fresh to say here. He draws on the valuable research of J. M. McEwen to provide a revealing contrast between Conservative MPs in 1914 and 1939, noting the shift from an old land-based ruling class to a wider ruling elite more dependent on commerce and industry. But, as he says, 'There were no more working men on the Conservative benches in the Commons in 1939 than there had been in 1914 and there was no likelihood that there would be in the near future' (p 361). Yet this change was, considering the social transformation of Britain, probably slighter than Dr Ramsden suggests; and a more detailed analysis of Scottish Unionism might have suggested to him that there at least the Tories still dearly love a lord.

There is another conclusion to be drawn from this fascinating and splendidly marshalled study. That is the transitoriness of success, or—another way of putting it—the ruthlessness of Conservatives with failure. Through this century, the party has had 10 Leaders, whether they 'emerged' or were elected. Of these, 5 were overthrown by a party revolt: Balfour, Chamberlain, Eden, Home and Heath; Baldwin himself, the hero of 1922 and 1924, was being savaged in 1926, and came close to resignation in 1931 just before the Depression and the economic crisis came along to transform the scene. Bonar Law's resignation was made because of his imminent death. The party has been equally savage with heirs-apparent: those like Chamberlain and Eden who had too long to wait did not 'reign' long. In all its loyalty it really likes a change pretty often. By contrast it is the Labour Party that is loyal to its leaders (Macdonald excepted)—perhaps because of a basic conservatism of attitude and structure. Tories are loyal to Throne and Altar, to Nation and to Party; but they are loyal also to success, and short on compassion. But then politics is about power and nothing else, is it not? Maybe it is not just a story of loyalty but of ruthlessness, and footnotes are places for the also-rans.

ESMOND WRIGHT

REFORM OF THE ENGLISH BAR

The Bar on Trial. Quartet Books. £4.95. Paperback £1.95. Edited by Robert Hazell.

This is a useful if highly controversial study of the English Bar, contributed by eight members most of whom have been barristers for about five years. Two have left practice, including the Editor, Robert Hazell, and William Rees, but not for reasons of disenchantment. This is unashamedly a volume of

criticism. The Editor claims that the book 'is the first systematic study criticising the Bar, written by members of the Bar. Its purpose is to try to change the Bar, to make it more useful to society, and to make it more satisfying for Barristers to work in.' It is fair to say that the contributors have done a great deal of work on facts and figures about the profession.

There are the old arguments about the privileges of the Bar in relation to the other and much larger branch of the profession, Solicitors, and the need for fusion. There is no doubt that a unified profession with specialist divisions of work within it can be successful. The American Bar Association is a good example. On the other hand in England there is no strong demand for fusion by Solicitors themselves; and privileges given to the Bar in relation to rights of advocacy in the higher courts and appointments to the High Court Bench stem basically from nature of their specialist functions and thereby particular aptitudes for judicial work. Furthermore the contributors to this book do not sufficently appear to appreciate that the Solicitors branch of the legal profession is concerned primarily with the business and non-litigious side of legal practice, and that their members joined it for engaging in that class of work. If they wish to transfer to the Bar, it is now quite simple. The converse equally applies.

In a contribution on the four Inns of Court, Nicholas Warren wants a democratic system in place of the existing control within the Inns themselves, with elections by barristers of the ruling Benchers and the elimination of judges on those bodies. There is no real demand within the profession for such changes. In addition judges, from their long experience at the Bar, are fully conversant with and sympathetic to the problems of the profession within the Inns themselves. Shortage of accommodation in London especially is well known and it must be fully accepted that young barristers find difficulty often in finding a permanent 'seat'. This shortage arises from the enormous increase in work, particularly in criminal courts during recent years and the consequent very high rate of entry into the profession. The amount of work would now seem to be levelling out, with the prospect of the profession becoming overcrowded. A very considerable factor contributing to the difficulty in finding room for work is not failure by the Inns to provide accommodation, but in persuading senior barristers and clerks to set up new 'Chambers' in accommodation made available. This is not really appreciated in this study. In this context one difficulty is to persuade barristers' clerks to move to new and smaller 'Chambers' where their percentage earnings would be greatly reduced.

One of the most effective arguments in this study is that clerks should be paid by salary. There is no doubt that they have an enormous influence in the early years of a barrister's career in making or breaking him, according to their own judgment of his abilities and their close relation with the solicitors giving the briefs.

There is a highly critical contribution by Helena Kennedy on the difficulties for women at the Bar. There is, admittedly still some prejudice against them both by members of the Bar and clerks in relation to their aptitude in the profession. This is now subsiding and there are some very successful practitioners. She also criticises the few judicial appointments among women. Here the test to be applied must be in relation to quality and not to quantity of practitioners suitable for the Bench. There is no reason to doubt that this is done.

This volume contains many other root and branch proposals, including statutory controls in the running of the profession and salaries for members of the criminal Bar 'who would have the security of a steady income, and of a pension on retirement'. There is also the controversial, but more powerful, argument in favour of partnerships between barristers. While there is a strong case for changes in particular instances, this overall attack upon the running of the profession is not convincing. After all the contributors themselves would agree that barristers provide a dedicated, highly skilled and independent service of integrity to the community.

A. G. DE MONTMORENCY

THE THREE SITWELLS

Façades: Edith, Osbert and Sacheverell Sitwell. John Pearson. Macmillan. £9.95.

Edith, Osbert and Sacheverell Sitwell *lived* a Gothic novel. If they hadn't existed, Iris Murdoch would surely have invented them. All three stepped forth towards the end of the last century like rich figures from a tapestry hanging in the bleak northern hall of Renishaw, their ancestral home in Derbyshire. They came from splendidly ancient stock—though not quite so splendid as they liked to trumpet it. For, sober truth to tell, despite the admixture of noble marriage blood, the brass-tacks fact is that the family wealth derived from nail-making, and their machicolated pile stood within furnace-flare of the Sheffield steelworks. But the great merit of the Sitwell siblings is that they transcended the artistic disadvantages of their 'aristocratic' birth and dynastic destiny, to become working *littérateurs,* who wore their poetic intentions more proudly than their armorial tunics. Their parents, the eccentric Sir George and Lady Ida Sitwell, albeit unintentionally, provided their children with the motivation to escape. Mr. Pearson describes in painful detail the *via dolorosa* they trod from the nursery. It is a saga of a sort of pilgrims' progress from the Land of Philistia to the arcane free-state Province of Art. In order to accomplish their journey they found themselves obliged to erect façades.

Mr. Pearson essays to show us the Edith behind the megaphone, the Osbert behind the bland Hanoverian mask and the pseudo-candour of his *Left Hand, Right Hand!* pentateuch. The façades crumble. Only Sacheverell, sole survivor of the rebel trio, remains intact and inscrutable. He has a very small speaking part.

The book makes no pretensions to literary critical judgment, although it is plain to see that Mr. Pearson considers, and quite rightly in my view, that Sacheverell is the most important of the three. There is, however, no attempt to 'place'—or plant—the Sitwells in the field of English literature. Nevertheless, Mr. Pearson's commentary succeeds in illuminating their works by the light which he throws on the psychological background of their composition. In the process, interesting facets of contemporary figures who crossed the Sitwellian trajectory are highlighted. We see T. S. Eliot coping valiantly with his insanely difficult first wife; Aldous Huxley infuriating Osbert by his alleged plagiarism; D. H. Lawrence writing Osbert into *Lady Chatterley*; Noël Coward lampooning Edith. There is much comic tragedy and tragic comedy, but both are related by Mr. Pearson with tactful sympathy. There are no *lapsus gustae*. This is the more remarkable because there is no reticence in the author's treatment of his subjects' behavioural vagaries. Osbert is exposed in all his snobbish intolerance, and the fact that he was a lifelong homosexual is neither glossed nor gloated over. Edith, while absolved from the frequently whispered insinuation of lesbianism, is clearly limned as the undeniably difficult and conceitedly prickly

person that she was, although her essential goodness of heart—to which I can personally testify, for she was extremely kind to me during a long-ago illness—is emphasised.

With wealth of anecdote, verging at times, indeed, upon gossip, Mr. Pearson rehearses the splendours and miseries of the remarkable triad's rise from cultural obscurity to their emergence in the nineteen-twenties as the 'alternative Bloomsbury', followed by a twenty-year eclipse, before a final extraordinary renaissance in the nineteen-fifties. Sadly, the story of their lives thereafter declines into unmitigated tragedy. Edith died in 1964, harassed by delusions of inescapable persecution by the Inland Revenue, and allaying her fears that, like her mother before her, she would end up in prison for debt, by remedial resource to drink. Osbert, stricken with Parkinson's disease, immured himself in his haunted Italian castle of Montegufoni, and made a will so mischievous in its provisions—or lack of provisions—that it was to drive a final wedge of alienation between himself and the surviving member of the once so-close triumvirate. Sacheverell remains—but mortally wounded, robbed even of kindly memory. Mr. Pearson has produced a powerful, well-written and rewarding study of the burgeoning and wilting of three scarlet trees.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

A STUDY OF CHARLES DODGSON

Lewis Carroll A Biography. Anne Clark. J. M. Dent. £6.95.

The Victorian vicarage, the cradle of so much of our best nineteenth-century thought and literature, continues to flower and expand in the searching light of our nostalgic, exploratory resurrection. Those dynastic, crinolined figures—peopling every cell of the humming house behind them, and posed on croquet lawns in a long photographic moment—revive in puppet-jerks at each fresh attempt to recapture the lost existence of those who were only, after all, for many of us, our own great grand-parents.

That guarded castle of respectability may conceal a family secret or scandal, which, as often as not, directly attaches to the particular wayward genius spawned therein. In the case of Lewis Carroll, Anne Clark has ably elaborated the paradox that the absence of morbidity in the vicarage at Daresbury, the sheer, loving piety and eschewing of prideful activity of the none-the-less gifted paternal figure, the Reverend Charles Dodgson, may have contributed to the lifelong lack of assertiveness and rigidity, and consequently the curious divagations of the author of *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*.

This well-written and thoroughly researched biography, however, must not be taken to be excessively or indeed predominantly interpretative. Anne Clark is a member of the Committee of the Lewis Carroll Society, and its erstwhile secretary, and her book stands upon its accuracy: it will be referred to for its framework of facts by, no doubt, the writers of still more exegeses as yet unconceived. She makes full and excellent use of new material relating to the family history, childhood, and Dodgson's academic career at Christ Church, Oxford, and she explores in interesting detail his connection with the Pre-Raphaelites, and with the Royal Family, especially with Queen Victoria's youngest son, Prince Leopold, who, it seems, was for a time in love with Alice Liddell—the original 'Alice'.

As is to be expected of her, Anne Clark is strong on the complicated history of the various editions of the *Alice* books, brought about by Dodgson's pursuit of perfection, and also on the particularisation of his pamphlets and squibs, booklets and papers, on mathematics, logic, university politics, lawn

tennis and other grasshopper subjects. She makes previous, perhaps more scintillating studies, appear frankly inaccurate, and she steers away from the psycho-analytical approach which has added so much fun to the *Alice* culture. She preserves a very low profile on our crude, latter-day revelation that Dodgson's preference for the company of girl-children concealed glutinous depths: so low, indeed, that unless one were forearmed with this wretched piece of knowledge, one would choke with surprise when she smoothly inserts into her narrative the memorable sentence, 'Dodgson had long earnestly wished to photograph children in the nude, but it was not easy to arrange.'

On all the arguable areas of Carrollian lore, Anne Clark can be relied upon to have a sensible and well-supported opinion. These are such matters as the reasons for his failure to take Holy Orders, the reasons for the glaciation of his friendship with Tennyson, and with Dean Liddell; the extend to which he hoped to marry the adult Alice, and the effect upon him of her supposed rejection; the reality of the claim that his duties as Curator of the Common Room inhibited his literary output; and finally such weighty matters as the inspirational contribution to *Alice* of the pleasant town of Llandudno, where the Liddells took their holidays, and where, indeed, there was a proliferation of rabbits.

MOLLY TIBBS

THE DUNKIRK ENIGMA

Dunkirk—A Miracle of Deliverance. Frederick Grossmith. Bachman & Turner. £5.50. Limp cover £1.95.

What made the Germans decide to hold back the final assault on Dunkirk in the crucial days of May, 1940, thereby enabling 335,000 men to be ferried home from the beaches in every kind of craft, even yachts and barges? The Channel was millpond calm, though a storm had raged inland a short time before.

The Rev. F. Grossmith, Evangelical Minister in Grimsby, Chaplain to his branch of the Dunkirk Veterans' Association, examines the views of historians who have argued: Hitler wished to spare the B.E.F. the humiliation of defeat and surrender as a step towards making an honourable settlement with the British which, in *Mein Kampf*, he highly esteemed. He saw the need to halt his tanks at the Canal line because the terrain beyond this point was unfavourable to heavy armour and his tank force was down to half-strength from combat losses and breakdowns and he needed to build it up for the drive through France to Paris. Goering, head of the Luftwaffe, believed his air force could make any attempt at sea-rescue impossible. Field-Marsahl von Runstedt, who favoured a peace settlement with us, convinced Hitler of the danger of French attacks on his widely dispersed forces.

Disposing of these practical theories, the author, as a man of faith, prefers to believe that what Churchill called 'a miracle of deliverance' was a divine response to the royal decision to make the coming Sunday, May 26th, a National Day of Prayer. Had there not been a precedent when Ludendorff pierced our Fifth Army line in July, 1917, a Day of Prayer was fixed for August 4th, and the next day Marshal Foch launched a tank counter-attack that finally turned the tide?

Why should God so favour us against the 'Gott mit uns' Germans? Because Hitler and his Nazis had become anti-God, anti-Christ, and turned to occult beliefs. Count von Schewerin wrote: 'The Fuehrer is to the German people what Christ was to the world of nearly 2,000 years ago—the messenger of the Almighty.'

To underline these conclusions, and the testimony of a *Daily Telegraph* writer that 'the consciousness of miraculous deliverance pervades the camps in which the troops are now housed in England', Mr. Grossmith relates many veterans' firsthand stories of ordeal and heroism in the retreat to the coast and under beach strafing by Stukas. One reads of a naval officer marching through the burning streets playing bagpipes to rally stragglers from cellars, of men lining up lorries to make jetties to facilitate escape to rescue craft, of the humanity of survivors to stricken and wounded. Whatever one's beliefs or lack of them it is inspiriting to have a simply written avowal of faith on an epic theme.

TREVOR ALLEN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Decision Over Schweinfurt (Robert Hale. £6.95). This book is basically the history of the United States 8th Air Force, from its formation in Britain in February, 1942 under Brig.-General Ira C. Eaker until the latter's appointment to the Middle East allied air command at the end of 1943. It is a remarkable story, told by the author, Thomas M. Coffey, with skill and dramatic effect. He has done a great deal of research both among documents and through interviews with many who took part in those events. Until the summer of 1943, the Americans' main effort was to convince the British that daylight precision bombing was practical and worthwhile. 'Bomber' Harris and most of the RAF were against it for a long time. Meanwhile, General Eaker contented himself with minor daylight raids by his growing force of B-17s. The first great test was the raid by 230 Flying Fortresses on the ball-bearing factory at Schweinfurt in the heart of Germany on 17th August, 1943. They had to be without fighter escort after Antwerp, but in bombing terms the raid was a great achievement. On the other hand the cost to the USAF was enormous. Thirty-six planes were destroyed and 122 damaged. This was followed on the 14th October by a second raid on Schweinfurt. Of 291 Flying Fortresses sent on the mission, 231 returned to Britain; and of these 60 were lost and a further 142 damaged. In manpower, there were 600 casualties. A large part of this book is devoted to detailed accounts of these raids, and of the superb courage of the crews. Mr. Coffey has also dealt with the German efforts to destroy the Americans. It is a horrendous account of the battles on both side. Was it all worthwhile? It established the American daylight bombing attacks together with the RAF night raids. On leaving 8th A.F., Churchill told General Eaker: 'Around-the-clock bombing is now achieving the results you predicted.'

The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot: The Economic Works. Volumes IX, X, XI. (The Economist. £45 set of three volumes.) These three volumes, containing mainly miscellaneous material and letters, continue the valuable reissue of the complete works of Walter Bagehot, eventually to comprise twelve volumes. Meticulously and sympathetically edited by Norman St. John-Stevas, author of *Walter Bagehot: A Study of His Life and Work*, the set will cover virtually the entire output of Bagehot's literary, political and economic writings. It could be claimed that Bagehot is among the most prolific and versatile of Victorian essayists. This is not to suggest that any part of his work can be set aside as irrelevant to the present time. In fact, much of his political thinking is particularly appo-

site today, as for instance his essays on 'The English Constitution' and 'A Universal Money.' At the same time, it must be admitted that the present three volumes are of interest mainly to specialists in the subjects covered. For many readers the supreme interest of Bagehot's comment lies in the better known studies of English writers, already available in Volumes I and II of this series, and in the Everyman series for many years. Contemporary readers continue to find Bagehot's analysis of such literary giants as Gibbon and Dickens particularly shrewd and illuminating.

If not so immediately enthralling, the main value of Volumes IX, X and XI is that they provide an opportunity to study Bagehot's letters and bibliographies as well as the political essays in an assembled form: thus helping to fill in the gaps and contributing to a powerful portrait of this extraordinary man who, during his short life (1826-77) covered banking, literary authorship and political commentating—all during a period of momentous change. The books are printed and bound to a very high standard of practical excellence.

Latin Literature (Penguin Books. £1.50). This anthology of translations from Latin prose and verse edited by Dr. Michael Grant was first published in Pelican Books in 1958. It is now reissued with revisions in the Penguin Classics series. The authors range from Plautus to St. Augustine. Many of the prose translations are by the Editor. Cicero, Caesar, Cicero, Livy, Pliny and Tacitus are all represented. There are translations by Robert Graves from Suetonius and Apuleius. Discussing the translation of poetry, the Editor points out that 'the translation of a poem must have the characteristics of a poem. Certainly no ancient poem can be made to live *its own* life again.' Many of the verse translations are from great or distinguished poets. For example in the translations from Virgil, both Dryden and Cecil Day Lewis are included. Sir Philip Sidney, Milton, Dryden, Swift, Addison, Pope, Samuel Johnson and A. E. Housman are among the translators of Horace in this anthology. Other Latin poets represented include Catullus, Ovid, Lucan, Martial and Juvenal. The translations live in their own rights as distinct and separate poetry of great quality. This is a fascinating volume which will be widely appreciated in this new edition.

Xenophon A History of my Times (Penguin Books. £1.95). This translation of Xenophon's *Hellenica* by Rex Warner first appeared in 1966. It is now reprinted, in the Penguin Classics series, with a new Introduction and Notes by George Cawkwell. The period, of course, covers the first four decades of the fourth century BC when the Greek city states, to quote Mr. Cawkwell, 'reached a balance of impotence'. It is a sombre story written by Xenophon in his old age.

The Best of Chums (Cassell. £7.50). In 1892 the boys' magazine *Chums* was published, in competition with the already established *Boy's Own Paper*. After a difficult start, *Chums* became a widely read paper, published weekly, then at one penny. Eventually it died during the Second World War in 1941. Like *B.O.P.*, it appealed to the middle-class schoolboy. It contained plenty of adventure stories, practical tips and, of course, sport. In this large volume, Philip Warner has selected material from *Chums* over the years, together with many of the illustrations. It should prove valuable for the historian of juvenile publications, as well as still providing good reading for boys today.

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MONITORING EAST-WEST TRADE FOR MADRID

by Michael Kaser

MADRID next year will be the *venue* of the second review conference on the Final Act of Helsinki. Those who care to consult the original presented to Parliament in August 1975 (Cmnd. 6198) will find three substantial sets of affirmations about trade between East and West Europe — on the ways to improve the commercial exchanges themselves, on 'industrial cooperation and projects of common interest' and on 'trade and industrial cooperation'. The first 'follow-up' conference took place last year in Belgrade, but was dominated by issues of human rights. The next review ought to examine more deeply the manner in which East-West economic developments have been progressing and the present article seeks to set out some of the matters requiring discussion at Madrid with the member-states of Comecon (the East European body for trade and plan coordination).

The Final Act contained a whole section on the improvement of economic and commercial information, but among the East European signatories only Hungary and Poland have kept their word; others have actually reduced their publication of foreign-trade data. A few examples may suffice. The USSR in its returns for 1976 began by omitting non-ferrous metals, but those for 1977 not only cut out still more (oil and gas imports for example) but literally halved the volume of data by quoting either physical quantities or rouble values, not both, as previously. Inflation on free markets to which Comecon prices adjust on a lagged index, precludes the use of values as a guide to quantities; nor can the sensitive issue of pricing be examined since the dividend of volume by value is an indicator of price. The GDR after Helsinki perversely ceased to publish imports and exports altogether: all its *Yearbook* produces is turnover, i.e. the sum of imports and exports. Clearly its delicate area is the trade balance, which a turnover series completely masks. Romania stopped issuing its annual abstract of trade also in the year of Helsinki: while a modicum appears in a general statistical abstract, it is manifestly incomplete. It even compelled the Comecon Secretariat to omit the line for Romania from the tabulation of members' trade with developing countries and with the West. Bulgaria has not improved its trade coverage and is so slow to publish that current detailed analysis is impossible. Albania was the sole

European non-signatory and has not published any trade returns for the past fifteen years.

Such is the secrecy on visible trade. The official veil over invisibles—shipping, tourism, remittances, insurance and above all debt service—was complete at the time of Helsinki. Since then, the increase in hard-currency indebtedness has led Western bankers to demand more information. Hungary and Poland have so far conceded balance-of-payments data, but for the other countries the observer still has to rely on the borrowers. For two years the OECD has been compiling totals of medium-term Euro-currency credits and bonds from the 'tombstones' appearing in the financial press—those rectangular lists of banks which solemnly declare that, 'all these obligations having been sold, this appears as a matter of record only'. Last year the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in Basle enlarged its circle of reporting banks to render fairly comprehensive its aggregation of short-term indebtedness.

In any event the outside observer can consult Western partner statistics. From these it is clear that the importance of this commerce ranges from high dependence in the case of Finland for both imports and exports and a substantial reliance on the East as a market in the case of Austria, Greece, Iceland and Turkey; of those only Iceland is correspondingly dependent on the East for its imports. The West European countries are fairly homogeneous with regard to trade with the East—they take between 2 and 6½ per cent of their imports from communist sources and, Ireland apart, sell between 2½ and 7½ per cent of their exports. North America sells Eastward 2½ per cent of its exports and takes 1 per cent of its imports. For all, the differential—roughly 1 per cent of total exports—represents the deficit East Europe regularly runs with the West. At that level of trade and of deficits, the East does not *prima facie* bulk large in the trade of the West.

Nor could it be said that Western lending and the East's accumulation of debts are out of proportion to that relatively modest visible trade. The Eurocredits raised by Eastern European borrowers between 1972 and 1977—the peak period of business, for little was borrowed before 1972 and brakes were severely applied last year—constituted only 7 per cent of the Eurocurrency market in those five years and the net loans outstanding in 1977 represented just 5 per cent of that category of business on a world-wide basis. Such lending, moreover, has suited Western bankers in their conditions of considerable liquidity—due both to the petrodollars infused after October 1973 and to the rate of inflation which makes money cheap on a real rate of interest. With funds to invest, willing bankers met willing borrowers, but an issue that should be discussed is whether over-willingness has led to excessive competition to lend.

The object of the borrowers was in principle to buy Western technology—embodied in modern sophisticated plant (often whole factories on a 'turnkey' basis)—to re-equip their antiquated industry. Comecon members had lagged in technology since the War for a whole host of reasons. Their R & D spending has been inefficient, for although in pure science and in selected technologies, such as aerospace, Soviet achievements have been

reasonably in line with those of the West, production research and the diffusion of innovation have been poor (save to some extent in Hungary). The first and fundamental cause of backwardness has been the management system. Only Hungary has dispensed with the 'command economy' inherited from Stalin's politico-economic structure: the bureaucracy in industrial ministries and in factories alike has frustrated economic reform in the USSR just as it defeated Khrushchev's paraphernalia of 'hare-brained' reorganizations in 1964. It could be said that buying Western technology compensates the Eastern economies for their inherent organizational inefficiency. A second reason for relative technological stagnation has been 'socialist integration'—reliance on other members of Comecon for capital goods on a scheme of international specialization within the group. To some extent this was forced on the East by the strategic embargo policed by NATO powers through Cocom (Coordinating Committee) in the days of the Cold War; some quite severe restrictions persist, as IBM and Sperry-Rand have been finding in computer deals with the USSR. But the choice of integration was also deliberate, for Comecon has been seeking a degree of self-sufficiency. The system, of incentives for management and workers, finally favours replication rather than innovation and, all in all, the technology was relatively backward upon which the Comecon division of labour was based.

The planners' idea was to buy technology and repay with the products which would prove to be competitive in the West by combining in production high technology with cheaper labour, skilled and unskilled. Rather than rely solely on marketing their goods in the West, East European state enterprises became active in pursuing industrial cooperation (whereby, say, a component is manufactured in the East for incorporation in a Western final product); and insisted on counter-trade, usually meaning repayment in the production of the equipment imported once it was in action. But the East did not expect—nor did the West—the post-1973 recession: the hopes of massive sales to repay the initial loans have simply not come true and job protection in the West has deterred industrial cooperation at present times of high unemployment.

It was a consequence of imports of capital equipment (plus grain to the USSR) that the share of the West in Comecon trade shot up. Romania made its 'leap to the West' in the wake of its dispute with Comecon in 1962: it refused a place in the 'socialist division of labour' and its continued pro-Chinese stance has kept low its share of trade with Comecon. Poland turned to buying capital equipment in the West ten years later. Gierek came to power in early 1970 on a wave of consumerism, for the riots which overthrew Gomulka were a protest against retail price rises. Polish borrowing from the West in 1972-75, however, was not only to obtain foreign exchange to buy machinery, but also to get investment finance: Poland is the only Communist country where hard-currency loans have been needed to offset a shortage of domestic savings. Hungary, on the other hand, has only recently enlarged its dependence on the West, partly because it has been so successful in raising loans on favourable terms and in

industrial cooperation. These three states in 1977 took between 37 and 43 per cent of their imports from developed capitalist countries, but could sell only around 30 per cent of their exports for convertible currency. Because of its big grain purchases following a poor crop, the USSR then also exhibited one-third import dependence in the West, but so high a share is unlikely to persist. Czechoslovakia and the GDR buy around a quarter of their imports and sell one-fifth of their exports to the West, but their chief export items, engineering goods and consumer manufactures, are heavily bespoke for the USSR (only 15 per cent of Czechoslovak engineering exports, for example, went to the West in 1977).

Despite efforts to cut back on further borrowing—and the progress is not easy to halt because loans mature and servicing the debt is a heavy charge—the visible trade deficit in the first half of last year of the major Western Powers (EEC, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) was $3,250 million, of which just on half was due to the United States. In the latter case the reason was American grain exports to the USSR as a consequence of the latter's bad harvest of 1977; the bumper crop last year will cut Soviet purchases to the minimum set by the current US-Soviet agreement.

Total net bank indebtedness by the East rose by more than one-third in the eighteen months to June 1978. Inflation could not have accounted for more than a ten per cent rise; nor was the rise justified by the real volume of trade, because East-West turnover actually declined in 1977 and though, because the import cuts of that year proved excessive, it rose by some 13 per cent in 1978. It may be hazarded that $19 bn were needed in 1978 to settle the visible deficit of the year, to 'roll over' debt on maturity and to pay interest and amortization.

A quarter of bank debt is Soviet, nearly a third Polish, and the major nexus is U.S. bank lending to the USSR. Export-Import Bank lending is severely restricted under the Stevenson amendment to the Trade Reform Act and credit is thrown onto the shorter term market. It is doubtful whether the restrictions on the Eximbank are still (if ever they were) justifiable: but they have not prevented American lending to the East. In the first half of 1978 (full-year returns are not yet compiled) half the Western export surplus to East Europe was attributable to the United States.

Borrowing is, of course, only a temporary way to cover the deficits. The USSR sells gold: although not all sources agree, a tentative figure for last year is that it sold bullion to a near record total of 430 to 450 tonnes—only in one year (1963) had sales ever been higher. With the gold price through the $250 an ounce 'barrier' in February 1979, the $3 bn. thereby earned almost exactly settled its hard-currency deficit. The Western powers might consider whether they can with equanimity watch gold climb towards $300 an ounce: it is only the USSR and South Africa which benefit.

Counter-trade is the other technique to meet deficits—trying repayment to the initial loan is an ideal scheme for self-liquidating credit. Figures are

hard to come by, but it is likely that the share of East-West trade tied in this way has risen from one-fifth three years ago to one-quarter last year; some estimates put it as high as one-third. The counter-trade deals of the early 'seventies are now bringing their return flow. Italian firms undertook many such arrangements in those years and now have severe difficulty in absorbing chemicals imported from the East. In 1977 West Europe as a whole still had a trade surplus in chemicals of $1.8 bn with East Europe, but by 1985 deals already concluded and the expansion of the Comecon chemicals industry will convert this to a deficit of the same magnitude ($1.7 bn). The ICI deputy chairman, Mr. John Harvey-Jones, in making those estimates remarked last year 'that this is happening on the back of our technology, our preferential credits and our processing skills. Governments which encourage East-West plant deals see the short-term advantage of jobs in the engineering industry but they do not see the long-term transfer of jobs from the chemical sector' (*Financial Times*, 6 November 1978).

The Commission of the European Communities appear to have appreciated the importance of a symmetry of information-provision in East-West relations. Its increase is one of the three areas in which improvement is demanded as part of a formal agreement with Comecon. The forum at Madrid will group as the 'east' those same members of Comecon (since Albania, not having been present at Helsinki will not be invited to the review), but that labelled the 'West' will of course be much wider than the EEC. It seems appropriate therefore for that wider group—broadly the Europe-America nexus within the OECD—to exert its negotiating strength for the satisfaction of legitimate requirements of information. In making such demands, however, the OECD in its role as coordinator of the Western position on development trade and aid to the Third World must be prepared to press the equivalent 'transparency of transaction' upon those over whom its member-states have jurisdiction.

Such a *quid pro quo* in a triangle of Second and Third Worlds impinging upon the OECD nations is evident in any Western demand for registration of industrial cooperation and counter-trade. The role of multinational corporations in promoting or hindering the development process has long been under investigation at OECD, UNCTAD and the United Nations.

The open publication of East-West agreements on long-term deliveries against licences or short-term barter dealings would be perceived in the Third World as further justification for data on host-country terms for intra-corporation technology flow or transfer pricing. By the same token the OECD could properly demand prompter foreign-trade returns from a number of developing countries.

Within the strict context of the Helsinki Final Act, the Madrid conference would echo the priorities of Western industrial thinking (both trade union and management) in seeking a quantification of compensation trade —ranging from straightforward barter to the long-period interdigitation of production and marketing between an Eastern and a Western enterprise. But it is part of a wider Western priority, namely, more knowledge for a

competitive prognosis of demand and supply in the East. Already Western firms are being called in by Eastern administrations to make proposals on major projects before quinquennial plans are finalized; discourse on schemes and requirements before the latter are determined widens the knowledge of options available to the decision-maker and renders the contractor more flexible. Once legislated, Eastern five-year plans could be much more fully published—to Western advantage in assessing markets.

If the environment for 'industrial cooperation and projects of mutual interest' still leaves much to be desired in the provision of information, the Helsinki call for basic documentation on trade and economic performance is as yet unfulfilled. A practical step in Madrid would be to establish a minimum breakdown of the commodity composition of trade. The basis of technical discussion has just been furnished by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in a detailed concordance of the United Nations Standard International Trade Classification and the Comecon Standard Foreign Trade Nomenclature. The ECE's Division for Trade and Technology could be the ideal neutral workplace for a report on the existing situation and for elaborating proposals free of preconceptions. The commodity direction of trade (i.e. showing product sales by individual partner) presents more difficulty since issues of commercial or political secrecy can arise, but the Madrid conference should call for some alleviation of the extreme constraint now imposed by some Eastern countries.

The final issue—documentation on balances of payments and of transnationally-held assets and liabilities—raises more complex problems. At one extreme the West could justifiably seek the alignment of the other Comecon members to balance-of-payments data as published by Hungary and as furnished (though not as yet formally published) by Poland and Romania. At the other extreme the West must recognize the delicacy and the political concerns associated with the publication of reserves. But changes in foreign-denominated reserves are a matter of legitimate Western interest and the BIS and the OECD could be invited by both sides to corroborate their Western compilations from banks and Eurocurrency markets with Eastern counterparts.

At Helsinki only 'Basket One'—of political, strategic and military topics —spoke of 'confidence-building measures'. For 'Basket Two'—the economic issues here concerned—East-West trade, at present under threat, could only benefit from more openness.

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DEVOLUTION: THE PROSPECT FOR SCOTLAND

by Tam Dalyell, M.P.

IT was an extraordinary affair. Quite extraordinary. Nothing quite like it has ever occurred in the British Isles before. And, you may be quite sure that, if most participating politicians get their way, such an episode in our political history will never, never occur again.

Of Wales and its Referendum for a glorified local authority, to be housed in the Coal Exchange in Cardiff, I write not. A non-Welshman can only raise his eyes to Heaven and marvel how it could possibly be that a Labour Home Secretary with deep Welsh roots, a Labour Foreign Secretary with Welsh roots, a Labour Deputy-Prime Minister and Leader of the House of Commons, with his seat in Ebbw Vale, and a Prime Minister who has represented Cardiff for over one third of a century could manage to achieve only 11.9% of the vote in South Glamorgan. A more mind-boggling miscalculation would be difficult to unearth.

But Scotland was different. Indeed, the two propositions before the electorate in Scotland and Wales were as different as chalk from cheese. The Scotland Act involved the creation of a Prime Minister of Scotland, a Cabinet of Ministers responsible to a Scottish Assembly, and all the paraphernalia of a second and rival government to Whitehall—a government which would get on with the government in London about as well as two women trying to work in the same kitchen with a running quarrel about money. That would have been the relationship.

Of the passage of the Scotland Act, 326 hours and 40 minutes of the time of the House of Commons, others have written in the *Contemporary Review*. Sufficient to say that certain Government Ministers thought that, in the light of their experience in the defeat of the Scotland and Wales Bill, 134 hours 5 minutes, they would not get what appeared to be a more and more design-faulted Act through an increasingly sceptical House of Commons, without being able to provide a fall-back position of a Referendum. 'The people will have to decide in the end' was a conscience-settling, comforting thought for MPs who were whipped and loyal to their Party. Equally, the most recalcitrant No's in the Commons clutched eagerly at any straw which might just halt the juggernaut of a Bill going through the House. Although, with hindsight, some of the No's might have preferred to take the risk of defeating the Scotland Bill in the House, it seemed at the time that a Referendum was the only way of having any possible chance of jamming on the brakes.

So it eventually came about that on March 1st 1979, people in Scotland were asked to go to the polling station to put their cross against a Yes or No, as to whether they wished the Scotland Act to be implemented.

Now it is a matter for speculation as to whether for the previous 3 or more years the opinion polls had ever given an accurate reflection of the true state of feeling in Scotland on the delicate issue of Devolution, My

personal impression is that when the Scots were faced by the vague question, 'Do you want more say in your own affairs?' most of us hurried to answer anyone who asked that we were certainly in favour of more say in our own affairs. Equally, when the proposition was put, 'Do you want a specific Act of Parliament which everyone knows is like a House built on Biblical sand and a situation which could almost certainly lead to the break-up of the United Kingdom, and the End of the Union between England and Scotland after 272 years together?' the answer was very different, as it would always have been, if the question were put in that form.

Be that as it may, for 3 years or more, everyone assumed that there would be a Scottish Assembly, and indeed the main reason why the House of Commons assented to the Act at all was the alleged 'overwhelming demand of the Scottish people' for it. Thus it was thought right that George Cunningham, M.P., should get support for the proposition that this overwhelming demand ought at least to be put to the test, in the form of the celebrated 40% clause.

One immediate question is this—How on earth did it come about that the opinion polls, backed by the pundits of politics, went on, and on, and on forecasting a huge Yes majority, and turned out to be so lamentably wrong in relation to the Referendum itself? I put it to readers of the *Contemporary Review* that part of the reason for what may have been a sea-change was the force of the argument used by the No campaigners, which came through as a coherent theme during the campaign, which to the chagrin of the Government Ministers, the No's started away back in December 1978, knowing full well that we had a long way to come from behind in any electoral race.

The starting point of the No argument was that the problems of Scotland were little to do with the churning out of new laws, or the changing of old laws, which would be the business of a legislative Assembly, supposedly unable to do the job of local authorities. The problems of Scotland, the No's claimed, were far more about the shortage of money in general and the shortage of public expenditure in particular. An Assembly without money would be fiscally irresponsible, dependent on a finite block grant, allocated on an annual basis from the United Kingdom Treasury in Great George Street...

'Ah', but it was said by those in favour of Devolution, 'Was it not the No-Men—The Abominable No-Men as we came to be called—in the Parliamentary Labour Party who deprived the Assembly of money raising powers?' The favourite perjorative word was 'emasculated' the Assembly. We had to tell our opponents that it was nothing of the kind. Government Ministers and clever civil servants in four long years had been unable to devise any acceptable form of taxation for part—though only part—of a United Kingdom. In spite of the fact that the Secretary of State for Scotland had made an appeal to economists for ideas for a suitable form of tax-raising power for an Assembly in Edinburgh, no practical scheme had been found. Even Lord Kaldor, who came specially from Cambridge

for the House of Lords Debate on tax-raising powers for the Assembly, had to confess that even he could not identify a particular form of tax.

Since the fact that an Assembly was to have 'no money of its own', it is worth spelling out in detail, as it was spelt out during the Referendum Campaign, the exact nature of the problem. The first suggestion for finance-raising powers occurred in the 1975 White Paper on Devolution. The idea was that an Assembly should be financed through a surcharge on the rates in Scotland. But, of course, hardly was the ink dry, and the document circulated, before there was an outcry from Councillors, right across the political spectrum, from left to right. 'Why should we have the odium of collected money through an already unpopular, regressive form of taxation, when he will have no say in how that cash is spent?' It was a fair question, unanswered because in political terms it was unanswerable.

Soon, another idea was mooted, which seemed to have superficial attractions. There should be a surcharge on company taxation in general, and perhaps on capital gains tax, and corporation tax in particular. Yet, on reflection, it became clear that if such a surcharge were limited to one part of the kingdom, but not another, investment would be deterred from taking place in that part of the kingdom where such a tax operated. The upshot of this proposal would simply have been that the unemployment position North of the Border—Heaven knows, serious, and one of the causes of Nationalist voting in the first place—would have become even more serious.

There were those, however, in favour of devolution who thought that an Assembly without tax-raising powers would inevitably be fiscally irresponsible, and would feel hopelessly frustrated. One of these was the former Prime Minister, Lord Home. He suggested a sales tax in Scotland. And it would have had to be a significant sales tax, and not simply a token tax since Assembly spending, to be meaningful, could not have been insignificant. But the No's were entitled to, and did, ask Lord Home to pause for a moment. How could he really suggest that his neighbours, the shopkeepers of Chirnside and Coldstream, should be subject to a sales tax, and yet the shop keepers of Norham and Berwick, just across the Tweed, would have no such imposition put upon them? Impossible, other than with the erection of the whole paraphernalia of customs and borders controls. The swings and round abouts which people are used to in the United States would simply not apply, if a tax of such a nature were to operate in one part of a small island but not another part. In almost every meeting during the Referendum Campaign, the issue arose of the hypothication, or earmarking, of the oil revenues, or part of the oil revenues, for the use of a Government in Edinburgh.

Now in the heady days of 1974, the relative success of the Scottish National Party in the two elections of that year related more to the slogan, 'It's Scotland's Oil' than to any notion of a Government in Edinburgh. Five years later, people in Scotland have become far more sceptical as to whether a Scottish Economy could be financed out of oil, like some North

European Kuwait. Furthermore, in the Referendum, it was made crystal clear that if 'it was Scotland's oil', then tit-for-tat would come into the equation, and it would be 'English Natural Gas, English Coal and English China Clay', leading to the break-up of the United Kingdom economy, which would have been a catastrophe for working people in Scotland.

Thus it was that a lot of people in Scotland, the closer it came to polling day, began to realise that a set-up with all the trappings of a Parliament and the apparatus of a Government would have no financial resources, other than a finite block grant from the United Kingdom Treasury. During the campaign, it also began to dawn on people in Scotland that if they had an Assembly of their own the Scots might not always get that share of the United Kingdom cake, bigger than average, to which they had been used for 3 decades and more, under UK Governments of whatever political colour. It became clearer and clearer that, so long as the United Kingdom was run as one unit, money would be given out roughly on a basis of need. As soon as, however, a rival government was set up, then the other regions of the United Kingdom would watch, hawk-like, to see that now the Scots had achieved a government of their own, they did not get more than the fair share of what was going to other, no less needy, parts of the United Kingdom. Telling figures from the Treasury were reproduced on Scottish Television, showing that last year, 1977/78, for every £100 spent in England per head, in Scotland we had £127.

How long could such a situation possibly last? The well-founded suspicion grew that the total kitty might be smaller than before. Add the fact of a smaller kitty to the indubitable fact that the running costs of the Assembly, its clerks, officials, janitorial services, Hansard services, support staff and the greater and more significant expenditure on a second and rival government machine, would have to come out of the same kitty, and the alarm bells were certainly ringing. It could be, and was said legitimately, 'Do you want money for more politicians and fewer nurses? Do you want more money for Assembly staff, and less money for school janitors and other low paid workers in Scotland? Do you want money for more civil servants and less money to pay teachers?' Crudely put maybe, but none the less a practical question which people could easily understand.

As the campaign progressed, it got through to an increasing number of Scots that, should an Assembly be set up in Edinburgh, every grievance, real or imagined, would be ascribed not to the shortcomings of the Assemblymen themselves but to the fact that they had inadequate resources. Every school which should have been built in a deprived area and was not built, every hospital that should have been modernised and was not modernised, and every road which should have been repaired and was not repaired, would be ascribed to what? To the fact, of course, that the Assembly did not have any economic powers. Yet, as we have seen, to give it economic powers and financial control of tax would in fact erode away everything which distinguishes Devolution from the creation of a Separate Scottish State.

The truth is that there is no economic power which one can give to a

subordinate Parliament, in part—and this is crucial—and only part, of a United Kingdom. As we have seen, if any acceptable form of taxation had existed, able ministers and clever civil servants would certainly have lighted upon it many moons ago. The financial reasoning was one of the main factors which persuaded a great many people in Scotland that the proposals could not possibly last or endure in the form, or anything remotely like it, in which they were put forward by their begetters.

Another reason why the Scotland Act could not endure has been dubbed, for shorthand, 'the West Lothian Question', on account of the many interminable speeches which the author of this article ground into the House of Commons, making comparisons, rendered in the course of the Scotland and Wales Bill, seriatim and at length, of how, alphabetically illustrated, I could vote in matters relating to West Bromwich and West Ham but not West Lothian. Gradually, it was realised that this was not simply a problem of Parliamentary etiquette or procedure, let alone semantics, but about the very guts of power. It was not basically that Scots MPs would have a tremendous urge to talk about the affairs of West Bromwich or West Ham. The trouble was that when it came to voting their votes might be crucial, and would have been crucial after at least 3 of the last 10 General Elections, in imposing policies on England, against the wishes of the majority of MPs elected by English constituencies. Now the swings and roundabouts are acceptable so long as there is just one United Kingdom Government. They would be quite unacceptable, contrary to the principles of democracy and representation, and immoral, if applied to a situation where Scots could vote on the most delicate matter of English domestic politics, while MPs from England, no more than Scots Westminster MPs, would have any say in what took place in similar fields in Scotland.

The Scottish National Party, to their credit, have instinctively realised this problem existed and, on what they have judged to be purely English issues, have abstained from voting. Why, it was often asked during the Referendum Campaign, could not Scots MPs display a similar disciplined sense of abstinence? The answer is simple. If MPs from a majority Party, forming the Government of the United Kingdom, were to behave in such a way, that Government would soon fall. Their main task is to sustain a Government.

Logically, in current circumstances, the answer to this irreducible conundrum is to have a Cabinet of James Callaghan as Prime Minister, Denis Healey as Chancellor and David Owen as Foreign Secretary, with Michael Heseltine as Shadow Minister of Housing, Mark Carlisle as Shadow Minister of Education and Patrick Jenkins as Shadow Health Minister. To put it mildly, it was obvious that such a major constitutional novelty was not going to be blown in as a side-wind of the Scotland Bill.

The truth became clear that the day the majority in England coincided with the majority in the United Kingdom as a whole, the arrangement in the Scotland Bill would have to be changed. Now it may be said that most

electors did not consider such constitutional niceties, let alone sit around in public houses in the Cowcaddens in Glasgow, debating with one another like some latter-day Athenians, the ins-and-outs of the West Lothian Question. No. But what did come through was that the package as put forward were goods that somehow were not properly labelled. Instinctively, people felt that they were being offered a false prospectus.

Besides, a great many people came to feel that to vote yes was an irrevocable step down a road on a journey on which they had little or no desire to embark in the first place. The leaders in the Yes Campaign were identified more and more clearly as the Scottish National Party and the Scottish Labour Party, who wished to use the Assembly as a first step to something quite different from that which Government Ministers said they intended. Thus it came about that the No's won. I say won, because a significant number of people believed what they were told, not least by Government Ministers, that an absent vote equalled a No vote, and therefore did not bother to go to the polls. Unquestionably, the number in this position was vastly more than the 77,000 votes by which the Yes's actually exceeded the No's in the numbers recorded on March 1st.

Who's going to introduce a Rules of Referenda Bill in the next Parliament?

[Tam Dalyell has been Labour M.P. for West Lothian since 1962.]

GHANA: FROM PROTEST TO PARTICIPATION

by David Brown

IN February 1966 and again in January 1972 civilian Ghanaian governments were ousted by army officers. They justified their coups on the grounds that the incumbent governments had been autocratic and corrupt, and had mismanaged the economy so as to impose unnecessary hardship on the Ghanaian people. In recent years similar charges have been levelled with increasing force against the present government, and during 1978 these pressures finally forced the government to concede defeat and to agree to hand over power to its accusers; the hand-over to take place in July 1979. The parallels with the previous coups are obvious, but so too are the differences. What is happening now is that a military regime in being forced out of office by the civilians.

One way of interpreting these events might be to suggest that we are witnessing a revolutionary change in Ghanaian politics; a radical shift of power from the bourgeoisie, both civilian and military, towards the rural farmers and the urban workers who have been so clearly exploited by this and previous regimes. At the other extreme, it may be that the decision to hand over to a civilian regime is much more of a limited tactical retreat, with the military calculating that they can ensure the accession of a responsible client regime which will protect the interests of the bourgeoisie in general, and the armed forces in particular. This was, in essence, what happened in 1969 when the previous military regime, the National Liberation Council (NLC) handed over power to Kofi Busia's Second Republic. Even if this calculation by the regime proves wrong, power may still go to another section of the bourgeoisie rather than to the spokesmen of the rural and urban masses. The question then is one of the extent to which the military has in fact lost control and influence over events, and of the nature of the present political environment in Ghana.

Economic problems and economic unrest are clearly at the root of the regime's decision to relinquish power, but in November 1975 General Acheampong, the Chairman of the National Redemption Council (NRC) was stating firmly that he would not hand over to civilian rule while the prevailing economic situation continued. Three years later, in November 1978, his successor, Lieutenant-General Akuffo, influenced by the 'challenges and prospects of our economy' conceded that full civilian politics could commence, and confirmed that the military would play no part in the new regime. In part this change of response to economic problems has come about as a result of the escalation of those problems. In addition however, the political options open to General Akuffo in 1978 had been severely limited by the way in which the military had responded to the unrest which had been growing since 1974. Attempts at both the repression and the deflection of economic unrest had led only to the translation of that unrest into overt political opposition to military rule.

The basic problems facing Ghanaians in both the urban and rural areas

have been those of inflation and shortages. By 1976 the food price index had risen to three and a half times its 1972 level, from 118.9 to 414.1. But within another twelve months it had shot up again by more than two and a half times, to 1090.8, and estimates of inflation since December 1977 suggest a figure of up to 300%. Although detailed figures are not available it is clear that real incomes have declined significantly. Between 1972 and 1977 the price paid to Ghana's cocoa farmers went up from ten cedis to forty cedis per headload. This represents a fall in real income of about 56%. (A more accurate calculation would have to take account of the fall in cocoa output, during this same period, of about 30%, and also of the 10% to 15% of cocoa which has been smuggled out of Ghana at substantial profit.) Shortages have been acute especially since 1976. Local foodstuffs have been affected as well as imported goods, and essential commodities like soap, beer, tinned milk, batteries, bread, and corned beef have either been unobtainable or, at best, available only at massively inflated *kalabule* (black market) prices.

There are various causes of these problems of inflation and shortages. One is that the government has attempted to restrict imports, and then in mid 1978 the cedi was devalued. Shortages of local foodstuffs are related to a combination of poor harvests, transportation problems, hoarding and smuggling. Finally, and perhaps primarily, the government has repeatedly financed budget deficits by increasing the money supply, which rose from about 280 million cedis in 1971 to 1761 million by 1977, an increase of about 80% per year.

Economic unrest first became significant, in the urban areas, in 1974, and from the outset the blame was put on government mismanagement. Two main lines of argument were put forward. Firstly, that the NRC had become corrupt and inefficient, and was more concerned with the interests of the military than those of the wider population. This argument was illustrated by reference to the building of luxury houses for NRC members, for example, and the rise from $24 million to $83 million defence expenditure between 1972 and 1974 (after which time no further figures were published). The second line of argument has been that the refusal of the Ghana government to pay a producer price for cocoa which is at all comparable with the returns that can be obtained in the Ivory Coast and Togo, has led to a decline in cocoa revenue both because farmers have lacked any incentive to invest in the industry, and because smuggling has been encouraged. Thus despite the fact that cocoa exports provide 60% of the government's foreign exchange and 25% of its total revenue, and that world cocoa prices have been at record levels, returns from cocoa have in fact remained insufficient to provide a basis for renewed economic growth.

Unrest has taken various forms including strikes, criticism in the press, and attempted coups by disaffected groups within the armed forces. The one constant in the regime's response to the unrest has been the use of repression in the form of the banning of strikes, strict control of the press, and the frequent use of detention without trial and of military tribunals.

There have been numerous reports of the use of violence by the police and the army, and the regime has consistently attempted to prevent public criticism by classifying it as illegal subversion, rumourmongering, or incitement to disaffection. Against the background of this consistent repression, it can be shown that the policy of the regime has shifted, since 1974, from one of strengthening and entrenching military domination, to one of attempting to divert and incorporate critics, and when this failed, to an attempt at orderly, limited retreat.

After an initial attempt to encourage the participation of civilians in the government, the senior officers in the NRC responded to the growing unrest among civilians and in the army by moving to consolidate their position. During 1975 prominent critics of the regime like Kofi Awoonor and Johny Hansen were detained. Junior officers critical of the government were accused of planning a coup and tried by military tribunal, and the faction-ridden NRC was superseded by a Supreme Military Council (SMC) composed solely of senior officers. The main impact of this entrenchment of the regime was to convince its critics that the only way of ending the erosion of civil liberties and the decline in the economy was to demand the return to civilian rule. This demand came mainly from the urban areas, and notably from the urban middle class. Although the rural population has probably been hit hardest by inflation and shortages, they have tended to become increasingly disillusioned and wary of involvement in national politics. This scepticism can be explained partly by the sharp contrast between the continued lack of economic development in the rural areas, and the promises which were made by the politicians, and believed, during the decolonization period. The rural population also has few effective channels through which grievances could be articulated. Certainly the Houses of Chiefs and the District Councils have not functioned in this way. Within the urban areas, it is true that the unionised workers have been extremely active in striking for pay increases, but the translation of this into a broader demand for a change of government has been inhibited by the continued identification of the TUC with the military regime, one aspect of this being that the TUC Secretary-General, Alhaji Issifu, owes his post almost entirely to NRC support.

It has fallen then to the urban middle class groups to be the main spokesmen of opposition to military rule, and particularly to four groups, the Bar Association, the Professional Bodies Association, the university academics, and the university students. In the case of all these groups there has been a professional concern with civic freedoms, a clear economic grievance, and an established professional organization through which these concerns could be articulated. In September 1976 the Bar Association demanded that the military hand over to a civilian regime by 1978 and refused to participate any longer in military tribunals. It was this which finally persuaded Acheampong that repression and entrenchment alone would merely mean the increasing isolation of the government from the rest of society, and that a new initiative was necessary in order to try to contain the high level of public unrest. In October he introduced his idea

of Union Government.

Although the concept was never very clearly defined, Union Government was widely perceived to have three main aspects; that the SMC themselves would determine the timetable and the constitutional framework for the transition to the new regime; that the police and armed forces (including General Acheampong) would occupy key positions in the government; and that no political parties would be allowed to form. In this way Acheampong hoped to institutionalise military involvement in Ghanaian polities and prevent the re-emergence of the political cleavages which had dominated civilian politics in the past. A committee was appointed which outlined a possible constitution and proposed a timetable for the handover to a Union Government, and the first major event of the transition process occurred in March 1978 when a referendum was held on the Union Government proposal. Acheampong claimed a victory; that 60% of the voters had said 'yes' to his plan. In reality however the referendum had shown clearly both the extent of opposition to the military, and the essentially coercive nature of the regime. It marked a watershed between the attempt to consolidate military rule, and the attempt to stage an orderly retreat.

It was clear that the referendum had been rigged, both in that there had been harassment of the Peoples Movement for Freedom and Justice (PMFJ) and other bodies which had attempted to campaign against Union Government, and also in that the official returns reflected the regime's aspirations more than the actual votes cast. Immediately after the referendum the PMFJ was banned, its leading political activists arrested, and many others were detained. This reinforced the view, both within the armed forces and in the wider public, that the SMC's handling of the referendum had finally destroyed its credibility. Public hostility to the armed forces provoked junior officers to put pressure on the government. Senior officers in the SMC calculated that their only chance of retaining effective control lay in removing General Acheampong and making him the scapegoat for what had happened. Consequently, on the 5th of July, Acheampong's second in command, General Akuffo, took over and explained that he had done so primarily because Acheampong had been conducting a 'one man show.'

After this initial concession, the SMC has been forced to make several more. Amnesties were announced for all those detained or in exile for opposition to Acheampong, and on the 31st of July Akuffo confirmed his commitment to handing over power on the 1st of July 1979 and conceded that the police and armed forces would play no part in the new regime. Apart from that however, the Union Government proposal was retained with only a change of name to 'National Government'; a new government would rule for a transitional (trial?) period of four years, during which time political parties would be banned. Unrest at these restrictions may well have been contained by the compromise suggestion of the Constitutional Commission that parties be allowed after a two year period, had it not been for the crisis which broke in November. Akuffo had bowed to economic reality by following through the process of devalua-

tion begun by Acheampong, to produce an overall devaluation of the cedi by 140%. This measure, together with an austerity budget, gave a further massive boost to inflation and brought over 70,000 workers out on strike, including the civil servants. At the same time the District Council elections which had been held without political parties, turned out to be a complete failure both in that the poll was extremely low (perhaps 25%) and in that, despite the ban, the old party allegiances nevertheless emerged in a 'sub rosa' form. On the 30th of November Akuffo made the major concession. Political parties would be allowed to form from the 1st of January.

One of the lessons of decolonization, at least as it occurred under the British in West Africa, was that once a departing regime had given the go-ahead for the holding of elections and the formation of political parties, their ability to retain control of events dwindled rapidly. Nkrumah had been elected even though the British had put him in prison, and the constitutional safeguards erected to preserve the 'Westminster model' politics were easily discarded after independence. The military regime in Ghana, like their counterparts in Nigeria, clearly believe however that they can use their ability to supervise the transition process so as to preserve military influence after military government has ended.

General Akuffo has sought to erect several controls over the type of regime which will take over. He has stipulated that once elections have been held, the political parties 'will have to come together in parliament and present a national front'. He has ensured that the Constituent Assembly, which has been part appointed and part elected from the new District Councils, bases its deliberations on the draft constitution prepared by the Drafting Commission appointed by the SMC. Moreover, he has succeeded in banning from public office most of the senior politicians of the previous Progress Party and CPP governments, on the grounds that they had been indicted by one or other of the Committees of Enquiry which have been held in the past to inquire into financial irregularities. Finally, the 1978 Political Parties Decree seeks to limit the type of parties which may contest the elections by instituting a registration procedure and banning old party names and symbols, prohibiting tribal, regional, religious or professional based parties, and demanding that a registered party must have at least three founding members from each District of Ghana, and must pay C5000 registration fee.

The aim of these controls is clearly to prevent the re-emergence of either of the two main political parties of the past, the CPP and the Progress Party, whose behaviour in government has prompted the previous military interventions. Clearly also there is a concern to try to prevent radical opponents of the military regime coming to power, who might undertake a 'purge by committee of enquiry' against the SMC. Finally, there is also a concern to prevent the politicisation of ethnic cleavages which the military elite consider to be a major threat to the unity of the armed forces, as well as to the wider society. The indications are however, that in all these respects, the military regime will not be successful.

In the brief time available for parties to campaign for support, it is clear

that there is no hope of developing new organizational networks or attempting real ideological mobilization. The parties must clearly base themselves on existing political groupings and perceptions, and there are perhaps four major aspects of Ghanaian politics which are particularly relevant to the present situation. These are the cultural predisposition to personalist leadership, the continued relevance of old political allegiances, the significance of alignments on the Union Government issue, and the persistence of communalism.

In the past the main issues of Ghanaian politics have been symbolised, for the mass of Ghanaians, in the personality (perhaps the charisma) of particular political leaders. The leading part played by Nkrumah in ending colonial rule enabled him to be seen as the focal point for anti-colonial nationalism, while Kofi Busia could become a symbol and a rallying point for opposition to Nkrumah. To a lesser extent Komla Gbedemah gained some personal following in 1969 through his association with Nkrumah and with the martyred hero of the 1966 coup, Colonel Kotoka. However now that Nkrumah and Busia are both dead, and Gbedemah together with other leading ex-politicians is barred from holding political office, at least for the moment, there seems to be no-one around who has played a sufficiently dramatic part in recent Ghanaian history to enable him to attract this sort of personalist support, other than from his own local or ethnic community. However, one option open to the main contenders for the executive presidency in the new government is to attempt to gain this kind of personalist support by stressing their personal and ideological association with the main heroes of the past, notably Nkrumah and Busia.

Despite the odium which was attached to Nkrumah's name in 1966, and to Busia's in 1972, it is clear that Ghanaian politics has never broken loose from the pattern which was established in the period of decolonization. The tendency to view politics in pro- and anti-CPP terms is especially pervasive among the political elite, and at least three of the parties which were formed in January fall clearly into the pro-CPP camp. These are the Peoples' Revolutionary Party (PRP) led by Johny Hansen, a revival of an earlier small radical socialist party; the Peoples' National Party (PNP) led by Imoru Egala and Kojo Botsio, which seeks to be a more moderate party of the CPP 'establishment'; and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) led by the ex CPP activist, Osai Poku. Some sort of merger between these three parties is possible, although leadership rivalries would make any such merger a fragile one; witness the collapse of the first such attempt, in February, between the PNP and the PDP.

Among the supporters of Busia, the main contender for power is the Popular Front Party led by J. H. Mensah and Victor Owusu (Busia's Finance Minister and Attorney-General). Other Progress Party activists, notably William Ofori-Atta and R. R. Amponsah, have split from the main body of Busia supporters, mainly because of leadership rivalry, and have joined forces with some ex-National Alliance of Liberals members, notably Obed Asamoah and Sam Okudzeto, to form the United National

Convention. Some sort of alliance between these two parties is possible. However the SMC may well be pushed into conceding that individuals presently banned from politics may appeal. Amponsah, Mensah and Owusu are all banned, as is Gbedemah, but if Mensah and Gbedemah for example were to get their bans reversed, then one option open to Gbedemah could be to opt for the United National Convention as the best vehicle for his political aspirations. If this happened then a cleavage between the Popular Front Party and the Convention could be a major focal point of the election campaign.

Although the CPP and Progress Party blocs clearly do not constitute two distinct and cohesive political groupings, let alone two separate ideologies, previous attempts to break away from this view of politics, and to find a new reference point, have repeatedly failed. Several of the new parties are trying to find, and occupy, a middle ground. The most important of these are Dr. Bilson's Third Force party, an urban based group which has existed in one form or another since 1966, and the Social Democratic Front led by the TUC Secretary-General, Alhaji Issifu, and Dr. de Graft Johnson, who led one of the 'third force' parties in the 1969 election. It is possible also that the Action Congress Party of Colonel Bernasko, who left the NRC government in 1975, may also identify with the 'third force' group. These parties are likely to be far less critical of the military than are either of the other two blocs. The indications are however that the 'third force' parties will again fail to bring about any shift of Ghanaian politics away from the established base points of opposition to, or support for, Nkrumah.

It might have been expected that the most important influence upon the pattern of politics in 1979 would be the issue which has precipitated the return to civilian politics, that of Union Government. Specifically, it might be expected that the parties led by those who campaigned actively in favour of Union Government, like Alhaji Issifu's party and Osai Poku's PDP, would be aligned against those professionals and ex-politicians who had come together in the Peoples Movement for Freedom and Justice. In fact however, the PMFJ, which brought together individuals of widely different political persuasions, like Johny Hansen, Komla Gbedemah, and General Afrifa, broke up as soon as the opposition to Union Government had succeeded. In addition, groups like the Professional Bodies Association and the Bar Association have also come into conflict on the question of how far to cooperate with General Akuffo. The general position seems to be that opposition to military rule has been so widespread that no party or individual identified with Union Government or with the SMC can hope to gain widespread electoral support.

Perhaps of all the factors which contribute to patterns of political allegiance in Ghana, the politicisation of communalism is the most pervasive. Although there are major difficulties in distinguishing between ethnicity and communalism, it seems that the various locality, district and regional communities in Ghana tend to vote for those natives from the community who appear to have the most influential alliances at the centre,

and who thus seem most likely to be able to divert resources to the community. This seems to apply whether or not the community is ethnically homogeneous. Clearly then, the communal identity of constituency candidates and presidential candidates has a major influence on the pattern of electoral support. Communalism and ethnicity are especially difficult to distinguish at the regional level; but however they are defined, it is clear that there are at least four important geo-political areas in Ghana; the north (including both the Northern and Upper Regions), Ashanti (inclusive of Brong-Ahafo), the Volta Region, and the southern Akan area (the Western, Eastern and Central Regions). None of these areas has ever been completely politically united, since communal cleavages abound within each area. However, voting patterns do tend to reflect, in part, the different experiences and perceptions of the populations of these four areas. Three sets of cleavages seem most likely to be politically relevant in 1979; the distinction between the north which is probably hit hardest by inflation and shortages, and the more prosperous cocoa growing areas to the south; the rivalry between Ashanti and southern Akan areas, which has been evident at various times within the NRC and the SMC; and the cleavage between the Ewe-dominated Volta Region, and the Akan areas. It was this last cleavage which dominated the 1969 elections, and Akan-Ewe tensions certainly have continued to play a dominant part in national politics both during and after the Busia regime. However it seems probable that this cleavage was only translated so directly into voting alignments in 1969 because of the fortuity that the two contenders for power, Busia and Gbedemah, happened to be, respectively, Ashanti and Ewe.

While it is clear that the main issue structuring political alignments within the bourgeois elite is that of the Busia-Nkrumah cleavage, it is equally clear that among the electorate, considerations of communal advantage are likely to predominate. The particular way in which these two factors interact will have much more impact upon the type of regime which takes over from General Akuffo, than Akuffo's own attempts at controlling the course of events are likely to have. Clearly the transition to civilian rule marks a major rejection of, and defeat for, the Ghanaian armed forces; but it does not thereby imply any significant change in the basic structure and pattern of Ghanaian politics. That pattern was established in the mid 1950s, before independence, and neither ten years of military rule, nor the continued 'immiseration' of the Ghanaian masses has done much to weaken the power of the bourgeois political elite.

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CAN WE CHANGE OUR MINDS?

by John Elsom

THREE things, according to the ancient story, changed Buddha's mind —a sick man, an old man and a dead man. Buddha, whose childhood was protected, reached manhood before he caught sight of humanity *in extremis;* and the experience so shocked him that he resolved, there and then, to conquer what were to him the unfamiliar terrors of the flesh. His method was meditation. He sat under a tree for weeks, and when sleep threatened his concentration by pulling down his eyelids like roller blinds, he tore out those lids by the roots, scattering them to the winds and the soil, from which was invented the holy drink of tea.

Western traders, typically mistaking form for content, learnt how to exploit the *detritus* from contemplation, drying it out, packaging it and submitting it finally to the ultimate humiliation of perforated bags. They did not know, nor did they care about, what happened after the first tea ceremony; for Buddha at length concluded that we could only escape mortal ills by abandoning mortal desires—thus reaching a state of enlightened nothingness where death and life, sickness and health, age and youth merge into a single affirmation.

But is it strictly correct to say that three things changed Buddha's mind? If he had been brought up in the slums of Calcutta, he would probably have passed three hundred bodies by, in the different stages of dying and decomposition, without wasting a second glance. His startled horror, and his determined reaction to it, were consequences of his previous privilege. His childhood conditioning was at work in unfamiliar circumstances. Buddha's mind only changed after the meditation and the conquest, when he had attained Nirvana. But at what point did those minutes and hours of thought transmute themselves into a higher elation where minutes, hours and even thought itself did not matter? Was it when the original purpose of his curious enterprise had been forgotten?

Saul's conversion was a much simpler matter: a stroke of lightning on the road to Damascus. But did he change his mind, or did He? Can we, in short, even change our minds, by ourselves, just like that, if the will to do so was itself shaped at some unfathomable point in our childhoods, when we didn't want to go to bed unless the door was left open? Do we always require some outside agent, like an acupuncturist's needle, to divert our inner energies along new lines? Or do our minds change of their own accord, without us (or anyone else) willing them to do so? We can change our opinions, of course, our clothes, our sleeping partners, our houses and our politics; but underneath this range of surface choices, there beats the slow, insistent pulse of consciousness, whose variations lie as far beyond our control, as do the planets which, astrologers say, can change our minds.

But my purpose is more mundane. In Britain, we are facing a general

election which, for all I know, may have taken place before this article appears. The chief question seems to me not who will win, but whether it will make any difference. I do not intend cynicism. I am not suggesting that the country is run by international conspiracies or by a pack of civil servants who will do what they like, whatever government is in power. I am not implying that the democratic process is useless or that Mr. Callaghan and Mrs. Thatcher are conducting mock battles. I am not being either pessimistic or optimistic; nor am I asserting that the real difference is between spending governments and saving ones. Least of all, do I believe that the British disease, if we have got one, is incurable.

But we have seen several governments elected since the war whose intentions, out of office, seemed radical, reformist and for the most part admirable. Within months, and sometimes only weeks, their manifestos looked as stale and impractical as the bottom of a butter mountain. Perhaps they were blown off course by events, to use a period phrase; or perhaps the situation which they discovered when arriving in office was different from the one which they had imagined when out of it. At all events, these bright-eyed idealists, fresh and beaming from their election victories like bridegrooms from a church, quickly assumed the hang-dog, careworn look of first-time adulterers, not knowing quite what to admit or to whom, couch-candidates and pill-takers; while the old roués soldier on, with their cautious cynical smiles and their airs of 'you may not trust me, but, by God, you need me!'

I have fought almost every election since 1962 and never, being a Liberal, on the winning side; and so cannot claim any detachment, only a consistency of failure. But I have lost any satisfaction I may once have felt from watching other people's chickens come home to roost. Even Liberals thought, when Harold Wilson came to power in 1964, that his government could do much good. With the support of the unions, he seemed in a strong position to modernise industry, to introduce the new technology and to prevent the resulting gains from weighing down the pockets of the few.

But we watched George Brown's plan to expand the economy fall into ruins, felt the 'white-hot' technological revolution grow cold and saw how the policy for conglomerates, modernising small firms by pulling them together into large ones, brought with it a mass of other problems in its wake. The unions demonstrated that they were prepared to co-operate with the government if it suited their interests, and not otherwise; and when the government at last abandoned Barbara Castle's attempt to reform industrial relations, through *In Place of Strife*, I was convinced, as others must have been, that whatever basic changes were needed in our society, they were not going to be brought about by Wilson's men.

Changes certainly happened, but not the ones which we expected. Whether wealth was spread or not, power was certainly centralised—through the government's increasing control over the economy, through the growth of *quangos* and ministerial patronage and through Wilson's highly personal style of leadership, whereby he had to be seen to be doing everything, from solving the problems of Vietnam and Rhodesia after his

fashion to mopping up the oil from the Torrey Canyon. There was a curious paradox: as the government's impotence over events became more noticeable, so was the government's determination to lay their hands on the visible levers of power. But these levers failed to work, or not as expected. The TUC issued vain warnings against shop floor dissidents—the economic sanctions against Rhodesia not only didn't work within weeks, or months, or years, but they didn't work because oil was still being supplied by British companies with government stakes in them.

It was a sad decline from high hopes to French farce. And so what was the alternative? Honest, sensible government, no wild dreams, no rhetoric, an attention to central issues with the EEC and industrial relations among them, a reduction of the power of central government except in certain areas, a release of individual initiative and Edward Heath. The proposals of the Selsdon men might look naive on paper, but surely they would learn in office.

Again, I do not wish to underrate the achievements of Heath's administration. He, after all, got us eventually into the Common Market, and fatally risked his government by trying to solve at a stroke the problems of pay bargaining, which led to the battle with the miners and the three-day week. Tories sometimes argue that Heath's downfall was caused by backing away from the policies on which he was elected: the pluralist became a *de facto* centralist. I doubt whether history will support that view. The Selsdon men just had not realised how difficult it would be to de-centralise quickly. They thought it was all a matter of cutting taxes and government spending. But the idea of nationalising and de-nationalising industries with the changes of governments had proved disastrous long before Heath came on the scene; and without such measures, you could only de-centralise by cutting back severely on the social services, which was politically quite as disastrous. We only have to remember the furores over the introduction of small de-centralising measures in the social services—the abolition of free milk in schools, the introduction of admission charges for museums and art galleries—to realise how politically impractical it was to institute major cutbacks. Each careful tax concession within our hopelessly confusing tax system brought with it abuses and petty profiteering, leading to lopsided pluralism, if pluralism at all. And when the policy of not subsidising industrial lame ducks was put to its first major test, that of saving or not saving Rolls-Royce, Heath's decision was unavoidably the same as Wilson's would have been.

And so, after a few years of troubled peace, we are back into the election fray again; but what do we expect either from the return of a Selsdon woman or from a new Labour government, with or without a decent majority? Will it make any real difference?

Liberals, of course, have their own interpretation of events. They believe that because the two main political parties are financed by the opposite sides of industry, a class confrontation is unavoidable, whichever party is in power. The centralist-pluralist struggle seems to them purely theoretical, unless you previously attempt to define what the role of government

should be in society, and the intended balance between the public and private sectors of the economy—what can and should be organised best on a national, rather than a local or private level, and a host of other factors. To Liberals, the reform of our democratic system seems an unavoidable first step to escape the gladiatorial nature of our political disputes. If we are going to solve any problems at all, we have to solve them together, rather than in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion.

I would not disagree with any of this, nor perhaps would the majority of British voters, whichever party they vote for. The difficulty comes, first in changing the nature of the debate, and secondly in getting rid of various stock reactions which impede discussion. There is an old parable about a caterpillar with arthritis. He went along to the wisest sage in the jungle, an owl, who pondered and eventually said: 'You have not got arthritis at all. You are trying to change into a butterfly.' The caterpillar thanked the owl and limped away; but before he left, he creaked his tired old body around and asked, 'But how do I change into a butterfly?' 'Don't bother me with little technical details,' retorted the owl, and fell asleep.

The curious situation in Britain today is that most people know what is wrong. They know that shop-floor anarchy can't continue and that we must have some generally accepted pay bargaining procedures. They realise that the political system is unfair and acrimonious; and that certain sections of the community, for various reasons, lose out in the power battle to gain money and status. They are prepared to be more productive, yes, and to accept the introduction of new technology which might temporarily increase unemployment. But they are not willing to accept meaningless unemployment, futile industrial changes and absurd managerial or governmental fiddlings. The more one canvasses, the more one realises that there is a consensus for change in Britain; and that few people in Britain are as bloody-minded or anarchic as commentators would lead us to suspect.

But why has this mood not yet been changed into action? What stops the metamorphosis of the caterpillar? The problem is partly that nobody has bothered to explain, or if they have, it has not been generally realised, the way in which government has been encumbered over the years with the weight of previous legislation. It is necessary to tidy up the office before new work can be started. But governments are elected on promises for legislation, and so new bills simply pile on top of old ones, without anybody tackling the equally necessary task of simplifying the system, explaining it to the public and ensuring that the whole pattern has a coherent order. There can also be temporary political advantage in keeping things disordered and inaccessible to the public: mistakes are less readily noticed, which is why Clement Freud's bill attempting to secure a public right of access to information about official bodies is so important.

Untidiness and ill-temper are two states which any good administrator would wish to avoid at all costs; but they are, as it were, built in to our political system. But government is not solely about administration, not even primarily. You cannot administer your way out of genuine moral dilemmas. I dislike politicians who parade their consciences and am dis-

mayed by the way in which our political vocabularies are weighted down by moral offloading. We can no more ensure sexual or racial equality through government action than that the elderly can be properly looked after through the welfare services, let alone public morals improved through public subsidies to the parent-teacher associations. Stripped of the hyperbole, the different practical measures covered by these actions may have a limited usefulness; but culture and how we treat each other do not lie within the province of any government.

Nevertheless, governments do have moral choices to make, and moral responsibilities, but on a national rather than a private level. It is depressing to watch how, since the war, supposedly liberal countries have readily accepted (and tightened) immigration laws, how reluctantly the British government acknowledged its duty towards the Ugandan Asians, provided that poor and overcrowded India did the same and how sternly Australia has turned away the Vietnamese refugees. Britain in particular has had a limited and self-centred vision of the problems of the Third World; as indeed it has had towards Europe. The contrast between moral cowardice in our external affairs and sanctimony in our internal ones breeds cynicism. How can governments reprimand pub landlords for turning away West Indians while there is even a trace of suspicion that our immigration laws are more zealously applied to blacks than to whites? How can we proclaim the principle of equal opportunities for women, while the ranks of our civil service, of TUC officials, of the CBI and so many other national institutions are so palpably biassed towards men? How can we even talk about democracy while we are so busily denying it in so many directions? Our deeds and our rhetoric are at odds.

But moral rhetoric is built in to our electioneering process. Few politicians are elected through expressing doubts or a readiness to see other people's points of view. Pacts and compromises, necessary to government, are on the hustings mistaken for a lack of integrity, an admission of failure. When electors are asked to put their crosses on their ballot papers, they are making very vague decisions indeed. Apart from the fact that our political parties all span a range of views, many of which may be self-contradictory, electioneering is largely a matter of one-upmanship, of exposing the other man's unfitness to govern. Political commentators, who agree about very little, assert almost unanimously that political opinion in Britain has been very volatile since the war and that the anti-vote has been stronger for most of the time than the pro-. Parties lose elections, rather than positively win them. The Thorpe affair, like the Poulsen affair and the now forgotten Profumo case, were political godsends to the anti-votes.

The lack of resolution shown by our governments reflects, I believe, the inadequate way in which political parties ask for, and are given, votes. The inadequacies are deeply embedded in the process; and at the heart of this process is what we have been conditioned to expect from governments, too little and too much, encouraging illusion and disillusion, cynicism and false idealism, and that happy-go-lucky apathy whereby we confuse real moral problems with phoney ones, and relegate them all to that slight section

of the mind which we reserve for politics. We change our political opinions readily enough—but not our conditioning, not our minds.

But can we change our minds? How do we do so? David Steel made a very brave effort to concentrate the country's attention on two major political issues, pay bargaining and industrial relations, in a party political broadcast which firmly declared itself against party politics. It could, of course, be dismissed as a subtle form of one-upmanship; but the remarkable response—a flood of letters to all three political leaders—indicates that many people were prepared on this occasion not to be cynical. The next few months will decide whether we can raise the level of political debate to meet the country's needs; and that is really the only decision which matters. But it is not a decision which will be reached at Westminster or in the caucuses of constituency parties. It may come through a sudden upsurge of impatience with the mediocre or even through a realisation, during the European elections, that Britain is not just a little island. Or, of course, it may not come at all, in which case we can only hope that others may learn from our intransigently absurd example, as the sick, old and dead men influenced Buddha.

The June issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *The General Election: Towards Open Textured Politics* by David Southern, *Informatics—True or False?* by James Avery Joyce, *Direct Elections to the European Parliament: Approaches, Attitudes and Problems* by Juliet Lodge and *The Young Writers' Festival* by Robert Rubens.

E. M. FORSTER'S *COMMONPLACE BOOK*

by Elizabeth Heine

WHEN E. M. Forster found among his family treasures the big, nearly empty commonplace book of the nearly forgotten Bishop Jebb, patron and friend of his grandfather, he immediately undertook to continue it. Bishop Jebb began to collect his commonplaces in 1804, drawing up a neatly ruled index for his entries but using only twenty pages of the six quires of fine foolscap. E. M. Forster began his collection in 1925 and carried on more or less regularly for the rest of his long life, making his last note, with some bemused humour, in 1968, at the age of 89. He filled 275 pages; as he wrote after a hundred or so, when he published an essay on 'Bishop Jebb's Book' in 1940, the volume may indeed be called his own. Still, in the wonderful fidelity provided by facsimile reproduction, Bishop Jebb's notes introduce E. M. Forster's, faintly counterpointing Christianity in a copperplate hand to the squiggly, pessimistic observations of the twentieth-century champion of humanism and individual liberty.

E. M. Forster's *Commonplace Book** now seems most valuable for its exposure of another layer of his private existence, though historians may appreciate the ironic contrast formed when Bishop Jebb quotes the pre-Christian philosophers to bolster his faith in the Christian God as the *summum bonum*, and Forster, in the midst of World War II, searches the works of the early Christian saints for wisdom with which to bear the horrors of a falling civilization. The years since Forster's death in 1970 have seen the publication of *Maurice*, his Georgian novel of homosexual love; of *The Life to Come*, containing the short stories centred on homosexuality; and of P. N. Furbank's clear-minded and thorough biography, revealing perhaps more of Forster's private life than some of his friends and admirers cared to know. Had E. M. Forster died in 1930, like D. H. Lawrence, his fame as a novelist would still rest, as it does now, on the five novels published by 1925. *Maurice* and the earlier homosexual stories, such as *The Life to Come*, might have been published outside England, and we would have had by now, as we have had with Lawrence, nearly fifty years in which to come to terms with unconventional sexuality, fiction weakened by censorship, and the bitter comments of private expression. What we would have missed are the years in which Forster established himself as a major essayist and moralist, and it is precisely the strength of his reputation as a humanist sage and adviser that has made for difficulty in assessing the effects of his closely closeted homosexuality.

Death-dates—his father's in 1880, his mother's in 1945, and his own in 1970—have shaped to an unusual degree the eccentricities of E. M. Forster's life and reputation. His birthdate—1 January 1879—means that his centenary is being celebrated even as the full significance of his hidden life has

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* *Commonplace Book* E. M. Forster. (London: Scolar Press, 1978). A facsimile edition limited to 350 copies. £150.

still to be assimilated. The fine facsimile edition of the *Commonplace Book*, prefaced with an excellent introduction by P. N. Furbank and Forster's essay on his and the Bishop's book, has been published in time for the start of the centenary year. So have the definitive Abinger editions, both meticulously edited by the late Oliver Stallybrass, of *A Passage to India* and its remarkable companion volume, which shows the development of the manuscripts of this classic novel. Exhibitions of manuscripts and memorabilia—the most notable of these at the British Library—musical tributes, and academic conferences held around the world assure us of Forster's wide-ranging influence. What we still need is more sense of his full personality, and it is in this quest for understanding that the *Commonplace Book* is most helpful.

First, lest it be thought that publication in facsimile is merely some sort of centenary extravagance, it must be pointed out that the *Commonplace Book* is intensely 'written' in the most concrete, visual sense of the word. Forster remarks in his essay that the rich paper 'tempts even the twentieth century into calligraphy.' As calligrapher, he adopted Bishop Jebb's scheme of writing the first word of an entry—though no longer necessarily the topic—in the hand-drawn margin, kept his own writing rather more legible than in his working manuscripts, used spacing and the size of his letters to balance and emphasize meaning, and wrote notes sideways, in balloons, or occasionally in frames and shapes resembling the emblematic poems of George Herbert, The entries of the last ten years, as Forster in his eighties struggles to keep his writing legible, have a cranky beauty of their own. The existence of the facsimile edition simplifies the descriptive problem which will be encountered in the transcription promised for 1982. It also, at the expense of half-an-hour of exploration as the reader becomes accustomed to the quirks of Forster's handwriting, offers the steady awareness that Forster cared very much for the look of these pages. A very strong sense of style dominates the apparently casual or incongruous arrangements. The book itself, as object, reminds us that in the latter half of his life Forster had become skilled in using his diffidence, originally self-protective, as a charming mask through which unexpectedly pointed criticisms and truths might be spoken, or behind which they might be written. And this reminder brings us from the manner to the matter.

Forster's *Commonplace Book* is by no means so personal as a diary or even a journal. On the whole he reserved it for thoughts, with little description of the precipitating events. And certainly, though there is an extensive range of quotation, Forster's commonplaces are not simply a collection of others' words. They reflect his moods and his efforts to keep up with the topics of his time. They record the semantic wonders of his 'dream sentences' and occasionally his dreams, or 'train talk' remembered with his characteristically accurate ear for the remarkably commonplace. Bloomsbury *aficionados* will be rewarded with Forster's note on the group as a literary movement, in which he regrets, along lines suggested by Gerald Heard, what he takes to be the intellectual's fear of emotion; or with a reported monologue, on a 'Julian' in Paris, which must be Vanessa

Bell's; or with Forster's account of his dismay at the prospect of a *Visit to Virginia,* recognizing the mantic quality of Virginia Woolf's genius as he notes that it will not do 'to rally the Pythoness.' There are recurrent considerations of his own romantic worship of nature, sometimes adopting and sometimes opposing new scientific viewpoints. (Here Bishop Jebb's *Analogy* between the newly discovered *Gases* and the probability of immaterial *Spirits* hovers in the background.) There are occasional ventures into poetic or semi-poetic composition, one a moving meditation in the style of T. S. Eliot, admitting a need to protect his emotions from the transformations imposed by the 'creative words' he knows he can draw from them. In other entries, both early and late, Forster notes that he finds solace from pain or relief from apathy in the simple act of writing. The reading notes of the working critic continue for many years. In the earlier years, as Forster was approaching and entering his fifties, the self-revealing ideas for possible subjects and characters for a new novel will take priority for most readers.

The reading notes which found their way into the Clark Lectures, published as *Aspects of the Novel* in 1927, and into another series of lectures, delivered at Cambridge in 1931, in which Forster attempted to define the differences between the creative and critical faculties, bracket the period in which he was himself turning from novelist to critic. Sometime in 1926, under the heading *Lover* and in the context of an observation that 'we deny passion to *all* to whom we are accustomed,' he sketches a character: 'a highly civilised man who has deep emotions but has prepared no one to respect them when they come out. Consequently he is reduced to casual lust where he is satisfied and happy until his civilisation has an elevating and redeeming influences [*sic*] upon his bedfellows. The "better" he makes people the lonelier he feels.' A year or so later he considers more extensively a novel on middle-age, to be written without regret or even much concern for youthful ideals. He wonders how to avoid his own youthful romantic note—like the 'high threnodic note' of Conrad—how to get closer to his own experience, and how to cope with the boredom and lack of incident that he felt hampered Henry James's novels of the middle-aged. For even with a more lecherous and carnal hero, Forster suspected that the Jamesian weaknesses would loom. And he was very much aware that he had a character and a theme rather than an incident, without James's faith that character is incident.

Forster's hesitation about this novel of middle-age, with himself as 'M. A.,' is both personal and critical, although the following entry, on the *Elusiveness* perceived in him by both J. B. Priestley and 'friendly, sensitive' Leonard Woolf, elusively suggests that his proposed treatment of the heterosexual carnality of the middle-aged hero is part cause of the boredom he felt with the topic: 'Is it just that I am different to most people, or that, knowing the difference, I have developed to conceal it? Supposed an elf, I am actually a—.' The blank is Forster's own, characteristically concealing, but best understood if some term meaning 'homosexual' is provided. Several of the entries in the next year or so suggest deep disgust and

depression, noting, for instance that the 'passion' of the savage and the 'kindness' of the civilized are deeply at odds, bitterly so for the civilized. Early in 1930 an idea for a story of 'Mother and son' appears. The mother would dominate the son in his youth and then regain her dominance later in life, 'with the difference that his subjection is conscious now and causes him humiliation and pain.' And having broached this intensely personal subject, Forster remarks in tiny writing that a 'ruthless and unpleasant writer might make something of this.' He chooses instead to define as the only theme he finds 'worthwhile' 'two people pulling each other into salvation,' and wisely observes, in much larger letters, 'It takes two to make a Hero.'

It was about 1930 that Forster began his life-long friendship with Bob Buckingham, and a note written a few years after his idea for a 'ruthless' novel assures posterity that happiness may indeed come to anyone: 'It is the only message worth giving.' The much later note, *One More Novel?* (8-3-43), appears as a result of Buckingham's demand that Forster leave the distractions of essays and broadcasting, even in the midst of war, to write a novel: 'Say again that you believe in human relationships and disbelieve in power.' Forster considers his age, the depression of war, his feeling that a new novel would allay his 'fear that—in spite of success far beyond my hopes and of a gratification far beyond most men's—I haven't fully come off,' and the hindrance of his 'poetry,' his tendency 'to dissolve characters into a haze.' Other notes of the same period show Forster's awareness that the 'nibblers' which 'waste me and diminish me' are 'kindness, lust, and fun,' 'especially kindness,' but he is not particularly regretful. The possibility of another novel is by this time very faint, and Forster's regret turns gradually into more and more pleasure in what he did manage to get done.

Because the *Commonplace Book* gains a more biographical, diary-like specificity only in Forster's later years, most of his commonplaces will reverberate differently for readers more and less knowledgeable of his life and work. But although most readers will be aware that his ideas for possible characters and subjects for novels did not develop further, there remains a fascination in discovering the record of his awareness that he perhaps ought to write, and then perhaps should have written, another novel. The regretful suspense is akin to the interest in rereading, or even reading, a novel. As the more diary-like observations develop in Forster's later years, the sense that the *Commonplace Book* may itself approximate Forster's unwritten novel grows stronger. It would of course be a novel very modern in form, full of disparate fragments of thought unified only by the character of the notetaker. There would not be much incident, though there is a break, with a premature 'LAST ENTRY' when Forster leaves Abinger and begins his notes again in Cambridge. There would be an unusual range, from middle-age to a very old age, wholly avoiding any 'high threnodic note' of youthful idealism. Instead there would be cynicism mitigated by despair at the decay of 'civilised,' humanistic values, hedonism restrained by conscientious self-analysis, the touchy pride of the

very old leavened by flashes of a mischievous, bawdy humour. There would be changes in tone to match the long years of living, pragmatic notes mixed with the insignificant, the wise, the witty. The latest notes, especially those on death, would fascinate not only for their content but for their sense that they exist as much to guide the younger as to preserve the old.

Read as the closest available approximation to Forster's unwritten novel, the *Commonplace Book* comes to resemble something like Doris Lessing's *Golden Notebook*. One works out the life pattern of the central character, the novelist who is simultaneously writing and not writing, dissipating emotions and ideas in notebooks, only one of them golden, as one reads on. Recurring doubts, reiterated concepts, variegated themes are woven together by the reader with a delighted, hard-earned sense of discovery. The resemblance breaks down, however, as one considers what is missing. The external series of factual references to Forster's published works and to the events of his life must be inserted parenthetically by the mind of the reader, as by the hand of an editor. The ironies, which would have been pointed with Forster as novelist, are unstressed. Still, we can observe that this critic who insisted on the importance of realistic characters in fiction knew that his own had a tendency to dissolve into 'poetry,' or the haze of ideal theories. Or we can wonder at the unimaginative, commonplace misogyny that moved this defender of individual liberties to discount half the human species, of course only in private. Because of Forster's homosexuality, the misogyny may be the greatest irony. It is very difficult here to distinguish cause and effect, but the contexts suggest that his antipathy is cultural, not biological, dependent on education, or lack thereof, on habit, and on choice.

Readers familiar only with Forster's public self may have to deal with some disillusionment as they confront the complexities of the *Commonplace Book*. In public Forster was always pertinent, gracious, charming, and usually large-minded. In private he could be the opposite, even malicious as well. A very few uncharitable remarks and unnecessary identifications in the more recent, more diary-like entries have been masked, lest they give offence to living persons. But perhaps these revelations of private pettiness have their own usefulness. In a Yeatsian or Jungian sense, the public mask gains power from private fears and flaws. In Forster's own view, character becomes more rounded, more 'real,' as antitheses and complexities appear. Nor should it be forgotten that the laws of his time made Forster's private life a criminal one. He had reason to hide, reason to ask for tolerance, reason to argue that censorship wastes the unwritten as it constricts the written, and the writer. Forster's *Commonplace Book* reveals as much in its disappointments as in its treasures. It is entirely welcome.

[Elizabeth Heine is completing Oliver Stallybrass's work on the Abinger edition of E. M. Forster's unfinished novels and stories.]

THREE KINGS OF ORIENT: THE CHANGING FACE OF MONARCHY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Part II: A little question of dynastic survival: King Bhumiphol Adulyadej of Thailand

by Roger Kershaw

ABSOLUTE Monarchy in Thailand realized its most sublime expression under King Chulalongkorn or Rama V of the Chakri Dynasty, whose reign spanned the years 1868-1910. This is not to say that the magical, quasi-divine pretensions of the monarch had discovered a new vitality in face of the challenge of modernization. On the contrary, modernization was a far-reaching process initiated by the monarchy itself, with monarchical power its first beneficiary. It was not the doctrine of absolutism that underwent change but the capacity of the monarch to project his power into nearly all corners of the kingdom and quarters of the population by means of a modernized bureaucracy. The power of Rama V was not, however, adequate to preserve the old empire of Siam from all encroachments of European imperialism. Laos and north-west Cambodia were lost to the French, the Shan States of northern Burma and the northern Malay States to the British. Moreover, Britain's dominant position in the Siamese economy must be reckoned as part of the price Siam paid for its political independence. But in the estimation of the Thai people of today it was King Chulalongkorn who not merely saved Siam but made it a Great Power —for independence on a continent of colonies has an undeniable quality of greatness. The cult of Phra Chunlachormklao, observed each October 23rd at the Equestrian Statue in Bangkok, overshadows the cult of every other monarch of the dynasty.

The achievements of the Fifth Reign were due, of course, not simply to the modernization of the bureaucracy but to the genius of the King as chief executive. One reason why royal absolutism was cut short in 1932—the reason most commonly acknowledged—was that the new bureaucratic class were not content to execute the decisions of kings and their courtly advisers: they wished to share in power, even usurp it. But a factor of equal importance was the inferior calibre of the two sons of Chulalongkorn who succeeded him. The first of these, Rama VI, did much to create a Thai nationalist consciousness, but in so far as nationalism enhanced expectations of national greatness and obsessions about decline, it was a legacy of mixed value for the dilettantish and indecisive Prajadhipok, the last absolute ruler.[1]

Constitutionalism and democracy are now firmly incorporated as formal attributes of Thai nationalism and it is commonly claimed and widely accepted that the Thai monarchy has survived to this day because it ceased to exercise political power, absolute or otherwise, after 1932. It

is also held that by remaining 'above politics' the monarchy plays a vital part in preserving national unity—in other words, in reducing the level of conflict. Indeed the existence of the monarchy has moderated many conflicts but it has not resolved them, only postponed their solution. Some would argue that the monarchy has not stood above politics at all but has thrown its weight behind conservative interests, or been mobilized by them in their own support. Scarcely had King Prajadhipok been deprived of absolute power than he intervened with an influential critique of Pridi Phanomyong's socialist economics. Monarchy was relegated to the background during the era of Field Marshal Phibul Songkhram (straddling most of the nineteen-thirties, forties and fifties, and coincident for part of the time with the minority of Ananta) but Field Marshals Sarit and Thanom brought it back into play in the nineteen-sixties as a provider of legitimating ritual for *their* half-baked, tin-hat absolutism and as a bulwark against the inroads of Communism from Indochina.

King Bhumiphol, 40 years old in 1967, abhorred his exploitation by a self-interested and self-appointed power-group. Certainly he saw it as his duty to help to preserve Thailand from revolution but a monarchy which was identified with corrupt, military regimes would simply have guaranteed its own early extinction. Bhumiphol therefore set himself the task of fostering respect for religion and love for a monarchy which, while relying mainly on its traditional assets in relation to the peasantry, would be forward-looking like that of Bhumiphol's august grandfather and earlier Chakris. However, after three decades in obscurity the monarchy could hardly be a source of dramatic initiatives. Nor was it in Bhumiphol's character or training to be so overtly political. Rather, he appealed to the patriotism and social responsibility of the university students: the dedication of this future elite could slowly raise the quality of public life and the performance of the bureaucracy, while their good example might foster social responsibility and political restraint among less privileged Thais, as popular horizons and aspirations expanded. At the same time, the university students and those recently graduated may be seen as a 'constituency' if not exactly a 'power-base' of the King up to about 1974, as he sought to escape military domination and free himself for a more effective contribution to national unity. Thus in relation to the military dictatorship the King exerted a progressive, not conservative influence.

Only in relation to radical socialism and Communism were his aims 'conservative', and it will seem either superfluous or prejudiced to say that he was thereby 'taking sides'. Obviously, unless the monarchy is entirely passive it must exert its influence on the side of its self-preservation. In any case, Bhumiphol almost certainly sees the preservation of the monarchy as a means to an end—the people's happiness through evolutionary change —not as an end *per se*. But only in a nation where anti-monarchism does not yet figure on the 'political agenda' in any form can a self-preserving and anti-revolutionary monarchy be said to be in some sense 'above politics'. By 1974 at the latest, quite apart from the insurgency, Marxism had gained a strong foothold if not the upper hand among the leaders of the Thai

student movement—the very movement which the King had subtly encouraged for a number of years and had tacitly supported in October 1973 when he put an end to the battle of Bangkok (the bloody clashes between students and the forces of the Thanom-Praphat regime) by commanding the two dictators and their heir designate, Colonel Narong, to leave Thailand. Considering the steady loss of 400-500 lives each year in the Communist insurgency in the more remote regions, Marxism among the young intelligentsia added a frightening dimension to the national crisis. The King's gradual disaffection from the student movement between 1974-76 and perhaps even from the democracy which his actions had done so much to usher in, was perfectly consistent. But ironically, the rank and file of the student movement accepted the claim of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) to be fighting for democracy and some saw no contradiction between the aims of the CPT and preservation of the monarchy (which the former was careful never to criticize).[2] Being unconscious of the anti-monarchical implications of their politics, many students could regard the King's change of attitude as proof of his 'insincerity' and bias.

We would agree that he was taking sides, while sympathizing with his predicament. From one point of view, Communism was already 'within the gates': passivity was out of the question. Viewed in another way, if the monarchy at the very centre of the social web could not defend itself when under direct political attack, how, psychologically, could the more peripheral but ultimately dependent segments be expected to hold together? Only in December 1975 Thailand's most closely related monarchy, the Lao, was abolished by the new Communist government—a sobering portent. Besides, Bhumiphol is nothing if not a 'political animal', ever aware of the shifting configuration of power and the increasing importance of public opinion in this configuration. Even if the principal contribution which he makes to the long-term defence of Thailand against revolution is in the form of his inherent, traditional attributes, he must also remain politically 'viable' on a day-to-day basis: precisely by rejecting the option of close identification with the military he has cast himself in the role of a political actor in search of alternative partners. But the paradox which accompanies 'politicization' is that the King will be seen to be taking sides on occasion (especially when the coveted middle ground shifts one way or the other), contrary to his higher purpose, to be a unifying symbol. Politicization also means exposure and vulnerability.

In relation to the student movement in 1976, the shift of public opinion against the students was possibly a more decisive, immediate consideration for the King than the students' anti-monarchism. But the two factors were intimately linked. Without doubt the students were not 'abandoned' without some heart-searching but the King's hand was forced. Certain student elements (those who knew perfectly well what the CPT was fighting for) published vicious propaganda against the monarchy in broadsheet form. If the monarchy showed itself indifferent or impotent in face of such affronts, its supporters among various patriotic organizations and citizens' groups might take the law into their own hands (indeed they did

so after a student who could pass as the more intelligent twin of the Crown Prince was given a mock hanging at Thammasat University on 4 October 1976). Worse still, their morale, and ultimately the morale of wider circles of the population, would sink in face of the CPT's war of attrition. Above all, the morale of the Armed Forces, provincial policemen and Border Patrol Police would be affected if the arrogance and revolutionary rhetoric of the students seemed to be calling the political shots at the capital (who will say that there was no element of morale-boosting in the decision of a certain B.P.P. commander to send his men to Bangkok to 'defend the monarchy' and, in the event, invade Thammasat University on 6 October?).

Yet however justified the apprehensions of the King, the manner in which the democracy of 1975-76 ended—with a massacre of university students which the King did not intervene to prevent, followed by an Army coup which he did not oppose—destroyed his standing with Thai liberals and the student movement. The massacred students had been protesting against the return of Field Marshal Thanom in the guise of a monk, doing merit at a royal temple. Thus the King had already signalled his change of heart in a deeply meaningful, even provocative, way. Kukrit Pramoj, a former Prime Minister and one-time confidante of the King, pleaded in vain for the monarch not to take sides.[3] Many students must have seen the unscheduled return of the Crown Prince from a military training course in Australia on the night of 1-2 October as a move in the same sinister game, for according to an aide-de-camp at the airport, it was the Prince's deep concern about national developments that had brought him home.[4] The monarchy appeared to have become the willing tool of the extreme Right in resistance to all manner of reform, any advocacy of which risked being branded as 'Communism' during 1976 and 1977. The King further damaged his reputation in liberal quarters by personally selecting the Judge Thanin Kraivichien as Prime Minister from a short-list prepared by the Armed Forces. Thanin as Prime Minister proved as sternly anti-Communist (and, for the time being, anti-democratic and anti-liberal) as he had been on the TV series which originally brought him to the attention of the public. It was common knowledge in the capital that Thanin's government lasted a full year up until 20 October 1977—some six months beyond the point at which the Armed Forces leaders themselves had concluded that he was too inflexible—only with the protection of the Palace, and that in the end the 'Revolutionary Group' or Armed Forces junta ousted him without seeking royal approval. The King continued to show his sympathy for Thanin by wearing civilian dress on occasions when military uniform would have been prescribed, and by appointing Thanin Privy Councillor on 15 December 1977 (Kukrit Pramoj's newspaper ran this item of news in pointed juxtaposition with a lead story about an increase of 'madness' in Bangkok!). It was again common knowledge among intelligentsia and army personnel that the internationally embarrassing trial of eighteen students in a military court, in connection with 'October 6', could not be disposed of in the early months of General Kriangsak's ministry

because the Palace was prepared neither to see the *lèse-majesté* charges brushed aside under a precipitate royal amnesty, nor to allow Kriangsak's 'usurper' government the luxury of a smooth shift back into liberal gear. Finally the King gave the green light to an Amnesty Bill, signing it into law on 15 September 1978. General Kriangsak declared on this occasion that His Majesty had taken the initiative in the matter some time previously, for the sake of national unity. But this can only be true in the sense of the King judging the moment ripe to accede to Kriangsak's wish. As liberals would note, Kriangsak had seemed to hint at royal obstruction in April when he explained to the international press in Hong Kong that 'the charges against the students are regarded in Thailand as among the most serious offences, especially with regard to *lèse-majesté*'.[5]

In the context of our discussion of liberal perceptions of the monarchy during the Thanin interlude and after, it is indispensable to record, also, the emergence of intense animosity towards Queen Sirikit. The foreign observer can do little more than to mention what was widely rumoured, as it is easier to identify 'fiction' (impossible to believe) than 'fact' (impossible to prove). But a composite liberal 'profile' would start from the proposition that the Queen, while still a woman of dazzling beauty, has reached an age at which she begins to be preoccupied with the future of her son, Prince Vajiralongkorn (the Crown Prince) and problems of the dynasty. Incensed by the anti-monarchical spirit among students and the insult to her son, it is she (it is said) who determined the choice of the obsequious Thanin, she and her faction at court who caused the King's loyal, but brilliant and outspoken old servant, Kukrit Pramoj, to be ostracized. The marriage of the Crown Prince to his first cousin (the Queen's niece) on 3 January 1977 was a reputed 'Queen's move' on behalf of her clan, the Kitiyakorn, a development of the brilliant 'opening' by her father in the days of her own engagement in 1949. Her relatives were alleged to be exerting pressure on the bureaucracy to have liberals transferred from positions of influence in the public service. Certain summonses to the Palace appeared to be issued without the authority of the King. By her appearances in uniform and participation in activities such as rifle practice the Queen was seen as collaborating with the Thanin formula of national salvation through a garrison state and martial monarchy. Hers is also assumed to have been the guiding hand behind the forays of the Crown Prince into the front line of counter-insurgency.

It was precisely this aspect of Palace policy (the schedules of the Royal Family are of course drawn up by the Palace) that was attacked by Kukrit Pramoj in February 1977, following a report that the Crown Prince's convoy had been fired on in Pechabun Province.[6] All that Kukrit argued in print was that it was intolerable that the heir to the throne should be exposed to mortal danger; he demanded to know, and did not state that he already knew, who was responsible. But the knowledgeable public will have understood his attack as a criticism of the Prime Minister (Thanin) and the Queen, as the responsible party, and may have guessed that Kukrit had reservations about the Crown Prince's militaristic image as such.

Reading between the lines of Kukrit's journalism is something of a national pass-time of the middle class. Not long before, he had written with feeling of the baleful influence of Dowager Empresses in Chinese history;[7] some readers were prompt to draw a parallel with Thailand. Shortly afterwards he wrote at some length in praise of Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain in her Jubilee Year, pointing out that despite Britain's loss of empire, and economic decline, the glory of the English throne had grown, thanks to the dignity of its incumbent and her ability to retain the love of the vast majority of her people.[8] Again, some readers were quick to assume an adverse comparison with developments in Thailand. Whether or not Kukrit has ever committed the thesis to paper, it is in fact his view that the Royal Family must play a unifying role in relation to *all* their subjects, including the insurgents. He does not deny the importance of military suppression, but the Royal Family must not be directly identified with it—their task should fall, so to speak, on the 'psychological warfare' side of the operation, offering hope of reconciliation and reacceptance into the national community for any who were led astray and are prone to have a change of heart. In the terms of this quite radical thesis the CPT are 'the Thai opposition', not just a domestic but (in the eyes of the community) a 'domesticated' force. The monarch must not take sides.

While Kukrit Pramoj was developing his oblique critique of trends at the Palace and the 'front line', the Communist Party itself threw caution to the winds and began a series of direct attacks on the Royal Family in its radio transmissions from China. As if to confirm Kukrit's worst fears, Princess Wibhawadi, a secretary and emissary of the Queen, was killed by Communist gunfire while travelling by helicopter in a danger zone of Surat Thani Province—on the very day, 16 February, on which Kukrit voiced his concern for the safety of the Crown Prince. The Voice of the People of Thailand took up the question of royal sponsorship of counter-insurgency after the press had written with outrage of Princess Wibhawadi's 'murder'. Up until October 1977 the VOPT played on the theme that the King ('the Arch-Feudalist') was in league with the Armed Forces leaders ('the warlord clique') to suppress the people. He was alleged to share responsibility for the massacre at Thammasat because of the special loyalty of the Border Patrol Police to the throne. But after the fall of Thanin the transmitter focused on *division* between Palace and military; stressed the importance of the Queen ('the female feudalist') as a power behind the throne; identified the Crown Prince as her instrument; and saw fear for the future (specifically, apprehensions about the fate of the Crown Prince) behind the elevation of the talented Princess Sirindhorn to become an apparent heir to the throne after the heir apparent, on the King's 50th Birthday, 5 December 1977.[9]

In deciding that the monarchy was fair game, the CPT showed sensitivity to the mood of certain urban circles following the monarchy's adoption of a conspicuously political, less transcendental role. Indeed the Communists obviously picked up their material from Bangkok gossip. What they had failed to pick up was the widespread *popular* belief, and delight,

that 'our next monarch is to be a Queen' (whether or not the Crown Prince survived his father!). Nor, it seems, had they heard the report that the Queen had *withdrawn* her favour from her son, because of the startling *decolletées* of his consort (which had shocked the public too) and the failure of the young couple to pay courtesy calls on Her Majesty as often as she deemed appropriate. And there was the fact that the first royal pregnancy, announced in April 1977, had ended tragically. According to one rumour of very limited circulation, certain 'lesser evil' considerations were part of the circumstances surrounding the 'unhappy event'. It cannot be ruled out that such whispers were a form of malicious wish-fulfilment for those who had predicted the worst from the latest cross-cousin marriage in an outstandingly endogamous royal line (a healthy royal daughter was in fact born on 7 December 1978). Nevertheless, fear that the line *might* not be capable of continuation through the official heir would have helped to heal any possible division of opinion between King and Queen over Sirindhorn's promotion (inevitably—though VOPT's view is unclear in this respect—there had been some speculation that it was a move by the King counter to the Queen's aspirations). At any rate, the Communists were not subtle enough to consider whether criticism of the Queen's unwholesome 'influence' had been less a form of attack on the King than a possible means of avoidance of such attacks, by loyal people who were bewildered by the King's behaviour and needed to see him as the victim of cabal (this interpretation might well apply to Kukrit). The Communists, like many liberals, failed to consider whether the King's confidence in Thanin was not due in large measure to the latter's unshakable integrity in the battle against corruption—rather than the 'urgings of the Queen.' They failed to welcome the King's alliance with Thanin for what it essentially was: an alliance against military power. The VOPT could only mock the division between the King and the Army, and their inferred struggle for control of the Police, as a symptom of the instability of the 'ruling class'.[10] Yet it is remarkable that after 10 January 1978, broadcast propaganda against the monarchy ceased dramatically. Had the CPT perhaps sensed a change of mood in Bangkok in response, for instance, to the brilliant decision to bring Princess Sirindhorn to the fore as an unspoken, substitute heir? To all appearances the monarchy had won an important tactical battle.[11]

At this point a few words of commentary will be in order, on popular, semi-educated urban opinion. We have suggested that the elevation of Princess Sirindhorn was a brilliant decision. This is so because of the failure of the intensive public promotion of the Crown Prince's image as well as the exceptional qualities of the Princess herself: her academic distinction (only slightly overplayed by the media), her almost maternal maturity in her early twenties, combined with a delightful modesty and lack of airs which speak of 'true breeding' in any language. The Prince, by contrast, has appeared to have difficulty in executing his public duties with dignity. He was gauche where he tried to be gallant. Eyes and voice lacked the lustre of intelligence. The contrast between the royal siblings added fuel to the popular view that an inbred royal line may sometimes produce

a genius but no less often a nonentity. The consort of the Prince, a graduate of Secondary Form 2, reinforced the contrast. Besides, for the Crown Prince to marry his cousin just did not seem 'up-to-date'. If the King was responding to *this* mood, his action illustrates, not for the first time, a high degree of political acumen and the excellence of Palace intelligence about movements of public opinion (as, earlier, in October 1976, and later, with the amnesty of September 1978).

Now simple folk do not well understand the niceties of the law. One may smile at their confidence that Princess Sirindhorn was to be their next Queen. One need not accept, either, the suggestion of the Communist transmitter that the elevation was a precaution of the monarchy against any accident which might befall the Crown Prince from 'internal causes'—meaning, apparently, actions initiated by the military to check the use of the Crown Prince as an agent of the monarch's, or indirectly the Queen's, influence in the Army. In fact, if, as rumoured, the Prince becomes a 'non-person' at court his resentment could make him an attractive rallying-point of military opposition to an independent throne. And what of the VOPT's reference to 'external causes' of the Crown Prince's demise—meaning, presumably, death in action? The VOPT assumed fear in the Palace *lest* the Prince should succumb. However, there was no sign of the Palace heeding Kukrit's advice to stop sending the Prince into danger zones. On the contrary, this policy did not cease, and on 1 September 1978 there was an ominous incident in which his helicopter was hit by ground fire. But in that case, what *is* the nature of the Queen's 'regard' for her son? Has a short-lived 'blaze of glory' become a more desirable scenario than the imaginable alternatives?

We have suggested that any doubts about the continuation of the line would have provided a basis for agreement between King and Queen on the elevation of the Princess. Certainly the ceremony could not conceivably have taken place without the Queen's freely given support. Moreover, the reports of the Queen's disappointment in her daughter-in-law seem authentic. Is there any reason for supposing that reservations about the heir apparent could have been shared at an earlier date? We may dispose at once of the innuendo against the Queen regarding her 'promotion of the Kitiyakorn interest' by way of a cross-cousin marriage. There is an almost certainly reliable report that the Queen had made overtures to a member of the court for the hand of his daughter, a university student, but the girl refused. But why then were enquiries not made among other families? Why the haste to contract an engagement after the Prince's return from Australia? Why indeed his return before the end of his training course?

If we refrain from giving a direct answer, it is not for reasons of ignorance. Suffice it to say that 'concern about national developments' had nothing to do with the case, but a crisis of a kind which can place two sets of parents in a state of unwelcome confrontation at any time. This crisis could not be solved by a union of families because although the two sides were close in rank, the inferior of the two had compromised rather than enhanced

their prospects, by being in a position to pride themselves prematurely on the destiny of their offspring: *quod nascetur ex te regale, vocabitur filius principis.* Indeed the sequel could yet prove to be one of the greatest ironies of modern Thai history: *impleti sunt dies ut pareret, et peperit filium suum primogenitum.* Irony or no, the Royal Family must have been under intense pressure from the quarter in question to solemnize the match. It is difficult to assume that the pamphlets which attacked the engagement of Mom Luang Soamsawali to the Crown Prince were all the work of purely disinterested patriots. It is also difficult to imagine that the Royal Family *could* have found anyone, in the circumstances (including the desperately short notice), but a member of the Queen's own family. More important still, one begins to see the glimmer of a partial, alternative hypothesis about the King's failure to prevent or limit the bloodshed at Thammasat University on 6 October 1976. For all that he may have been moving with a current of opinion against the students, was his mind not completely taken up, at that precise moment, with other things: not simply with short-term solutions to a family crisis but with the profound implications, for a once again essentially *political* dynasty, of the unspeakable irresponsibility of its next title-bearer? This, in dangerous times, was a burden to give any monarch pause.

NOTES

1. A leading Thai intellectual, Sulak Sivaraks, has recently discussed the last days of the absolute monarchy in his essay 'Anakhot khong thai' (The future of Thailand), *Sangkhomsatparithat* (Social Science Review), June-August 1976. This essay is important as a contribution or stimulus — inevitably controversial in the Thai context — to a debate on the role of monarchy. Few readers in 1976 will have failed to see the relevance of S. Sivaraks's remarks about the 'inevitability of degeneration' to a contemporary situation in which the heir to the throne had shown no evidence of outstanding gifts.
2. Cf. the opening discussion in Thomas A. Marks, 'The Thai monarchy under siege', *Asia Quarterly* 1978/2.
3. Kukrit Pramoj, 'Khao nork na', *Siam Rat*, 28 September 1976 (reprinted in Kukrit Pramoj, *Khao Nork Na*, Bangkok, Siam Rat, 1977; pp 119-126). Kukrit could not, of course, accuse the King of taking sides but argued movingly that accusations that he *had* taken sides must be false.
4. *Thai Rat*, 3 October 1976.
5. *Bangkok Post*, 7 April 1978. The Prime Minister could also have been sensitive to public anger (no doubt one consideration in the King's mind too) though by now it was well on the wane. Some students were accused of subversive activity (mainly under laws enacted retrospectively) but the defendants in the *lèse-majesté* affair aroused more emotion in Thailand; (for opposite reasons) internationally (the manacles and sackcloth which symbolize the heinousness of this offence tend to arouse sympathy for the prisoner when seen by a Westerner).
6. Kukrit Pramoj, 'Khao klai na', *Siam Rat*, 16 February 1977.
7. Kukrit Pramoj, 'Kha klai na', *ibid.*, 22 December 1976.
8. Kukrit Pramoj, 'Kha klai na', *ibid.*, 25 February 1977.
9. Broadcasts of special interest of the Voice of the People of Thailand are

regularly published in English translation by the United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). A good tabular summary of broadcasts touching on the monarchy between 26 February 1977-10 January 1978 (based on FBIS) is given by Marks, *op. cit.* (The programme which speculated about motives for the elevation of the Princess was broadcast on 8 January 1978). N.B. The Palace Law lays down that a female may *not* succeed, but the new Constitution of 22 December 1978 indicates (Art. 20) that she may if a male heir be not available. Traditionally (and in the Palace Law) it is the monarch's prerogative to determine the succession (in conjunction with the National Assembly since 1932) but until the Constitution was changed it would have been difficult for the King to nominate his daughter. Even now it is merely *implicit* from Sirindhorn's new title — Chao Fa Maha Chakri Sirindhorn — that her rank is equivalent to that of the Crown Prince, though some detect overtones of precedence.

10. VOPT, 5 January 1978/FBIS, 11 January 1978. This important item is omitted, curiously, by Marks, *op. cit.* He does cite (without identifying the newspaper) VOPT's quotation of the extraordinary warning to the monarch from a military faction, regarding continued favour shown to Thanin (see 'Phraya Mai', *Dao Siam,* 28 December 1977), but seems to question its authenticity. On the other hand (but surely this is inaccurate) he says the 'press was rife' with reports of Bhumiphol's opposition to the military in October 1977.
11. The assessment that VOPT attacks ceased after 10 January is based on a perusal of all FBIS reports from January to October 1978 inclusive. The only exception was a couple of passing references, on the occasion of the amnesty, to 'big feudalist' participation in the 6 October 1976 massacre (VOPT, 15, 16 September 1978/FBIS, 19 September 1978).

[Dr. Kershaw's first article in the present series, *Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia,* was published in *Contemporary Review* (Vol. 234 No. 1359). His next article, *In Memoriam Sultan Yahya Petra of Kelantan, Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia* will appear in the June issue.]

POEMS

IMAGES OF AN UNDERGROUND MANXMAN

Perhaps then, sooner than
anyone would have guessed, we will meet
on the cold corner of some midnight street,
halfway between the small silver-green
meadow where we left our blamelessness
and the grey shore that whispered
to us of big ships, distant lands.

So let us be ready, we
who have conquered the flat horizon,
we who have counted familiar seasons
in strange cities far from the sea,
who held the cool heathered hills,
the dim melancholy glens, in their souls
and, innocent of reasons,
sensed the time to return.

Outside small furnished rooms
lit by transistor memories
and unfinished poems,
the night is holding its breath.

Pine-trees are imaginably tall,
distant: standing perfectly still
beneath a high,
glistering sky.

Above the thorns beside abandoned rail-tracks
brief wings flap
darkly, are gone.

Inside the casino on the promenade a small
white ball clatters to a stop,
is clutched by a numbered cup.

I do not know what time it is.

The lamplight winks,
the moment waits.

MICHAEL DAUGHERTY



TWO MINUTES SILENCE—NOVEMBER 1978

The traffic's been stopped by policemen wearing
white ceremonial gloves; hardly anyone's out
but the group at the Cenotaph holding flags
and sharp wreaths, wearing their suits and medals.
Trees in the Park have a burned-off appearance,
dark branches and twigs, a handful of leaves
yellow against the sky. It's eleven o'clock.

Childhood glimpse of the annual Silence:
forbidden to move as Big Ben froze my parents.
What to remember? The war that curtailed
their youthful courtship and made their marriage
fumbled passes for sex and fierce depressions?
Did my mother remember the air-raid shelters; my father
hear in that Sunday deafness the falling
bombs onto German homes beneath him?

I remember
the smell of washing, green soap bubbling,
roasting meat and cabbage boiling; I remember
the rolling steam, the zinc boiler, the stone floor,
the cold wintry condensation, forbidden to breathe.
I remember, a few years later, the church parades
for Scouts and cadets, a military band out front,
honouring soldiers who died by playing at soldiers.

A bugle sounds: that sound is a human life
blown through trees as a shell explodes. I wish only
to honour the dead,
the dead and the living who almost died,
without any trace of a wreath or a flag, without appearing
to honour the cause
or the criminal leaders who murdered them all.
I will not conspire with a bugle call
to honour the silence that made twelve million dead.

CAL CLOTHIER

WHO ARE THE HANDICAPPED?

by Joseph H. Allen

THE same concern and despair of a possible solution to a very stubborn problem are often expressed by a great majority of the community, as instanced in a recent correspondence I received as a Manager of the body referred to in the following letter:

> At a recent meeting of our Primary Schools' Joint Managing Body grave concern was expressed by one manager, and shared by all, at the decline in the behaviour patterns of children, even young children. At its worst, concern was expressed about increased involvement in child crime. It was felt that some of this is our responsibility and that we should make an effort, at least by talking about the problem.
>
> Whereupon an open meeting was eventually convened for parents, managers, teachers and all involved to discuss this serious social and educational problem.

Nevertheless, it is a perennial question that, unfortunately, is not going to be solved by lamentations and sterile discussion. Nor will any purpose be served by the apportionment of blame. The permissive society in which we live must be recognised as a fact. Realistically, if unfortunately, it is a society that will grow more amoral than moral: a society in which we, as responsible citizens, must seek more to influence than fundamentally to change. But what influence can we hope to exert?

At this point a study of the history of the particular social question will disclose a not too dissimilar comparison to the problem of world peace. In a solution to either problem there will be found advocates best described as *doves* and *hawks*.

Always, in the numerous educational conferences and debates, are to be found the *hawks* with their extreme opinion of a solution to the problem; to whom the cure for all crime is in the belief that repressive punishment is the sole deterrent. Directly opposed to such a solution are the *doves* or advocates equally persuaded that the cure to all social problems is implicit in the efficacy of the psychiatrist's couch. Not surprising, then, that a large proportion of opinion is left consumed by a sense of frustration.

Consequently, must the problem remain insoluble? I believe not. Personal experience in a long career in various educational fields has convinced me that a practical approach is not only possible but essential.

In the first instance, the suggestion could be described as no more than theoretical, prompted by an article I had recently read. The writer outlined the work done for the handicapped child and discussed the place of the handicapped child in our modern society:—a particularised discussion with neither a suggested connection with the *normal* child nor his social problems. The possible relationship between the two came later. At the time, I was intimately involved in work with a school for handicapped children.

Eventually the word 'handicapped' came to have a meaning other than that usually used to describe the *physically* handicapped: in fact, a realisa-

tion that physical disability is not the only cause of deprivation—easing away a biased conception that distorts our assessment of the real potential of the handicapped and one which often leads us to adopt a generally negative or sentimental approach in our association with the disabled. We are forced, unfortunately, to fail to appreciate the more positive aspect of that special gift they all seem to derive from their acceptance of their particular disability—an ability not only to cope with their physical handicap but to realise the need for a realistic understanding and social compassion within their community: something rarely equalled in our supposed *normal* schools.

In truth, the physically handicapped, I was led to observe, are so often far less at a moral and social disadvantage than those children of my acquaintance who appeared to be physically whole. A surmise which, if correct, must pose the following question: if within a school for physically handicapped it is possible to create a social ethos of highly desirable attainment why, in the supposed *normal* school, is the same quality of moral and social standards unattainable? The answer, experience has shown, is not too difficult to understand.

In the *normal* school, where a child's personal uncertainty and disruptive background is not recognised and appreciated as a handicap compared with the disability of the physically handicapped child, the *normal* handicap is often ignored:—a handicap often far more urgently in need of particular understanding and attention, than is the plight of a cripple.

In the physically handicapped school, a child's particular handicap is communally shared by both the other children and staff in mutual understanding and co-operation, thus creating a mutual social awareness far more intimate than that which exists among children and staff of the normal school.

In short, the unfortunate, *normal* child, because his handicap is not so blatantly apparent, can never expect to receive even a proportion of the understanding or concern of his particular moral and social disadvantages as that accorded the physically handicapped child: and this despite the suffering of the intensely painful affliction of a disturbing home background.

A reality that imposes a moral responsibility on every member of staff of a *normal*-named school is to be at least as conversant with the particular home backgrounds of the children they teach as are the staffs of special schools in understanding and administering to the physical disabilities of the children in their care: a responsibility that must be part of any social education.

Here, I believe, is the means by which sincere care and individual compassion can provide an important part-solution to an apparently insoluble problem.

QUARTERLY FILM REVIEW

by James Morton

SOME weeks I really wonder what I am doing sitting in a blacked-out room at unreasonable hours watching, and listening to, reel after reel of mindless garbage. And then there is a good streak which not only makes it all worth while but actually leaves an impression which can last literally for years. After that extravagant opening I hope the films live up to my salesmanship.

Woody Allen has often featured in my articles and the only film to which I have shown anything like affection was *Annie Hall*, the quasi-autobiographical story of his on-off affair with the actress Diane Keaton. Even that film was full of his never emptying box of tricks. Now he has made *Interiors*, a Checkovian tale of three sisters and their relationship to the parents in the process of divorce after many years of marriage. I forget which one of Wodehouse's characters it was who referred to some slice of life as being like a Russian drama where nothing much happens until the fourth act when the mujick shoots himself. If one wishes to carp this comment could be applied to *Interiors*. The whole film proceeds on a muted basis but with each frame there is an extension in the development of at least one of the characters. Genevieve Page is the slightly demented mother who visibly disintegrates in the face of her husband's implacable intention to divorce her and marry a rather overblown Jewish widow. Diane Keaton is the most accessible of the sisters. Allen, for once, has no part in this magnificently acted film. What is outstanding is the composition which has gone into each shot. Filmed mainly in the form of interior shots one can actually sense the effort he and his cameraman have made over the lighting and arrangements of each frame. At the time of writing there appear to be no plans to release the film but it will soon become standard repertory on the art house circuit.

In my time I have been to some fairly awful weddings, including one where the slightly drunken (and certainly unshaven) clergyman dropped a not quite extinguished cigarette-end on the chancel steps and snapped his fingers twice at the photographer hidden in the Lady Chapel so he would be able to get a snap of the Blessing. Then there was one when the bridegroom's father called out after the response, 'With all my wordly goods I thee endow', 'There goes his Lambretta'. *A Wedding*, the latest offering from Robert Altman has been compared to *M*A*S*H*, which was a film I disliked intensely. I thought that as a dissection of a rich society wedding, this new film was at times hysterically funny. It needs to be seen with a laughing audience in a full house but the danger in that will be that the jokes will be lost in the noise. The plot is very simple. An Italian family marries off its son to a rich Southern family. The film recounts the happy day from the entry of the bride to the nightfall. In between there are more jokes than can be reasonably counted. It is perhaps easiest to say that the groupie from Altman's *Nashville*, Geraldine Chaplin, is excellent as the

closet gay mistress of ceremonies. Nina van Pallant (of Nina and Frederick fame two decades ago?) is the drug addict mother of the bridegroom. Mia Farrow is the nymphomanic sister of the bride. One of the sisters' aunts is having an affaire with the black houseboy, an extremely large guest falls passionately in love with the bride's mother. The bride's father is desperate to return to Italy where he worked as a waiter. On the bride's side there is a wholly mad aunt—indeed it resembles and only slightly exaggerates every dreadful wedding with which one has been associated. An horrid example of life once more repeating art.

Michael Crichton is having something of a run at the moment. He has a good thriller *Coma* going the rounds and he has filmed *The First Great Train Robbery* from his own novel of more or less the same name. Genevieve Bujold is the young Doctor in the first film who wonders why so many young people end up in a coma after routine operations in a big Boston Hospital. It's unfair to disclose why they are but there is a very credible reason. It is also a sufficiently cynical film to make you wonder if she will in fact survive to the final credits. I certainly have no intention of telling you whether she does but she manages to generate sufficient interest in her character for you to hope she does. The film itself is really one of those Perils of Pauline with Ms Bujold moving from one crisis to the next, never quite sure who is on her side. It includes a very well done 'walk through the Old Dark House', in this case the New Dark Hospital but Crichton manages to make it quite scary. Really good Sunday afternoon fodder which carried the awful thought that it really could happen for you to carry as you leave the cinema.

Also good Sunday afternoon fodder is *The First Great Train Robbery* with Sean Connery and Donald Sutherland. This time the question is will they hijack a quantity of bullion bound for the Crimea in 1855? Aided and/or hindered by Lesley Ann Down (who was so good as Phyllis Dixey in the teleplay) and Wayne Sleep who seems to have forsaken ballet and is now appearing in Aladdin at the London Palladium, they embark on their venture which first requires them to obtain four impressions of four keys which are seemingly unreachable. How they manage this takes up the first and best two thirds of the film. Obviously something must and does go wrong but again it would be unfair to reveal what. There are liberal film quotations to while away any dull minutes. Buffs will recognise *Cat Ballou* and *The Magnificent Men in their Flying Machines.* As my companion said, 'They seem to be using the sets left over from *Oliver.*' But it's very good fun.

The French seem always to have at hand an inexhaustible stock of actors and actresses who are not necessarily what we would call *jeune premier* but who can nevertheless sustain a film. Michel Simon was a good example. His role seems to have been taken over by Phillipe Noiret. Annie Giradot has long been a favourite of mine but she (as indeed I am) is fast approaching a plump middle age. They combine in a film, *Dear Inspector,* by the darling of the Boulevards, Philip de Broca. Now in his time de Broca has produced some stunning films, notably *Roi de Coeurs* with Alan Bates and

Pierre Brasseur but in past years fewer and fewer of his films have crossed the channel.

The comment sadly applies to French films in general. Someone (who?) has been murdering Deputies in full Parisian daylight. Annie Giradot is the police inspector and Noiret the reluctant hanger-on reviving a past love affaire. In the end analysis neither really has much to do but they each do it extremely well. It is good to see Georges Wilson as one of the deputies who lasts well into the films. I remember seeing him years ago as the tramp in *Une Aussi Longue Absence*. He doesn't seem to have changed much and his diction is an example to many younger actors. I hope we shall soon see de Broca's *Le Carvaleur* which is presently selling out the cinemas in Paris. This time Annie Giradot plays with Jean Rochefort who after what seems like a lifetime as the hero's best friend has leapt to stardom. This film, the story of a concert pianist who cannot leave women alone, is of his partial come-uppance.

After *Dark Star* and *Assault on Precinct 13*, John Carpenter's *Halloween* is a little disappointing, although there are plenty of *frissons* to keep the audience on its toes. The story is the familiar one of the escaped mental patient out for revenge. Again more details will only serve to spoil the excitement but the film harks back to Hitchcock's *Psycho*. In fact Janet Leigh's daughter Jamie Lee Curtis is the heroine caught at the American trick 'n treat (what a nasty expression). Which is the killer and which is the joker?

The Picture Show Man allegedly stars Rod Taylor but in fact he must have been brought into this amiable, but not very substantial, tale of the decline of rival travelling picture showmen in the outback just before the arrival of sound, to try and persuade the distributors that they have a top name who might pull in the punters. In fact John Melion stars as the showman whose endeavours are continually sabotaged by Taylor. The style of the film could best be described as picaresque with Melion lurching from one minor crisis to the next. In fact the film could well be described as a precursor to *Newsfront*. There are an alarming number of parallels but whereas the latter has, as I have said before, been received rapturously by the buffs *Picture Showman* had to have its debut on the prestigious Sunday night spot on BBC. Careful questioning amongst my friends has so far not revealed anyone who saw it which is a pity because it has a deal of nostalgic charm and is very well acted.

Curiously enough on the day of writing this article it is twenty-five years ago exactly that Max Ophuls' masterpiece *Madam de* opened at the Cameo Polytechnic in London. It has now been revived, I think for the first time apart from showings over the years by the National Film Theatre, at the ever enterprising Camden Plaza. This was Ophuls' penultimate film and it is one of the half a dozen on which his reputation was finally based. It comes by way of being the middle part of what almost certainly amounts to a trilogy of films, *Le Plaisir*, *Madame de* and *Lola Montes*. I do not think that even in *Le Plaisir* Ophuls expresses quite such dazzling style.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

GOD INCARNATE

The Mystery of The Incarnation. Norman Anderson. Hodder & Stoughton. £3.50.

Professor Sir Norman Anderson has strong claims to be regarded, though he is the last person in the world to mention them, as the outstanding layman putting the intellectual Christian case in this country at the present time. There are others, not least Malcolm Muggeridge, who command a wider audience and do battle just as strenuously with the infidel. But Norman Anderson is unique in his challenge to the weak sisters on our own side. I hope that it is neither un-Christian nor disrespectful to refer to many contemporary theologians in that way.

What is so difficult to provide, and he provides superbly in a series of books, is a highly rational case for a traditional Christian position. When I say that his attitude is traditional, I mean that it is traditional in the sense of being an extension of a tradition. It is certainly not a mere repetition cunningly wrapped up of the doctrinal assertions of the last two thousand years.

Up till now I would have said that my favourite books by Norman Anderson were those which dealt on the one hand with the resurrection and on the other hand with comparative religion. (He is a special expert on Islam). Perhaps in time to come I and others will regard *The Mystery of the Incarnation* as the most valuable of all. Which is not to say that I rise from reading it with a very clear idea of how one ought to look on the incarnation. But no one with Christian leanings can fail to be drawn by it still further towards Christ.

Professor Anderson begins as positively as ever. 'I have opted', he says, 'for the word mystery, because I believe the incarnation is the most meaningful event that has ever happened, though we cannot fully understand it with our finite minds.' Again and again throughout the book he helps us forward with new insights and yet warns us in the same breath that when all is said and done this is a mystery and a mystery it will remain.

There is no opportunity here of indicating the immense range of his historical and theological knowledge. Here and elsewhere he presents himself as a 'lawyer among the theologians', but if there were such a thing as a gentlemen v. players match in the theological arena he would certainly be captain of the gentlemen!

It seems possible here to do no more than quote a few of his positive statements. Referring to the Trinity, he writes: 'The watershed from the point of view of his disciples was clearly the resurrection . . . it was in the light of His exaltation that they remembered words He had spoken during His earthly life, which they had been totally unable to understand at the time.' . . . 'It was consequent on His exaltation, too, that an embryonic belief in the Trinity must have begun to emerge. The confession "Jesus is Lord", with all that the title *kyrios* implies, proves that at a very early date the exalted Saviour was somehow identified with God.'

He is equally definite when he writes 'No understanding of the mystery of the Incarnation can be true to the biblical revelation unless it also explains the meaning and significance of the Atonement. Any Christology which concentrates on Emmanuel, God with us, at the expense of Jesus, God the

Saviour, must surely be defective; for soteriology and Christology are inextricably bound together.'

No one knows better than Professor Anderson the intellectual problem of grasping and holding in one's mind the two overwhelming truths contained in the doctrine of the Incarnation. 'How', he writes 'can we reconcile the essential Deity with full human experience? This is the age-old problem.' And Professor Anderson does not encapsulate a solution as though he were solving some crossword puzzle. Every word of his last chapter 'The Incarnation and personal Faith today' must be studied more than once. I end with one further quotation which means more to him than it has hitherto meant to me, but if it means so much to him one must keep worrying away at it. 'This, to me', he writes, 'is *the* secret of the Incarnation, that when God revealed himself as a man among men, the incarnate Son was utterly and completely dependent on his Father. There was nothing in this which was essentially alien to his pre-existence state and there was nothing which was not utterly human, for that was how man ought always to have lived'.

I cannot myself quite understand how in Professor Anderson's theological picture Christ was *equal* to God the Father. And the same question might be asked about the Holy Ghost. Divine, yes certainly, but equal? Even however to put the question so crudely may be to reveal that at least one more reading of this remarkable book is necessary.

FRANK LONGFORD

A MASTERLY CHEF DE CABINET

An End to Promises. Douglas Hurd. Collins. £4.95.

Douglas Hurd's book is an account, drawing—though only briefly—on his own diary, of his four years as Edward Heath's Political Secretary, when he played the part of a Lady Falkender—if such were possible—to a very different Leader. He conveys vividly the pell-mell quality of political life.

> 'On Sunday 8 December, for example, the Prime Minister entertained the Italian Prime Minister, Signor Rumor, to dinner at Chequers. The meal was hardly over when Mr. Heath flew to Sunningdale by helicopter to preside over the last stage of the conference on the future of Northern Ireland. Three days later it was time for the State Visit of President Mobutu of Zaire. Two days after that the European summit began in Copenhagen. These were four major events, two of them (Sunningdale and Copenhagen) of outstanding importance. They were all the kind of diplomatic event which in normal times Mr. Heath would much enjoy and at which he would perform very well. They all involved talks, travel, long meals, extensive briefing beforehand; yet none of them had anything to do with the crisis which was swallowing us up.'

He stood close to the throne, but was not present, of course, at Cabinet meetings, and was cut off equally from those sessions with top Civil Servants which were of major importance to one who wanted to get things done, and whom some have called 'a civil servant's Prime Minister'. Mr. Hurd reveals how smoothly and how disturbingly the bureaucrats take over and cocoon any Minister and especially a Prime Minister, and how difficult it is to keep lines open to party opinion. He writes with restraint and precision, and as a friend and admirer of 'Mr. Heath', as he calls him throughout; not the least of the book's merits is its coolness, its candour and its sharp refusal to use the over-indulgent, the over-rhetorical and over-familiar phrases. He salutes Mr.

Heath's immense industry, his courage, his total integrity, his refusal to put party before country, his unwillingness to personalise and cheapen. He hints at the exasperations too, the problems in Scotland (though he says hardly a word on devolution) and—as leitmotif—the recurrent difficulties over 'the Speech'.

> 'I seem to have spent all my working life drafting speeches for other people, and I hate it. It becomes almost intolerable when one has no clear guidance on what is needed. Over and over again we would start a day or a journey with a major speech looming at the end of it for which we were not ready . . .
>
> We often puzzled over this. It was not that Mr. Heath failed to understand the importance of speeches. He knew the magic of words, and often talked about it. In fact I believe this was the trouble. He was a perfectionist. We served up adequate drafts, which he saw were only adequate. It would take him hours to transform them—but the necessary hours were never there. They were swamped by meetings, and yet more meetings. So at the last minute the adequate draft was looked at, reluctantly approved, and unenthusiastically delivered. Next time of course would be different; but next time turned out much the same. It was a mystery and a tragedy that a man who possessed such a talent of exposition could not find a working method which turned it to good effect.'

The book is at its best when the restraint breaks down, and we are given these vivid inside glimpses of the working life of the man himself.

When he turns to issues Mr. Hurd is interesting on incomes policy, and the struggles with the miners in 1972 and in 1973/4. He is persuasive in his view that the Government, as ultimate employer, cannot stand aside on issues of wages in the very large public sector, emphasising how dependent it is on the skill (or otherwise) of each nationalised industry's Board, and how loaded against the public interest were the media, repeatedly featuring Trade Union officials who were always asking for more. He has shrewd ideas of his own, such as 'recalling' a negotiation when it got out of control. He was clearly a masterly but unobtrusive chef de cabinet, with memos, briefs and wise counsel readily at hand. He does not pretend that there are magic answers in politics, and he clearly has no more sympathy with dogma than he has with rhetoric. Politics clearly calls for immense patience, skill and dexterity. It also calls for luck. And if luck does not shine on you, all else is wasted.

ESMOND WRIGHT

THE GEOGRAPHY OF GESTURES

Gestures: Their Origins and Distribution. Desmond Morris, Peter Collett, Peter Marsh and Marie O'Shaugnessy. Jonathan Cape, £6.95.

Perhaps it is because the acquisition of verbal communication has been regarded as the crowning evolutionary achievement of Homo sapiens that the significance of human gesture has been relegated to a position in no way consonant with the important part which it plays in interpersonal contact. In fact, it is the conviction of the authors of this pioneering work that 'where communication of changing moods and emotional state is concerned . . . gestural information is even more important than verbal. Words are good for facts and for ideas, but without gestures, human social life would become a cold and mechanical process'.

The great problem confronting the authors was to devise a methodology

which would enable them to apply verbal analysis to the unspoken language of expressive movement—'To describe in words the visual qualities that make a painting by Rembrandt a great work of art is a daunting task, and to convey the precise significance of a fleeting gesture is equally challenging'. Appreciating how, by investigating the geography and history of art movements, it is possible to deepen the understanding of great works of art, the authors decided to apply a similar investigative process to the subject of gesture. Under the direction of the four authors, an Oxford research team, which included twenty-nine field-workers and interpreters in forty locations in twenty-five countries across western and southern Europe and the Mediterranean, set to work on a three-year project systematically tracing the origins and geographical range and distribution of twenty key gestures. A pictorial sheet displaying the twenty selected gestures—such as finger-crossing, nose-thumbing, cheek-screwing, nose-tapping and the giving of the palm-back V-sign—was shown to a total of 1,200 random subjects, who were invited to interpret each gesture. The gestures selected were all of the symbolic type, that is to say, a gesture which is not simply an emblematic mimic, but one which involves a process of abstraction and requires the acceptance of a local convention in order to be invested with communicable meaning.

A great deal of fascinating data regarding gestural concepts emerges from the authors' field study. Many of the gestures proved to be multi-message gestures; a phenomenon which the authors ascribe to the frequent local selection of variant symbolic pathways. In a number of instances there was even direct conflict in the interpretations offered in different zones. Surprisingly, perhaps, many gestures extended their range across national and linguistic borders, so that such labellings are 'British', 'French', 'Italian', and so forth, were impossible, giving the lie to the previous notion of so-called 'national gestures'—although the existence of territorial consistent *meanings* was established. Certain patterns emerged—such as the phenomenon of Gestures Boundary, in which some gestures were found to cease abruptly *within* a particular linguistic area, reflecting a cultural division within a nation which required elucidation in historical terms. A pioneer study of this kind throws up, as one would expect, many problems which must be the subject of further investigation, but the book is a stimulating one, evoking the critical gesture of thumbs up!

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

THE POETRY OF ROBERT SERVICE

Collected Poems of Robert Service. Ernest Benn. £8.50.
The Best of Robert Service. (Paperback). £2.95.

These two books of the works of this most popular poet, will, I am sure be enthusiastically welcomed by his many admirers. In the *Collected Poems* we have a treasure chest containing 'The Spell of the Yukon', 'Ballads of the Cheechako', 'Rhymes of a Rolling Stone', 'Rhymes of a Red Cross Man', 'Ballads of a Bohemian' and the 'Bar Room Ballads'. The easy style of Robert Service makes him a most readable poet. He described himself as a happy man, because his talent was in proportion to his ambition, and he was able to write the kind of verse that he liked to read. He wrote about everything he saw . . .

'The lonely sunsets flare forlorn
Down valleys dreadly desolate;
The lordly mountains sear in scorn
As still as death as stern as fate.'

So he describes the Yukon in 'The Land God Forgot'. He tells as vividly of the men and women who sort fame and fortune in its lonely wastes, where successes were few and failure usually meant death.

Many and varied were the characters who shared his Bohemian existence in Paris. Although he was by nature a solitary man, not given to making many friends, no one passed unnoticed. So that we may know who or what inspired each set of verses, during this time, they are linked by extracts from his diary, giving a complete picture of the hungry times, and the good times; and how the joy of his verses being accepted so often meant more than money to Robert Service.

With the outbreak of the 1914 war his whole world changed, but he continued to write to everyone he met, of the boys who marched gaily away to war full of Patriotic fervour, the hardened soldier who does his duty, and the women and children who love and fear for them. As an ambulance driver Robert Service served in the front line, and so we do not get the romantic death and glory view, but the full horror and futility of war. He writes . . . .

'And you yourself would mutter when
You took the things that once were men
And sped them through that zone of hate
To where the dripping surgeons wait;
And wonder too if in God's sight
War ever, ever can be right.'

His views in every aspect of life and death are presented to us to take or leave as we will; and all of them are assembled in this book to give us the whole picture of his life and times, an asset to any bookshelf.

The paperback contains over one hundred of the best and most popular poems. It must have been very difficult to decide which to include. Ernest Benn have done a superb job, and given us a very well balanced selection. To anyone unfamiliar with the works of Service this book would be a perfect introduction, and to those already initiated it is an ideal travelling companion.

CLARE MCCARTHY

HITLER AND HIS FAMILY

The Memoirs of Bridget Hitler, edited by Michael Unger. Duckworth. £4.95.

These memoirs were apparently typewritten in America by the Irish-born wife of Alois Hitler, Adolf's half-brother. Mr. Unger of the *Liverpool Daily Post* states that they were found among the papers of literary agent, Dr. Edmund Pauker, and passed to the New York Public Library. This is the first full, though unfinished, version published.

Bridget and Alois settled in Liverpool, and there, from November. 1912 to April 1913, they were joined as 'unwelcome guest' by Adolf, to evade military service in Austria. She found him dirty, dishevelled, ill, a 'weak and spineless' dabbler in art who made no effort to work but studied world maps and talked of a resurrected Germany that would regain power and conquer first France, then England. When Adolf's mother died in 1908, he lived on the family inheritance, did no work, sponged on Alois's sister Angela until she tired of him, then contrived a lodging in, of all places, a municipal home for old men! He sold a house, pocketing Alois's share of the proceeds. Not exactly an exalted picture of the future dictator.

When Adolf was climbing to power as Führer of the Nazi party, Alois left Bridget to care for their son Patrick, went to Germany to seek employment

with Adolf's help; and there bigamously married again. At eighteen, young Pat decided to join his father under Uncle Adolf's patronage, and Bridget duly followed. Thus she was able, from intimate contact, to study his private life; and a scathing exposure she makes of it. There was, for instance, one stormy scene when Adolf, enraged at articles about him and the family that Pat had written in the British press, told him 'Your father isn't related to me. He had a different father and mother. He just lived in the family as an adopted child' and ordered Pat to return to England and publish the fact. It was a trick, Bridget states, to refute the adverse publicity which Adolf feared would harm him, though subsequently he admitted the Alois relationship and in a 1938 will, discovered in 1953, he had left Alois 60,000 Marks.

Another disclosure, based on an investigation made by Leo, the brother of Adolf's niece Geli, on whom he had jealously doted, was that Adolf did shoot her in a fit of rage; it was not suicide. Leo was eventually killed in an effort to reach Austria.

Bridget's account of the Führer, his chief henchmen and their methods is ruthlessly illuminating. She calls him arch-hypocrite, master double-crosser, 'a confident actor with method in his greatest madness.' Mr. Unger, in his Introduction, concedes that at times she was inaccurate but claims that she writes simply and sensibly, as a whole her memoirs are not over-written, her description of Adolf's arrival in Liverpool is 'circumstantial and convincing in itself. The question must remain open.' With so much that is unverifiable because it was personal and secret at the time, all one can say of the book is that it is often startlingly revelatory and accords with the testimony of others on Hitler's abnormalities.

TREVOR ALLEN

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Crossman Diaries 1964-1970. (Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape. £8.95). Anthony Howard has introduced and edited these selections from the three volumes of Richard Crossman's diary during his six years as a Cabinet Minister, *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister.* Each volume covered two years, first as Minister of Housing, 1966-68 as Leader of the House of Commons and 1968-70 as Secretary of State for Social Services. These three volumes, containing over a million words, were themselves selected by Dr. Janet Morgan from the original transcript, taken from dictated tapes, of some three million words. The new one volume version is a tenth of the original: some 300,000 words. Mr. Howard has excised most of the 'side-road excursions off the main thoroughfare' and has 'tried as a general rule to preserve (apart from the mustier examples of Departmental detail) the various episodes in which Crossman was himself closely involved—at the cost, admittedly, of ditching those parts of the political history of 1964-70 at which he was a mere spectator'. For example, by comparison with the contents of Volume III of the main work, we have at length Crossman's account of the Cabinet's acute differences following Barbara Castle's White Paper, *In Place of Strife,* in January 1969, and the question of including in the proposed industrial relations bill compulsory ballots before official strikes and the fining of recalcitrant unofficial strikers. The opposition in Cabinet was led by Jim Callaghan, then Home Secretary, who wished to 'set up the Commission, put the Trade Unions on their honour and do what you can'. 'Harold and Barbara then made

it that there would be horse-laugh from the general public and that the government must take power to control strikes'. Jim Callaghan won the day eventually in Cabinet and Barbara Castle and the Prime Minister were left stranded and had to withdraw the penal proposals. Mr. Howard has retained in this volume many of Crossman's comments, often caustic, on his colleagues and other public figures. Crossman's version of these years has to be read in conjunction with other views. While Mr. Howard concedes that this one volume edition cannot pretend to provide a comprehensive picture of domestic politics during these years, 'on the other hand, I believe it does offer a striking self-portrait of the life of a senior politician—as well as a view, certainly no less impressionistic than Sir Harold Wilson's own, of the 1964-70 Labour Government'.

Collected Poems 1944-1979 (Hutchinson. £4.95). Kingsley Amis has brought together 104 of his poems, rather less well known than his novels, in this admirable collection. They include poems already published in previous collections, *Bright November* (1047), *A Case of Samples* (1956) and *A Look Round the Estate* (1967). The remaining twenty are now collected together, in this volume, for the first time.

Foul Bills and Dagger Money (Cassell. £6.95). Since the twelfth century itinerant judges have travelled the country on circuit and tried cases on Assize. Only recently have Assize Courts given way to Crown Courts, but High Court Judges still travel round the circuits. In this very enjoyable volume, Dick Hamilton tells the story of the Northern Circuit since its inception in 1176. It is all about the administration of justice in the North of England from those early times, written informally with plenty of anecdotes and descriptions of particular cases. One includes a detailed contemporary report of a coiner's trial at York in 1696. There is a great deal about the life of judges and barristers on circuit and of famous, or notorious, characters attached to it at some time in their careers, for example, Judge Jeffreys, James Boswell and Lord Birkenhead. More about Lord Eldon's travels on the Circuit would have been an advantage. His anecdote book is a delight. This volume by Dick Hamilton is written as much for the general public as for the lawyer and will be widely enjoyed.

Alcohol and Alcoholism (Tavistock Publications. Associated Book Publishers Ltd. £1.95; paperback). This is a highly authoritative Report of a Special Committee of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, under the chairmanship of Dr. G. Edwards. As the Report points, there is today a greater awareness of alcohdism as a problem. On the other hand, there is widespread ignorance of its extent and effects in terms of health and social well being in the nation as a whole and among individuals. Indeed there is a public reluctance to be better informed. The stark facts and arguments set out in this Report, if widely read, should greatly help to end this appalling apathy. In his Foreword, Sir Martin Roth, Professor of Psychiatry at Cambridge and Past President of the Royal College, commends this small volume as 'a remarkably comprehensive account of the epidemiology, social background, clinical features, and management of alcoholic dependence'. The Report stresses what is fundamentally at stake: 'Lives are being ruined on a large scale by the abuse of alcohol'. It is estimated that at least 300,000 people have 'drinking problems of such severity as to merit the conventional label of "alcohol-

ism".' Apart from these, there is much excessive drinking with potential alcohol related disabilities. Sir Martin Roth summarises these. Apart from liver disease and delirium tremens which are generally known, he cites 'the part it plays in causation of diseases of the pancreas, cancer of the oesophagus and stomach, tuberculosis, anaemia, vitamin deficiency, and some grave forms of heart disease'. He writes: 'Even greater ignorance prevails regarding the wide range of mental disorders associated with chronic alcoholic dependence'. This is all discussed in the Report and the whole question of alcoholic dependence.

The growth in recent years has been alarming. The Report points out that 'the number of people admitted to mental hospital with a diagnosis of alcoholism or alcohol psychosis has been climbing at a rate of about 10% each year—from 439 in 1949 to 13,432 in 1975' and 14,557 in 1976. Between 1950 and 1974 the annual drunkenness arrests rose from 47,717 to 103,203. This follows a great increase in drinking habits. For example, since 1969 the 'consumption of wine has nearly doubled' and 'that of spirits has exactly doubled'. Apart from treatment, the Report argues for a new emphasis on prevention which 'is receiving pitifully inadequate attention'. This should be on government, social and personal levels, with the need for specific goals. For example, the national *per capita* alcohol consumption should not rise and a very careful check kept upon alcohol related diseases. No doubt, publicity would play its part. Furthermore, the Report looks to the acceptance of 'safe levels of drinking'. 'We would suggest that an intake of four pints of beer a day, four doubles of spirits, or one standard-sized bottle of wine constitute guidelines for the upper limit of drinking. It is unwise to make a habit of drinking even at these levels, and anyone driving a vehicle should not drink at all before driving'. The Report makes it quite clear that these levels may be too high for some people. It all depends upon the particular individual. The great difficulty, as the Report realises, is giving effect to its recommendations. Ultimately it must depend upon willing public acceptance. A report of this calibre and authority, if sufficiently appreciated, should help greatly towards this end.

Thomas Hardy (Penguin Books). The Penguin English Library Series have just published six of Hardy's novels in paperback and also a volume of *Selected Poems* (£1.00), also in paperback. The latter has been edited with an Introduction and Notes by David Wright. This selection, covering more than 400 pages, is 'less than half of Hardy's entire output', and as such is bound to be in some measure personal to the collector. Nonetheless it will be widely welcomed. Each of the novels here published contains a useful chronology and is edited with notes and an Introduction. David Wright also edits *Under the Greenwood Tree* (70p). Ronald Blythe introduces *Far From the Madding Crowd* (80p). George Woodcock edits *The Return of the Native* (80p), while *The Mayor of Casterbridge* (80p) is edited by Martin Seymour-Smith. David Skilton edits *Tess of the D'Urbevilles* (80p) with a separate Introduction by A. Alvarez. C. H. Sisson is responsible for *Jude the Obscure* (80p).

The Mill on the Floss (Penguin Books. 95p). The serialisation on television of George Eliot's masterpiece provides the occasion for the publication of this edition in Penguin Books. It is a straightforward edition of the novel, set in mid-nineteenth century rural England, without introduction or annotations.

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DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: APPROACHES, ATTITUDES AND PROBLEMS

by Juliet Lodge

AT the beginning of 1979, the multi-media information campaigns of the European Parliament and Commission got under way. They were designed to make the public aware of direct elections to the European Parliament and the opportunity to vote in them, and to present some factual objective information to European Community citizens in order that they might learn something about the European Community and its policies. For the most part, however, the campaigns were designed to attract attention to direct elections.

Although the Commission and the European Parliament have co-ordinated their multi-media information campaigns, and although all have common elements and ideas, the actual content has varied from member state to member state insofar as there is no common poster, for instance, about direct elections. However, there was a common envelope franking symbol —a hand placing a vote in a ballot box—and special European elections' stamps were designed to commemorate the occasion. Again, there was neither a common stamp design nor a common day of issue. Some argued that a common stamp was not feasible in view of the different postage charges in the member states. But this was little more than an excuse. The issue of the stamps certainly became a contentious affair. Indeed, when the Dutch stamps were issued, there was consternation at the fact that the Dutch, in printing the names of the nine member states on the stamp, had referred not to the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany but to England and Germany respectively.

The information programmes of the Commission and the European Parliament were intended to enhance public awareness of the European Community and direct elections before the election campaigns of the different parties themselves were launched. It was decided that the Commission's and the European Parliament's activities in this respect should, therefore, cease at the end of March even though in some cases this would result in a hiatus before the political parties' began seriously campaigning for votes.

Whereas in the spring of 1979 it was clear on the European continent that direct elections to the European Parliament were both imminent and expected to invigorate the European Community, in Britain there was no excitement about the historic elections to be held on 7 June 1979. In the middle of March, opinion polls revealed that over half of all respondents had either not heard about direct elections to the European Parliament or were unable to say when the elections were due to be held. Such apparent ignorance and disinterest can be explained by reference to several factors including the devolution referenda, speculation about the budget and a General Election, and the absence of the kind of information likely to capture the public imagination. Certainly, as far on as March 1979, Britain lacked the European elections' trimmings so prominent in other European Community countries.

There were a number of reasons for this, and most are explicable in political or tactical terms. Yet, without a doubt, the British public were at a disadvantage insofar as Britain was not host to one of the three transnational parties' direct elections' campaign launching congresses. It is true that in London in December 1978, the European Liberal Democrats, of which the British Liberal Party is a member, put the finishing touches to their manifesto. But they were not to launch their campaign until April 1979—and then from Luxembourg. The other two transnational parties—The European People's Party and the Confederation of Socialist Parties—held their congresses in Brussels in January and February 1979 respectively.

The fact that Britain was not host to the transnational parties' congresses is not an adequate explanation of the low level of interest in direct elections to the European Parliament in Britain. After all, neither Ireland nor Denmark—both equally isolated from the heart of the European Community—play host to a transnational party congress; and Ireland, unlike Holland, was not able to pick up direct coverage of the Brussels congresses relayed on West German and Belgian television. The visual contributions that these large transnational congresses made—what with their scarves, stickers, tee-shirts and manifestos—to arousing public awareness of direct elections in some European Community countries cannot be overlooked. How then was Britain's apparent disinterest to be explained?

Perhaps one of the key reasons lies with the fact that, apart from the Liberals who were members of the European Liberal Democrats, neither of the two major British parties (which were expected to capture nearly all of Britain's 81 seats in the directly elected European Parliament) made anything of their membership of transnational European parties. This was not surprising insofar as the European Democratic Union, of which the Conservative Party is a member, had no conspicuous role to play in direct elections. However, the Labour Party is a member of the Confederation of Socialist Parties. A few Labour delegates even attended the Confederation of Socialist Parties' congress in Brussels in January 1979 where the Confederation's election 'appeal to the voters' was launched instead of a manifesto since some members, notably the British, did not want to be bound

by a supranational manifesto.

The Confederation of Socialist Parties has its own logo and an arrow-shaped symbol used by many of its member parties on the continent. Several continental socialist and social democratic parties overtly attach significance to their membership of the Confederation. Yet for the British Labour Party this appeared to be neither a source of pride nor policy. Given the Labour Party's opposition to supranational arrangements, suggestions of European party federations, and fears concerning the erosion of national policy, this was understandable.

Moreover, one of the Confederation of Socialist Parties' most influential member parties—the West German Social Democratic Party—not only enthusiastically greeted direct elections to the European Parliament as an historic step but also had repeatedly stressed and endorsed the need for increasing the European Parliament's powers—something against which the Labour Party is implacably opposed. The Social Democratic Party advocated the European Parliament exercising authority in all areas of European Community policy where national parliaments lacked control and surveillance powers, and in respect of European Community financial matters. The Irish Labour Party also advocated a shift in power. Such views did not recommend themselves to Labour Party members anxious to preserve Westminster's sovereignty and to prevent the accretion of the European Parliament's powers. However, the problem was that in so doing they risked overlooking the fact that their colleagues, far from pursuing the erosion of the authority of national parliaments, were in fact pressing for the exercise of parliamentary authority by the European Parliament at the supranational level *not* in areas where national parliaments were able to act effectively but in those where they were not able to do so.

Party rhetoric among the Labour rank and file overlooked this fact, and Mr. Callaghan's tactics at the Paris summit of the European Community in March also deflected attention to the Common Agricultural Policy. This meant that frustration with the general state of things could be channelled against the Common Agricultural Policy. Yet that Government, apart from basically endorsing the Commission's view that agricultural prices should not be allowed to soar, and that the Common Agricultural Policy needed reforming, failed to advance any constructive suggestions as to how either this could be accomplished or its own grievances over Britain's contributions to the European Community budget alleviated. Warnings about Britain's potential as an obstructionist force in the European Community were made so confirming the image of Britain being the only member state of the European Community led by a governing party largely hostile to the European Community and direct elections to the European Parliament.

Unfortunate as this was, the Labour Government's vacillations over the European Community and the general tenor of Labour Party members' pronouncements about the European Community created the impression that there was no common ground whatsoever between Labour and its colleagues in the European Community. Yet, the European Community's socialist parties were committed to advancing the goal of a social demo-

cratic Community. It was generally recognised that one of the issues in the direct election campaign would be unemployment. The transnational and national parties attached importance to combatting it.

In contrast to the Labour Party, the Conservatives—now returned to power in the recent General Election—shared a good deal with parties of the centre and centre right in the European Community both in terms of the electoral image they endeavoured to present, and in terms of key tenets of their policy. Like the West German Christian Democrats, the Conservatives tried to project themselves as the country's 'party for Europe,' and emphasised the need to maintain the European Community as a secure, western, liberal democracy. Both they and the European People's Party members hoped to realise conservative and Christian democratic principles and ideals respectively through a directly elected European Parliament.

The Conservative Party Research Department, aware of the Conservatives' apparent isolation within the European Parliament from members of the European People's Party with whose policies it could generally sympathise, pointed out in its *Campaign Guide for Europe 1979* that Conservatives did co-operate with members of the European People's Party, that alliances among parties of the centre right were desirable but that certain Christian democratic parties dependent upon trade union support and coalitions with left of centre parties (especially in Belgium) were reluctant to enter into a formal alliance with parties, like the British Conservative Party, not sharing their preoccupations. Others, notably Dutch Christian Democrats who attach great importance to the confessional basis of Christian Democracy, were not enamoured of what they regard as the Conservative Party's secular character. By contrast, the West German Christian Democrats welcome co-operation with the British Conservatives but recognise that the Conservative Party's chariness of supranationalism could make it an unacceptable member of the European People's Party.

What is interesting about the Conservatives' Campaign Guide is that, on the one hand, it is more than a guide in the sense that it covers not only European Community policies but also gives details about the European Community's history and its institutions: the aim being to counter widespread ignorance—an ignorance correlated with apathy and opposition to the European Community. On the other hand, it lacks a distinguishing symbol denoting membership of a transnational European party. It is true that the cover is edged by European Community flags but these lack the impact, for example, of either the hand clutching a rose that commonly appears on socialist and social democratic publications (including those of the Irish Labour Party) or the semi-circle of green stars encompassing the green and white 'E' symbol of the European People's Party, and akin to that of the European Community unofficial flag. This symbol appears on the covers, for example, of the West German Christian Democrats', the West German Christian Socialist Union's, and the Dutch *Christen Democratisch Appel* manifesto for direct elections to the European Parliament.

If green is the common colour of Christian democratic parties, royal blue and yellow are those of the member parties of the European Liberal

Democrats. The stylised initials (and colours) of the European Liberal Democrats appear on some member parties' publications like that of the Dutch *Vrijheid en Democratie*. The visual impact of the different parties is important. Common symbols provide an easy means of identifying a given national party's European party allegiance. This may not seem important in Britain where minor parties are not expected to fare very well on direct election day, not least because of the electoral system. But the 'colour-coding' will certainly be a useful device in continental countries with more parties contesting the elections and electoral systems based on proportional representation. In addition, once the parties' main campaigns get underway and receive increasing media, especially television, coverage, common symbols and colours, if displayed, will help viewers to recognise the broad political persuasions of parties and personalities with whom they are otherwise unfamiliar. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that many viewers can tune into broadcasts transmitted from neighbouring countries.

The general political environment in the various member states of the European Community, along with their governments' (and oppositions') attitudes towards direct elections to the European Parliament, has coloured the conduct and reception of the different direct elections' campaigns. Highly attractive posters have appeared on the continent and these often combine, as in the West German case, exhortations to vote in the European elections with colourful, informative cartoons in which the different nationalities are depicted by universally recognisable stereotypes. In Denmark, where there is a vociferous anti-European Community lobby, a similarly successful campaign complete with Euro-elections badges was launched.

In the early spring it would have been easy to assume that the all-pervasive apathy and disinterest that surrounded the question of direct elections to the European Parliament in Britain extended to the continent. The sharp contrast provided by other European Community member states, however, not only failed to mirror the British climate but also highlighted Britain's apparent isolation, and began to cause consternation in the ranks of British opinion leaders. At the same time, however, it cannot be assumed that everything was rosy on the continent.

A minor row was occasioned by the publication of a 'Eurobarometer' poll about public opinion relating to direct elections to the European Parliament. The finding that French socialists would have increased their share of the vote at the direct elections to 39.7 per cent (relative to their 23 per cent share of the first ballot vote at the March 1978 parliamentary elections), had they been conducted in the autumn of 1978, led to the 'Eurobarometer' being 'censored', and the 'offending' pages removed prior to its distribution. The altercation over the poll soon assumed farcical proportions when polls revealing similar trends but not conducted by people associated with the Commission of the European Community, were published.

At the European level a further difficulty concerned technical matters relating to the counting of votes and announcement of the results. Technical and political considerations ruled out the transmission of a simultane-

ously broadcast common programme from one studio to all nine European Community countries. However, it was hoped that all the member states of the European Community would be able to announce their results simultaneously on Sunday, 10 June 1979 via their own national programme networks. However, this was contingent upon all states agreeing to defer announcement of the results in their country until all others had closed their ballot boxes, and all being able to conduct the counting of votes before or on Sunday, 10 June—or at least to commence the count. Problems arose when it was realised that the Italian electoral law provided that the polls remain open until 10 p.m. on Sunday, 10 June, and that because of domestic difficulties and time pressure it would not be possible to amend the act to alter this provision.

Such difficulties notwithstanding, it was clear by mid-March 1979 that enthusiasm for direct elections to the European Parliament was growing—even in Britain where pessimistic forecasts predicted a turnout of less than 20 per cent, and certainly not higher than average turnout at local elections unless a General Election coincided with elections to the European Parliament. Turnout is likely to be a good deal higher both in Britain and on the continent where voting for some, as in Belgium, is compulsory, and for others considered a 'civic duty' A more realistic, and optimistic, forecast suggested that turnout in Britain would be over 40 per cent, and above 60 per cent elsewhere. Whatever the turnout and the results, political skirmishing will not end in respect of direct elections to the European Parliament on 10 June 1979.

Following the direct election of the European Parliament, the newly elected Members will have to organise themselves into party groups, select officers, compete for membership of the European Parliament's committees, and decide what, if any, amendments should be made to the European Parliament's rules of procedure. Given the fact that the membership of the European Parliament will have been increased from 198 to 410 members, it is likely that one of the first controversial matters to be decided will concern the rules governing the minimum size and composition of groups of Members seeking recognition as an official party group of the European Parliament. Since privileges attach to the party groups, there are incentives for forming one. Presently, an official party group must consist of no fewer than 14 members, or 10 if the membership is drawn from three or more countries. All but a few present Members belong to one of the six main political groups: the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the European Progressive Democrats, the European Conservatives, the Liberal and Democrat group, and the Communist and Allies group.

If, in the directly elected European Parliament, most Members join one of the six established groups, there may be little need to insist that a group having less than, say, 30 members, should not gain the formal status of an official party group. If not, then political manoeuvres will have to begin to determine the size and membership criteria which will have to be satisfied for members to attain recognition as a party group. Otherwise, the European Parliament's composition may become too fragmented.

The work of the directly elected European Parliament is also likely to result in political and inter-party controversy since the European Parliament is to be entrusted with the task of drafting a common electoral procedure for subsequent direct elections. This is likely to revive questions over the relative merits of different systems of proportional representation, and the actual distribution of seats to the member states of the European Community.

Both at present and in the first directly elected European Parliament, the 'big four'—France, West Germany, Britain and Italy—receive an equal number of seats even though in terms of the size of their populations there are, what some would regard as, significant disparities. France, for example, with 20.7 per cent of the European Community's population has as many seats as West Germany which has 23.9 per cent of the European Community's population. When the question of deciding how many seats any new members of the European Community should have in the European Parliament arises, it is probable that some Members of the European Parliament will attempt to have the whole issue re-scrutinised.

Over and above this, there is likely to be debate and controversy over the way in which the directly elected European Parliament wields and increases its influence, if not formal power, over European Community affairs.

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INFORMATICS: TRUE OR FALSE?

by James Avery Joyce

SINCE the first artificial satellite, *Sputnik*, soared into orbit, more than 2,500 satellites and space probes, both civil and military, have been launched. Among the various types of satellites are those used for meteorological, earth observation or remote-sensing and communication purposes. The recent development and improvement of communication satellites has extended man's capacity for communicating world-wide, both swiftly and reliably. In fact, a recent UNESCO study, under the chairmanship of Sean MacBride, S.C., states that 'despite the expansion of all the (earth-based) media structures, there is a new sector of communications which is dwarfing all others in its rate of growth, is rapidly changing today's societies and is likely to be the foundation of the future—but of which the general public is only superficially aware. This is the vast field of data and information processing, now increasingly referred to as informatics, after the French term *informatique*'.

It asserts that there are few human activities which are not in some way connected with or involved directly in electronic processing. This has produced what is called the 'information explosion', enormously increasing the quantity of data which can be stored, analysed and transmitted. This processing has revolutionized scientific, industrial, commercial and governmental operations and given an ever more global significance to mankind's ability to handle and use data. And it is no longer possible to distinguish between communication and informatics, although informatics brings new dimensions of great importance into play.[1]

The vigorous debate that has plunged UNESCO into the centre of a cauldron of burning issues on freedom of information is due to the fact that the *control* of the production and utilization of these new information processing and telecommunication systems is at present mainly in the hands of the industrialized countries and, in some instances, of a few Western multinational companies. Implications of this situation for world-wide social and economic development arise because communication has reached a planetary dimension today as a result of the conjunction of three processes, *viz*: (a) spectacular expansion of conventional channels of communication; (b) invention of new technological devices for transmission of messages; and (c) opening up of larger markets for information goods and services.

Consider the daily press. The world-wide circulation of newspapers is more than 400 million copies daily, an increase of 20 per cent over the past ten years. Circulation per thousand inhabitants has increased even more on a world average: from 104 to 130. The total number of dailies is now around 8,000. At the country level, the highest daily newspaper circulation (per 1,000 inhabitants) is in Sweden and Japan (nearly 600). Regionally, the highest circulation (per 1,000 inhabitants) is in the USSR (396), and the largest *number* of dailies is in North America (1,935).

Dealing for the moment with quantity: how does this affect the Third World? With almost two-thirds of the world's population, the developing countries have a total circulation only one-sixth that of the industrialized nations. In the developed world, there is a copy of a daily newspaper for approximately every three inhabitants, in poorer regions there is one for every 30 persons. In a dozen countries in Asia, the figure is one for every 50. India's 835 newspapers rank third in the world in number, but circulation is only 16 copies per thousand people, almost exclusively limited to cities and large towns. Thirteen countries in Africa have only one, while 8 African countries and three Arab States have no daily newspaper at all.

The great majority of daily newspapers are privately owned or managed by political parties, social and religious groups. In socialist countries newspapers are either government owned or published by trade unions, sports associations, youth organisations, factory groups and co-operatives. In 18 African and Asian countries, dailies are controlled or generally managed by State organs. Most developing countries have few papers circulating in rural areas for economic and social reasons, the high rate of illiteracy, or low per capita income.[3]

And what about books? In spite of the increasing competition as newer forms of communication to vast audiences have developed, the book reading public has steadily increased. Between 1955 and 1976, world annual book production has more than doubled, and it has tripled as to the number of copies printed. More than 590,000 titles and about eight *billion* copies per year are now on the market. A major reason for this upsurge has been the post-war revolution in book production and distribution techniques, especially in the growth of the paperback market.

Now comes the rub. *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes*? Who is in charge? Or is nobody in charge? Let us take the press agencies, the major source of supply and circulation of general information within and between countries. Besides serving the press, they are increasingly serving broadcasting organisations. There are now, it is true, national news agencies in more than one hundred countries—a considerable increase over the past ten years. There are also many hundreds of specialized agencies for the dissemination of business, stock exchange, tourist, weather and scientific news. Moreover, the rapid development of visual news has given rise to new types of agency specialising in supply of photos, documentary films and so on.

Among these agencies there are five—Agence France-Press (France), Associated Press (USA), Reuters (UK), TASS (USSR) and United Press International (USA)—which have a predominantly wide international role, due to the size and technological strength of their systems for distributing news in many languages all over the globe. Most national agencies subscribe to two or more of the world agencies to receive foreign news and even to provide domestic news. This is because, relatively, few national newspapers and mass media maintain their own offices or correspondents abroad.

A recent trend of particular interest is the growth of regional co-operation

among Third World agencies. For example, in 1975, the Non-aligned countries organized a pool which now exchanges material through thirteen agencies as redistribution centres, As a case in point, the thirteen English-speaking countries in the Caribbean, with help from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNESCO, began in 1975 the operation of CANA—the Caribbean News Agency—and became an independent regional agency in 1976. Similar regional efforts are also under way in Africa, the Arab States and Asia. The 1977 Colombo meeting of Asian news agencies decided to carry out a feasibility study looking towards the establishment of a permanent Asian news network. Nevertheless, some 35 countries (some with population over a million) have no news agency at all.

What, then, has been the main bone of contention that brought upon UNESCO last October such diatribes from the big dailies as 'a simple NO to UNESCO!' (*New York Times*, 13 Oct.) and 'THE WAY TO A CAPTIVE PRESS' (*London Times*, 30 Oct.)? (The supreme irony of this combined Trans-Atlantic assault on UNESCO was that, when I was in New York during November, the *New York Times* was nowhere on sale; and when I returned to London in December, the older *Times* had also gone out of action—for the same reasons!)

In a nutshell, the main complaint is that existing news networks are largely patterned on links of former 'colonial' periods and their surviving economic ties, as well as on cultural and language propensities, This tends, obviously, to channel news flows in a North-South direction and inhibit the virtually non-existent exchanges between the developing countries themselves. While there is a flood of news on the East-West axis between North America and Europe, and even between socialist and Western countries, the one-way flow between North and South can hardly be called an 'exchange'.

There are, too, lesser imbalances in the flow of news as a result of language differences in the case of Japan and Europe. Clearly, ideologies apart, these strong hold-overs from the past bear heavily on the present-day situation where existing 'flow patterns' have much deeper impact on countries without powerful information media facilities of their own. These *real* factors lie behind the present-day calls to liberate information systems 'from the state of dependence'.

This is by no means the whole story of the media debate which erupted at UNESCO's General Conference last autumn; but it revealed what Jonathan Power (*Herald Tribune*, 26.10.1978) called 'the iron grip of Western imperialism at work', namely, the dictatorship of the Telex machine and the airwaves. The facts were clear, beneath the rhetoric. Every day, Associated Press, Reuters, United Press International, and Agence France-Press pump out around 300,000 words in their world services alone. Hence, the Third World news media are force-fed on a diet of European and U.S. edited stories, reflecting the biases and prejudices of alien cultures.

Agence France-Press alone has 171 foreign correspondents in 167 countries, operating 108 bureaus—more than either the American Associated

Press or the United Press International—yet 70 percent of its revenue comes from a subsidy (says Power) from the French government. Again, the BBC broadcasts 24 hours a day around the world in 39 languages, but this budget is met by the British Foreign Office. So, the Third World, reacting to what was sometimes described in Paris as a Western attack on its cultural independence, called for a 'new information order'.

As was to be expected, the Communist countries heroically supported them. And it was at that point that the Western news agencies and editorials indignantly focussed on the bugbear of 'state control', in spite of the continuous evidence that various forms of state intervention over news dissemination have long become a normally accepted process. Fortunately, a sense of compromise consoled the West about a final resolution, well-watered-down from its original form, whilst the Third World eventually realized that no number of resolutions could force the West to print what they did not want to print.

In the result, UNESCO's Director-General presented the final compromise document under the new title: *Draft Declaration on fundamental principles concerning the contribution of the mass media to strengthening peace and international understanding, the promotion of human rights and to countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war.* This was the outcome of three weeks of lengthy and often emotional consultations at the twentieth session of the General Conference in Paris last November. When this Declaration was adopted by acclamation, the President truly said that 22 November 1978 was a historic day for UNESCO.'

Although some delegates later took the floor to explain their vote and express reservations concerning certain parts of the text, they stressed that they had approved the draft in so far as it preserved freedom of information and its free flow. And many of them pointed out that the adoption of the Declaration 'constituted a major step forward in the establishment of a new more just and more effective world order of information and communication.'

Thus, over thirty years of diligent search for a world information order had stemmed from principles based on Resolution No. 59 of the UN's first General Assembly adopted in 1946, declaring that 'Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated'. It is also laid down in the guidelines that freedom of information 'requires as an indispensable element the willingness and capacity to employ its privileges without abuse. It requires as a basic discipline the moral obligation to seek the facts without prejudice and to spread knowledge without malicious intent.' Reaffirming this foundation, the 1978 Paris Declaration was (it said) 'conscious of the complexity of the problems of information in modern society, of the diversity of solutions which have been offered to them as well as of the legitimate desire of all parties concerned that their aspirations, points-of-view and cultural identity be taken into due consideration.'

Our remaining space can perhaps best be used to select from its eleven carefully chiselled articles some key phrases, listed as follows:

The exercise of freedom of opinion, expression and information, recognized as an integral part of human rights and fundamental freedoms, is a vital factor in the strengthening of peace and international understanding.

Access by the public to information should be guaranteed by the diversity of the sources and means of information available to it, thus enabling each individual to check the accuracy of facts and to appraise events objectively. To this end, it is important that the mass media be responsive to concerns of peoples and individuals, thus promoting the participation of the public in the elaboration of information.

If the mass media are to be in a position to promote the principles of this Declaration in their activities, it is essential that journalists and other agents of the mass media, in their own country or abroad, be assured of protection guaranteeing them the best conditions for the exercise of their profession.

In countering aggressive war, racialism, apartheid and other violations of human rights, which are *inter alia* spawned by prejudice and ignorance, the mass media, by disseminating information on the aims, aspirations, cultures and needs of all people, contribute to eliminate ignorance and misunderstanding between peoples and to make nationals of a country sensitive to the needs and desires of others.

For the establishment of a new equilibrium and greater reciprocity in the flow of information, which will be conducive to the institution of a just and lasting peace and to the economic and political independence of the developing countries, it is necessary to correct the inequalities in the flow of information to and from developing countries, and between those countries.

In the spirit of this Declaration, it is for the international community to contribute to the creation of the conditions for a free flow and wider and more balanced dissemination of information, and the conditions of the protection, in the exercise of their functions, of journalists and other agents of the mass media. UNESCO is well placed to make a valuable contribution in this respect.

It was not, possibly, with conscious intent that the final Declaration was unanimously greeted in US and European editorials as 'a victory for the West' (as undoubtedly it was). No doubt, too, on the other side of the iron curtain 'a victory for the East' (as undoubtedly it was) was just as eagerly acclaimed. Perhaps, in another thirty years, the same sort of Declaration might be perceived as a victory for the world community. But that is not yet.

NOTES:

1 Source: *Interim Report of Communication Problems of Modern Society* (UNESCO) September 1978.
2 *Sources*: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (1976) and 'World Communications' (1975).
3 *UNESCO*, CC-78/ASIOCOM/4 Add.

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YUGOSLAVIA

by F. B. Singleton

THE interest which the outside world shows in Yugoslavia is not related to that country's physical size, its economic strength or its military power. It is a country of 27 million people in an area slightly larger than the United Kingdon. The level of income per capita ($1,750 in 1976) places it amongst the poorer countries of Europe—a situation not eased by the disastrous earthquake which hit the Dalmatian coast on Easter Sunday—although it is still far better off than most of the Third World countries with which Yugoslavia is associated in the non-aligned movement.

As a political unit on the map of Europe, Yugoslavia is a comparatively young country. A century ago the territory it now occupies was divided between two small independent principalities—Serbia and Montenegro—and two multinational empires, Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Turkey. At the end of the First World War the two empires had disappeared, and the main groups of the South Slav peoples came together to form the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later renamed Yugoslavia). Despite efforts by the non-Serbs to create a federal structure, the new state was highly centralised and dominated by Serbs, Throughout the 1920s and 30s the relations between the Serbs and the other groups—especially the Croats—overshadowed all other questions, preventing progress on the vital issues of industrial development, social welfare and economic justice, which cried out for attention in this poor peasant country. The tension between the two main national groups occasionally erupted into political murder. In 1928 the leader of the Croat opposition party was killed by a government supporter whilst the parliament was in session, and six years later King Alexander was shot by a Croat terrorist whilst on a state visit to France. A belated attempt in 1939 to reach a compromise between Serbs and Croats came too late to enable the country to present a united front in the face of German and Italian pressure. In March 1941 the government of the Regent, Prince Paul, yielded to German pressure and joined the Tripartite Pact. A *coup d'état* led by a group of Air Force officers removed the pro-Axis government, and declared the young King Peter, son of the murdered Alexander, to be of age. On 6th April the Germans, supported by their allies the Italians, Hungarians and Bulgars, invaded the country and quickly defeated the Yugoslav army. A month after he had ascended the throne the new King was in exile and his country began a four year period of partition, occupation, civil war and revolution, during which one and three quarter million Yugoslavs died, most of them at the hands of their fellow countrymen. All the pent up animosities of the past burst out into civil war. The so-called Independent State of Croatia attempted to purge itself of Serbs, and the Serbian Cetniks fought against the Croats. Both nationalist groups attempted to suppress the Communist-led Partisans. The Partisans were the only group which consistently fought the occupying

forces and which had a policy of brotherhood and unity between the different nationalities. They may have exacted rough justice against those whom they considered to be enemies of the revolution, but they did not encourage nationalist hatred between the peopls.

Even before the end of the war the Communists were able to take power and to win recognition by the Allies for their new government, led by Marshal Tito, who was Prime Minister until 1953, and who has been President ever since. The key position of power—leader of the party—he has retained since 1937.

The new Constitution of 1946 recognised the existence of the separate national groups by granting a federal structure, with six republics and two autonomous provinces corresponding to the distribution of the different peoples.

Under Tito, Yugoslav Communism has undergone a number of transformations. At first it followed slavishly the path laid down by Stalin, but in 1948 Stalin turned on Tito and his comrades, expelling them from the Cominform and mounting a hysterical campaign of abuse against them. The shocked and disillusioned Yugoslavs rallied round their leader, and the regime survived.

During the 1950's a distinct Yugoslav path to socialism began to emerge. Internally it involved a decentralisation of decision making, the development of the system of self-management and the separation of the Communist Party's functions of political leadership from the day to day administrative control which it had also exercised during the period of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat.'

The system of self-management began in the 1950's with the establishment of workers' councils in the factories. It has since developed into the concept of a self-managed society, in which not only productive enterprises, but all forms of public activity, including education, health and culture, are included. The 1974 Constitution and the 1976 Law on Associated Labour provide a blueprint for a society in which relatively small groups of workers, operating through 'basic organisations of associated labour' have a part to play in the making of decisions regarding the running of their enterprises. An elaborate structure of other decision making bodies integrates the activities of these smaller groups. In the fields of social welfare, health, education, etc., 'communities of local interest' bring together the providers of services, the consumers and the representatives of local enterprises whose productive wealth provides the material basis for services. There is no lack of consultation in Yugoslavia—in fact, some think that there is too much talk and not enough action. At least workers feel that they have a voice and that it is listened to. At best they feel that they have the power to decide their own future. The system is held together by the integrative functions of the so-called socio-political bodies —the League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance and the trade unions.

In foreign policy, the Yugoslav road to socialism has meant a diversification of foreign trade outlets and a break with the previous policy of

uncritical support for the Soviet Union. Eventually it led to Yugoslavia taking a leading role in the non-aligned movement. Soviet attempts after the death of Stalin to recover from the drastic mistake of 1948 have led to the normalization of relations at government level, and to the association of Yugoslavia with COMECON, but have not led to an abandonment of the policy of non-alignment.

The 1960s saw a further liberalisation, with the opening up of Yugoslavia's markets to foreign (mainly Western) competition and the elaboration of the concept of 'market socialism'. The close integration of Yugoslavia with the economies of Western Europe takes many forms. Since 1967 private foreign capital has been able to come in to the country and scores of joint enterprises have been established, in which 49% of the capital is owned by foreigners. There are also many other forms of partnership in which Western firms cooperate with Yugoslav self-managed enterprises in manufacturing, marketing and tourism. Yugoslavia also receives large sums in economic aid from the World Bank, and from Western governmental agencies. For the last 15 years hundreds of thousands of Yugoslav workers have been allowed to seek work in Western Europe. Despite the world recession of recent years, there are almost a million Yugoslav workers and their dependents temporarily resident in Western Europe. Most are in Germany, but there are also large Yugoslav communities in Austria, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Sweden. The remittances which these workers sent home amounted to $1,500 million in 1978, far exceeding the $1,000 million received from the booming tourist industry. 72% of workers' remittances originate in EEC countries. These sources of invisible earnings in hard currency do not, however, bridge the yawning trade gap with the EEC countries. This is now running at a rate of over $2,400 million per annum, and creates serious problems, both economic and political, for the Yugoslavs. EEC countries take 30% of Yugoslavia's exports and supply 40% of imports. EEC protectionism has particularly affected the export of Yugoslav agricultural products. In 1973 30% of Yugoslav exports to EEC countries came from agriculture. In 1977 this had fallen to 19%. Negotiations have now begun, to replace the existing limited EEC agreement which expires on 31st August 1979, although it took over a year of talks to settle the terms on which these negotiations would proceed. During this time some progress was made on the granting of loans from the European Investment Bank to improve the highway which runs between the Austrian and Greek borders, and which carries a heavy load of EEC traffic destined for South East Europe and the Middle East.

In the early stages of the talks the Yugoslavs hinted that, if a satisfactory solution were not reached soon, Yugoslavia might be forced to enter into closer trade relations with COMECON and Third World countries. This is unrealistic, as the goods which Yugoslavia needs to expand her industries are not available from these sources. A more likely outcome would be a slackening of growth and a serious economic crisis in Yugoslavia.

Such an outcome would not be in the interests of the EEC, or of anyone else in Europe, as it would contribute to the instability of the Balkan area

at a particularly sensitive time. A number of factors might endanger the stability of Yugoslavia during the next few years. Overshadowing all is the uncertainty about the succession to 87-year-old Marshal Tito. Formally, the situation is clear. A collective Presidency, which is already taking over some of the functions of head of state, has existed for several years. Real power will probably rest, however, in a triumvirate representing the Party, the army and the economy. One cannot see a single leader of Tito's stature emerging.

One of the causes of instability is the persistence of regional economic inequalities. In Yugoslavia these are more serious than they are in countries which are culturally homogeneous. The people of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, the poorest region, are not only at a lower level of development than are the Slovenes, who enjoy the highest income of any republic in the Federation, but they also speak a different language—Albanian—and their religious tradition derives from Islam, whilst Slovenia is firmly Catholic. The birth rate of the Kosovars at 35 per thousand, is amongst the highest in Europe. Between these two extremes there are various gradations. The less developed, formerly Turkish occupied areas, include Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro. They receive special assistance from a federal fund to which contributions are paid at the rate of 1.9% of GNP. Despite genuine efforts to reduce the gap, and despite an impressive increase in industrial growth in the less developed areas, the fact remains that the gap has widened in per capita terms. In 1947 Kosovo's national income per head was 3½ times below that of Slovenia. It is now over 6 times lower.

In the last ten years serious disturbances have occurred, fuelled by nationalist resentments. In Kosovo the cause was a sense of underprivilege. In Croatia it was a feeling that the Croats were paying too high a price for helping their poorer neighbours. In a sense Yugoslavia presents a microcosm of the world problem of relations between the rich and poor nations.

The recent visit to Yugoslavia of Chairman Hua was an important event in the development of Yugoslav foreign policy. It was a warning to the Soviet Union and her allies—particularly Bulgaria—that they should not attempt to interfere with Yugoslavia's affairs. The Bulgars do not accept the existence of a separate Macedonian nation, which has fulfilled its national aspirations since 1945 with encouragement from the Communist Party and the Yugoslav federal government. In 1978, a year in which they were celebrating the 100th anniversary of the San Stefano Treaty, the Bulgars had to be told that the revival of the Big Bulgaria, which was proposed by Tsarist Russia at San Stefano, and which included Macedonia, is a pipe dream from the distant past.

Fears in the West, and in Yugoslavia, that the Warsaw Pact armies might intervene when Tito dies are, I believe, exaggerated. Yugoslavia is well prepared for a defence in depth, with a strong regular army and a citizens national defence system. The only beneficiaries of a Soviet military involvement in the Balkans—which would probably include Romania—would be the Chinese.

This is not to say that there will not be attempts to exploit the divisive tendencies within Yugoslavia. I believe that the system built up during the last 30 years is strong enough to survive Tito, and that all concerned will come to see that an economically prosperous, stable Yugoslavia is essential to the peace of Europe.

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The July issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *The General Election—and Afterwards* by Paul Rose, *Industrial Relations and Law: the West German Example* by David Southern, *The Land of Lorna Doone* by H. J. B. Peel and *Looking Both Ways in Venezuela* by Steve Ellner.

THREE KINGS OF ORIENT: THE CHANGING FACE OF MONARCHY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Part III: In Memoriam Sultan Yahya Petra of Kelantan, Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia[1]

by Roger Kershaw

IF numbers were any criterion, Malay monarchy would have to be reckoned the most thriving institution of its kind in Southeast Asia. The Malay Peninsula counts no fewer than nine Muslim Sultanates—and Borneo another, in the shape of Brunei. But let it be quickly added that the exercise of Brunei's sovereignty is subject, until 1983, to the restraints of a protective treaty with Britain, and that a large part of the effective sovereignty of the nine peninsular Sultanates was signed away to the Federation of Malaya in 1947. When the colonial power withdrew in 1957 the sovereignty of the Federation was vested in its new Head of State, the *Yang di-Pertuan Agong*—'he who is made Supreme Lord'. However, the 'Supreme Lord' enjoys this status for a mere five years. At the end of his term he reverts to the quality of Sultan of one of the nine States and resumes opportunities for political influence (if ever they were forgone) which are more considerable than at the national level—notwithstanding the modest geographical scope of a Malay State; for the Sultanates *qua* office are basically hereditary,[2] have supreme authority over Muslim religion within their realm (an authority not formally devolved during tenure as *Agong*) and are deeply rooted in the social structures of their respective States. The position of Supreme Ruler, by contrast, is elective, rotating, more strictly 'constitutional' and, above all, new. It is widely maintained that the former Sultan of Brunei was deterred, in part, from joining the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 by the realization that he could not be appointed first Ruler of the larger Federation[3] but would have to take his place and await his turn on a strict scale of seniority. Yet considering the predominantly ceremonial nature of the office, one can conceive that His Highness would have found it a poor exchange for his substantial prerogatives at home.[4]

Let us explore briefly the reasons for establishing an elective Malay Kingship at Independence, and the mechanism of election. Some form of Malay kingship was indispensable as indirect rule had made it the symbol of the Malays' political birthright in the ethnically plural society of colonial Malaya. But as 'Malay kingship' was never embodied in a single throne, but fragmented among several States, there was no royal line with a claim to permanent precedence. Hence the election of a succession of Supreme Rulers from among, and by, the nine State Rulers and following, in principle, an order of precedence based on dates of succession to the State thrones but subject to the right to pass over a successor apparent if his

peers judge him unsuitable. When the next-in-line is passed over or declines nomination he drops to the bottom of the list—like a newly enthroned Sultan—but the list grows progressively shorter and at the time of writing comprises only Perak, Pahang and Johore (as no State may provide the Agong twice unless all others have exercised the privilege or are finally and definitively rejected in spite of being the sole surviving candidate States on the list).[5] The Sultan of Kelantan who passed away on 29 March this year at the age of 60, after a reign of 3 years and 6 months as Supreme Ruler, was the sixth *Agong* since 1957. The honour had fallen previously to Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Perlis, Trengganu and Kedah. Like the Sultan of Kelantan, the first two incumbents died in office. The late Sultans of Johore and Pahang were passed over or declined nomination in the election of 1957, the late Sultan of Pahang (again) in 1970, the present Sultan of Johore in 1975. There is also a Deputy, or *Timbalan,* whose nomination has come to be understood as a prelude to election as Supreme Ruler. But it is significant—and we shall recur to the point later—that constitutionally, a Sultan who is next in order of precedence, but was passed over for nomination as Deputy, does not lose his 'place in the queue' at the next *Agong* election. This means that his peers will be required to consider him first when the time comes (five 'assents' suffice for election).

The transient nature of *Agong* incumbency provides some assurance of malleability for the governing elite, in particular the Prime Minister, who has the most contact with the *Agong.* The present writer is not aware that there have ever been tensions of a clearly political nature.[6] The *Agong* even seems to lack any clear, practical function in relation to Malay Special Rights. His formal responsibility to determine racial quotas for business licences and scholarships, and generally to safeguard the special position of the Malays, is exercised under Cabinet advice. Constitutionally, it is the Conference of Rulers,[7] not the *Agong,* whose specific consent is required to any change in the legal status of the Malays and their language. But in real terms the Conference too seems peripheral: it is the dominant political party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), which has been the true custodian of Malay privilege, by achieving a high degree of Malay unity under its leadership, dominating the legislative and executive process through a multi-racial coalition, and making such amendments to the Federal Constitution as it has deemed appropriate from time to time. In a notable incident in 1963 the then Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, unhesitatingly put the Sultan of Perak in his place over a dispute with the elected State Government, and addressed a veiled warning to the Rulers as a whole that their continued status was contingent on a docile relationship to the political elite. Even in relation to the choice of Prime Minister the recently deceased *Agong* found his discretion curtailed, for on the death of the second Prime Minister, Tun Razak, in January 1976, it was difficult to call on anyone but the Deputy Prime Minister, Hussein Onn, to continue the government. Interestingly enough, however, UMNO felt itself excluded by the choice and did not confirm Hussein as its new President immediately or automatically.

In point of fact the position of monarchy in general *has* been subtly strengthened in the short term by some recent developments. It was after the race riots of 1969 that the Conference of Rulers was given a formal veto over any reduction in the rights of the Malays (previously the Constitution referred to an obligation of the legislators to 'consult' the Conference). At the same time it became illegal to question any racial privilege, even in Parliament, and since the 'position of the Rulers' is itself one of the provisions of the Constitution relating to the 'position of the Malays', it is now illegal to question it. The embarrassed contortions of the UMNO General Assembly in September 1978 when it humbly petitioned the Conference of Rulers to consider the coordination of the religious affairs administration of the States, are suggestive of a shifting balance of power. But why, in any case, the attempt to reduce the Sultans' prerogatives in such a sensitive area?

The answer lies in the phenomenon of religious revival, which is now rampant in Malaysia as in the rest of the Islamic world. The life-style of Malay Sultans has not generally endeared them to religious purists; in as much as they have shown an interest in religious affairs in the past, their interest has favoured traditional religious authorities, not the modernists, and as such has been motivated by political considerations as much as doctrine or piety. But the present exception proves the rule. Having vetoed, earlier, a move by the Conference of Rulers to institute fixed dates for Ramadan, the Sultan of Kedah was now feared on the point of sealing an unholy alliance with his religious radicals with a view to essentially political advantage. Such advantage could take a number of imaginable forms: enhanced political influence and substantial *douceurs* if religious revival sweeps the Islamic Party into office as the State Government; funds from the Middle East if Kedah can project itself as the vanguard of the Islamic State movement in Malaysia; great prestige at the national level—as the Ruler who 'pointed the way'—if revival fulfils its promise to be the wave of the future; at the very least, increased leverage with the present State and Federal ruling party, UMNO. Whatever the Sultan's motivation, an Islamic State movement in a Malay State has appalling implications for racial harmony throughout the country; the UMNO leadership will thus do its utmost to arrest the trend.

Still, the danger in Kedah is only one cloud on a broad political horizon. Some of the other Rulers have been asserting their revived self-confidence in more direct and 'conventional' ways. Two cases of dispute between a Sultan and his Chief Minister have become *causes celèbres* and the ingredients are remarkably similar. In the 1974 elections an enlarged Malaysian governing coalition was able to win every State—the first time since Independence. The Prime Minister and UMNO national leader, Tun Razak, aspired to a higher degree of coordination between Federal Government and the States, and a higher standard of administration at all levels, in partial fulfilment of an ambitious political and economic design for the plural society (the New Economic Policy). He thus took upon himself to dictate his choice of Chief Minister, if necessary, to the incoming majority

group in each State Assembly. The normal courtesies of interaction and consultation between State political leaders and the Sultan of Perak (for one) appear to have been neglected, and the latter (the same who had clashed with the ruling party in 1963) was not a little aggrieved. But the conflict developed further ramifications when, in keeping with the Federal line on clean government and administrative probity, the new Chief Minister proved unsympathetic to the Sultan's desire to enlarge his family's wealth by way of land purchase and mining concessions within the State. The Sultan protested by boycotting State functions and growing a beard. The national leadership of UMNO finally gave way in September 1977, and the Chief Minister was changed.

A comparable crisis came to a head in Pahang during 1978. Early in the year, in anticipation of elections, the Sultan made a claim that he alone could appoint the Chief Minister. When Tunku Abdul Rahman, in his latter-day role as newspaper columnist, warned the Sultan of the dangers of a clash with popularly elected power His Highness qualified his words, saying that he would accept whomever the ruling party might nominate. Nevertheless the Sultan was very far from satisfied with the individual whom the Prime Minister and Pahang UMNO eventually selected as Chief Minister after the July elections, nor with the categorical manner in which the name was submitted to him for 'approval', without even the courtesy of a short-list from which a nominal 'choice' could have been made. As in Perak, business ambitions became an issue too, for the new Chief Minister rejected the Sultan's application for an addition of 20,000 acres of logging land to his vast private holdings. The Sultan retaliated by initiating steps towards stripping the Malaysian Attorney General (the liaison officer between Pahang UMNO and the national UMNO leadership) of all his State honours. The immediate sequel was an apparent but, if true, quite extraordinary summons of the Sultan to the Federal capital by the Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn.[8] The moves against the Attorney General went no further.

In dealing with an increasingly assertive—or, in face of Federal pretensions and encroachment, simply resistant—royalty, the UMNO national elite do not seem likely to brandish a serious threat of abolishing monarchy, despite signs of a more critical public mood. Besides being formally anti-constitutional, such a radical 'unscrambling' of the prevailing political order would be out of keeping with UMNO's philosophy and its own 'social structure', in which aristocratic Malays have long found a comfortable, even dominant, niche. But it would be perfectly credible that Datuk Hussein should have warned the Rulers that 'forces greater than either of us' could sweep away everything that both UMNO and the Rulers cherish, if the latter do not adopt a style more compatible with the times. The twin spectres which Datuk Hussein can raise are social radicalism or Communism among the poor peasantry, and Islamic fanaticism among the expanding youthful intelligentsia. Unfortunately, if that is Hussein's argument, it reveals twin weaknesses. Alliances of mutual benefit between royalty and Islamic revival, *against* UMNO, are not ruled out, as the case

of Kedah shows, and it ill becomes the leader of UMNO to preach about socio-economic gaps and relative deprivation when the acquisition of wealth by a class of Malay new-rich is a conspicuous feature of the government's New Economic Policy. Yet in its unredeemed state, monarchy can contribute little to the defence of moderate Islam against the new zealots, even if it wishes to.[9]

A somewhat greater irony confronted the Prime Minister following the death of the Sultan of Kelantan. The Deputy to the late *Agong* was the Sultan of Pahang, who would perform the functions of *Agong* until the election of a successor. It is generally supposed that in 1975 Tun Razak—himself a Pahang man of high birth—exerted influence on a nomination which entailed passing over Perak. Tensions with the Sultan of Perak, as much as Razak's own Pahang background, had made Pahang a more attractive choice, assuming that a Deputy is invariably confirmed as *Agong* when the throne next falls vacant. But now Razak was dead and the Sultan of Pahang had clashed with Razak's successor, Hussein. Constitutionally speaking, Perak still had the right of first consideration. But could Pahang bear to see its claim gainsaid after nearly four years' tenure of the Deputyship? A 'compromise' choice might have seemed to be available in the form of Johore (the present Prime Minister, felicitously, is a Johore man), but the present Sultan, a perennial absentee, seems to have been deemed unsuitable when he was at the head of the list in 1975. The possibilities are infinite for conflict and grievance, whatever choice is made,[10] and for a growing conviction even in governing circles that monarchy is not an unqualified asset to Malaysia's development. The days of the sixth *Agong* may yet be remembered in retrospect as a reign of comparative tranquillity.

Apart from the difficulties in Perak and Pahang and the death of Tun Razak, the reign was distinguished, however, by the remarkable constitutional crisis of October-November 1977 in Kelantan, in which the Islamic Party, although a member since 1973 of the enlarged national coalition, voted no-confidence in a 'clean' Islamic Chief Minister appointed originally by Tun Razak in 1974. As it happens, the *Agong* was himself not enthusiastic about the Chief Minister, Datuk Mohamed Nasir. He regarded him as a dilatory character and had even urged him to step down a short time before. After the vote of no-confidence the *Agong* intervened behind the scenes to hold up the dissolution of the Kelantan State Assembly which Datuk Mohamed Nasir had requested and which the Regent (the *Agong's* son) was prepared to grant; for while the national leaders at first looked to a negotiated reshuffle of the State Government in UMNO's favour, the *Agong* had his own scheme for a solution of the crisis, based on an amenable minority faction in the Kelantan Islamic Party. But when, as a result of the delayed dissolution, order appeared to be breaking down, the *Agong's* antipathy towards the majority Islamic clique which had engineered the Chief Minister's dismissal may have ensured that he had few reservations about signing into law (as *Agong*) the unprecedented suspension of the Constitution of a Malay State (his own)—a suspension which was to further, for the time being, both the cause of UMNO and the cause of

Federal ascendancy in Kelantan: upon the lifting of emergency rule, UMNO, with the help of a break-away Islamic group led by Datuk Mohamed Nasir, was able to defeat the Islamic Party in special State elections. Nevertheless, as the UMNO hierarchy in Kelantan was fearful that the Sultan would now block a shake-up of the Kelantan Civil Service and thereby frustrate UMNO's plans for rapid economic development and political consolidation in a State long dominated by the Islamic Party, it is difficult to doubt that the consequences of the royal decease will be evaluated positively in some quarters when once a beloved Ruler and kinsman has been fittingly mourned.

NOTES

1. It had been our intention to devote this third article in the series mainly to the life and times of Sultan Yahya Petra himself—the only monarch with whom the author has had an audience—but His Majesty's untimely death a few weeks ago has seemed to bring into focus some wider issues concerning Malay monarchy. The affairs of Kelantan will not, therefore, be treated in detail here.
2. On the variations in the precise practice of the individual States see H. E. Groves, *The Constitution of Malaysia,* Singapore, 1964; pp 50-53. N.B. The Ruler of Perlis is in fact styled *'Raja'*, the Ruler of Negri Sembilan *'Yang di-Pertuan Besar'*. There are two other States without thrones: Penang and Malacca.
3. As formed, the new Federation comprised the 11 peninsular States, Singapore (till 1965), Sarawak and Sabah.
4. After the Brunei popular rebellion of 1962—both an anti-Sultan and anti-Malaysia movement—constitutional advance fell far behind the States and Federation of Malaysia.
5. An indispensable guide to these and other constitutional matters is Tan Sri Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim's *An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia,* Kuala Lumpur, 1972.
6. An incident of 1974 was ambiguous: the incumbent (the Sultan of Kedah) was prevailed upon by the Prime Minister, Tun Razak, to postpone till expiry of his term a second marriage on which (to the noticeable detriment of enjoyment and concentration during a State Visit to Britain that summer!) he had set his heart. Tun Razak was acting on the representations of the women's section of his political party, which had thought to see in the 46 year-old Monarch a champion of monogamy in Muslim society. An issue of *Newsweek* which reported the case briefly but facetiously (see International Edition, 9 September 1974; p 39) was impounded by Malaysian Customs.
7. It is to be noted that the Conference includes the appointed Governors of Penang, Malacca, Sarawak and Sabah except for purposes of discussing religion and electing the *Agong.*
8. The crisis is analyzed by M. G. G. Pillai, *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 28 November 1978, and K. Das, *Far Eastern Economic Review,* 1 December 1978, pp 12, 14-15. Pillai also refers to a meeting between Hussein Onn and the other Sultans, a little earlier, at which he reportedly called for restraint in their business activities.
9. Relatively open and widespread criticism of royalty is a significant development in Malaysian life. A subtle but authoritative jab came from the pen of a Malay writer, Ishak Haji Mohamed, who commented recently that the

problems of the Malays (meaning the massive Chinese population) should not be blamed on the British but on those who first sold them Penang and Singapore. In Kelantan, trisha-pedallers have spat at the *Istana Rakyat Ayer Mata* (The Palace of the People's Tears) now under construction on compulsorily purchased and undervalued peasant land at a cost to State funds of M$18m (latest estimate).

10. As this article went to press it was learned that the choice had fallen on the Ruler of Pahang. It is difficult to resist the thought that the Rulers have 'cocked a snook' at the Prime Minister by thus adhering to precedent, where it was open to them to pass over all three contenders and launch a new cycle of succession by nominating the Ruler of Negri Sembilan—a well-educated man. An opportunity to fashion a more flexible institution seems to have been missed. Meanwhile the Deputyship has been left vacant at least until June—a hiatus which inevitably suggests some failure of consensus.

[Dr. Kershaw's first and second articles in this series were concerned with Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia and King Bhumiphol of Thailand respectively, and appeared in *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 234, Nos. 1359 & 1360. The series will be reissued as a pamphlet, *The Changing Face of Monarchy in Southeast Asia. Three Political Portraits*, with the inclusion of a genealogy of the Thai Royal House].

THE GENERAL ELECTION—TOWARDS OPEN-TEXTURED POLITICS

by David Southern

THE functions of the voter in British general elections are limited: 'There is a Government in being which he can confirm or else reject in favour of the alternative team' (L. S Amery). Since February 1974 the Labour Government lacked both a firm electoral basis and a clear working majority in Parliament. British government, however, will not return to its normal pattern. In the 1970s parliamentary government as this country has known it for a hundred and fifty years has come to an end. Britain now has the form of responsible party government without the substance.

The one rule of the British constitution prior to the 1970s was the irremissibility of governmental responsibility. The Cabinet exercised the powers of government. The ruling party had a complete monopoly of power for its tenure of office. Government and party were welded together by their collective responsibility for all acts of public policy. The Government ruled through a loyal and apolitical public service.

Mr. Heath's Cabinet of 1970 was the last British government which behaved as if it could rule by acts of will and utter a final word which would be obeyed. The breakdown of Mr. Heath's government and the system of government which it inherited can be dated fairly precisely. In 1972 Mr. Heath resolved to force economic growth by expansion of the money supply. The then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Barber, had all his political life played a faithful Berthier, to Mr. Heath's Napoleon. At this proposal, however, the Chancellor resiled. Mr. Heath breathed fire:

> Hath he so long held out with me, untir'd,
> And stops he now for breath?

The rest of the Cabinet, restive at the apparent wilfulness of their leader, supported Mr. Barber. For a week Westminster and Whitehall awaited his resignation with tremulous expectancy. Mr. Barber, however, was not of the blood of resigners. He agreed to stay in office to implement the new policy, on condition that he should receive no further ministerial post and would retire from politics when the Government left office. At that moment perished the system of Cabinet government based on a House of Commons majority. Mr. Heath and Sir William Armstrong went one way; the Cabinet and the Conservative majority in the Commons became onlookers at proceedings which they were powerless to influence. The mechanics of parliamentary government continued to function. Like abandoned locomotives with their fires still alight, the Conservative government and party were carried along for a while by the rails. But the vital accord, the indissoluble bond of responsibility between Prime Minister, Cabinet and party was gone. The premature general election of February 1974 was not the affirmation but the abnegation of responsibility: Mr. Heath, no longer equal to

the problems of a time so out of joint, tried to hand the ticket back to God.

Since 1974 the breakdown of Cabinet government, hitherto covert and concealed, has become open and confessed. In 1835 Sir Robert Peel asked his Cabinet colleagues whether it was consistent 'either with the credit and character of public men or the interest of the King's service to continue to conduct a Government with a minority in the House of Commons.' Mr. Wilson and Mr. Callaghan, however, faced with the inability of either the Government or the Opposition to command a majority, had perforce to learn the skills of minority government. Governments now neither resign nor dissolve despite the loss of major votes in the Commons. On important matters—the standard rate of income tax, the proviso for a forty per cent affirmative vote in referendums before the Scottish and Welsh Assemblies can be established—the Government had abdicated responsibility to the House of Commons. The Cabinet itself was publicly divided on the question of whether or not Britain should remain a member of the Common Market, so resort was made to referendum, an institution incompatible with parliamentary sovereignty. But neither Parliament nor the people can be strictly responsible: hence nobody can be called to account for decisions taken by them. As J. S. Mill writes, 'Responsibility is null when nobody knows who is responsible.' With the breakdown of the authority and integrity of government, responsibility for public policy can no longer be exclusively localised in the Cabinet.

As long as the Government had a monopoly of power and responsibility, the function of the House of Commons was to support or oppose the administration of the day. An elongated Siamese ligature united Government and Parliament inseparably. All matters of detail could therefore be elevated into matters of principle. For this reason the House of Commons remained the sole great legislature of the world whose public debates were occasions of high grandeur and importance. What Churchill called 'a sense of crowd and urgency' on the floor of the House of Commons is still an incomparable experience. But this juvenile pleasure is dearly bought. The exclusive emphasis on the plenary sessions of the House atrophied the life of its committees. The whole work of Parliament is organised around the conflict model. Committees can decide nothing of substance, because the only question for decision, underlying every matter of detail, is whether one is for or against the Government. The Standing Committees of the House are but pale simulacrums of the plenary sessions. Hence the disastrous inadequacy of the committee system of the House of Commons, which is also the only great legislature with no foreign affairs, no defence, no economic policy committee. Floor debates restrict members to a ritualised partisan activity. There is no premium on knowledge because how they think does not matter; how they vote does.

In the past M.P.s have accepted their lot because they believed that executive domination of Parliament had a vital political function to play. As in the case of the development of Cabinet government, the Heath era marked a watershed in the attitude of M.P.s to their political role. No government in future will be able to count on the loyalty and discipline

displayed by Conservative M.P.s from 1972 to 1974. In this period Conservative M.P.s found that the traditional virtues led to the shambles: most of them still bear the scars of that experience. The hold of governments over Parliament and of the party leadership over M.P.s has been permanently weakened, In the Conservative Party the division between those who followed Mr. Heath into exile and the triumphant band of Thatcherites went beyond the normal range of opinion found within a government party. The respective champions of each section then toured the country, the former asserting the need for an incomes policy despite the conflict this entails with the essential purposes of trade unions, the latter proclaiming the most trivial economic cliches as if they were the law received on tablets of stone from the Lord on Mount Sinai. As for the Parliamentary Labour Party, its members could no longer summon up sufficient unity of purpose to organise a parish bun fight.

When after February 1974 Parliament began with some regularity to defeat the Government, it was confidently predicted that the stars would fall from Heaven. Like blind Samson, Parliament tugged valiantly at the pillars of the house: the pillars gave way but the house remained standing. A defeat of the Government in the House of Commons soon became a routine matter. If the House of Commons could get along without the Government, then the Government could to the same extent do without the House of Commons. When M.P.s found that the Government spoke not in the wind, nor in the earthquake, nor in the fire but in a still small voice, they asked themselves the same question as that put to Elijah. What doest thou here?

The changed relationship of government and Commons made partisan activity of the old kind otiose. The figures who once invested the party division with a grandiose significance—Michael Foot and Enoch Powell—are now anachronisms. M.P.s no longer wish to serve as the poor bloody infantry in a party war which has ceased to serve a useful purpose. In a sense now, Government is outside the House of Commons and all parties in Parliament are in Opposition. M.P.s are now more aware of the interests which they share in common and less conscious of the party differences which divide them. Relaxed party discipline has weakened the unity and coherence of the two great parties. The two elections of 1974 saw a great increase in the representation of minor parties in the Commons. In form and in substance we now have a multi-party Parliament.

In a multi-party Parliament the centre of gravity shifts from the centre to the periphery, from the plenum to the committees. The fragmentation of Parliament breathes life and vigour into its committees which, no longer the dependent creatures of the plenary sessions, develop an independent role. At the instigation of back-bench M.P.s and against the wishes of both Front Benches, the endenisation of Parliament into a committee-dominated assembly of the continental type is already under way. The Committee on Procedure has recommended the establishment of committees with a permanent existence and limited subject matter. Members of such committees would develop a corporate spirit and expertise, constituting a countervail-

ing pressure to the factitious animosities of the party system. The powers of such committees would ineluctably expand from the mere scrutiny of departmental work to the drafting of departmental legislation. Hence the Parliament elected this year will be a different sort of Parliament to the assemblies which it succeeds.

Not only has Parliament hitherto had an attenuated political function but also the institutional basis of the political system has been very narrow. The two great institutions of the British constitution are the executive and legislature. A formal account of British government comprises simply the Crown and Parliament. It has been part of the genius of the British political system to adapt to new realities of power. Yet new and major sources of influence have been either assigned a quite unrealistic role or kept outside the pale of the constitution altogether.

When the modern civil service emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century, it was cast in the role of the subordinate creature of the executive. Constitutionally there can be in Britain no antinomy between party and national goals; the Government by definition embodies the national interest. Therefore the civil service should be the apolitical and obedient instrument of the Government. The constitutional distinction between political leadership and neutral administration has from the start, however, contained the seeds of its own negation. The discontinuity of political leadership resulting from the two-party system contrasts sharply with the stability of the civil service. The continuity necessary for democratic politics has been secured, firstly, by giving in practice substantial political responsibilities to high officials, secondly by the convention that an incoming government accepts the measures of the outgoing one.

In the 1970s the civil service has come to formulate a national interest alongside and above the viewpoints of the political parties, superseding the constitutional identification of the Government with the national interest. The leaders of the civil service never had the intention of taking over the government, but in 1972 something akin to a breakdown in Cabinet government occurred. The civil service had to fill this gap because there was nobody else available who had the confidence to command or was capable of controlling the system. As civil servants have moved reluctantly but resolutely into high politics, the veil of ministerial responsibility, which has traditionally rendered opaque the actions of civil servants, has become transparent. The whole direction in which reform of the committee system of the House of Commons is moving requires that civil servants should put forward and defend their own policy choices and exolve the bonds which tie them to their ministers. Greater prominence has been given to administrative as opposed to party goals, because the Labour government since 1974 systematically reversed the measures of its predecessor, thereby violating the convention that a new government should build upon rather than demolish the work of the administration which it replaces. Finally, the principle that state servants are the politically neutral agents of public policy has become impossible to maintain because the special duties of Crown employment have become historical fictions:

civil servants now join unions affiliated with the TUC and take industrial action in exactly the same manner as non-state servants. When civil service unions openly organise actions whose proclaimed object is the hampering of government rather than the discharge of its responsibilities, the civil service can no longer be regarded as the obedient instrument of the political executive.

The new role of the civil service is symbolised by the enlarged benefits conferred on its members. At the same time as Mr. Heath with conviction and Mr. Barber reluctantly starting printing confetti money in 1972, the entire public service was accorded inflation-proof pensions linked to the cost of living, one of the most expensive and extravagant concessions ever made by a British government to any social group. The changes affecting the civil service have brought a realignment of the respective powers and responsibilities of the political executive on one hand and the administration on the other. The dissonance between formal and actual responsibility, which has pervaded British institutions since the mid-nineteenth century, has now reached the point where the constitution requires reformulation. We must move from a theory of the Crown to a theory of the State.

The other great institution left outside the pale of the formal constitution is the trade union movement. The nineteenth century brought profound social as well as institutional changes, which in turn produced political effects. That prescient Liberal, Sir Edward Grey, observed in 1912: 'Power . . . is now passing from the House of Commons to the Trades Unions.' Yet the power of the trade unions—like that of the civil service—is still imperfectly recognised in our constitutional scheme. For its first two years the Heath government sedulously kept the trade union leadership at arm's length, expecting it to be the obedient recipient of laws handed down from above, as if the Cabinet were in fact—as it is in theory—a sovereign enthroned at the centre of the political system. It was the fatal error of the Heath government to believe that the British constitution was what it appeared to be. Their industrial relations policy sought to make the substance of trade union power accord with its form. Their measures appeared to be a threat to the vital interests of trade unions and obliged them to exercise openly the powers which they had long ago obtained covertly. Hitherto no party has drawn the logical consequence from this and come forward with a scheme to enlarge and regularise the part trade unions play in the system of government.

Not only the institutional but also the social basis of the British constitution has long been much narrower than the actual range of social forces. Since the great extensions of the franchise in the nineteenth century, Britain has been a democracy resulting from the combination of a middle class autocracy with an alienated working class. In the nineteenth century working class voters gave their allegiance to middle class parties. Trade unions remained essentially apolitical, concerned not with the political complexion of government but with what governments did. When governments tended to become authoritarian—as most governments have a habit of doing—they were kept in check by the trade unions, who in this negative

role have proved great bulwarks of liberty. Since the 1920s when the Labour Party displaced the Liberal Party, British party politics have been largely explicable in class terms. The political *raison d'être* of the Labour Party has been to maintain the group identity of the working class: council housed, comprehensively educated and conscripted into trade unions. The political fortunes of the Conservative Party have in turn depended on its capacity firstly to attract the section of the working class which has resisted this process, secondly, to cartellise the middle class vote. Mrs. Thatcher's thirst to reassert middle-class values has its counterpoise in the Labour Party's determined identification with the working class in general and the trade unions in particular. Both attitudes are appropriate to past rather than future circumstances. The conventional middle/working class dichotomy has lost both its economic basis and its power as a variable to explain individual voting behaviour. Britain is the most socialist nation in Europe: in terms of income differentials there is a broad overlap between middle and working class jobs. Social attitudes have lagged behind economic facts and the levelling process itself has produced an exaggerated assertion of inherited differences of status.. While middle class privileges have remained, however, access to them is more open, In any case the cleavage between manual and non-manual labour, exaggerated by the party system, has never corresponded to the true variety of social groupings. Now that this cleavage has been further eroded, the two major parties cannot maintain their hold over their voters. Hence their share of the total vote has consistently declined since 1951 and emergent new parties have achieved significant electoral followings. The old alignment of voters along ideological or regional lines only recently re-emerged.

That British politics have undergone a sea-change is emphatically demonstrated by the results of the general election of 3 May 1979. The central postulate of the Butler-Stokes school of political science has been that in Britain, because of the number of dormant Labour voters, the greater the percentage of the electorate voting, the higher will be the Labour vote. What was declared to be impossible, however, has come to pass: turnout has risen by 3% but it is the Conservative vote which has increased. The weakened hold of the two major parties has been confirmed. The Conservatives received 3% less of the popular vote than they obtained in the general election of 1970, while the Labour and Conservative parties together won 80% of votes cast, more than in the two 1974 elections but less than in any general election since 1929. The two party system will remain but in a muted and modified form.

The full results (October 1974 results in brackets) were:

	Votes cast	% age of vote	Seats won
Conservative	13,697,753(10,445,951)	43.9(35.9)	339(276)
Labour	11,509,524(11,446,671)	36.9(39.3)	268(319)
Liberal	4,313,931(5,234,399)	13.8(18.3)	11(13)
Scottish Nationalist	504,259(839,617)	1.6(2.9)	2(11)
Welsh Nationalist	132,544(166,321)	0.4(0.6)	2(3)
National Front	191,267(114,415)	0.6(0.4)	0(0)

Other	871,512(887,558)	2.8(3.0)	13(13)
Total	31,220,790(29,102,084)		
Total electorate	41,093,264(39,974,993)		
Turnout	76% (72.8%)		

It is conventionally said that Britain lags behind other West European nations in terms of political and social change. The reverse is true: in the last decade Britain has changed at a pace which compared with that of our European neighbours is breath-taking, a process which has generated the tensions which are cited as evidence of Britain's backwardness. The process is evidence of the continued vitality of Britain's institutions. The segments into which British political life has been divided—sovereign and subject, executive and legislature, politics and administration, Government and opposition, middle and working class—are breaking down: British politics is becoming open-textured. The result of the general election marked one further stage in the transformation which will bring the rhythm of parliamentary life into harmony with wider social and economic forces.

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THE OPTIMUM TAX REFORM FOR BRITAIN IN 1979

by Arthur W. J. Lewis, M.P.

BRITAIN is committed to the principle of taking collective responsibility for the care of the unable. The unable include the young, the old, the sick, the disabled and the handicapped. The liability of such an endeavour lies in the tendency to validate inability at the expense of ability. The extreme of this tendency is manifest in a computation which runs like this. 'To each according to his need, from each according to his ability to pay.' Man's potential needs are infinite, man's ability to pay is strictly finite. This computation is a prescription for universal poverty. It can lead to an attempt to fill a bottomless pit from a limited resource and to wind up with a bottomless pit and no resource. Provided this liability is recognised by all, and provided the Nation is protected from those who would exploit this frailty, in order to achieve conquest by consent, then the taking of collective responsibility for the care of the unable can be a major advance in civilisation.

For a variety of historic reasons Britain has fallen into debt. The problem is so overwhelming that Britain borrows money to pay the interest on what she has already borrowed. Being in debt, Britain is not free to conduct her affairs according to her own best interests. The major manifestation of this phenomenon is the self inflicted injury of the tax on earnings. This tax punishes those who strive to create the wealth that could get Britain out of debt. It is interesting to speculate as to whether any Chancellor who was his own master would impose a tax that is tantamount to committing economic suicide.

A Chancellor of the Exchequer who was freed from the instructions of the money lender would contrive the disposition of his revenue take in such a way as to remove every possible hindrance to production. He would harvest his tax in a manner designed to enrich the harvest. Presumably the Chancellor in Britain today is under instructions from the money lender and in consequence he takes the harvest in a manner which damages productivity. It is difficult to imagine a sane man behaving in this manner if he were free to operate correctly. The tax on earnings which prevents the creation of wealth leaves the nation poor. National poverty renders the high ideal of a welfare state impossibly burdensome. The concept of accepting collective responsibility for the care of the unable is an advanced form of civilisation which is only commensurate with a thriving and prosperous economy. Owing to the liability stated earlier, a welfare state can easily become self destructive. That phenomenon is in full spate in Britain today.

A Government, under pressure from the electorate to honour its manifesto commitments, whilst struggling with hidden constraints imposed by money lenders, is only too liable to borrow or to print more money. The result is inflation. Money loses its value when it is poured into circulation

in a desperate attempt to hide the failure to produce the wealth needed by the nation to pay its way. Inflation, created in this manner by the Government, places tremendous pressure on the wage demands. The Labour Government in Britain was trying to hold these wage demands in check and to reduce the inflationary spiral by obtaining the acceptance of a lower standard of living. A Labour Government was not well placed to attempt a feat which is diametrically opposed to the goal for which it was elected into office. As if in a nightmare we watched a Labour Government increasing interest rates for the money lenders who have the nation in hock. The working man was forced to slave for the benefit of foreign money men.

It would be an admission of defeat to abandon the concept of caring for the unable as a national responsibility. We must find an alternative to cutting back in the welfare state. We must find the exact cause of our difficulty, correct it and so create the prosperity which will make the welfare state inexpensive to service.

The answer to our problem is very simple. Britain needs to be wealthy. Wealth is created by the people. The people create wealth by producing goods and services that are needed and wanted and which can be exchanged on the world market. Human beings are never happier than when they are successfully creative. Low production only occurs in the presence of suppression.

The tax on earnings is viciously suppressive. It punishes the worker for working, and when the revenue raised in this manner is used to reward the indolent, this tax totally invalidates the contribution made by the worker to the common good. As soon as we recognise that this tax on earnings is suppressive, we must not rest until it has been abolished. It is not good enough to talk in terms of reducing this tax. This is tantamount to condoning theft from the pay packet. Whatever the cost in lost revenue this tax must be withdrawn.

Before we rush to the many attractive alternatives that wait in the pipeline for consideration, let us be certain that an alternative tax will be required. In the first place the tax on earnings only provides a proportion of the Chancellor's revenue requirements. The cost of harvesting this particular revenue and the industry which has grown up for the purpose of avoiding this tax, combine to consume some 50% of its total yield. The remainder can be said to go towards the cost of servicing loans which are required to cover the debts created by the loss in production caused by the tax on earnings. Suppression is very damaging and the cost of that damage must be measured in £billions.

Everyone, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is aware that the burden of taxation in Britain has become too great. A wise statesman will use this opportunity to reduce the burden of taxation in order to create the greatest possible dynamic impact on the economy. By concentrating the reduction at one key point it is possible to use the reduction to create an increase in the total revenue yield. The total revenue yield will depend

upon the size of the nation's productive capacity. That capacity is determined by the individual, by his willingness to work, by his ability to find work and by his willingness to stay in the U.K. and here to make his creative contribution. A withdrawal of the tax on earnings will remove the suppression which dims the willingness to work. As soon as the intention to withdraw the tax on earnings is fully understood by the people of Britain a multiplicity of projects will get under way to win this punishment-free reward. There will be full employment. The 1½ million currently unable to find work, will be able to obtain employment and will be able to increase productivity. Furthermore, Britain has a hidden asset. There is an elite work force in exile. When Britain withdraws the tax on earnings, and Britain becomes a tax haven, the best brains and the greatest skills will be drawn to our shores. The withdrawal of the tax on earnings is a precision operation. It will actually increase the revenue available to the Treasury. But most important of all the root cause of inflation will have gone and the new revenue will be free of inflation. The quality of revenue will become sound. From a position of strength and prosperity it will be so much easier to introduce other tax reforms urgently needed.

It was often said that no one wanted an early General Election because there were no popular options to offer the electorate. A withdrawal of the tax on earnings is a very popular option. At no time in our history could it have been more popular. It may require an act of faith to remove it, but the rewards will be great. Let the whole nation share with the Chancellor of the Exchequer the burden of responsibility for taking the plunge. Let us all say to him that we will sink or swim together. If there is a risk in doing the right thing, then let us share the risk.

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AND NOW THE VOID: TWENTIETH CENTURY MAN'S PLACE IN MODERN TRAGEDY

by David R. Morgan

SAMUEL Backett, writing in the 'Unnamable' of twentieth century man as the non-hero trapped in the void of absurdity, said,

> All in all; each man in all men, all men in each man, no definition, no laughter. All beings in each being, each being in all beings, no focus, no tears. All in each, each in all. All distinctions are mind, by mind, in mind, of mind; no laughter, no tears. No distinctions, no mind to distinguish.

To many artists, playwrights, novelists and poets the uneasy marriage of reason and nightmare which has dominated the twentieth century has given birth to an increasingly surreal world, brooded over by the triad God of Sex, Paranoia and Anti-belief. From this comes the religion of Absurdity, branching into suffering and cruelty. Ranging in theatre from the little enacted joint surrealist creation *The Masturbations of Memory*, which deals basically with the birth of a foetus, as a pilgrim's progress of the sub-conscious into a world of overheated light and fused earth, which is really only a wound on the Cerebral Cortex of the unformed baby—its own life and death, as Ionesco called it, being:
'The dream-play of the irreconcilable melancholy of the exposed embryo.'

To the plays of Ionesco and Beckett, in which tragedy is often superseded by total suffering in a hostile universe, and Adamov who deals with the isolation of man from the unnamable and the mutilation of his soul as a factor in the ravaging of the beast of time, in which there is no tragedy only inevitable acceptance or ignorant perdition.

For the conception of the twentieth century man as portrayed on the stage by the writers of the 'Triad God', we must turn far back to the roots of tragedy and *The Myth of Sisyphus*, which was re-introduced this century by Albert Camus. Sisyphus was condemned for eternity to roll a heavy stone up a steep hill, his objective being to position it at the crest. However, every time he reaches the summit with it, the stone invariably rolls back down again and so he must repeat the process over and over, forever. This goes beyond tragedy to what Knot labelled 'Absurd' and another critic, B. S. Johnson, called 'Dramatic suffering'. With Camus in *The Outsider* and *The Myth of Sisyphus* and Genet and Adamov in their plays, Sisyphus is displaced from his Myth and re-born, 'Astride a grave . . . and an uneasy birth' (Beckett, *Godot*) into the twentieth century, still rolling his stone, yet under different circumstances; for now Sisyphus is a man living his life-task solely for its own sake, in a universe which no longer makes sense because there is no God to resolve the contradictions and therefore no point in rolling the stone up the hill since the punishment is now invalid and the reward for adherence to it no longer there. But, paradoxically, tragedy is reintroduced because for the modern man in the void there is an ironic salvation and that is to realise the absurdity of his situation and

thus accept the inevitable; if this does not offer happiness at least it prevents disillusion. The tragedy therefore, is failure to recognise this tragic state of being.

From this somewhat bleak conception we can see, with Beckett and others, that there is a true tragedy present, although the mode of expression is revealed differently from, for example, the brooding of Hamlet or the resounding pity of Hedvig in Ibsen's *The Wild Duck*. For the tragedy of the twentieth century man is that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, no power to express, together with the obligation to express. This is more in tune with reality; the breakdown of essential communication. It is in life that we must 'kill Time', in drama time kills us. The dramatists before our time showed the sands of time running out on such as Dr. Faustus, and Hell approaching. In the twentieth century Beckett and other contemporary writers became anti-dramatist, showing time stretching endlessly, and Godot not coming! Beckett allows us to laugh at the two tramps, Vladimir and Estragon, in *Godot* only for us to realise that in the end we shall share their tragedies, This method of comedy counterpoising tragedy is not unique to twentieth century drama, yet seen in the light of the modern Sisyphus it is original:

> *Pozzo*: I don't seem to be able . . . (Long hesitation) . . . to depart.
> *Estragon*: Such is life. (*Waiting For Godot*: Samuel Beckett.)

By presenting absurdities, we soon perceive the realities beneath and with these realities only can we find sympathy and thus identification with the tragedy expressed therein.

With Ionesco, Sisyphus exists in a dream, or a reality that has evolved into a dream as the placid façade of middle-class life splits open and the submerged fantasies come pulsing through. Ionesco never creates characters of any depth or substance, the people in his plays are sudden and two-dimensional, like the figures in a dream. Ionesco said in the preface to a collection of his plays:

> Modern man is pure dramatic essence and pure dream substance. The dream is pure drama. In a dream, one is always in mid-situation . . . I think that the dream is a lucid thought, more lucid than anyone has when awake, a thought expressed in images and at the same time its form is always dramatic. It can be tragedy and comedy, expressed in an inexpressible medium made clear whilst at the same instant being unmixed by the distillation of time.

Ionesco's dream world is unpredictable, irrational and abrupt; Beckett is the opposite, the world of chess, meticulous and cruelly rational, as in *Endgame*, for instance, when Hamm rejects the possibility of life elsewhere, but uses it as his cue for dismissing further responsibility in the form of Clov:

> *Hamm*: If he does exist he'll die there or he'll come here. And if he doesn't . . . (Pause)
> *Clov*: You don't believe me? You think I'm inventing?
> *Hamm*: It's the end, Clov, we've come to the end. I don't need you any more.

We are shown the tragedy through a refracted light, by realising that some type of relief will come with the realisation of man's meaningfulness and yet paradoxically the characters hope against hope that:

> We're not beginning to . . . to . . . mean something.

For then perhaps God would not be dead, for god would be ourselves with the possibility of redemption and all the responsibility that goes with that, a truth too cruel, frightening and saving to be thought of.

In *Marat-Sade* Peter Weiss reveals the natural progression in a dramatist of presenting the dramatic characters filling the void with the gossamer webs of illusion, alienation, absurdity and cruelty. This is an evolution from the concepts of Artaud, Brecht's Epic and Total theatre and Alfred Jarry's *Ubu* plays and the ideology of Pataphysics. Weiss uses total theatre in which the world is a lunatic asylum, in which emotional expressions of tragedy and comedy are mixed with paranoia and schizophrenia:

> A mad animal.
> Man's a mad animal.
> I'm a thousand years old and in my time
> I've helped commit a million murders . . .
> I escape . . . through all the shit and the splintered bones.
> I'm not through yet,
> I have plans.

Marat exhorts man to: 'Suffer as he suffered on the cross . . .' for it is 'The will of God.'

The Theatre of Suffering takes over from Beckett's Theatre of Stagnant Time and Ionesco's theatre of the Outsider. But despite the widely different devices used, the picture of twentieth century man is still the same, steeped in the tragedy of search unfulfilled, of questions unasked or unanswered, whether in spheres political, artistic, love or life in its forms, as De Sade says in Weiss's play:

> Before deciding what is wrong and what is right
> First we must find out what we are,
> I do not know if I am hangman or victim

Beckett wrote in *Watt*:

> I am always searching for something, myself I think, it's tiring in the end and then it is only the beginning.

And as Herbert Read said in *The Problem of Our Age*. It is . . .

> why people who have no personal convictions of any kind allow themselves to suffer for indefinite or undefined causes, drifting like shoals of fish into invisible nets. The problem is mass suffering, mute and absurd. We live in a tragic age, but we are unable to express ourselves in tragic poetry. We are inarticulate and our only art is mockery or one of self-indulgence or self-pity. Our fatalism gives us a stoical appearance, but it is not a genuine stoicism. It is a dull animal endurance of misfortune, unfocused and unexpressed.

Thus, on the stage, as we have seen in the light of the drama of the void, the old definitions of tragedy are no longer completely valid. The expression of life has been distilled and expanded through the theatres of 'Surrealism', 'Absurdity', 'Cruelty', 'Expressionism' and 'Alienation', until tears and sadness have become ambiguous and the tragedy is not now losing something but having it in the first place and thus having the possibility of loss. As Rilke said:

Wer spricht von siegen? Uberstehn ist alles.

(Who talks of victories? To see it through is everything.)

Whether the interpretation of Twentieth Century Man's 'Tragio-oppressive' state ranges from the extreme pessimism of Beckett, to the suffering depression of Ionesco and Adamov, the comic cruelty of Alfred Jarry and the ironic farce cruelty of Weiss or the purer cruelty of Artaud and the politically explosive flux of void and emotion of Brecht, still the tragic expression is always oblique, implied or as farcically absent as the vanished meaning of life. Sometimes the tragedy is not there, for all is destruction or destroyed. There is no loss of happiness for happiness or truth have never existed; as Chorus and Macheath chant in Brecht's *Threepenny Opera.*

> What keeps a man alive if not the hours
> He spends devouring, tearing, killing all he can?
> That's how man lives his life, he has the power
> To make himself forget that he's a man.

Harold Pinter in the Sixties and early Seventies showed us a more domestic proposition of twentieth century man and the void. With his characters he shows society providing us with warm, reasonably comfortable caves, in which we can huddle with our fellows, beating on the drums that drown out the howling hyenas of the surrounding darkness. The tragedy here is that the drums that drown our fears also destroy communication and the caves themselves, in the end, cannot prevent the hyenas, in their silence, from entering.

Going back slightly in time to the forties and fifties, Jean Paul Sartre expounded his concept of existentialism, introducing a new facet in the factors making up our multi-ambivalent twentieth century man—the modern Sisyphus. Sartre saw tragedy as intrinsic to his nature, that is, as inexpressible as the fleeting soul, offering an opposite to the bleak logical positivism of writers that had gone before him. This same tragedy has evolved from the well of silence to being paradoxically expressible, but in an elliptical manner, as the tragedy of a people possessing all manner of globes, atlases, railroad guides and trunks, but who die without ever managing to leave their home town. From this, with Genet and certain followers of Artaud, tragedy has often been transmuted into what have been called the 'Seven obsessions of Drama', being the flaccid penis, excrement, anxiety, the timeless place (life/death ambiguity), the threatening past, the hallucinatory over-reality of tables and furniture and the disquieting geometry of rooms, streets and stairways.

'Traditional tragedy on the stage had, by the Twenties and Thirties,' says Knott, 'become somewhat of a cliché'. The playwrights were thus faced with retaining an essential self within the world of clichés, to counterpoise the cliché of tragedy, until it seemed a mere show or enactment to entertain and then, because of its new mask of self-mocking meaninglessness, to find the devices of smashing the pseudo disguise and revealing the deeper, true tragedy beneath. Brecht, Ionesco, Beckett and Genet have been called 'The Blasphemers' because of their use of techniques, gleaning their philosophies or anti-philosophies on stage, giving, in the light of what

we have discussed previously, Twentieth Century Man new expression. In their revealing, often obscurely, of tragedy they have gone more to the Eastern tradition, for the representation of personal suffering and heroism which we call 'Tragic Drama' is distinctive of the Western tradition. The tragedy transposed from the East and the concept of Sisyphus has become more subtle—a tale used as a model—

> 'In some obscure village in Central Poland, there was a small synagogue. One night, when making his rounds, the Rabbi entered and saw God sitting in a dark corner. He fell upon his face and cried out. "Lord God, what art thou doing here?" God answered him neither in thunder nor out of a whirlwind, but with a small voice.
>
> "I am tired, Rabbi, I am tired unto death." '

This is the kinder way of looking at the situation. Others, instead of giving an allegory, would simply exclaim. 'God is dead.' Whatever the case, in one very true sense tragedy has gone from our stage, for in the past tragedy required the intolerable burden of God's presence. In another sense, of course, tragedy has just changed and in fact been given new life in expression. The silent shriek of Mother Courage when she must identify her dead son is the silence of modern tragedy, not communicated in words but of the screams in the winds of the defiled Universe. The cry of the exposed embryo, the yell of the isolated crowd, the scream of the self-burying corpse, all joining in the unbroken curve of tragedy.

Often the characters in a modern play, especially in Beckett, learn and do nothing, so that the audience can learn and act. We have moved away from the realism of Ibsen and Chekhov, with their discipline of unfolding insight, T. S. Eliot perhaps bridged the gap in the forties and fifties with his 'pivotal poetic dramas'. But his plays, such as *Murder in the Cathedral*, seem sadly lacking in any drama either to insight tragedy, comedy or sympathy. His *The Cocktail Party* is perhaps more pertinent in its rejection of much of the imaginative richness and its relevance to modern life of the dramatic tradition that leads from Büchner to Strindberg, turning back to a ghostly existential past that merges with Kafka's future.

Gloucester in *King Lear* can no longer exclaim:

> As flies to wanton boys, are we to Gods—
> They kill us for their sport.

The Gods, if Gods there be, no longer find us even amusing. Whilst there is a higher logic or ordering that we suffer for upon the illogical confines of the Earth, tragedy is definable. But in the modern conception, where God is either dead tired of us all or simply dead, then all logic is rent asunder—the logic made illogical in the Earth's total confines. The tragedy is undefinable, inexpressible, all pervasive—an extension of what Brecht said:

> The sufferings of this man appal me, his pains are terrible, his losses beyond tragedy, for all, all are unnecessary.

Camus wrote 'Tragedy today is collective'. Despair is not tragedy, it is evasion. Boredom often takes over from tragedy or humour. The boredom of the Twentieth Century, which we find so dramatically expressible, is intrinsic in the Twentieth Century Man, like the people of Oran before the

plague, in Camus' *The Plague*, who work, love, laugh and cry:
'. . . with the same feverish, yet casual, air. The truth is that everyone is bored and devotes himself to cultivating habits,'

Thus it is that one can look at modern man's situation in drama from many angles, each playwright offering a different facet to make up a whole, albeit mixed up, picture of this holistic creature faced with the void within and without. We have seen how new tragedy has been injected into this modern Sisyphus. Certain forms of tragedy have become dead or mute and yet, as we have seen, essential tragedy remains revealed in the workings of the personal, impenetrable world. This world must be defended and yet this very act of defence can destroy others by destroying their reality. The bleak view of the holistic individual can be shown in the three factors which create the new tragedy: firstly, that nothing is; secondly, that if anything is, it cannot be known, and thirdly, if anything is and can be known, it cannot be expressed in speech or communicated to others.

The tragedy therefore is not only the estrangement from self, but from a self that may not have existed in the first place. The dramatists of the 'neo-politicus' twentieth century man despair of the validity of any romantic, moralistic, sentimental or philosophical interpretations of the facts of existence; instead, presenting facts to their audiences in either deliberately absurd totality or in a deliberate nakedness, without any hints or truths or values for belief. But the implications are there. The tragedy comes from the audience now and, as with the absurd characters who would find deliverance if they accepted their absurdity, so we who see the inexpressibility of the 'New Tragedy' of modern drama should recognise the tragedy as being just as true and deep in its abstraction as the howlings of Samson chained in Gaza, blind as we now are silent. The tragic nature of man derives from the fact that this absolute vision beyond the void is tied to an impotent expression. Before the 'Blasphemers' and others this impotency was stressed through overt expression. Now, it is either obscured or made elliptical through the flooding of lights and comic, cruel or outrageous action; or it is left completely impotent, drowned in frustrated silence. As Beckett said in *The Unnamable*:

'You must go on . . . I can't go on . . . I'll go on.'
The tragedy no longer needs expressing, it just 'is'.

[David R. Morgan, winner of several prizes and awards for poetry, is the author of a novel and a book for children. He is at present working on a volume of new poems.]

THE YOUNG WRITERS' FESTIVAL AT THE ROYAL COURT THEATRE

by Robert Rubens

ONCE a year the London public is offered the unusual opportunity of seeing a selection of plays written by authors under the age of eighteen. These productions, while varying widely in theme and subject matter, have a unique interest not only for their artistic merit but also because they can be seen as a possible foreshadowing of the tone and the quality which the British theatre might develop in the years to come.

It has often been said that the theatre as a form of art moves in phases of lively creativity alternating with fallow years of dull uninspired plays. But since the mid-1950's there is no doubt that the Royal Court Theatre, London, has been responsible for some of the most exciting productions in the modern theatre. The Young Writers' Festival Programme is another example of this particular company's artistic awareness and shrewd foresight in keeping in constant touch with the mood of the times.

The director of the Young Writers' scheme, Mr. Gerald Chapman, says quite simply that one of the basic reasons for his programme is '. . . to find the playwrights of the future'. He also feels that young people should be given the chance to express themselves to a wide public audience and that we as adults should listen carefully to what they have to say. It is Mr. Chapman's conviction that the clearest indication of what society has done to itself can be seen in its effects on children.

While always in search of artistic potential in the plays submitted by the young people, the Royal Court directors are also particularly interested in their recurring themes and preoccupations. Aside from the perennial adolescent concerns with love, sex and parental relationships, many of the manuscripts are directly involved with social topics such as unemployment and racial prejudice. Although Gerald Chapman's primary objective is to encourage and develop young talent, he considers this programme to be an important annual event for the audiences as well as the authors because he feels strongly that, 'The kind of awareness that young people have of their environment is a very acute one.'

The first Young Writers' Festival was organised for London school-children by Joan Mills in 1973. Out of approximately fifty manuscripts submitted, only a few were chosen for amateur performances at the Oval House Theatre. These were so successful that they were later done as Sunday night productions at the Theatre Upstairs of the Royal Court. This led to an offer from the *Young Observer* for nationwide publicity which brought in a hundred and fifty manuscripts of which the best were given full professional productions at the Theatre Upstairs in 1974. Miss Mills soon began to enlarge the programme with a playwrights' workshop, a discussion group and sessions of improvisational playwriting for children. From then onwards the Young Writers' Festival became a popular yearly project.

Since 1973 Gerald Chapman has noticed a marked change in both the subjects and the attitudes expressed in the plays. While the earlier works were more saturated in private fantasy, the recent plays tend to present bleak interpretations of modern life. Although often expressed with humour and vivacity much of the current writing by young people contains a strong element of violence and an underlying pessimism which Mr. Chapman finds frankly worrying.

However in choosing the plays his main consideration is to find what he terms, 'an original voice'. He feels that despite the influence of films and television, much of the writing is strikingly fresh and spontaneous because of the authors' quick and intuitive comprehension of their own milieu. When this originality is coupled with a certain degree of literacy and theatrical understanding, then Mr. Chapman will seriously consider producing the play. He believes: 'Basically the criteria that apply to young people's writing are not particularly different from those that apply to older playwrights.'

Before and during the rehearsals Gerald Chapman has worked closely with the authors in a workshop which is an integral part of the programme. He has pointed out structural flaws in the plays and suggested possible revisions, but he always insists that the authors do the re-writing themselves. Mr. Chapman feels that any systematic form of teaching creative playwriting is impossible. When asked what gives him the clue that a young person might develop into a serious playwright, he explained that although a child's work may show exceptional talent on its own level, there can be no guarantee that in ten years time the same author will still be writing or will be writing as well as he did in his youth. Therefore the essential factor in the nurturing of young talent is to offer sympathetic and creative encouragement and then simply 'hope for the best'.

Gerald Chapman feels that the source of some of the best plays which he has discovered derives from what he calls the *'alternative life-style'* which the children live outside of the home and the school. He believes that once the school bell goes and they have shed their mask of being a good pupil, their *'real'* life begins. It would appear that the reason for this situation is that many children realise—often unconsciously—that the theory of scholastic achievement leading ultimately to later success in the professional world is not actually true. Thus they are faced with two extreme alternatives—one is to kow-tow to the system while knowing perfectly well that they are not going to win. The other choice is the life of the streets and the formation of gangs.

These themes turn up continually in the manuscripts received by the Royal Court. There are frequently young characters who find themselves unemployed, then turn to crime and are sent to prison. The same type of character will often come out of prison and then dedicate himself to a life of professional crime, but making certain that he is not caught. In many of the plays a school is burnt to the ground as an act of revenge as well as other more violent forms of rebellion. These alarming subjects originate from what Gerald Chapman considers to be a cycle of repression

and inadequacy in the treatment of children in our larger cities. So in spite of the abundance of talent which he has found in the plays, he is acutely aware that many of them express a pervading pessimism; a disturbing sense that the children feel that whatever they attempt, they will not succeed in doing and that even if they protest against their situation, they will inevitably be punished for their protests.

This kind of adolescent pessimism is most effectively explored in Paul Lister's play entitled *Island,* the second of the five short plays which comprise this year's Young Writers' Festival. Mr. Lister has placed three unhappy teen-agers on a traffic island in the midst of a motorway. Their conversation is acerbic and succinct, revealing snatches of their personal lives but mainly their mutual disgust with the soul-destroying horrors of inner-city life. In fact, the most articulate of the characters, Steve, who is played with brilliant intensity by Mr. Laurance Rudic, refers to himself as an 'inner-city product' and compares himself and his friends to a flock of sheep who simply '. . . don't know what it's all about.'

It is Steve who makes the final harrowing plea to the roaring disinterested traffic and to the world around him — a place for human understanding and simple faith in mankind. This play is a powerful, well-faceted little testament of the modern desiccation of feeling and a serious warning to all of us about the psychological damage which our increasingly mechanised society has caused.

Another play which deals with the theme of adolescent unrest, but written in a lighter vein, is *Me, I'd Like to Catch Miss Kerr* by Julia James. A quartet of gum-chewing, gabbling schoolgirls playing truant present their obsessions with pop-singers and their loathing of established authority in a briskly directed romp of crackling, teasing dialogue which culminates in the girls taking revenge on their schoolmistress and headmistress, not through violence, but by bombarding them with a stream of pseudo-scientific and technical phraseology. This is an ironically funny and disturbing play which is enhanced by the inspired idea of having the two schoolteachers portrayed by men dressed as women who add exactly the right touch of exaggerated authority and comic absurdity to the situation.

Mr. Mervyn Willis who directed these plays so skilfully has also directed Mark Power's *I'm Just Trying to Convince Myself that Vampires Don't Exist* which is a sombre study of an intelligent undergraduate bedevilled by nightmares and a recurring fear of being alone in the dark. Much of the play takes the form of a duologue between the troubled student and a friend who is studying psychiatry. Their talk is lucid, absorbing and it illuminates a great deal of the hero's anxieties, but it is not until the end of the play that we discover the true nature of his disturbance.

Perhaps the most ambitious of these plays is *Miracles Do Happen* by Douglas Parkin who attempts to explore the relationship between a frustrated vicar and his quietly domineering wife. The author has an unfailing ear for the inanities of genteel village chatter and much of his dialogue is laced with a humour as dry as the sherry which his characters are often

drinking. The story of the vicar's attempt to break away from his situation is made more complicated by the implication that his estranged son is about to appear after an extended period abroad. By this time one is so mesmerised by Mr. Parkin's tragi-comic slice of vicarage life, that one wishes that the play could have been long enough to include what might have been a brilliantly explosive father-son confrontation.

The most original and amusing piece in this programme is called *Humbug* which evolved out of the Royal Court Theatre's creative writing course for ten to twelve year olds. Thirteen young authors* devised this delightful farce and it was directed in a most unusual manner by the authors themselves and Mr. Philip Hedley. During the rehearsals the children acted out each scene while the adult actors observed their movements, mannerisms and gestures in order to recreate the natural spontaneity of the play.

Mr. Hedley, who has said that he wanted to retain the non sequitur charm of the original script, has triumphantly succeeded in bringing the play to life by helping his actors to enter gaily into the spirit of its topsy-turvy plot which revolves round a draper and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Humbug, their two daughters and the customers in the shop who include the Queen, the blustering Sir General Lurch and his two incompetent soldiers with their absurdly unusable guns without triggers. There is also a delightful drunken milkman with a passion for proposing marriage to any woman in sight and many other equally eccentric characters who flit through this play which is continually funny and fascinating as an almost surrealist example of a child's view of the grown up world.

All of the plays, although written by young people, are performed by professional adult actors with skill and enthusiasm. Yvonne D'Alpra in particular displays exceptional comic versatility in the roles of the vicar's wife, the truant schoolgirl and the delightfully dotty Miss Daly, pushing her broom in *Humbug*. Catherine Hall adds her own unique brand of sulky nervousness with great effect in all five of her varied roles. Anita Dobson and Diana Rayworth both reveal remarkable comic talent and faultless timing in three of the plays. Amongst the men in the cast Brian Attree gave a most moving performance as the mentally disturbed student in Paul Lister's play and Trevor T. Smith was wonderfully funny as the perpetually saluting Major Disaster in *Humbug*.

Under the guidance of Gerald Chapman, the Young Writers' Festival of 1979 was an exhilarating evening which makes one look forward eagerly to next year's productions and offers great hope for the future of the British theatre.

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* The authors of *Humbug* are:
Dorian Adams, Joanne Caffell, Helen Foster, Tracy Heyfron, Rachel James, Lisa King, Tabitha Meakin, James Noble, Sonya Slade, Kevin Toner, Eddie Toppin, Christopher Williams, Katherine Williams.

QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW

by David Fingleton

BERG. *Lulu.* Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra/Dohnanyi. (3 Records). DECCA D48D 3.
BRITTEN. *Peter Grimes.* Covent Garden Chorus & Orchestra/Davis (3 Records). PHILIPS 6769 014.
HOLST. *The Planets.* London Philharmonic Orchestra/Boult. EMI ASD 3649.
HAYDN. Symphonies 93 & 94 'Surprise'. Royal Philharmonic Orchestra/Beecham. HMV Concert Classics SXLP 30285.
BEETHOVEN. Mas in C. Beecham Choral Society & Royal Philharmonic Orchestra/Beecham. HMV Concert Classic SXLP 30284.
BEETHOVEN. Violin Sonata 'The Kreutzer'/MOZART. Violin Sonata K.454. Kulenkampff/Solti. DECCA 'Eclipse' ECM 832.
BEETHOVEN. The Five Cello Sonatas. Piatigorsky/Solomon. HMV Treasury RLS 731 (2 Records).
SHOSTAKOVITCH. Symphony No. 15. London Philharmonic Orchestra/Haitink. DECCA SXL 6906.
NEW YEAR'S DAY CONCERT IN VIENNA. Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra/ Boskovsky. (2 Records). DECCA D147D 2.

IT does immense credit to the record industry that within a few months of each other have recently appeared two truly indispensable recordings of 20th century operatic masterpieces. Berg's *Lulu* and Britten's *Peter Grimes* were first performed within a decade of each other on either side of the last war, and both are works of massive musical importance. It is however ironic than Decca's recording of *Lulu* in the version left by the composer at his death in 1937 should have appeared just weeks before the Paris Opera's milestone first production of the complete 3 Act Opera. For at his death in 1935 Berg left about 40 minutes of the third act unorchestrated, and the Zurich premiére of 1937 performed what has since become the normal version, recorded here by Decca, of the first two acts followed by the third act interlude and the orchestral version of the opera's final scene, both taken from Berg's own arrangement of the 'Lulu' Symphony. The Paris production however gave all three acts, with the orchestration of the third completed by the Austrian composer Friedrich Cerha. The reason for the previous incompleteness had been the opposition of the composer's widow, Helene, and, since her death in 1976, that of the Berg Foundation which she created. It is indeed sad that Decca should have undertaken their admirable recording in 1976, before it was thought advisable to use the Cerha completion of Act 3. For, having heard the complete Paris production during BBC Television's splendid Opera Month in April, it is clear not only that Cerha did his work with great integrity, but also that the third act is indeed crucial to the opera, whatever may previously have been argued. Perhaps it might not be too much to hope that Decca could now reassemble their forces from the present recording and proceed to add the third act to their existing two.

For all one's regret at its incompleteness, one can only hail and admire this Decca issue. Recorded in Vienna's Sofiensaal, whence so much of the company's very best work emanates, and superlatively played by the Vienna Philharmonic under Christoph von Dohnanyi, this recording makes

it clear that the orchestra is truly another voice in the opera, and moreover demonstrates that, for all its complexity, this is also a work of very considerable lyrical beauty. The large cast is virtually beyond reproach, and has singers of great distinction in even the smallest roles. Thus Schigolch is magnificently taken—down to the last asthmatic wheeze—by the great Hans Hotter, Kurt Moll sings the animal trainer, Heinz Zednik the Valet, Werner Krenn the Prince, and Manfred Schenk the Athlete. Walter Berry is a persuasive Doctor Schön, Horst Laubenthal takes the Painter, and Josef Hopfer is a slightly reedy Alwa. The nearest to disappointment in this recording comes from Brigitte Fassbaender's Countess Geschwitz: strongly and smoothly sung, but not fully inside the role, and thus rather failing to suggest fully the obsessive relationship with Lulu. The title role is taken by Anja Silja, who remains the supreme Lulu of our day, true to Wedekind as well as to Berg. She sings with unfailing dramatic power, and also with great subtlety so that every nuance of this infinitely complicated character is demonstrated. Hers, like the recording as a whole, is a great performance.

So is Colin Davis's of Benjamin Britten's *Peter Grimes*. Based on Crabbe's poem 'The Borough', concerning life and death in a small Suffolk fishing town, Britten's opera remains one of the most dramatic, and musically accessible, to have been written in the past half century. The composer himself conducted a memorable recording of it with Peter Pears in the title role, which was written for him, issued by Decca nearly 20 years ago. This new Philips issue complements that earlier version even if it does not replace it, and springs from Covent Garden's wonderful 1975 production by Elijah Moshinsky, and its revival in May last year. Thus this recording has the Royal Opera's Chorus and Orchestra at their very considerable best, and the entire supporting cast of Borough inhabitants is as heard at those 1978 performances. Where the recording differs is in the title role and the conductor. For whereas last year at the Royal Opera House we heard Robert Tear as Grimes, conducted by David Atherton, the recording reverts to Jon Vickers and Colin Davis, as in the 1975 new production. Vickers's Grimes contrasts very markedly with that of Pears. He is a tougher, less overtly visionary character, one whose roughness is elemental, and whose streak of poetry is incidental to his make-up. Personally I find this a more convincing characterisation, but it remains a matter of taste. There is no denying however that Vickers sings the role with massive authority and unfailing musical intelligence. Under Colin Davis's inspired direction the entire cast respond with powerful beautiful performances in which there is scarcely a weak link. Heather Harper's immensely moving Ellen Orford, Thomas Allen's Ned Keene, Forbes Robinson's menacing Swallow, Elizabeth Bainbridge's Auntie, and Patricia Payne's vindictive Mrs. Sedley are outstanding. As Balstrode the young baritone Jonathan Summers (who took the role at very short notice from an indisposed Norman Bailey) sings admirably but cannot avoid sounding somewhat youthful for a retired naval captain. The Philips recording is beautifully balanced and extremely clear, and this set cannot fail to give

unending pleasure to admirers of Britten's music.

There have been two very important anniversaries in British music recently—three if one includes the amazing Sir Robert Mayer's 100th birthday this month. On 8th April Sir Adrian Boult, our greatest living conductor, was 90, and on the 29th of that month we celebrated the centenary of that great and unique force in British music, Sir Thomas Beecham, who was born in 1879 and died in 1961. Not surprisingly the record companies have not let these dates go unnoticed, and to celebrate Sir Adrian's birthday EMI have issued his recording of Holst's suite 'The Planets' which marked his last entry into the recording studio in the summer of last year, 60 years after he conducted the work's first performance. The composer wrote in Boult's score that it was 'the property of Adrian Boult, who first caused The Planets to shine in public and so earned the gratitude of Gustav Holst'. How right he was, and how marvellous is this latest performance of a work that has always remained close to the conductor's heart. There is a wonderfully rich, considered authority about this interpretation: some of his tempi—notably that for the opening 'Mars'—are slow, but they never lag, and the suite comes across as truly great music. It is magnificently played by the London Philharmonic Orchestra, and is given one of HMV's very finest recordings—a record to be cherished and played again and again.

EMI intend as the year continues to reissue a great number of Beecham's recordings, as well as an eight record musical biography of a large number he made between 1910 and 1957, which in itself promises to be a major event. Two of the first issues demonstrate his great affinity with Haydn, whose symphonic output seems to be sadly neglected by today's conductors, and his capacity for persuasion that a composer's less than front-ranking works are nevertheless to be loved and treasured. We have here beautiful performances of Haydn's 93rd and 94th (The Surprise) symphonies, given by his own Royal Philharmonic Orchestra in the late 1950's, and demonstrating Beecham's flair and style, as well as the orchestra's outstanding wind playing. Beethoven's Mass in C has always remained in the shadow of the great Missa Solemnis, and Beethoven was never in any case amongst Beecham's very favourite composers; but what advocacy he displays here, and what affection for a work that suddenly comes alive and emerges from the undergrowth of a plethora of semi-professional church performances. The soloists, Jennifer Vyvyan, Monica Sinclair, Richard Lewis, and Marian Nowakowski are all in stunning form, and the Beecham Choral Society and again the RPO respond nobly to their conductor. As the months go by I anticipate much pleasure in store from the Beecham centenary.

Two other important historical reissues come from Decca and EMI respectively. Sir Georg Solti has made countless major recordings as a conductor, but his very first records were made as a pianist, with the great German violinist, Georg Kulenkampff, who died tragically young in 1948. Their performances of the Beethoven 'Kreutzer' sonata, and the Mozart in B flat K.454 are transfers from 78's whose quality and clarity are quite

remarkable. Remarkable too are the performances which demonstrate total empathy between the two performers, producing chamber music of the highest order, and issued here at truly bargain price. The five Beethoven cello sonatas are played by Solomon—one of our very greatest pianists, sadly no longer able to play, and the outstanding Russian-born cellist, Gregor Piatigorsky, who came to live in America and died last year. There are all the hall-marks of great music making, and whilst the players are wholly together, they take a highly personal, positive, almost idiosyncratic view of these works. Some tempi may seem initially surprising, but after several hearings begin to sound precisely right, and their rapport and electricity more than compensate for the occasionally abrasive tone of the cello. Once again the recordings sound remarkably fine for their age, and the records are issued at modest price.

Bernard Haitink's second instalment of his complete cycle of the symphonies of Shostakovitch takes the composer's final work in that medium, the elusive, enigmatic, and always interesting 15th. Predictably after his authoritative reading of the 10th symphony—the first record in the series—he demonstrates a refreshingly positive and personal approach to the music, which makes his performance an interesting foil to the recordings already made by the USSR Radio Symphony Orchestra conducted by the composer's son, Maxim, and by the Philadelphia Orchestra under Eugene Ormandy. Haitink's version is somewhat more spacious, and commendably lucid throughout, though the symphony with its quotations from *William Tell* and Wagner's 'Ring Cycle' still retains its secrets. There is admirable playing from the London Philharmonic, and a clear, warm recording by Decca.

Finally, also from Decca, comes music on a lighter note, but an issue which marks a highly significant technical advance. This year's traditional New Year's Day concert in Vienna, given by the Vienna Philharmonic under Willi Boskovsky, their great first violinist, is the company's first demonstration of their new Digital Recording technique. This computerised process virtually eliminates the necessity of editing recordings, has a wider dynamic range, greater frequency response, and is virtually free of all distortion. It is also said to be the first step along the road which will lead to records being played by the scan of laser beams rather than by conventional pick-up arms with styli—that makes one think! In practical terms the recording is startlingly clear and of immense quality with brilliant sound, a well produced bass and absolutely silent surfaces. Brilliant playing too by the Vienna Philharmonic with all the Strauss family favourites such as 'Wine, Women and Song', the Pizzicato Polka, The Blue Danube Waltz (resplendently played), and of course the inevitable Radetzky March, complete with audience participation. How commendable that a major technical advance should also provide so much fun.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

POPE JOHN PAUL II: A PORTRAIT

Man From a Far Country—A Portrait of Pope John Paul II. Mary Craig. Hodder & Stoughton. £1.00 (Paper back).

It is difficult to be unbiased about some one like Mary Craig, who has written a gratifying book about oneself. That came out last autumn. Since then, she has progressed through a charming edition of Douglas Woodruff's notebooks and a deeply moving interpretation of suffering from first-hand experience to this short life of the present Pope. It is hard to see how her gradient of ascent could be maintained, but I have the utmost confidence in the ingenuity of her publishers and her own unlimited creativity.

She has made no secret of the fact that the present book was written in weeks rather than months. But with a few corrections it should be able to stand the test of time. Within its limits (I will come to them in a moment), it seems to me a small masterpiece.

I knew nothing of the present Pope when he was elected. I knew a little more as waves of publicity poured over him but it has taken Mary Craig's book to help me understand his background and something at least of his character. To say that is not to disparage other books about him published or to be published, but hers has a vividness and narrative gift not surpassed easily.

If I refer to limits, I am not thinking primarily of the fact that her book is about the Pope and not about his doctrines. I have found most agreeable Easter reading in a combination of her book with his book of poems, which I understand imperfectly, and his *Sign of Contradiction,* the addresses which he gave in March 1976 for Pope Paul VI's Lenten Retreat. They are eminently comprehensible at a first reading, though I have a shrewd suspicion that one will find more 'in them' every time one reads them again.

Rather I have in mind the fact that neither she nor anyone else has yet thrown much light on certain crucial stages in the Pope's development. We are told that though the young Wojtyla left 'an indelible impression' on the minds of his school-fellows, almost the last thing mentioned in retrospect is his piety. Everyone expected that he would one day be a great actor. The visiting bishop turned to Father Zacher: 'Is that boy going to be a priest'? he asked. Zacher had long ago wondered the same thing, but had been at pains not to suggest it. So he shook his head. 'Doesn't look like it at the moment,' he replied. 'Pity,' said the bishop, 'he'd make a good one.'

Then come all the traumatic happenings of the war, brilliantly described by Mary Craig. But the actual decision to become a priest is dealt with all too tersely. He is knocked over by a tram. For a time his life hangs by a thread and as he lies delirious he feels a strong, sudden call to the priesthood. He recovers. There is an amazing improvement in his powers of memory. Then there is a second, equally serious accident. This time he reaches a watershed and he knows that a decision must be made without delay. Anyone who on their own plane has undergone a conversion knows that this is how things happen. But anyone who has read *Sign of Contradiction* would like far more light thrown on the transition from the young actor into the profound theological thinker.

Perhaps Mary Craig will perform the task herself. She arouses our interest without satisfying it, when she deals with the Pope's attitude to the birth control question during the crisis over Humanae Vitae. Here again the materials may not yet be available. Many other volumes will emerge in due course, but written as her's was at this particular moment, and for a particular purpose, it is hard to see how Mary Craig's could have been much better.

FRANK LONGFORD

WHITHER EUROPE?

Parliament for Europe. David Marquand. Cape. £2.95.
The Future of the European Parliament. David Coombes. P.S.I. £3.95.

Here are two of many books and booklets written for the most part by dedicated Europeans and academics about the future of the European Community. The fact that the first direct elections for a European Parliament are taking place while this review is going to press gives the two books announced above a topical flavour, though I prophesy a small turn-out of electors at polling stations.

David Marquand has many advantages in producing this timely and well-written book. He has been a pro-European M.P. for some years until he resigned to join Roy Jenkins as an official of the European Commission, with special duties as an 'observer' of the European Assembly. It is all the more important that he can write in his preface the following words: 'My experience in Brussels led me to the conclusion that the Community's present institutional arrangements are dangerously ill-adapted to its needs, and that there is a serious possibility that the experiment will fail if the arrangements are not changed. I also came to the conclusion that the prevailing British view of the nature and purpose of the Community is mistaken, and that Britain will not be able to play a satisfactory part in Community affairs until that view is abandoned'. This is strong language.

David Coombes' approach is more explanatory, more a treatise than a tract. For those who want to know how the European Institutions work, both books can be recommended, although Mr. Coombes' is more obviously written by an academic, with occasional lapses into jargon. However, he knows his subject thoroughly and makes some common-sense suggestions about practical reforms. Both books are short, less than 140 pages, but they require concentrated reading for the uninitiated.

I have myself grown up with the problem of Europe; I went to The Hague Congress with Churchill in 1948, was Chairman of the College of Europe at Bruges for many years and have written two books on European Assemblies. My only reason for making this personal declaration is to emphasise the wide gulf between these dedicated writers plus the members and officials of European Institutions and on the other hand the great majoriy of the British public. This partly explains the strong language (already quoted) used by David Marquand. The referendum and now the European elections are the only occasions when the man in the street has been consulted.

Will the short period of public discussion before the current elections stir up public interest? My forecast is that the public will vote on party national lines, that there will be a large Conservative majority and almost elimination of Liberal members. On the other hand when the first real parliament gets down

to work, it will discover the truth of David Marquand's analysis and over a few years will demand some fundamental changes. I remember so well in the fifties and sixties how British M.P.s from all parties, who regularly attended the various European Assemblies, gradually sloughed off their national prejudices and at any rate became European-minded. Also we are living thirty years on after The Hague Congress. This is the first trans-national parliament ever elected and it will include some men and women highly experienced in agriculture and industry. Both David Marquand and David Coombes lay stress on the out-of-dateness of political parties and on the different meanings that party labels signify in different countries. David Marquand aptly asks 'What is the proper Socialist attitude towards fishing quotas? What should Christian Democrats think about nuclear power? Can there be a distinctively Liberal aero-space policy? The answer to these questions are "none", "nothing" and "no". Yet these are issues which face Community decision makers and about which the elected Parliament will have to make up its mind'.

Both authors make interesting comparisons with the earlier years of United States federal and state institutions. Both books are valuable because they ask fundamental questions about the existing set-up and indeed about the Rome Treaty. They see the present institutions more as a process than a terminal structure; the Community is not merely an association of sovereign states. Nobody yet has to formulate a policy and justify it before an electorate or as David Marquand puts it: 'In the Community no one is unambiguously answerable for anything'. It is, therefore, opportune that at this critical stage in the evolution of European institutions there should be a directly elected parliament. My only regret is that there is no uniform method of election: our own method is a travesty of genuine representation. But parliaments are an essential element in western type democracy and, once freely elected, they have proved themselves capable of ensuring reasonable freedoms.

In both of the books covered by this review is an implication that a genuine European parliament is not only a vital and missing link in Europe, but that by its pressures the other parts, the Commission and Council, will have to modify their powers.

KENNETH LINDSAY

PROPHET, PRIEST AND PREACHER

John Wesley and His World. John Pudney. Thames and Hudson. £4.50.

This is a handsomely produced book of 128 pages in which the essence of John Wesley's achievement is recorded with all the skills of John Pudney as poet and historian. He begins with that often misunderstood aspect of Wesley's character—his liking for association with young ladies of sound evangelical experience. Sophy Hopkey was probably in love with him, with John discreetly at arm's length, and only ready to be involved if Sophy were free from the advances of Mr. Mellichamp!

What a man this was! Son of that remarkable Susanna Wesley who really laid the foundations of Methodism in the rectory at Epworth in the Lincolnshire countryside. It was here that John learned his 'method' at his mother's knee—his methods of prayer, Bible exposition, preaching and why he should be a methodical priest like his father. Rescued from the burning of Epworth Rectory that event marked him and his 'methodism' for all time. John Wesley was indeed a 'brand plucked out of the burning' and the gospel he preached

was marked with the urgency of the world's time running out with the souls of men waiting on the edge of eternity needing to give their souls into the hands of the Eternal God.

Mr. Pudney manages to combine all the varied aspects of the Wesley story from the school room at Epworth to the legendary death bed scene in March 1791 when the old prophet—still a priest of the Church of England—breathed his last, knowing that his Methodism had gone round the world and that thousands acknowledged him as their spiritual leader.

Although Wesley owed a good deal in his own spiritual experience to the Lutherans, the Moravians and the Brethren of the Continent, he himself remained an English prophet and his Methodism with its Bible centred teaching a truly English religious experience. Who but an Englishman would have ridden the turnpike roads of England on horse back for an enduring forty years? From horse back he wrote his letters, his journals and sermons, and on horse back he prayed for the little groups of people called Methodists. From horse back he managed the Methodist organisation, sold books through his publishing house and cared for the welfare of his 'preachers'.

He not only remained English in his style of life and organisation he cared too for the good health of the Church of England into which he was born. It is one of the sad facts of our own time that the plans to unite the two churches have faded. John Wesley would have regretted it.

CECIL NORTHCOTT

EXISTENTIALISM AND JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

A Preface to Sartre. Dominick LaCapra. Methuen. £9.50.

Professor Dominick LaCapra in his 'critical introduction to Sartre's literary and philosophcal writings' intends to show by his own method and example the ways in which 'critical strategies developed in recent philosophy and literary criticism are relevant to historical interpretation'. His strategies involve the close study of some of Sarte's most important texts; *Being and Nothingness* and the *Critique of Dialectical Reason;* the philosophical novel *Nausea,* (the only good philosophical novel, in Iris Murdoch's view, by Sartre or any other writer); and finally the autobiography, *The Words* along with the 'existentialist' biographies of Baudelaire, Genet and Flaubert. It is his consideration of the relationship between the two first mentioned major philosophical essays which Dr. LaCapra offers as a 'testing gound' for his particular approach. He is mindful of the fact that Sartre is heir by training to the German philosophers Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger but shows that these philosophies are grafted in Sartre on to the peculiarly French heritage of Descartes.

'The basic continuity', says Dr. LaCapra, 'is that of a philosophy centred on man who, in his intentional consciousness and free praxis, creates meaning and value in the world'. His interpretation involves bringing several disciplines to bear on Sartre's intellectual development, notably those of philosophy, history and literary criticism. He does not hesitate to grapple with the Marxist and sociological implications of Sartre's later, more formalised writings and their effect on contemporary French philosophers, particularly on Jacques Derrida, 'Sartre's successor as the most important philosopher in France'. Dr. LaCapra's aim as 'intellectual historian' is to 'mediate between specialised and general knowledge and contribute to the rethinking of significant problems.'

There are, for instance, at least two unresolved issues in Sartre's ethics. One is the 'paradox of freedom', recognised in other systems than the existen-

tialist one, where one man's freedom of action may be impeded by that of another. The other is the conflict between Sartre's analysis of the inwardness of human experience and a Marxist philosophy which reckons, not in individuals, but in masses. Since 1949 Sartre has concentrated on the altogether general sphere of sociology and politics, leaving unresolved the question of personal ethics and relationships. At the end of *Being and Nothingness* he promised but did not deliver a further volume on 'moral perspectives'. He failed to write, perhaps because it was impossible for him to resolve the same conflict, the final volume of his novel sequence, *Les Chemins de la liberté*, on the subject of the Resistance in France. There is still no unambiguous statement of Sartre's ethical position. The lack of a coherent system causes Mary Warnock and others to say that existentialism is more like a mood than a system; and that, though the existentialist voice has indeed a bearing on ethical theory, it cannot by itself give rise to a single coherent philosophy.

But Dr. LaCapra is not essentially seeking such a philosophy in Sartre. Indeed, he precludes the 'totalisation' of any of Sartre's texts, preferring to examine alongside them the novel *Nausea* which expresses ideas about consciousness and contingency and yet remains a work of art, not needing to be read in the light of theories expressed elsewhere. Similarly he turns to the autobiography, *The Words*, and the 'existential' biographies, works in which Sartre aims at 'totalising' his own experience into the writer he has become and interpreting the works of others through comparable insights. How far these insights could possibly be comparable is, in Sartre's own terms, justifiably called in question. A further question for Dr. LaCapra is how far his method of using creative literature in evaluating philosophical deductions is acceptable to either philosophers or historians.

So brief an account of Dr. LaCapra's book is, if not misleading, wholly inadequate to convey the fluidity and complexity of his thought and style. It is tempting, for example, to discuss his analysis of Sartre's over-riding concept of consciousness, continually striving for synthesis of its own responses to experience. Necessarily every man makes his own synthesis and therefore it self-evidently changes as time and existence go on. This process of change is the only aspect of human existence in which consciousness answers to necessity. Experience, as in other philosophies, is not characterised by landmarks in the external world. All objects and events encountered are contingent. Necessarily the changing synthesis results in change of moral attitudes. The condition of freedom is therefore presupposed in analysing the concept of consciousness, which is itself contingent, being part of the world. Hence the profound contradiction already mentioned in Sartre's ethics, since he came to deny the supremacy of individuals, making no reference to the incompatibility between this view and his earlier reliance on consciousness which can exist only in the individual. Therefore his concept of 'committed literature', seen at first as literature committed to any genuinely moral view of life, soon came to mean for Sartre 'literature committed to socialism', as if such a commitment could be the only genuine one.

In his concluding chapter, 'In Lieu of a Conclusion' Professor LaCapra clearly does not envisage the easy emergence of a definitive study of Sartre's work. He does, indeed, open the reader's mind to the possibilities of further analysis along the 'deconstructing' lines of his own. His book is provocative, admirably conceived and lucidly written.

BETTY ABEL

A NONCLIMBER'S MOUNTAIN LORE

On Mountains. John Jerome. Gollancz. £6.50.

Some of our best books have been written by enthusiasts. Mr. Jerome is one—for mountains, every aspect of them. He grew up among the bogs and flat-lands of Houston, Texas, and never saw mountains until, at seventeen, he and two friends took off in an old station wagon to see Colorado. He was never the same again, and later moved to Denver to be near them, for 'Mountains are mysteries. They stimulate man's imagination as powerfully as do the seas and the skies, and have traditionally been the repositories of myths and religions.'

Yet he is no climber. His youthful ascent to the top of Pikes Peak, he admits, was by automobile, his chief pleasure not the view from the top but at the bottom where he discovered a neat little sandstone park called the Garden of the Gods at the eastern edge of the Rockies. Apart from skiing on the lower slopes he does not *use* mountains but is content just to *see* them, be among them, find out all he can about them. A most unheroic fellow to be writing about their hazards and perils without one valiant 'Excelsior!' to speed him on the way.

But there I am with him. I've stood by the narrow-track railhead at Kleine Scheidegg gazing at the sullen, glowering face of the Eiger, thinking *I wouldn't want to try to climb that lot for a thousand pounds.* I've plodded up a lower slope of the Tyrolean Alps and been perfectly content with the view, willing to leave the craggy heights to others. I could sympathise with Dante, who called mountains 'the gates of hell', with early travellers obliged to cross the Alps who were often blindfolded lest the horrific scenery drove them mad, the superstitious folk who believed that the souls of the dead inhabitated a ruined city on the Matterhorn's summit.

Nonclimber Mr. Jerome may be, but he has a reverence for the 'hard men' who conquer the utmost heights—Everest and all that—or die in the attempt. He notes that John Harlin, killed in 1966 by a snapped rope from an overhang, was the 27th climber to die on the Eiger; that in the splendid summer of '62 it was climbed by no less than 44 Alpenists in 14 groups almost jostling each other to reach the top; and that in '63 it was climbed by a woman.

All the lore one needs is here—about the formation of mountains, crevasses, glaciers, avalanches, ice and snow, the fauna and flora, mountain playgrounds, hardy mountain folk. Mr. Jerome is a skilled researcher and chronicler, though not above labouring the obvious occasionally. His amateur enthusiasm enables him to dispense with the technical jargon of most climbers' narratives.

TREVOR ALLEN

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Berlin Bunker (Dent £6.95). This is a fascinating and enthralling account by James P. O'Donnell of the last days of Hitler in the bunker near the Reich Chancellery in Berlin. He entered it on the 16th January 1945 and there committed suicide on the 30th April. Mr. O'Donnell has done an immense amount of research over many years seeking out and interviewing many surviving witnesses close to Hitler during those last months. 'I have told this bunker story through the eyes, ears and memories of as many survivors as I could find. To that extent this is a reconstruc-

tion, not a biography or an historical analysis of the end of the Second World War.' He pays particular tribute to Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper's *The Last Days of Hitler* published in 1947. Although he has had the advantage of questioning new witnesses, including some released from Russian custody, 'three full decades and much new information do not, however, make radical changes in the main contours of the portrait of Hitler and his court which Professor Trevor-Roper first drew.' Basically Mr. O'Donnell differs from Professor Trevor-Roper in details, drawn from more extensive evidence since available; for example as to the precise manner of Hitler's suicide, which included poison. Mr. O'Donnell's book is dramatic and tense as it draws to the inevitable end, amid all the stress, strain and intrigue within the bunker itself and Hitler's ultimate recognition of defeat and determination not to be taken alive. Contrary to his orders, his body was not burnt in fact to ashes and was finally identified by the Russians through dental checks. Nonetheless Stalin refused to accept proof and maintained that Hitler had escaped. One of the most interesting parts of this volume is the account of the break-out from the bunker after Hitler's suicide. Hitler had entrusted his personal pilot, Hans Baur, to escape with Martin Bormann out of Berlin to Rechlin airfield and then to fly him to Admiral Doenitz's HQ in Schleswig-Holstein. When Baur was released from Russian imprisonment in 1955 he was able to give his account of the break out and Martin Bormann's disappearance in Berlin. He certainly never flew out with Baur. Mr. O'Donnell accepts the statement of Artur Axmann, the Nazi Youth leader also in the break-out, that he saw the body of Bormann, with another, near the old Lehrter Bahnhof. They were unmarked: 'I assumed then, and I am sure today, that both men had taken poison'. Mr. O'Donnell confirms this evidence when two skeletons were uncovered in 1972 nearby by workmen. 'Splinters of glass cyanide capsules were lodged in the jawbones of both'. Later 'police were able to make a positive identification from dental records that the skeletons were those of Bormann and Stumpfegger.' Does this end the legend of Bormann's escape? The author is entirely convinced that it should.

Print and the People 1819-1851. (Penguin Books. £5.25). Dr. Louis James has selected and introduced this 'unique anthology of popular literature' covering the period between the notorious 'massacre' of Peterloo, preceding the Six Acts, in 1819 and the Great Exhibition in Hyde Park, London in 1851. They were, of course, most significant years politically, socially and in terms of popular pressures for advance. During a critical period, this anthology is designed with much success 'to show on the one hand the development of popular literature with cheaper publishing methods and increased literacy; on the other, the ways this literature reflected the life of its readers'. As Dr. James points out, this anthology does not attempt to deal adequately with major political or social movements. It is profusely illustrated with facsimile reproductions. This paperback edition is now issued in the Peregrine Books series, having been first published in 1976 by the same publishers (Allen Lane).

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